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argued, and, in the very able argument that has been addressed to us in this case by Mr. Bosanquet, these cases have been fully brought before us. I thought it right therefore, ab initio, to go back through the whole thing and see whether or not the view I before expressed was correct and sound, or whether an examination of the statute and authorities tended to remove any doubt there might be in my mind, and would enable me to acquiesce in Mr. Bosanquet's view. Now, for that purpose I have gone further back than the statute in order to see as far as I can what has been the policy of the Legislature. There is, first of all, no doubt to be entertained that by law every person unable from poverty to maintain himself is entitled to be maintained at the expense of the inhabitants of some parish or, place which has the duty thrown upon it of maintaining its own poor, and that place so charged with the liability-and indeed every other place in which a person is found who is likely to become chargeable to the funds for the relief of the poor in ithas a right given to it of causing the removal of the person likely to become chargeable to what is popularly known as the place of settlement of the pauper. That right of removal of poor persons was in existence before the pauper settlement laws came into existence at all. It was in existence as far back as the reign of Richard II. and also Henry VII., in which years various Acts of Parliament were passed which insisted or asserted that poor persons and persons of certain descriptions should resort to certain places; and it is remarkable, in regarding the modern legislation upon the subject, how much that modern legislation agrees with the first legislation, because the whole spirit of the Acts of Henry VII. and Richard II. was that persons of certain descriptions were to resort to certain places where, in the language of the Act, they had become conversant, or had dwelt, or had abided. Therefore the policy in those days, if you found a vagrant or a person not having means of support, was to hold that the proper place for that person to resort to was a place where he was conversant and where he would find friends or persons likely to support him, or associate with him. That continued the state of the law until the time of Charles II. when the Act was passed which defines the law of settlement until recent changes have been effected by this Act, and in one instance by the Poor Law Act of 4 & 5 Will. 4. Now the of state things, therefore, which ultimately became settled, was that which came into existence by the statute of 13 & 14 Car. 2, which fixed the right of removal of persons likely to become chargeable, and consequently their place of settlement was deemed to be in the place where the paupers were last legally settled. Every word is important. 'Last legally settled "-he might have been settled in a dozen places, but the place where he was last legally settled was asserted to be the one to which he was to be removed, and therefore it became technically known as the place of settlement." Now the persons we have to deal with here who are to be removed, consist of a married woman and three children, all the children being under the age of sixteen, and of course unemancipated. If a question had arisen about the removal of these four persons before the statute which we have to construe, viz., 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s: 35,

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the state of things would have been this: The wife might have been removed to the place of her husband's settlement, because she derived that settlement from her husband. That would have been the state of things before 39 & 40 Vict., and is the state of things still, because, although that Act intended to abolish and did abolish derivative settlement in general, it excepted the wife from it, and therefore left the law as it was before upon that head. Therefore whatever construction you may put upon the Act the wife must be removed to the place of her husband's settlement. It seems to me that the policy of the Legislature was very clear, namely, that it would be very undesirable to separate husband and wife; and if you abolished her derivative settlement by marriage she would have had to go to her place of birth, because women, as a rule, very rarely have acquired any settlement of their own, and the probability is that a very large percentage of married women have no other than the derivative settlement of their husbands or birth settlement. In a great majority of cases if you were to send the wife to her birth settlement it would be a very different place from the husband's settlement, and the effect would be at once to separate them. It is most important to observe that the tendency of all modern legislation has been to increase the facility of gaining a settlement. In this very Act that we have to construe the Legislature has shown its intention of reducing irremovability as much as possible, and fixing the settlement as much as possible at the last place where the pauper had been conversant, by converting the status of irremovability of three years into a settlement, and since then, if I remember rightly, that term has been reduced to one year. So the effect is that any man having lived for a year in a place (that of course is not a very long time) has acquired a settlement in his own right, and therefore the wife presumably would go to the place where she had been recently dwelling, and therefore it would be a place possibly much better for her to be removed to than to the place of her birth, which she may have left for many years, and where, possibly, all her friends may be dead and gone. That is the matter as it stands with regard to the wife. By the old law, as well as by the new law, she has the same settlement as she had before, namely, the settlement of her husband. Then, with regard to the children, the case before the statute stood thus: They are legitimate children, and under the age of sixteen and unemancipated, and, consequently, before the statute, they would have derived their settlement from the father or mother, or would have been settled where they were born; but the foundation of all this is that birth is only a prima facie settlement, it does not become a conclusive settlement except in those cases where the derivative settlement is not known. I have said that these are legitimate children-and we have upon the present occasion, of course, nothing to do with bastard children, except by way of illustration-and in that view it is important to look at the legislation with reference to bastard children for the purpose of ascertaining the policy of the Legislature on the enactment now before us. Originally bastard children were in a different position to legitimate children; they were the children of nobody, and could derive nothing from anybody; they could not derive a settlement, and consequently of

