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FORCIBLE DEFILEMENT.

See Rape.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. Summary proceedings by landlord for recovery of demised premises, see Landlord and Tenant, § 302. Trespass, see Trespass.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY.

Parties to action by town, see Towns, & 75.
Right of action by United States, see United
States, & 124.

§ 9. It is essential to an action for forcible entry that complainant should have been in peaceable possession.-Schwinn v. Perkins (N. J.) 19.

§ 9. Mere occupancy or personal presence of such possession as to sustain forcible entry.Schwinn v. Perkins (N. J.) 19.

Claim or statement of mechanic's lien, see Me- complainant on the ground does not constitute chanics' Liens, §§ 132-160.

FINAL ACCOUNTS.

Of executors and administrators, see Executors and Administrators, §§ 465–515.

FINAL JUDGMENT.

9. A mere trespasser cannot by the very act of trespass give himself what the law understands by possession against the person whom he ejects.-Schwinn v. Perkins (N. J.) 19.

§ 10. Rightful owner gaining possession of land forcibly may be deprived of it by statutory proceedings of one in actual peaceable posses

Decisions_reviewable, see Appeal and Error, sion.-Schwinn v. Perkins (N. J.) 19. $$ 66, 76.

FINDINGS.

By court in general, see Trial, §§ 400-404.
By referee, see Reference, §§ 86-89.
Contrary to law or evidence, ground for new
trial, see New Trial, §§ 72-76.

In action for injuries from fires from operation
of railroad, see Railroads, § 486.
Inconsistent with general verdict in action
against principal, see Principal and Agent,
§ 195.

§ 18. Gen. Laws 1909, c. 340, § 1, held not to change the general provisions of law as to who shall be complainant in forcible entry and detainer.-Town of East Greenwich v. Guenond (R. I.) 1015.

§ 38. In view of Rev. St. c. 106, § 20, and chapter 96, § 1, held, that a claim for betterments cannot be set up in actions of forcible entry and detainer, but only in real actions.United States v. Burrill (Me.) 568.

§ 43. Under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 340, §§ 8, Review in appellate court, see Appeal and Er-9, a bill of exceptions held not to lie in forcible ror, $8 527, 704, 1008-1010, 1071; Criminal entry and detainer.-Town of East Greenwich v. Guenond (R. I.) 1015. Law, § 1160.

FINES.

Excessive fines, see Criminal Law, § 1214.

FIRE INSURANCE.

See Insurance.

FIRES.

Civil liability for injuries from fires caused by operation of railroad, see Railroads, §§ 453486.

FISCAL MANAGEMENT.

FORECLOSURE.

Of mechanics' liens, see Mechanics' Liens, §§
267-277.

Of mortgage, see Chattel Mortgages, § 278;
Mortgages, §§ 425-587.

Of mortgages on property of corporations in
general, see Corporations, § 482.

Of right of redemption from tax sale, see Taxation, § 70S.

FORFEITURES.

Disposition or devolution of forfeited devises or
bequests, see Wills, §§ 855-865.
Of bail bonds, see Bail, §§ 77-89.

Of municipal corporations, see Municipal Cor- of dower, see Dower, §§ 49-53.
porations, §§ 859-867.

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Of franchise of corporation in general, see
Corporations, § 621.

Of insurance, see Insurance, §§ 310-336, 745.
Of insurance, estoppel or waiver affecting right,
see Insurance, §§ 377-400.

FORMER ADJUDICATION. Operation and effect in general, see Judgment, §§ 634-747.

FORMS OF ACTION.

See Action, §§ 27-34; Action on the Case; Assumpsit, Action_of; Debt, Action of; Ejectment; Forcible Entry and Detainer, §§ 9-43: Replevin; Trespass, §§ 20-74; Trover and Conversion.

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FRATERNAL ASSOCIATIONS.

See Beneficial Associations; Insurance, §§ 723-
745.
FRAUD.

Affecting right to specific performance of con-
tract, see Specific Performance, § 53.
Laws impairing obligation, see Constitutional
Law, § 128.

Offenses involving fraud, see Embezzlement.
Parol or extrinsic evidence to show fraud, see
Evidence, 434.

By particular classes of persons, or persons in particular relations.

Applicants for insurance, see Insurance, §§ 256-291, 655, 723.

Sellers of goods, see Sales, § 43.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

III. PROMISES TO ANSWER FOR DEBT, DEFAULT OR MISCARRIAGE OF ANOTHER.

§ 20. Where the benefit, legal or pecuniary, to the promisor is the inducement for the promise of indemnity, such promise is not within the statute of frauds, as being a special promise to answer for the debt or default of another, but is an original promise binding on the promisor. -McCormick v. Boylan (Conn.) 335.

