that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seising to his own continued." use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his

such as the minds of serious and well-disposed men can rely upon with confidence and satisfaction.

Mr. Locke says, "that the labor of a man's body, and the work of "his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes "out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed "his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby "makes it his property." (On Gov. c. 5.)

But this argument seems to be a petitio principii; for mixing labor with a thing, can signify only to make an alteration in its shape or form; and if I had a right to the substance, before any labor was bestowed upon it, that right still adheres to all that remains of the substance, whatever changes it may have undergone: if I had no right before, it is clear that I have none after; and we have not advanced a single step by this demonstration.

The account of Grotius and Puffendorf, who maintain that the origin and inviolability of property are founded upon a tacit promise or compact, and therefore we cannot invade another's property without a violation of a promise or a breach of good faith, seems equally, or more, superfluous and inconclusive.

There appears to be just the same necessity to call in the aid of a promise to account for, or enforce, every other moral obligation, and to say that men are bound not to beat or murder each other, because they have promised not to do so. Men are bound to fulfil their contracts and engagements, because society could not otherwise exist; men are bound to refrain from another's property, because likewise society could not otherwise exist. Nothing therefore is gained by resolving one obligation into the other.

But how, or when, then, does property commence?. I conceive no better answer can be given, than by occupancy, or when any thing is separated for private use from the common stores of nature. This is agreeable to the reason and sentiments of mankind, prior to all civil establishments. When an untutored Indian has set before him the fruit which he has plucked from the tree that protects him from the heat of the sun, and the shell of water raised from the fountain that springs at his feet; if he is driven by any daring intruder from this repast, so easy to be replaced, he instantly feels and resents the viola

own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.

PROPERTY, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired by the first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shews an intention to abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally speaking, publici juris once more, and is liable to be again appropriated by the next occupant. So if one is possessed of a jewel, and casts it into the sea, or a public highway, this is such an express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder that will seise it to his own use. But if he hides it privately in the earth or other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein; for the owner hath not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but rather the contrary; and if he loses or drops it by accident, it cannot be collected from thence, that he designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such a case the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it again of the finder. And this, we may remember, is the doctrine of the law of England, with relation to treasure trove i.

BUT this method of one man's abandoning his property, and another seising the vacant possession, however well founded in theory, could not long subsist in fact. It was calculated merely for the rudiments of civil society, and necessarily ceased among the complicated interests and artificial refinements of polite and established governments. In these it was found, that what became inconvenient or useless to one man, was highly convenient and useful to another; who was ready to give in exchange for it some equivalent, that

i See Vol. I. page 295.

tion of that law of property, which nature herself has written upon the hearts of all mankind.

was equally desirable to the former proprietor. Thus mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, grant, or conveyance: which may be considered either, as a continuance of [10] the original possession which the first occupant had; or as an abandoning of the thing by the present owner, and an immediate successive occupancy of the same by the new proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of the owner, and delivering the possession to another individual, amount to a transfer of the property; the proprietor declaring his intention no longer to occupy the thing himself, but that his own right of occupancy shall be vested in the new acquirer. Or, taken in the other light, if I agree to part with an acre of my land to Titius, the deed of conveyance is an evidence of my intending to abandon the property: and Titius being the only or first man acquainted with such my intention, immediately steps in and seises the vacant possession: thus the consent expressed by the conveyance gives Titius a good right against me; and possession, or occupancy, confirms that right against all the world besides (2).

THE most universal and effectual way of abandoning property, is by the death of the occupant: when, both the actual possession and intention of keeping possession ceasing, the property which is founded upon such possession and intention, ought also to cease of course. For, naturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion: else if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would also have a right to direct

(2) Upon whatever principle the right to property is founded, the power of giving and transferring seems to follow as a natural conse. quence; if the hunter and the fisherman exchange the produce of their toils, no one ever disputed the validity of the contract, or the continuance of the original title. This does not seem to be aptly explained by occupancy, for it cannnt be said that in such a case there is ever a vacancy of possession.

own convenience, provided he found them unoccupie any one else.

PROPERTY, both in lands and moveables, being thus ginally acquired by the first taker, which taking amoun a declaration that he intends to appropriate the thing to own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal till such time as he does some other act which shews an in tion to abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally sp ing, publici juris once more, and is liable to be again ap priated by the next occupant. So if one is possessed jewel, and casts it into the sea, or a public highway, the such an express dereliction, that a property will be veste the first fortunate finder that will seise it to his own use. if he hides it privately in the earth or other secret place, it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein; the owner hath not by this act declared any intention abandon it, but rather the contrary; and if he loses or dr it by accident, it cannot be collected from thence, that designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such a c the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it ag of the finder. And this, we may remember, is the doctr of the law of England, with relation to treasure trove i.

BUT this method of one man's abandoning his proper and another seising the vacant possession, however w founded in theory, could not long subsist in fact. It was c culated merely for the rudiments of civil society, and nec sarily ceased among the complicated interests and artific refinements of polite and established governments. In the it was found, that what became inconvenient or useless one man, was highly convenient and useful to another; w was ready to give in exchange for it some equivalent, th

i See Vol. I. page 295.

tion of that law of property, which nature herself has written upon t hearts of all mankind.

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was equally desirable to the former proprietor convenience introduced commercial traffic, an transfer of property by sale, grant, or conv which may be considered either, as a continu the original possession which the first occupa or as an abandoning of the thing by the pres an immediate successive occupancy of the sa proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of t delivering the possession to another individu transfer of the property; the proprietor decla tion no longer to occupy the thing himself, b right of occupancy shall be vested in the new taken in the other light, if I agree to part with land to Titius, the deed of conveyance is an e intending to abandon the property: and Titius or first man acquainted with such my intention steps in and seises the vacant possession: thu expressed by the conveyance gives Titius a goo me; and possession, or occupancy, confirms tha all the world besides (2).

THE most universal and effectual way of ab perty, is by the death of the occupant: when, b possession and intention of keeping possessio property which is founded upon such possession ought also to cease of course. For, naturally instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have a else if he had a right to dispose of his acquisi ment beyond his life, he would also have a r

(2) Upon whatever principle the right to property power of giving and transferring seems to follow as a quence; if the hunter and the fisherman exchange the toils, no one ever disputed the validity of the contract, or of the original title. This does not seem to be aptly exp pancy, for it cannnt be said that in such a case there is of possession.