See ADMIRALTY, 1, 5, 6, 7.
1. When the supreme court reversed a decree in admiralty and reinanded the
cause to the circuit court, with instructions to render a decree against the
ship for the amount found due for supplies and repairs actually furnished
and really necessary, and the supplies and repairs were furnished upon a
bottomry bond which entitled the libellants to a premium of 19 per cent.
for the voyage: Held, that such premium should be included in the amount
to be decreed by the circuit court. The Grapeshot,
42
2. Interest is not allowed in admiralty unless specially directed, but this rule, so
far as it governs the construction of the decrees of the supreme court, only
applies to cases where the decree of the court below in favor of libellant is
affirmed. When such decree is reversed and the cause remanded, the circuit
court may allow interest, unless expressly forbidden to do so by the decree
of the supreme court.
Ib.
3. The 19th admiralty rule was intended to prohibit a joinder of proceedings in
rem and in personam, in the same libel for the salvage of the same goods.
Nott v. The Steamboat Sabine and Cargo,
4. A court of admiralty has no jurisdiction to try the question of title to certain
logs which have been incorporated into a raft and floated down a public
navigable river. Gastrel & Raymond v. A Cypress Raft,
5. When on a libel in rem to recover for repairs to a steamer, the jurisdiction of
the district court was submitted to, and the cause tried on its merits; after
appeal to the circuit court, the claimants could not for the first time set up
that the repairs were made in the home port of the steamer, and therefore
did not create a maritime lien, no such fact being averred in the pleadings
or shown by the evidence. Meagher v. The Steamboat Lizzie,
243
C. Where a seizure is made on water and the proceeding is consequently in ad-
miralty, and there is default, the court should use a wise discretion whether
to require proofs or not. The United States v. The Steamer Mollie, 318
7. In all such cases, proclamation to appear should be made and a decree entered
for default and contumacy, and upon reading the libel and proceedings
thereon, and with or without proof as the court may direct, such decree
should be made as the nature of the case may require.
1. In a suit in equity for a demand due to a partnership, all the partners must
be joined either as complainants or defendants. They are not merely prop-
er but necessary parties. Parsons v. Howard,
1
2. The United States courts have no power to effect a constructive service of pro-
cess on nonresidents. If nonresidents are necessary parties, unless they vol-
untarily appear, the suit cannot be maintained in the federal courts. If
they do appear as defendants, and are citizens of the same state with the
complainants, the court is ousted of jurisdiction.
Ib.
3. Semble, that a suit against partners may be brought in a federal court,
although some of them may not be found within the jurisdiction of the court.
4. The fact that holders of bonds issued by a state are prohibited, by the eleventh
amendment to the constitution of the United States, from obtaining judgment
on their bonds by suit against the state, in a court of the United States,
does not authorize a court of equity, by decree, to compel the state officers
to levy and collect a tax for the payment of principal and interest of the
bonds. McCauley v. Kellogg,
5. A court of equity will not grant a mandatory injunction upon a preliminary
or interlocutory motion, but only upon final hearing, and then only to exe-
ecute the decree or judgment of the court.
6. A court of the United States will not compel, by injunction, the officers of a
state to execute the laws of the state. To do so would be an attempt by
the court to administer the state government.
7. An action in a court of the United States against the executive officers of a
state, in their official capacity, to compel them to comply with a contract of
the state by the enforcement of its laws, is, to all intents and purposes, an
action against the state, and prohibited by the eleventh amendment to the
constitution of the United States.
Ib.
8. When the personal property of a public corporation is levied on at the suit of
an individual, it is not necessary to file a bill in equity to restrain the sale.
In Louisiana the sale may be restrained by intervention and third opposi-
tion. Featherman v The Louisiana State Seminary,
9. An alternative prayer does not necessarily make a bill multifarious.
v. The New Orleans Gas Light Co.,
10. If process is prayed against all the necessary parties to a bill, a demurrer for
want of proper parties will not lie on the ground that some have not been
served with process.
11. It is an indispensable prerequisite to a creditor's bill which seeks to subject
Ib.
property of the debtor, fraudulently conveyed, to the payment of the com-
plainant's claim, that the claim should first have been reduced to judgment.
Stewart v. Fagan,
12. A court of chancery may refer a matter for inquiry as to the facts at any stage
of the cause, even on final hearing. In re Walshe,
13. A bill of review can only be sustained upon the ground of error apparent on the
225
record, and the record consists of the pleadings, proceedings and decree, and
does not include the evidence. Barker's Heirs v. Barker's Assignee,
14. A party holding a first incumbrance on property about to be brought to sale,
ought not to be deprived of the right of bidding on the property up to the
amount of his claim. Therefore, when his right of priority is in dispute, it
ought to be settled before the sale; and whenever a specific property, on
which a separate incumbrance exists, can be sold separately without injury to
or sacrifice of that or other property, it should be thus sold so as to give every
incumbrancer the chance of protecting his securities without involving him-
self in onerous engagements. Campbell v. The Texas & New Orleans R.