§ 21. A promise by the defendant that he would indemnify plaintiff for any loss he might sustain by reason of becoming surety upon a bail bond held an original promise not within the statute of frauds.-McCormick v. Boylan (Conn.) 335.

V. AGREEMENTS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR.

$45. A contract that a sidewalk should stay in good condition for five years held not an agreement not to be performed within one year required to be in writing by Statute of Frauds (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1603) § 5, subd. 5.-Okin v. Selidor (N. J. Sup.) 770.

§ 49. A contract in terms covering five years. where performance may be required within one year, held not within the statute of frauds (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1602), if within such year the event upon which performance depended happened.-Okin v. Selidor (N. J. Sup.) 770.

VI. REAL PROPERTY AND ESTATES AND INTERESTS THEREIN.

§ 72. A contract, by which one who had laid a cement sidewalk took in part payment the

Vendors of land, see Vendor and Purchaser, sand excavated in the course of the work, is §§ 33-36.

In particular classes of conveyances, contracts, transactions, or proceedings.

See Bills and Notes. $$ 520, 537: Contracts, § 94; Insurance, §§ 256-291, 553, 655, 723; Wills, §§ 155-166.

Deed, see Deeds, § 77.

Sale of mining land, see Mines and Minerals, $ 54.

Sales, see Sales, § 43; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 33-36.

Particular remedies.

See Reformation of Instruments, § 20.

II. ACTIONS.

(C) Evidence.

§ 50. Fraud is never presumed, and the bur den of proof is on the party alleging it.-Monad Engineering Co. v. Stewart (Del. Super.) 598. $ 54. Fraud need not be established by direct evidence, but may be shown by circumstances.-Stouffer v. Alford (Md.) 387.

$58. Fraud need not be established by direct evidence, but may be shown by circumstances.-Stouffer v. Alford (Md.) 387.

(E) Trial, Judgment, and Review. § 64. Whether there is any evidence of fraud, or facts from which the jury may reasonably infer fraud, is, in most cases, for the court. Monad Engineering Co. v. Stewart (Del. Super.) 598.

$ 64. Whether a representation was an expression of an opinion or as a statement of fact held to be for the jury.-Hotchkiss v. Bon Air Coal & Iron Co. (Me.) 1108.

III. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

See Embezzlement.

not a contract in or concerning an interest in land required to be in writing by Statute of Frauds (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1603) § 5, subd. 4. -Okin v. Selidor (N. J. Sup.) 770.

FREIGHT.

Carriage of goods, see Carriers, §§ 72-201. Carriage of live stock, see Carriers, §§ 205230.

FUNDS.

Of religious societies, see Religious Societies, $$ 17-25.

Public funds, see Municipal Corporations, $$ 859-867.

FUTURE ESTATES.

Restrictions against perpetuities, see Perpetuities, § 4.

GARNISHMENT.

See Attachment.

GAS.

$ 16. The failure of a gas company operat ing as an agent of a city under a contract for the illumination of the city streets, to perform its duty to keep service pipes in repair, held to amount to misfeasance, rendering it liable to any one injured in consequence thereof.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 16. A gas company negligently failing in its duty to make necessary repairs in the serv ice pipes connecting city lamps with its gas mains, held liable for injuries from escaping gas, though the service pipes belonged to the city.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 16. A gas company contracting to furnish gas for city lamps, held required to keep the necessary connections in repair notwithstanding any ordinance by the city on the subject of street lighting.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 17. A gas company held required to take all reasonable precautions to confine the gas furnished within its pipes.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 17. A gas company does not discharge its duty to provide against the escape of gas, by assuming, without knowing, that a leak proceeds from one source when, in fact, it proceeds from a different source, discoverable by proper investigation.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 20. In an action against a gas company for personal injuries resulting from gas escaping from its pipes, an instruction held not objectionable as not within the issues raised by the declaration.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725.

§ 20. In an action against a gas company supplying gas to street lamps, for injuries caused by gas escaping from a leak in a service pipe connected with a lamp, evidence held not to so conclusively show the ownership by the city of the pipe as to justify a withdrawal of the case from the jury on that ground.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.) 725. $20. Whether a gas company negligently failed to keep in repair the pipes through which it furnished gas, held for the jury.-Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Connor (Md.)

725.

GENEALOGY.

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Constitutional grant of powers in general, see Constitutional Law, $ 26.

Of easements, see Easements, §§ 12–14, 42. Of right to use streets for purposes, other than highway, see Municipal Corporations, $ 680.

Determination of right of inheritance, see De- Of water rights, see Waters and Water Coursscent and Distribution, §§ 52-55.

GIFTS.

Specific performance, see Specific Performance, § 85.

I. INTER VIVOS.

Advancements, see Descent and Distribution, § 93.

