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11. A legislative grant cannot be impaired by forms and the same system of court a subsequent act of the legislature: Jennison v. ceedings for the accommodation of Planters' Bank, 23 Ala. 108; Tenn. & C. R. R. creditors; it has the power to regi Co. v. Moore, 36 Id. 371; Díontgomery v. Kas proceedings: Rathbone v. Bradford, son, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Stoildart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355; 1 Id. 590; Trustees v. Bradbury, 26 Am. Dec. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 260; Livingston v. 515; and this is so whether the grant be to an Pet. 469; Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. individual or to a corporation. But the fact kins v. Jones, 22 Id. 310; Webb v. that subsequent legislation has diminished the Iu. 4; Smith'v. Brayn, 34 Ill. 364; 1 value of a franchise does not make the act v. Horne, 82 Id. 491; Frost v. Isley, liable to the objection being discussed: Charles 345; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418; River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 429; Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134. It may cha Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.

remedy: Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; The legislature cannot revive a claim ton v. Horne, 82 Ill. 49; Carncs v. Rel barred by the statute of limitations: Wright Parish, 29 La. Ann. 603; Hardeman v. 1 v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Buttles v. Forbes, 18 39 Ga. 425; Fearing_v._ Irwin, 55 N.) Pick. 532; Kinsman v. Cambridge, 121 Mass. Penniman’s Case, 11 R. I. 333; Mills v... 558; Rockport v. Walden, 54 N. H. 167; Ato ton, 29 Wis. 400; Tennessee v. Sneeil, 96 kinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 11l; Davis v. Minor, 69. Nor is it material that the new rem 1 How. (Miss.) 183; Hicks v. Steigleman, 49 less expeditious or simple than the old: Miss. 377; Chandler v. Chandler, 21 Ark. 95; son v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Guild v. Rogt Bradford v. Strine, 13 Fla. 393; Coady v. Barb. 502; Jones v. Crittenden, 6 Am. Dec. Reins, 1 Mont. T. 424; Baldro v. I'omlie, i Or. Wood v. Wood, 14 Rich. 148; Ex parte 176; Rogers v. Handy, 24 Vt. 620; Wires v. lard, 40 Ala. 77; Starkueather v. Hawes, Farr, 25 Id. 41. A statute allowing a creditor Wis. 125. The right to alter the me to redeem at any tiine within two years after the whereby a right may be enforced is thus qui sale under a mortgage made prior to the pass- fied: An act which so alters the previous re ing of the statute is void: Grantly v. Ercing, 3 edial legislation as to wholly deprive a pers How. 707; Iloward v. Bugbee, 24 Id. 461; of recovering on his claim, undoubtedly impai Malony v. Fortune, 14 Iowa, 417; Robinson v. vested rights: Curran v. State, 15 How. 30. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; yet different views are en Western Savings v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St tertained in Iverson v. Shorter, 9 Ala. 713; 175; Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 20; Rigg v Freeborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277. And in Martin, 5 Ark. 506; or if it leaves any essenTuolumne Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515, it was tial part practically unavailing, it is not consaid that the right to redeem property sold stitutional: Musgrove v. Vicksburg R. R. Co., under execution pertains solely to the remedy, 50 Miss. 677; Morton v. Vallentine, 15 La. Ann. and is under legislative control.

150, Remedial rights, when vested.—The leg. Legislative power over statutes of lim. islature is not bound to continue the same itation: See the note to the next section,

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9. Limitations shall continue to run.

Seo. 9. When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run before this code goes into effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in this code, the time which has already run shall be deemed part of the timo prescribed as such limitation by this code. (Amendment, approved March 24, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 279; took effect July 1, 1874.]

Amendments of codes, how affected. of the statute of limitations, see the interesting This section applies to subsequent amendments decision of Edwards v. L'earzey, 96 U. S. 603. of the codes as well as to the code as originally Legislative control over statute of limi. adopted: See C. P. R. R. v. Shackelford, 63 Cal. tation. In the previous note it was stated 261.