R. Co.,
263
15. After a decree pro confesso, taken in a cause in equity, it is often proper for
the court to inform itself through its own officers, as by the report of a mas-
ter, or by deposition, or other inquest or proceeding, more particularly as to
the exact facts of the case. Forbes v. The Memphis, El Paso & Pacific R.
R. Co.,
323
16. Where a suit in equity was properly instituted against a railroad company by
a stockholder, a bondholder, and the trustees for the bondholders named in
the land grant mortgages of the company, in behalf of themselves as well as
all other stockholders, creditors or bondholders who might desire, and be
entitled to intervene, and the bill charged that the officers, agents and direc-
tors of the company were squandering and embezzling its property, and the
purpose of the suit was that the assets of the company might be preserved
and administered, and the relief prayed was proper to be granted, and a
decree pro confesso had been regularly entered, a receiver properly appointed,
an authentic report of the facts made to the court, and its judgment passed
thereon; individual stockholders were not permitted to intervene in the suit
as defendants, and file a cross bill on a general charge of fraud and collusion
on the part of the receiver, and erroneous judgment on the part of the court
in making the order referred to.
Ib.
17. In such a suit, in which such proceedings had been taken, it is not the proper
practice to allow individual stockholders to intervene to set aside the proceed-
ings, or to interpose obstacles to the progress of the suit. Such stockholders
may come in to take the benefit of the proceedings and decree, but not to
oppose and nullify them.
Ib.
18. In such a suit, rival creditors, by proceedings before the master, may fix the
priority of their respective liens, and creditors or stockholders may contest
the validity of the claims of other creditors and stockholders, but all in sub-
ordination to the general object and purpose of the suit, to obtain an admin-
istration of the company's assets and property.
19. In such a suit, persons will not be allowed to intervene as general defendants
and contestants, unless they show that they have an interest in the results as
stockholders or otherwise, and are also able to show fraud and collusion be-
tween the plaintiffs in the suit and the officers of the company having charge
of its interests.
Ib.
20. A state indorsed the bonds of a railroad company, upon the express condition
that such indorsement should vest in the state the title of all property pur-
chased with the proceeds of said bonds, and should give the state a first lien
on all the property of the company; and that upon failure of the company
to pay the interest or principal of the bonds, the governor should take pos-
session of all its property, and sell the same for the purpose of paying said
bonds. Default was made by the railroad company in the payment of in-
terest, and the governor took possession of its property, which he advertised
for sale: Held, that at the suit of a holder of bonds of a subsequent issue,
which the state had indorsed on the same terms as the first issue, but which
indorsement the legislature had declared not binding on the state, the court
would not restrain the sale of the road by the governor, nor take the posses-
sion thereof from the state, nor appoint a receiver therefor. Branch v. The
Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co.,
385
21. The relief asked in such a case could not be granted without adjudicating
the rights of the state, which ought not to be done unless the state were a
party, and the state could not be made a party.
22. A railroad company having its residence and principal office at Atlanta, Ga.,
conveyed to trustees, by one deed, all its line of road extending from Atlanta
through South Carolina to Charlotte, N. C., and other property to secure the
payment of the principal and interest of 4,248 bonds of $1,000 each, issued
by the railroad company. The railroad was an indivisible and inseparable
piece of property, which could not be divided without injury to its value.
The trust deed conferred authority on the trustees, and made it their duty,
in case the railroad company failed to pay either the interest or principal of
the bonds, to take possession of the property conveyed by the trust deed, and
advertise and sell the same (or such part as might be necessary) at Atlanta to
pay the sum in default. Held:
(a) That on default made in the payment of interest, and a demand upon
the trustees by the bondholders that they should take possession of the trust
property, and a failure of the trustees to do so, the court, on a bill filed by
the bondholders to require them to execute the trust would compel them to
take possession of the trust property or appoint a receiver for that purpose.
(b) Such appointment would be made even though there was no probable
deficiency of the trust property to pay the debts secured by the trust deed.
(c) When it was represented that the trust property had fallen into the
hands of two different receivers, accountable to three different courts, to the
manifest detriment of the trust estate, that fact of itself was considered a
sufficient reason for the appointment of a receiver for the whole property, if
the court had jurisdiction to make such appointment.
(d) The circuit court of the United States for the northern district of
Georgia has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for the entire line of said com-
pany's road and other property included in the deed of trust, whether within
or without the state. Wilmer v. The Atlanta & Richmond Air-Line Rail-
way Co.,
409
23. Where a bill was filed, the prayer of which was, that this court would con-
strue a trust deed executed by a railroad company, and compel the trustees
to execute the trust or appoint a receiver to take possession of and adminis-
ter the trust property, and service of subpoena had been made on the rail-
road company, which was the principal defendant, and a restraining order
had been allowed and also served on the railroad company, enjoining it from
delivering possession of the trust property to any one except a receiver ap-
pointed by this court in the case thus commenced: Held, that by these pro-
ceedings the court acquired constructive possession of the trust property,
and that possession thereof, taken under color of process from another court,
in a suit commenced after the proceedings above mentioned, was in con-
tempt of the process and jurisdiction of this court, even though the other
court first obtained actual possession of the property. (Per WOODS, Circuit
Judge.)