§ 29. A delivery to trustees of certificates of corporate stock with a written assignment thereof, but without indorsement and without registration on the books of the corporation, as required by its by-laws and certificates, held sufficient to constitute a valid gift of the stock. -Talbot v. Talbot (R. I.) 535.

II. CAUSA MORTIS.

66. Delivery of a bank book held not to be a gift causa mortis.-Kelly v. Perkins (N. J. Sup.) 14.

§ 81. In an action to recover property as having been conveyed by gift causa mortis, certain evidence held admissible, as tending to show that plaintiff did not have the title to the property as set up in the action.-Kelly v. Perkins (N. J. Sup.) 14.

GOOD FAITH.

Affecting residence of parties to suit for divorce, see Divorce, $ 124.

Of attorney in dealing with client, see Attorney and Client, § 123.

Of mortgagee, see Mortgages, § 154.

Of party asking equitable relief, see Specific Performance, § 95.

Of purchaser of land, see Vendor and Purchaser, § 228.

es, § 156.

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III. CUSTODY AND CARE OF WARD'S PERSON AND ESTATE.

$58. Rev. St. c. 69, § 8, authorizing allowance from a ward's estate for reasonable expense in defending guardianship proceedings, construed.-Appeal of Farnum (Me.) 901.

$67. An appeal from a dismissal of a petition for an allowance, in a guardianship matter, under Rev. St. c. 69, § 8, is triable de novo.-Appeal of Farnum (Me.) 901.

$67. A claim under Rev. St. c. 69, § 8. for expenses in defending a ward against guardianship proceedings, is properly presented by peti tion in the name of the claimant.-Appeal of Farnum (Me.) 901.

HABEAS CORPUS.

II. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF.

§ 85. On habeas corpus by one imprisoned under conviction of crime, it may be presumed

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In equity, see Equity, §§ 359-385.
In probate proceedings and actions relating to
wills or probate, see Wills, §§ 316-329.
In proceedings for approval of location of
street railroads, see Street Railroads, § 9.
On application for liquor license, see Intoxi-
cating Liquors, § 70.

On certiorari, see Certiorari, § 62.
On motion or application for direction of ver-
dict, see Trial, § 178.

On plea in equity, see Equity, § 175.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

See Evidence, § 314.

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IV. TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, AND
WORK ON HIGHWAYS.

$127. Under Act April 12, 1905 (P. L. 142)
§ 2, held that, if an adjusted valuation has not
been made for the current year, road taxes in
a township of the second class must be made
on the adjusted valuation of the preceding year.
-Shenango Furnace Co. v. Fairfield Tp. (Pa.)
937.

§ 128. Equity will not compel the refund-
ing of a road tax levied on a wrong valuation
if the tax has been paid.-Shenango Furnace
Co. v. Fairfield Tp. (Pa.) 937.

$ 129. Equity may restrain supervisors of a
township from levying a road tax on valuation
not "the last adjusted valuation for county
purposes," as provided by Act April 12, 1905
(P. L. 142).—Shenango Furnace Co. v. Fair-
field Tp. (Pa.) 937.

V. REGULATION AND USE FOR

TRAVEL.

(B) Use of Highway and Law of the
Road.

Positive and negative testimony in action for
injuries caused by operation of automobiles,
see Evidence, § 586.

Regulations denying equal protection of laws,
see Constitutional Law, § 235.

Right of way over street railroad tracks, see
Street Railroads, § 85.

Statutory and municipal regulations relating
to movement of trains across highways, see
Railroads, §§ 244-255.

Streets, see Municipal Corporations, § 706.
Use of street as highway, see Municipal Cor-
porations, §§ 705, 706.

§ 165. The ultimate control of public rights
on the highways of the state is in the state
Legislature.-Public Service Ry. Co. v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County (N. J.
Ch.) 235.

§ 169. A traveler has an equal right to em-
ploy an automobile and to occupy the public
highways with other vehicles in common use.
-Campbell v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.

§ 172. All persons using a highway held
bound to exercise reasonable care to prevent
accidents.-Campbell v. Walker (Del. Super.)

601.

$172. Operator of automobile held to have
right to assume that others on highway will
exercise ordinary care.-Campbell v. Walker
(Del. Super.) 601.

$173. Plaintiff, injured while on foot by a
collision with a horse and sleigh driven by de-
fendant's servant, held to be in the exercise of
due care.-Chatel v. Schonlaud (N. H.) 128.

§ 176. Driver of automobile, approaching
wagon from rear on right side of road, in vio-
lation of 25 Del. Laws, c. 120, § 13, held guilty
of negligence.-Campbell v. Walker (Del. Su-
per.) 601.

