ably oppose the desertion or seek its termi- | She saw her husband frequently, and no nation, for her health or her life can only word or act upon her part suggested even be spared by its continuance. Obstinancy a privilege to him to return. His conduct may be found in such a desertion without in hanging around the house may have been, any effort or even desire upon the part of as stated, as a detective, or it may have the wife to prevent or terminate it. Any been due in part, at least, to a longing to acquiescence there may appear to be is return. He had not, to say the least, droppurely involuntary. It has also been sug- ped her entirely from his life, while the gested in several adjudicated cases that the contrary seems to have been the case on extent of the husband's violation of duty to petitioner's part. Defendant's desertion was his wife which will prevent her acquiescence the result of a quarrel over money matters. in his desertion of her from operating as a Petitioner's testimony of the details of that bar to her suit for divorce need not amount quarrel reflects little credit on her. For peto the statutory extreme cruelty which has titioner's justification in acquiescing in her been held necessary to justify the wife in husband's desertion we are almost wholly leaving his home, and thereby making the dependent upon her testimony, without corhusband guilty of constructive desertion. roboration. It may be summarized as folIn Wilson v. Wilson, 66 N. J. Eq. 237, 57 lows: Defendant quarreled constantly; Atl. 552, Vice Chancellor Stevenson says: was jealous; said that, if he knew petition'Where the acquiescence of the wife in the er was to dispose of her property before the continued desertion of her husband arises marriage, he would not have married her; from a reasonable belief on her part that in accused her of going out with men and carcase her husband should come back to live ing for men; did not like to have her forwith her he would, notwithstanding any. ef- mer husband's picture around; was jealous forts on her part to effect his reformation, of her children by a former husband; threatresume a course of conduct grossly violative ened to kill her; earned, when employed, of his duty to her, and causing her constant about $10 or $12 per week, and most of the physical or mental suffering, such acquies- time gave it all to her; gave her but $15 cence is not a voluntary consent of the mat- out of two weeks' earnings, that being the rimonial offense of desertion. It is practic- cause of the final quarrel, petitioner wantally a consent obtained by duress.' ing more, and, not receiving it, threw the $15 on the table and refused to take it. None of these charges are corroborated. The charges of intimacy with men were not of criminal intimacy; and the accusation that defendant quarreled constantly was without details. The testimony of petitioner touching defendant's threats carry little conviction and do not disclose the slightest fear or apprehension on her part. A brother of petitioner characterized defendant as 'lazy' but gave no details. One witness testified that after the desertion defendant spoke to her about petitioner being too intimate with a Mr. Keller, but criminal intimacy was not charged. I think it not only plain that there is insufficient corroboration of the matters which are urged by way of justification for petitioner's manifest acquiescence in the desertion; but I am also convinced that if corroborated the charges afford insufficient grounds to excuse petitioner's conduct. "It is, however, the well-recognized duty of a wife to make every reasonable effort to prevent or terminate a cessation of cohabitation and, in the absence of such reasonable effort on her part, the element of obstinancy, which is required by our statute, is necessarily wanting. While the reasonableness of her conduct must be largely dependent upon the circumstances of the individual case, yet it is undoubtedly true that the husband may fall far below the ideals of the wife and her duty to prevent cessation of cohabitation remain unimpaired. "In the present case it is entirely manifest that, when defendant announced his intention to leave petitioner and engaged himself in packing his personal effects preparatory to his departure, petitioner made no effort to prevent the consummation of defendant's purpose. Petitioner's conduct at that critical time, as narrated by herself, was wholly inconsistent with any desire upon her part to prevent the desertion then threatened and about to occur. Her conduct undoubtedly gave substantial encouragement to the desertion which then occurred. I am not able to believe that any reasonable effort on her part at that time to deter the threatened desertion would not have been successful. After the desertion petitioner made no effort whatever to terminate it. "I will advise a decree overruling the exceptions to the master's report." Weller & Lichenstein, for appellant. PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from will be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion filed by Leaming, V. C., in the court below. subjects of electric car lighting purposes, CONSOLIDATED RY. ELECTRIC LIGHT- made by the grantors or either of them, and ING & EQUIPMENT CO. V. UNITED letters patent issued thereon. The bill thus STATES LIGHT & HEATING CO. et al. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Aug. 1, 1910.) CONTRACTS (§ 116*) - LEGALITY CONTRACTS amended alleges (paragraph 4) that Moskowitz and the Adlers proposed (among other things) to assign to the National Company, in consideration of the sum of $1,995,000, all Three inventors sold their various patents "the right to all further improvements and for electric car lighting purposes, and also inventions for electric car lighting purposes entered a contract to assign any patents se- made or to be made by them or either of cured upon improvements or inventions made for electric car lighting purposes. The consid- them," that this proposal was accepted by eration of this assignment and contract was the National Company, and that, in pursunearly $2,000,000. Held, that this contract ance thereof, the contract in question was was not void, as against public policy in tending drawn, but that by inadvertence, accident, to lessen the incentive to make inventions or improvements, and, in view of the considera- and mistake the contract as written did not tion, it cannot be held to be beyond the powers conform to the proposal and acceptance, in of the vendors to contract to transfer their fu- that there was omitted the qualifying or limture inventions to protect the assignee of a pat-iting clause before the habendum, “for elecent already purchased. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 552; Dec. Dig. § 116.*] Suit by the Consolidated Railway Electric Lighting & Equipment Company against the United States Light & Heating Company and others. On demurrer to amended bill. Demurrer overruled. Lindabury, Depue & Faulks, for complainant. Collins & Corbin and Charles Green Smith, for defendants. tric car lighting purposes and the letters patent issued or to be issued thereon," and the contract as actually made was, with respect to future improvements, broader than the parties agreed to or had intended. It further appears by the amended bill that the payment by the National Company of the consideration mentioned in the assignment (the sum of $1,995,000) was made and receiv ed by the grantors; that the written contract was recorded, and that subsequently EMERY, V. C. The general object of this Moskowitz, in recognition of the obligations bill is the specific performance of an agree- of the agreement, assigned 16 inventions for ment for the assignment of patents or inven- electric car lighting purposes and the applitions, and it is filed by the assignee of the cations therefor, in which letters patent were original purchaser against one of the original subsequently obtained, of various dates bevendors, and also the assignee of this vendor tween July 9, 1895, and October 24, 1899, and, or assignor. The agreement in writing (a in accordance with these assignments, the copy of which is annexed to the amended letters patent were issued to the National bill) is dated July 31, 1894, and by it Morris Company; that on October 14, 1899, the NaMoskowitz, Leon D. Adler, and Abraham S. tional Company assigned to another comAdler, as the owners of certain inventions pany, the Electric Axle Light & Power Comand improvements, for some of which patents pany, its title to these letters patent, and its had been allowed, after reciting that the Na- whole right, title, and interest "in and to any tional Electric Car Lighting Company had and all improvements and inventions for purchased from them all the right they had electric car lighting purposes to which it was to these inventions and improvements, pat- or might be entitled under contract with ents on which they have applied for, or any of its employés or otherwise"; and that might thereafter apply for, and had paid to after this assignment, of which Moskowitz them the sum of $1.995,000, assigned to the and the Adlers had notice, and in recogniNational, etc., Company, in consideration of tion of his obligations under the contract of the payment of this sum, all their title and July 31, 1894, Moskowitz on March 18, 1900, interest in the said inventions and improve-assigned to the Electric Axle Company three ments, as well as to "all improvements and other letters patent for electric car lighting inventions made or to be made by them or purposes, and on December 20, 1899, Moskoeither of them." This agreement or assign-witz and the Adlers, together with another ment is general, and covers all inventions of whatever character. On the hearing upon the original bill, it was held unenforceable in equity according to its terms, on the ground that such general agreement was void, but on the evidence produced as to the circumstances of making the agreement leave was given to apply to amend the bill for the purpose of reforming the contract so as to limit the improvements and inventions to improvements, and inventions for the special person, assigned to the Electric Axle Company another patent of like character; that on August 29, 1904, the Electric Axle Company assigned to the complainant, the Consolidated Railway Electric Lighting & Equipment Company, "its entire right, title, and interest to applications and letters patent to which it was then or might thereafter be entitled under the contract of July 31, 1894, and the assignment of October 14, 1899." The bill then charges that after the agreement N. J.) CONSOLIDATED RY. E. L. & E. CO. v. UNITED STATES L. & HEAT. CO. 685 In Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462 (1875), the purchasers of a patent, who were about to form a company for the purpose of using a patented invention, paid the vendors a large sum