that remedial rights were within the control of
The statute, having commenced to run the legislative body; that they are not vested
under the law as existing prior to the adoption within the sense that they cannot be altered:
of the codes, continued to run notwithstanding Curry v. Sanders, 35 Ala. 280; Cutts v. Har.
them; and where the limitation prescribed in dee, 38 Ga. 330; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
the codes is the saine as that of the prior stat. 628, and other cases there cited. It is now
ute, the time runs as though no new legislation recognized that the legislature may alter or re-
had been enacted: Benjamin v. Eldridge, 50 peal a statute of limitations: Dyer v. Gill, 32
Cal. 012; and see Guillotel v. Mayor of N. Y., Ark. 410; llyman v. Bayne, 83 111. 256; Samp.
8 N. Y. 441, discussing the effect of the code 800 v. Sampson, 63 Me. 328; Krone v. Krone,
of that state upon the statute of limitations, 37 Id. 308; Bigelow v. Bemuis, 2 Allen, 496; Peo-
and reviewing the earlier decisions of Ely v. ple v. Wayne Co. Judge, 37 Mich. 287; 17orbach
Holton, 15 11. 595; Matter of Peugnet, 67 Id. V. Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Johnson v. Railrord Co.,
444; and Acker v. Acker, 80 Id. 143. A statute 54 N. Y. 416; Pearsal v. Kenan, 79 N.C. 472.
prescribing additional acts as requisite to ac But there is this qualification of the rule with
quire a right by the lapse of time refers only regard to rights already accrued, the new stat-
to the future, and requires the compliance with utory provision must give a reasonable time for
its provisions only during the remaining period their enforcement: Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb.
of the time: 0. P. R. R. v. Shuckelford, 63 Cal. 31; Lockhart v. Yeiser, 2 Bush, 231; Beal v.
261. As to the effect of a legislative alteration Nason, 14 Me. 344; II alcombe v. Tracy, 2 Minn.

241; W. S. R. R. Co. v. Stockett, 21 Miss. 395; statute has once completely run, there exists and in the absence of some reasonable time ex. no power in the legislature by a new act to repressly given therein, the law will presume vive the claim. See the preceding note. that it was intended: Dale v. Frisbie, 59 Ind. Limitation of actions: See secs. 312 et seq., 520; Bratton v. Guy, 12 S. C. 42. When the Code Civ. Proc. 10. Holidays.

Sec. 10. Holidays, within the meaning of this code, are: Every Sunday, the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of May, the fourth day of July, the twenty-fifth day of December, every day on which an election is held throughout the state, and every day appointed by the president of the United States, or by the governor of this state, for a public fast, thanksgiving, or holiday. If the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of May, the fourth day of July, or the twentyfifth day of December, fall upon a Sunday, the Monday following is a holiday. [Amendment, approved April 9, 1880; Amendments 1880, 49 (Ban. ed. 189); took effect immediately.]

Holidays.- Cited as to first of January fall Declaring the thirtieth day of May to be a ing on Sunday: Estate of Rose, 63 Cal. 346. holiday, and the addition of the last clause, Here a notice of appeal was given on Tuesday, are the particulars in which this section is the third of January, the sixtieth day being the amended. second, but the first coming on Sunday. 11. Holidays.

Sec. 11. If the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the fourth of July, or the twenty-fifth day of December, fall upon a Sunday, the Monday following is a holiday. (Amendment, adopted March 30, 1874; Amendments 1873–4, 2; took effect July 6, 1874.)

It will be observed that the thirtieth day the thirtieth day of May is enumerated with of May is omitted from this section. The en the other holidays falling on Sunday. tire section, however, is included in section 10 Holidays, when counted: See note to fol. as amended in 1880, in the last clause of which lowing section; and see sec. 13, and note. 12. Computation of time.

Sec. 12. The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is & holiday, and then it is also excluded. Computation of time. It is now the re

note to next section. Intervening holidays are ceived law in most of the states that time is to counted as part of the computed time. Should be computed as prescribed by the above section. the law require the publication of a notice daily Chief Justice Gray reviews the cases in Bemis for ten days, Sundays excepted, the exception 1. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, and concludes that in favor of the Sunday relates to the daily pubin computing time from the date or from the lishing of the notice, and not to the period of day of the date

, or from a certain act or event, time during which publication is to be counted: the day of the date is to be excluded, unless a Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241; Miles v. McDer. different intention is manifested.” The same moit, Id. 271. And if published on Sunday, Tule is adopted in Mish v. Mayhew, 51 Cal. 514; the fact that the day is a dies non does not Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 190; O'Connorv. Towns, vitiate the service, that publication being but 1 Tex. 107; Goode v. Webb, 52 Ala. 452; Handley one of a series of acts required to make the serv. Cunningham, 12 Busli, 402.

vice complete: Savings and Loan Society v. "Month” is meant to be a calendar and Thompson, 32 Id. 347. In excluding the last pot, a lunar month: Savings and Loan Society prescribed day in estimating the length of time : Thompson, 32 Cal. 347; Spragie v. Norway, for the performance of a duty required by law, 31 Id. 173; but see section 17, infra, subdivision it is necessary to include the following Monday. 4, defining the word “month.”

