57 votes for assessor, G. L. Gardner 33 votes for collector and M. W. Nordmeyer 97 votes for highway commissioner, though their names did not appear upon the printed ballot. Ballot No. I was voted for the appellee. The objection. made to it is that it bore a distinguishing mark. Parallel lines are drawn through the name of John Heeler, the caucus candidate for highway commissioner, and the name of Martin Nordmeyer is written beneath. The name of Martin Nordmeyer is also written in the blank space in the petition column under the title "For highway commissioner," and a cross is marked in each of the squares before that office. It is apparent that the voter was making an honest effort to vote for Martin Nordmeyer for highway commissioner and not attempting to indicate who voted the ballot, and whether or not he succeeded in legally indicating his choice for highway commissioner, his ballot ought not to be rejected as to a candidate for whom he did express a choice in the manner required by the statute. (Winn v. Blackman, 229 Ill. 198.) Ballot No. 2 was marked with a cross in each square of the caucus ticket. Some of the crosses have double lines. In ballot No. 6 the cross in the square opposite the name of the appellee has a third line, making a character somewhat like the letter A. This third stroke may easily have been inadvertently made. These ballots were properly counted for the appellee. Parker v. Orr, 158 Ill. 609; Winn v. Blackman, supra.

The court properly refused to count ballot No. 19 for the appellant because there was no cross in the square opposite his name or in the circle at the head of his ticket.

Ballots Nos. 10 and 15, which were rejected, should have been counted for the appellant. Objection was made to No. 10 because it had straight lines, not making distinct crosses, in the squares before the names of the candidates on the caucus ticket, which it is said constitute distinguishing marks. We regard them as careless and ineffectual attempts to express the voter's choice. Ballot No. 15 has the

name "M. W. Nordmeyer" written just above the words "For highway commissioner" under the heading "Petition,” with no mark in the square opposite. We regard this as an ineffectual effort to vote for Mr. Nordmeyer and not as a distinguishing mark.

Ballot No. 4 should have been counted for the appellee. It is in the same condition as No. 15, except that the name written in is that of Mr. Gardner and is written on the caucus ticket.

Ballot No. 8 was properly marked as a vote for appellant but was properly rejected by the court on account of the characters appearing on its face, which constitute a distinguishing mark. These characters are said by the appellant to be the initials "J. E. O." of J. E. O'Connor, who received 57 votes for assessor. They may as well be the initials of the voter himself as of a candidate. Whether the characters were intended to represent those letters or not is very uncertain, but if so, they have no tendency to indicate in any legal way the choice of the voter among the candidates. The voter has not attempted to write in the name of a candidate and the characters constitute a ready means of identifying his ballot.

Ballots Nos. 7 and 18, which were counted for the appellant, should have been rejected because the lines upon them do not cross in the square in front of his name. Parker v. Orr, supra; Winn v. Blackman, supra.

To the 153 votes counted for the appellee without objection should be added ballots Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6, making his total vote 157. To the 146 votes counted for the appellant without objection should be added ballots Nos. 10 and 15 and the 8 ballots counted for him by the court, except Nos. 7 and 18, making his total vote 154.

The judgment of the county court will therefore be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Dec. '10.] THE PEOPLE v. C., C., C. & ST. L. R. R. Co. 393

THE PEOPLE ex rel. H. H. Whitlock, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 21, 1910.

This case is controlled by the decision in People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 327.)

APPEAL from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. LAWRENCE T. ALLEN, Judge, presiding.

REARICK & MEEKS, and GEORGE B. GILLESPIE, (L. J. HACKNEY, and GILLESPIE & FITZGERALD, of counsel,) for appellant.