in shares for assign of July 31, 1894, the defendant Moskowitz | chine subsequently patented to another, and made certain improvements and inventions the contract (page 701 of 32 Fed.) was said for electric car lighting purposes, and also to be one which the vendor had the right certain improvements in the inventions trans- to make and was willing to make and by ferred under the contract of July 31, 1894, which he was bound. and filed applications for patents, on which 12 letters patent were subsequently issued between September 10, 1901, and August 23, 1904. Four of the letters patent were issued directly to the defendant company the United States Light & Heating Company upon as-ments of the patents and all future patents signments made pending applications for pat- which the vendors might acquire "with reents, and the remaining 8, for which letters spect to the inventions or any of them or any patent were issued to one James H. Young of a like nature." This contract was susas trustee, were subsequently assigned by tained, and in answer to the objection that Young as trustee to the defendant company. such an agreement to assign future patents Young is alleged to have received letters pat- was against public policy, as tending to disent and to have made the assignments as courage inventions, Sir George Jessel said trustee for Moskowitz. The bill further al- substantially: In such cases there must be leges that Young had notice of the agree- first considered the right to freedom of conment of July 31, 1894, of Moskowitz with the tract on the part of the assignor, and this National Company, and acquired the inven- right, as a matter of the highest public politions and improvements and applications cy, is not lightly to be interfered with. Next, from Moskowitz without paying value there- it cannot be assumed that a contract for the for, and that the defendant company when product of future labors of a man's brain, as it acquired title from Moskowitz and Young, author or inventor, is necessarily against trustee, also had notice of the agreement, public policy, and, on the contrary, many exand that it acquired this title without pay- amples may be given of cases entirely repuging value therefor and with full notice and nant to this argument, and on which the arknowledge of the right of the National Com-gument on public policy as to the voluntary pany and its assigns to the said inventions restraint is the other way. So far from necand improvements as set forth in the bill.essarily discouraging future inventions or The demurrer filed to the amended bill by the United States Company and Moskowitz, besides the general allegation of want of equity, specially sets up that the contract as sought to be reformed should not be enforc-invent or produce. It cannot therefore be ed because it is void as against public policy and inequitable as being too general and unrestricted. mental labor (which is the basis of the argument on public policy), such contracts may fairly be said often to encourage the author or inventor to such work and enable him to 917. My present view is that the question in a court of equity comes finally to the issue, whether on the entire facts admitted or prov safe to hold, as was argued in the case, that the agreement was of itself against public policy and void. And in other decisions conOn the original hearing, I held that a gen- tracts for the assignment of future inveneral assignment or agreement to assign all im- tions relating to a particular subject have provements or inventions to be made, without been sustained and enforced. Reece Folding restriction as to time or character, was not Co. v. Fenwick, 140 Fed. 287, 72 C. C. A. 39, only against public policy, but was not recog-2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094 (1905); Bates Machine nized by the patent laws of the United Co. v. Bates, 192 Ill. 138, 61 N. E. 518; BirkStates, which were the only basis of any as-ery Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 71 Conn. 113, 40 Atl. signable right. Rev. St. § 4898 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3387); Walker, Patents (4th Ed.) § 274, and cases cited. Defendants claim that the agreement, although limited to future inventions for electric car lighting pur-ed the contract for the assignment of future poses, is equally void as against public policy, and is on the face of it unenforceable in equity as coming within the class of contracts described by Mr. Justice Bradley in Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill (C. C.) 32 Fed. 697, as naked assignments or agreements to assign in gross a man's future labors, as an author or inventor; in other words, a mortgage on a man's brain to bind all its future products. Such a contract, he said, does not address itself favorably to the consideration of the court. In this case an assignment of letters patent for a machine, "together with all improvements I may hereafter make," for the sum of $12,000, was sustained as an inventions goes no further than a restraint fairly and reasonably necessary for the protection of the assignee under all the circumstances of the case. And, if no further facts appear on the hearing to change the aspect of the case as it appears on the bill, I conclude that there is no bar to its enforcement on the ground that on the face of the bill the contract was necessarily a contract against public policy, and that its enforcement against an assignee, even