Ib.
24. Contra. Service of process gives jurisdiction over the person; seizure gives
jurisdiction over the property; and, until the property is seized, no matter
when the suit was commenced, the court does not have jurisdiction over it.
Thus, when two suits between different parties, raising different controver-
sies, and having different purposes in view, are commenced in courts of coör-
dinate jurisdiction, and the possession of the property, which is the subject
of the suit, is necessary to the relief asked in each case, that court which first
seizes the property acquires jurisdiction over it, to the exclusion of the other,
no matter when the suits were commenced or process in personam was
served. (Per BRADLEY, Circuit Justice.)
Ib.
25. Where certain bondholders whose bonds were secured by a deed of trust filed
in behalf of themselves and all other bondholders whose bonds were secured
by the same deed, who chose to come in as complainants and bear their
share of the expenses of the suit, a bill against the trustees named in the
deed, to have the trust administered and the trust property sold and its pro-
ceeds distributed, and the other bondholders were numerous and some of
them unknown: Held, that it was not a valid objection to the making of a
decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, that all the bondholders were
not made actual parties; they might be allowed to come in as complainants,
or might propound their claims before the master. Wilmer v. The Atlanta d
Richmond Air-Line Railway Co.,
447
26. Where a railway is conveyed by a trust deed or mortgage to secure bonds, and
it cannot be divided and sold in pieces without manifest injury to its value,
the whole may be sold before the principal is due, on default in the payment
of interest.
Ib.
27. If two railroad corporations, created by different states, join in making a trust
deed conveying their joint property to secure bonds issued by them jointly,
and suit is brought to enforce the trust in the district where one of the cor-
porations resides, and it is served with process, and the other corporation,
being a nonresident of the state or district where the suit is brought, enters
its appearance and files an answer jointly with the other, both will be bound
by the decree of the court.
Ib
28. The Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Railway Company conveyed to trustees by
a single deed all its line of road extending from Atlanta, Georgia, through
South Carolina to Charlotte, North Carolina, to secure the payment of a
series of bonds issued by the railway company, and the railroad was an in-
divisible and inseparable piece of property which could not be divided with-
out injury to its value: Held, that the court had jurisdiction to decree that
the trustees should sell the entire line of road, according to the terms of the
trust, notwithstanding a large part of the road lay beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the court; and that a sale and deed under such decree would
convey a good title to the whole property.
29. Penalty of bond for appeal fixed under rule 32 of the supreme court.
30. A married woman executed a mortgage on her separate estate to secure her
husband's debt at a time when, according to the decisions of the supreme
court of the state, such a mortgage was valid. By subsequent decisions of
the same court, such a mortgage was declared invalid: Held, in a proceed-
ing to enforce the mortgage, that the federal court was bound by the later
adjudications of the state supreme court. Mitchell v. Lippincott & Co., 467
31. Where there is a prayer for general relief, a court of equity may afford such
relief as the averments of the bill and the proofs warrant, although the com-
plainant may not be entitled to the relief specifically prayed for. Moore v.
Mitchell,
32. Exceptions to the report of a master should be precise, and raise well defined
issues. When they are vague and general, and require of the court the per-
formance of duties which properly belong to the master and counsel, they
will be overruled. Stanton et al., Trustees, v. The Alabama & Chattanooga
Railroad Co.,
506
33. A person who has recovered judgment against the receivers of a railroad for in-
juries received by him while traveling as a passenger upon the road is not en-
titled to payment out of the earnings of the road, or the proceeds of its sale
in preference to the first mortgage bondholders, unless it is so provided by
the order of the court placing the road in the possession of the receivers.
Davenport v. The Receivers of the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Co.,
34. When a court of equity was called on for the purpose of preserving a trust
estate situate mainly within its jurisdiction, to remove a nonresident naked
trustee, and appoint another in his stead, it had the power to do so ex parte,
in a case where service on the absent trustee was impossible. Ketchum v.
The Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co.,
35. The fact that such absent trustee was within the territory of a country at war
with the country in which the court was sitting did not detract from the
power of the court to remove him and appoint another, but furnished a good
reason for its exercise.
36. Junior mortgagees may file a bill to foreclose their mortgage without making
prior mortgagees parties, but a sale in such a case would necessarily be
made subject to the prior mortgages. Young v. The Montgomery & Eufaula
Railroad Co.,
606
37. In such a suit, the prior mortgagees can be made parties only by service of
process or voluntary appearance. A general notice calling upon them to
present their claims will not make them parties or bind them.
38. If, however, such prior mortgagees are represented by trustees who are actual
parties to the suit, then a notice calling upon them to present their claims
before the master would be effectual, and the decree of the court would
bind them.
Ib.
39. When junior mortgagees have first brought their suit to foreclose, and the
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