Where a stat. A publication of a resolution of intention was ute directs the publication of notices a certain pronounced insufficient, it appearing that the number of times a week for a specified number statute required the publication to be made for bumber of weekly publications be observed, cepted," and that the

publication was for four but that the prescribed length of time, calcu: days only, exclusive of the last day, which was lowed : Savings and Loan Societyv. Thompson, 210. Again, in estimating the period for which

a judge may grant an extension of time, under Excluding holidays.--As to the perform section 1054 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, if ance of secular acts falling on a holiday, see the last of the thirty days falls on Sunday it is

to be excluded: Muir v. Gallowny, 61 Id. 498. Time, how computed, and ye See also application of section to redemption and day defined: See post, secs. 32 from sheriff's sale under section 702, post; Per The supreme court is always ham v. Kuper, Id. 331.

the transaction of business: Sec. 134; Fractions of a day will be considered by the thirtieth day in which to make an the courts where time is important, and the hear a cause in bank falls on Sunday rights of parties are concerned: Craig v. God court cannot make the order on the I frey, 1 Cal. 415; People v. Beatty, 14 Id. 566. Adams v. Dohrmann, 63 Cal. 417. 13. Certain acts not to be done on holidays.

Sec. 13. Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a work of sity or mercy, is appointed by law or contract to be performed upon a par day, which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be performed upon th business day with the same effect as if it had been performed upon th appointed.

Day of performance a holiday.-Under Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426; Kuntz v. T this section, a note falling due on Sunday is 48 Mo. 75; Thayer v. Felt, 4 Pick. 354; payable the following Monday, in the absence v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 17; Commonwealth Bra of usage to the contrary; the language of the Varnum, 49 N. Y. 279. In Patrick v. F section being permissive. In Hibernia Bank v. 45 Mo. 314, the principle was not applied O'Grady, 47 Cal. 579, the note in question was mechanic's lieu expiring on Sunday, the held payable on Saturday, the day of maturity thinking that such a lien should be str being Sunday; but this was under a former construed against the lien-holder. Under statute prescribing that such should be the case New Jersey act, a note maturing on Sun with negotiable instruments. The rule of the May 30th, is due and payable on the follow code is that which most generally is observed: Tuesday: Hagerty v. Engle, 43 N. J. L. 29 14. Seal defined.

Sec. 14. When the seal of a court, public officer, or person is required law to be affixed to any paper, the word “seal” includes an impression of su seal upon

the

paper alone as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. An impression of a seal on paper without does not vitiate the record of the writing: Smi wax is suficient: Connolly v. Goodwin, 5 Cal. v. Dall, supra. A corporation may adopt tl 220; and such impression may be made with a seal of a private individual: Gashwiler v. Iillipen: Hastings v. Vaughn, Id. 315. The appel. 33 Id. 11; but when adopted must be used a late court will assume from the letters “L. S.," the seal of the corporation: Richardson v. Scot after a certificate of a notary printed in a tran- R. W. & M. Co., 22 Id. 156. script, that the original was properly executed: Seals other than official are abolished by Toucharil v. Crow, 20 Id. 150. In copying a the Civil Code, sec. 1629. sealed instrument, it is not necessary to tran. Court seals: See secs. 147 et seq., Code Civ. scribe the seal: Jones v. Martin, 16 Id. 165; Proc. Smith v. Dall, 13 Id. 510. An omission of a Seals for private writings: See sec. 1929, county recorder to make any mark for the seal Code Civ. Proc. 15. Joint authority.

Sec. 15. Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.

Executing joint authority. If from the Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow. 239; Ex parte Rogers, delegation of authority it appear that all must 7 Id. 526; so alsó Talcott v. Blanding, 54 Cal. not only meet but all must agree, the authority 289, where all met and a majority decided; must be pursued: People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361. Smith v. Smith, 28 Ill. 56; Tuscarora Bridge Before the code there were many authorities Co. v. Jemison, 33 Ala. 476; McCrary v. Ilar. to the effect that, as a general rule, where the rison, 36 Id. 577: Blodgett v. Prince, 109 Mass. legislature had created a board of commission- 4; Ilenderson v. Bulkley, 14 B. Mon. 236. Not ers and conferred discretionary powers to de- only does section 15 remove the distinction becide upon matters of public interest, but had tween the exercise of a joint authority between made no provision that a majority shall consti- public and private bodies, but also gives to the tute a quorum, all must be present and consult, majority power not only to decide, but to meet though a majority might decide: People v. Cog- and decide; where a majority, a quorum of the hill, supra, citing Grindley v. Barker, 1 Bos. & board, have met, a majority of the quorum may Pul. 229; Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 218; decide: Flint v. Harrington, 63 Cal. 257. 16. Words and phrases.