when voluntary and with notice, is inequitable. The bill itself shows the payment to the grantors of the sum of $1,995,000 for the inventions existing and future. The receipt of this sum demurrer, it cannot as matter of law and in the absence of any qualifying facts be said that an agreement for the transfer of future inventions of the same character, based on the immediate payment to an inventor of such an enormous consideration, is on the face of it illegal. Under the circumstances as disclosed, it cannot be held to be beyond the power of the vendors, or to have been, as to them, illegal or inequitable. Defendant must answer the case stated by the bill and the demurrer to the amended bill will be overruled. Before entering order overruling the demurrer, the stipulation of counsel as to the amendment of the bill and demurrer should be carried out. cars standing on the incline, the northerly one being about on a line with the southerly side of Buckingham avenue. These cars were started by defendant's servant, and the plaintiff in endeavoring to turn from High street to Buckingham avenue westerly to cross the tracks, passed in front of these moving cars and was struck and severely injured, for which he had a verdict. There was a rule to show cause allowed defendant, and it contends that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in endeavoring to cross in front of moving cars. The plaintiff testifies that he was driving northerly on High street; that the point he was trying to reach required him to turn from High street and drive up Buckingham avenue crossing the tracks; that he saw the railroad cars standing on his left without any locomotive attached; that when coming HACKMAN v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO. to the crossing he stopped his horse and lookOF NEW JERSEY. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. June 14, 1910.) 1. RAILROADS (§ 350*)-CROSSING ACCIDENT— CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—EVIDENCE. Evidence in an action for collision of cars which had been standing on an incline a few feet from a street crossing, and which, being let loose, ran into plaintiff's wagon as he was crossing the tracks, held sufficient to go to the jury on the question of contributory negligence. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1166; Dec. Dig. § 350.*] 2. RAILROADS (§ 318*)-CROSSING ACCIDENTNEGLIGENCE. It is negligence to turn loose a train of cars on an incline, with knowledge that they will run over a street crossing, without giving warning of their approach. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1013; Dec. Dig. § 318.*] Action by Charles A. Hackman against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company of New Jersey. Heard on a rule allowed defendant, after verdict for plaintiff, to show cause. Rule discharged. Argued February term, 1910, before GUMMERE, C. J., and BERGEN and VOORHEES, JJ. Thomas Brown and Alan H. Strong, for plaintiff. McCarter & English, for defendant. ed both ways, and the cars were standing still, and he saw no men around them; that he started his horse and was driving slowly over the crossing; that as soon as he was over the second rail the cars ran against him, striking a part of the front wheel; that when he started to cross the track he was about 8 feet from the side of the car and about 12 or 15 feet from the end of the car as he crossed. Mrs. Metzner, a witness for plaintiff, testified that she was driving on Buckingham avenue towards High street on the opposite side of the track from where plaintiff was when he started to cross; that she saw him drive around the corner from High street. and when she first saw him he was almost on the track, and that she was so near the track that she saw the freight cars on the track; and that just as the plaintiff was on the track she noticed the cars backing down on him, and to avoid running into him she switched her horse to the right, and his horse crossed safely, but the car struck the wagon and he was carried down. This was the plaintiff's case, at the close of which there was a motion for a nonsuit upon the ground of contributory negligence, which was refused. On the part of the defendant there was testimony tending to show that as the plaintiff was driving towards the crossing he was called to, and told to look out for the cars, but it does not appear with any clearness that he heard these calls. We think it is clear that the defendant was guilty of neg PER CURIAM. This is a suit for damages, and the plaintiff had a verdict for $6,000. The undisputed facts are as follows: The defendant company has a number of tracks which it uses as switches running in and along High street in Perth Amboy. This street runs north and south and crosses Buck-ligence in undertaking to run cars over a ingham avenue. Just to the south of this street there is an upgrade so that cars standing upon the tracks on that side of Buckingham avenue will, if released and started, run by gravity towards and across Buckingham avenue. On the day in question the plaintiff was driving along High street towards Buckingham avenue, and there were five or six public highway without taking any precautions to warn those traveling along the street and likely to cross in front of the cars. As to contributory negligence, if the cars were not moving when the plaintiff attempted to cross, certainly he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Whether they were