$176. Driver of automobile, failing to give
warning of his approach as required by 25 Del.
Laws, c. 120, § 11, held guilty of negligence.-
Campbell v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.

$176. Driver of automobile held not liable
for injury from collision, unless his negligence
caused the accident.-Campbell v. Walker (Del.
Super.) 601.

§ 176. Driver of automobile held not liable
for injury caused by collision, if negligence of
plaintiff caused the accident or contributed
thereto.-Campbell v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.
§ 176. Failure of driver of vehicle to go to
right side of road, after he knew or should
have known of approach of automobile from
rear, held negligence, barring recovery for in-
jury.-Campbell v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.
§ 176. Injury to passenger in vehicle by col-
lision with automobile without negligence of
defendant held unavoidable accident, for which
plaintiff cannot recover.-Campbell v. Walker
(Del. Super.) 601.

§ 176. Passenger in vehicle held bound to
exercise due care, as well as driver.-Campbell
v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.

$184. The proximate cause of the injury to
plaintiff while coasting on the highway held
to be a question for the jury.-Farrington v.
Cheponis & Panarausky (Conn.) 652.

§ 184. Whether a passenger in vehicle, in-
jured by collision with automobile, exercised
reasonable care, held for the jury.-Campbell
v. Walker (Del. Super.) 601.

$ 184. In an action for personal injuries re-
ceived in a collision with a horse and sleigh
which was driven near the center of the street
and close to a street car, the driver, defendant's
servant, held negligent.-Chatel v. Schonlaud
(N. H.) 128.

(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions.
Accidents at railroad crossings, see Railroads,
$$ 301-350.

In streets, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 819-

821.

in equal shares by herself and husband, is en-
titled to a homestead right to the extent of
$500 in her share exempt from levy of execu-
tion under section 3.-McLaughlin v. Collins
(N. H.) 623.

II. TRANSFER OR INCUMBRANCE.

§ 111. Pub. St. 1901, c. 138, § 4, held not to
require a clause in a deed specifically releasing
the homestead right.-Perley v. Woodbury (N.
H.) 1073.

§ 111. The power of an owner to alienate
property in which the husband or wife or minor
children have a homestead right held not con-
ferred by Pub. St. 1901, c. 138, § 4.-Perley v.
Woodbury (N. H.) 1073.

§ 118. A deed which effectuates the release
of dower is sufficient to effectuate a convey-
ance of a homestead right.-Perley v. Wood-
bury (N. H.) 1073.

§ 118. A mortgage construed, and held to
convey the homestead right.-Perley v. Wood-
bury (N. H.) 1073.

§ 118. A mortgage in which a wife joins
held to bar the homestead right.-Perley v.
Woodbury (N. H.) 1073.

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§ 198. A county held not liable for injuries § 11. "Malice," essential in murder, defined.
from the negligence in repairing a public road-State v. Roberts (Del. O. & T.) 305.
by the county prison board in supposed pursu-
ance of Act May 25, 1907 (P. L. 247).-Kelley by selection of deadly weapon, or by antecedent
§ 11. Malice, in law of homicide, held shown
v. Cumberland County (Pa.) 276.
threats.-State v. Johnson (Del. Gen. Sess.)

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605.

§ 13. Malice, in law of homicide, held im-
plied from unlawful acts denoting a wicked
heart, bent on mischief, or an act from which
death ensues.-State v. Johnson (Del. Gen.
Sess.) 605.

$22. "Express malice aforethought" defined.
-State v. Roberts (Del. O. & T.) 305.

$ 22. "Murder of the first degree" defined.-
State v. Roberts (Del. O. & T.) 305.

§ 23. "Murder of the second degree" defined.
-State v. Roberts (Del. O. & T.) 305.

§ 28. Intoxication held no defense to charge
of murder, unless accused was incapable of con-

Dower or rights of widow in real property of ceiving any intent to kill, when his offense was
deceased husband, see Dower.

reduced to murder in the second degree.-Com-

Subrogation to rights of mortgagee, see Sub-monwealth v. Detweiler (Pa.) 271.
rogation, §§ 12, 33.

I. NATURE, ACQUISITION, AND

EXTENT.

(A) Nature, Creation, and Duration of
Estate or Right in General.

§ 1. Nature of homestead right stated.-
Perley v. Woodbury (N. H.) 1073.

(B) Persons Entitled.

§ 21. Under Pub. St. 1901, c. 138, § 1, held,
that a married woman occupying land, owned

III. MANSLAUGHTER.

$ 31. "Manslaughter" defined.-State v. Rob-
erts (Del. O. & T.) 305.

IV. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL.
§ 84. Elements of assault with intent to
commit murder stated.-State v. Johnson (Del.
Gen. Sess.) 605.

§ 89. Where, if death had resulted from the
assault of accused, the crime would have been

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