Sec. 16. Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are de

Id. 35; but the opposite view was entertained in Railroaul Tax Cases, 8 Saw. 235.

fined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.

Words and phrases, how construed.- Wheat. 326; Mayor v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; The above is the general rule with regard to Philalelphia R. Ř. v. Catawissa R. R. Co., 53 the construction of words, whether in contracts, Pa. St. 20; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. But statutes, or constitutions. The meaning to be if a technical word is manifestly used in an given to words in contracts is provided for in untechnical sense, the court will give it the the Civil Code, sections 1644, 1645, and Code meaning intended by the party using it: C. P. of Civil Procedure, section 1861. The follow. R. R. v. Beal, 47 Cal. 151; Clark v. City of ing decisions follow the rule of the codes: Utica, 18 Barb. 151; Robinson v. Varneli, 16 Houghton's Appeal, 42 Cal. 35; People v. Eddy, Tex. 382. And see Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 43 Id. 332; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Id. 111; Waller 387, for a construction of the words "pro rata" 7. Harris, 20 Wend. 555; United States v.Jones, in a will. 3 Wash. 209; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 17. Words, what they include.

Sec. 17. Words used in this code in the present tense include the future as well as the present; words used in the masculine gender include the feminino and neuter; the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular; the word " person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person; "writing" includes printing; "oath” includes affirmation or declaration; every mode of oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced by the term “ testify," and every written one in the term “ depose;" "signature" or "subscription"includes mark, when the person cannot write, his name being written near it, and witnessed by a person who writes his own name as a witness. The following words, also, have in the code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent in the context:

1. The word "property” includes both real and personal property;

[2.] The words “real property” are coextensive with lands, tenements, and hereditaments;

3. The words " personal property” include money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt;

4. The word "month” means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed; 5. The word “ will ” includes codicils;

6. The word "writ” signifies an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of the people, or of a court or judicial officer; and the word "process," a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings;

7. The word “vessel,” when used in reference to shipping, includes ships of all kinds, steamboats and steamships, canal-boats, and every structure adapted to be navigated from place to place;

8. The term “ peace-officer" signifies any of the officers mentioned in section eight hundred and seventeen of the Penal Code.

9. The term “magistrate” signifies any one of the officers mentioned in section eight hundred and eight of the Penal Code;

10. The word "state," when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words

may include the district and territories. [Amendment, approved March 30, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 2; took effect July 6, 1874.) "Person," in its legal signification, is a gen.

“Signature." — Fac-simile of an autograph eric term, and includes artificial as well as nat- printed and used as a signature is a signature: ugal persons: S. V. W. W. v. Schottler, 62 Cal. Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 563. And an at 2016. The word " person, " in the fourteenth cient signing: Ilancock v. Bouman, 49 IM. 413; amendment to the constitution of the United Barnard v. Heydrick, 49 Barb. 62.' But to cut elit es, was thought not to include corporations, a written signature and

alix to another instru: in C, P, R. R. v. Board of Equalization, 266 ment is not a signing

of that instrument: Fox v. Board of Supervisors, Id. 563. The clerk

of a board of supervisors may adopt a printed 81

“United States"

POL. CODE-6

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signature: Williams v. McDonald, 58 Cal. Miller v. Heilborn, 8 Id. 133, illustrate how 527.

this meaning may be qualified by the context. “Masculine" includes “feminine.” There The right to an appeal is property within the is no variance where the indictment charges meaning of the Penal Code, section 519. It the larceny of a “horse” and the proof shows will be an injury to property under this section it to have been a “mare: People v. Pico, to write threatening letters preventing one 62 Cal. 50. Masculine words in statute ex. from prosecuting his appeal: People v. Cad. tend to the feminine gender of that class: man, 57 Id. 562. Foltz v. Iloge, 54 Id. 28.

"Month:" See note to section 12, ante. "Property" includes evidences of debt, as Words used in boundaries are defined in a general rule: People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 331; sections 3903 to 3907 of this code. but People v. Hibernia Bank, 51 Id. 243, and 18. Statutes, laws, or rules inconsistent with code repealed.