moving at all or to such an extent as to be ob Charles E. S. Simpson, for petitioner. STEVENSON, V. C. In this ex parte case the master has reported in favor of a decree of nullity under the statute, on the ground that the petitioner was under 18 years of age when the marriage ceremony was performed. I cannot concur with the learned master, in view of the character and extent of the proofs presented to establish the fact that the petitioner was "under the age of eighteen" when the marriage was solemnized and consummated. served by him before he attempted to cross | decree of nullity of marriage. Petition disis a disputed question of fact, and a careful missed. examination of the testimony of the witnesses called by the defendant does not satisfy us that there is such a preponderance of evidence on this question as to justify a withdrawal of the case from the jury. The cars were standing about on a line with the street, and they had run only about 12 or 15 feet before they struck the plaintiff, and Mrs. Metzner says that after the cars started they ran quite rapidly, so that it is not unreasonable to suppose or infer that they were not moving when the plaintiff started to walk his horse across the track only a few feet from the cars, or if they were just started, were not moving sufficiently to attract his attention, therefore we think upon the question of contributory negligence it was right to submit the case to the jury. The second question argued by the defendant, namely, that no negligence was established, we think hardly worthy of discussion. To turn a train of cars loose on an incline, with knowledge that they will run over a street crossing, without giving warning of their approach, is the grossest kind of negligence. On the third point, that the verdict is excessive, we do not feel disposed to disturb it. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was badly injured, and perhaps permanently. The rule to show cause should be discharged. TITSWORTH v. TITSWORTH. The case is brought under the new law which constitutes paragraph 5, § 1, p. 475, of the divorce act of 1907, permitting a decree of nullity "at the suit of the husband when he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the marriage, unless such marriage be confirmed by him after arriving at such age." The age of the petitioner at the time of the ceremony is alleged to have been 15 years and 5 months, the age of the defendant at the time of the marriage is not shown definitely, but it appears that she was a minor, and the petitioner testifies that he thinks she was about 18 years of age. It is worthy of note that the clergyman who performed the marriage ceremony accepted the statement of the petitioner that he was 21 years of age, although no parents or guardians were present. The clergyman testified to this effect before the master, recognizing the petitioner who was present. Whether or not the defendant knew that the young man who was undertaking to marry her, and did in fact take her (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Nov. 1, as his wife, was incapable of contracting 1910.) 1. MARRIAGE (§ 67*)-ANNULMENT-STATUTES. Under Divorce Act (P. L. 1907, p. 475) § 1. par. 5, permitting a decree of nullity of marriage at the suit of the husband under the age of 18 at the time of the marriage, unless the marriage is confirmed by him after reaching such age, a decree of nullity operates practically to render void at the time of its rendition what up to that time was a valid but voidable marriage and amounts to a decree of absolute divorce, and the children of the marriage are legitimate. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. 140; Dec. Dig. § 67.*] 2. MARRIAGE (§ 60*)—ANNULMENT-EVIDENCE -SUFFICIENCY. Where a husband sues to annul a marriage under Divorce Act (P. L. 1907, p. 475) § 1, par. 5, permitting a decree of nullity of marriage at the suit of the husband under the age of 18 at the time of the marriage, a decree of nullity will not be based on the testimony of interested witnesses without the production of any record establishing petitioner's age, in the absence of evidence showing that no such record exists. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. § 131;, Dec. Dig. § 60.*] Petition by David Charles Titsworth, by next friend, against Ida S. Titsworth for a more than a voidable marriage, which he could later on disaffirm if he saw fit to do so, does not appear. So far as the proofs show in this case, the young wife may have fully believed that her husband was over 18 years of age and capable of entering into an absolute and binding marriage with her. The petitioner may have falsely stated to the defendant that he was 18 years of age, and by this falsehood may have induced her to surrender herself to him. The defendant who makes no defense may now be willing to have her marriage annulled. This new statute of 1907 has certainly made a very radical change in the marriage laws of New Jersey. It is somewhat startling to contemplate from an ethical and sociological point of view the situation created by the statute in this case, and other similar situations which are liable at any time hereafter to arise. This young man, perhaps as mature physically as most adults, without the knowledge of his parents, went with the young woman to whom he was paying attentions to a clergyman's house and undertook by a solemn ceremony, of which her brother and sister were witnesses, to es |