JOHN H. LEWMAN, State's Attorney, (R. W. Fisk, counsel,) for appellee.

of

Per CURIAM: Upon application being made in the county court of Vermilion county by the county collector for judgment against appellant for delinquent taxes for the year 1909, objection was made to that part of the hard road tax for the town of Ellwood which was in excess of one dollar for each $100 of one-fifth of the full value of the property of the appellant as fixed by the assessment of 1909. The town of Ellwood, by a vote taken at the annual election in April, 1907, authorized a levy of one dollar per annum on each $100 of the assessed value of the property in that town for a period of five years. The court overruled the objection and entered judgment, from which appellant has prayed and perfected this appeal.

P.

The sole question raised is the one determined in People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 327.) As our conclusion in that case is decisive of the question here presented, the judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. Jacob JACOBSON, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 21, 1910.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-power of legislature where constitution confers jurisdiction on certain court. The jurisdiction conferred upon any court by the constitution cannot be diminished by the legislature, but in the absence of a constitutional prohibition the legislature may confer concurrent jurisdiction of the same subject matter upon another court.

2. SAME-Section 2 of Municipal Court act, conferring jurisdiction in criminal cases, is not invalid. Section 2 of the Municipal Court act, in so far as it attempts to confer upon the municipal court jurisdiction in criminal cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, is not in violation of section 26 of article 6 of the constitution, conferring jurisdiction of cases of a criminal nature in Cook county upon the criminal court, as the jurisdiction so conferred is not exclusive. (Berkowitz v. Lester, 121 Ill. 99, followed.)

3. SAME-Constitution does not give an appeal to criminal court in all criminal cases in Cook county. Section 26 of article 6 of the constitution does not give an appeal to the criminal court in all criminal cases in Cook county, but provides that such appeals as may be given by law in those cases shall be taken to the criminal court, and such appeals are tried de novo.

4. SAME-when constitutionality of a statute is not involved. The question whether section 22 of the Municipal Court act, so far as it provides for a review by the Appellate and Supreme Courts of judgments of the municipal court in criminal cases, is in violation of section 26 of article 6 of the constitution, providing that appeals in criminal cases in Cook county which may be given by law shall be taken to the criminal court, is not presented for consideration in the Supreme Court where the question of the right of appeal to the criminal court was not presented to or decided by the municipal court.

5. CRIMINAL LAW-section 9 of bill of rights contains no prohibition against a trial of several offenses at one time. Section 9 of the bill of rights, relating to the right of an accused person to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed, contains no prohibition against the trial, at one time, of several offenses committed in the county where the trial is had.

6. SAME when question whether the accused had a right to be tried for one offense at a time is not presented. The question

whether one charged in two informations with separate violations of the same section of a statute, each offense being a misdemeanor of the same grade and subjecting the offender to the same punishment, was entitled to object, on other than constitutional grounds, to going to trial on both informations, is not presented in the Supreme Court where the defendant made no objection to going to trial nor any motion for the prosecutor to elect, and where there is no bill of exceptions in the record or anything to show that evidence of more than one offense was heard.

7. SAME-Several misdemeanors of the same nature may be embraced in separate counts of same information. It is no objection to an information that it charges, in separate counts, the commission of several misdemeanors of the same nature; and the joinder of several misdemeanors of the same nature will not, in general, vitiate in any stage of the prosecution, nor does the practice of quashing the information or calling on the prosecutor to elect, exist in such cases.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. MICHAEL F. GIRTEN, Judge, presiding.

LOUIS GREENBERG, and HENRY A. BERGER, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. STEAD, Attorney General, and JOHN E. W. WAYMAN, State's Attorney, (ZACH HOFHEIMER, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

An information was filed against the plaintiff in error on July 19, 1909, in the municipal court of Chicago, which charged him with persuading a female (naming her) to enter a house of prostitution for the purpose of practicing prostitution. On July 29 a jury was sworn to try the issues; leave was granted to file an amended information, and an amended information was filed charging that the plaintiff in error procured the person named in the first count, and another, (naming her,) as female inmates of another house of prostitution. On July 30 the jury empaneled on the previous day was discharged; the plaintiff