Sec. 18. No statute, law, or rule is continued in force because it is consistent with the provisions of this code on the same subject, but in all cases provided for by this code all statutes, laws, and rules heretofore in force in this state whether consistent or not with the provisions of this code, unless expressly continued in force by it, are repealed and abrogated. This repeal or abroga tion does not revive any former law heretofore repealed, nor does it affect an right already existing or accrued, or any action or proceeding already taker except as in this code provided; nor does it affect any private statute n expressly repealed.

Code operating as a repeal of prior new act and the former statute a repeal statutes.-See application of this section to implication will take place: Forqueron power to give other punishment for contempt Donally, 7 W. Va. 114; Golding v. College than as prescribed in this code: Johnson v. Su Chambersburg, 8 Vroom, 258; Covington v. perior Court, 63 Cal. 578; and to sec. 1881, Code of East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 518; Pacific R. R. Civ. Proc., in regard to a wife's testifying against v. Cass County, 33 Mo. 17; W. W. Co. v. B her husband: People v. Langtree, ci Id. 256. hart, 41 Ind. 364; Grant Co. v. Sels, 5 Or. The code commissioners quote the general prin- Hurst v. llawn, Id. 275; People v. Burt ciple of repeal by implication, as laid down in Cal. 561; Ex parte Smith, 40 Id. 419; Esta Perry v. Ames, 26 Id. 382, and stated herein. Wixom, 35 Id. 320; People v. Sargent, 44 after, and then say: "In view of this decision, 430, and cases above cited. There mus the language of the text was necessary, repeal. such a positive repugnancy between the ing all former laws on the same subject, and the old provisions that they cannot whether consistent or not."

together or be consistently reconciled: A Statutes continued in force: See sec. 19. v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; Wood v. United

Repeals by implication.—It being the de. 16 Pet. 342; Clay Co. v. Society for Sa sign of the codifiers to frame a new system of 104 U. S. 579. law, as appears from the note to section 4, ante, The general design undertaken by the the effect of the code upon existing laws must to revise the laws, gives room for the be determined accordingly; yet previous sec cation of another principle in respect t tions of these preliminary provisions disclose struing legislative enactments, which an intention not to disturb existing rights, and effect, embodied in the above section. section 18 must be construed with reference to recognized that a new statute, revising the these sections; the last clause of section 18 de. subject matter of an old one, and evide clares the same thing. The whole provision is tended as a substitute for it, will opera but a formal statement of a well-settled rule repeal of the former law, althouglı it is in the construction of statutes, though the expressly stated: Treadwell v. Yolo Co repeal of statutes by implication is not favored Cal. 563; Stirman v. State, 21 Tex. 7 by the courts: Gordon v. People, 44 Mich. 485; len v. State, 42 Conn. 55; Campbell People v. Webster, 3 Neb. 323; People v. Quigg, 1 Dakota, 17; Swann v. Buck, 40 MI 59 N. Y. 83, 88; People v. Palmer, 52 Id. 82; Strauss v. lleiss, 48 Md. 292; Erwin v Hogan v. Guigon, 29 Gratt. 709; State v. Sev. 15 Ga. 361; Conley v. Calhoun, 2 erance, 55 Mo. 378; W. W. Co. v. Burkhart, 41 416; State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 319 Ind. 364; Merrill v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 42; Sco v. Crocker, 13 How. 429; United States field v. White, 7 Id. 401; People v. S. F. & S.J. 4 Saw. 256; United States v. Tymen, R. R. Co., 28 Id. 236; Buckingham v. Steuben- 93; Leighton v. Walker, 9 N. 11. 59; ville R. R. Co. 10 Ohio St. 25; Goodrich v. Mil- wealth v. Kimball, 21 Þick, 376; L waukee, 24 Wis. 422; Horton v. Mobile, 43 Ala. State, 58 Ind. 333; Ilayes v. State, 598; Gill v. State, 30 Tex. 514; Kerlinger v. Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Id. 60. Jud Burnes, 14 Minn. 526; and, generally, such a in Aurilock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. construction will be given the two provisions menting upon the effect of the seco of the law as will enal,le them both to have of the act of February 5, 1867, effect: Fowler v. Perkins, 77 III. 271; Iverson twenty-fifth section of the judicia v. State, 52 Ala. 170; Crosby v. Patch, 18 Cal. 1789, after stating that it was ma 438; Pond v. Maddox, 38 Id. 574; Wallon v. congress intended “by the latter Wallon, Deady, 605; yet where there is a revise the entire matter to which the plain and unavoidable repugnance between the reference,” said: “We are uf opinio

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