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necessity were always removed to the place of their birth, with one exception, and which exception shows the anxiety on the part of the Legislature not to separate people who cannot take care of themselves. There was an exception in the case of nurslings who up to a certain tender age could not be separated from the mother. The law as to bastards was altered by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 71, which made a bastard child follow the settlement of the mother until the age of sixteen, or until it had acquired a settlement in its own right. I have adverted to that for the sake of pointing out by way of illustration the policy of the Legislature in regard to the removal to one and the same place of the mother and the child. The legitimate children were first of all benefited by the Act we have to deal with. Before the passing of that Act these three children now in question would have had the last settlement of their father, and it may be that that would have the effect of separating them from their mother; but the statute in question not only excepts the mother from the abolition of derivative settlement, but also excepts the children. Sect. 35 says: "No person shall be deemed to have derived a settlement from any other person, whether by parentage, estate, or otherwise" (I have endeavoured to find out how it is that the word estate has crept in there, and I think it must be by accident that the word has crept in) "except in the case of a wife from her husband and in the case of a child under the age of sixteen." Therefore, a child under sixteen is excepted and may still derive a settlement by parentage. What is the settlement which it is to derive from parentage? It is to be the settlement of its father or its widowed mother, as the case may be, up to the age of sixteen. Then the section goes on: "Which child may take the settlement of its father or its widowed mother, as the case may he, up to that age, and shall retain the settlement so taken until it shall acquire another." Therefore, again, the Legislature fixes the child's settlement at that of the parent up to a particular age, and it prevents what was previously the state of things, namely, the applicability of the removal of the child to any subsequent settlement acquired by the father. It therefore fixes the child's settlement at that place where it was most likely the child would be conversant, that is to say, the most recent place of the father's settlement; and, inasmuch as that is reduced now to one year, it would most probably be a settlement of recent date. So far as possible it seems that the Legislature says: "Let the child go to its parent and with its parent," but then there was this further to be provided for: if the section had stopped there, the child being excepted from the abolition of derivative settlement, and still deriving its settlement by this very Act with its parent, it might turn out that the parent's settlement was a derivative settlement at a period prior to the abolition of derivative settlement, and might still therefore be the settlement of the child. That would be doing the very thing which the Legislature seemed to desire not to do, and that is to go back to a derivative settlement acquired, perhaps, from a grandfather no one knows when. Therefore, if the section stopped there, the effect would have been still that you might have to send the child a long way from where the child was conversant and abided, and that it

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appears to me the Legislature intended not to do, and it proceeded to legislate in regard to it, and provided: "If any child in this section men. tioned shall not have acquired a settlement for itself, or, being a female, shall not have derived a settlement from her husband" (let me pause here to say I am unable at present to concur in the construction which has been put upon the words "any child" there, for reasons that my brother Cave will state), "and it cannot be shown what settlement such child or female derived from the parent without inquiring into the derivative settlement of such parent, such child or female shall be deemed to be settled in the parish in which he or she was born." Therefore, it being the intention to abolish derivative settlement, it would seem that the Legislature thought, in that particular event, it would be better for a child to be sent to its place of birth rather than any other place. Whether that is a wise policy, whether it was exactly right, and whether it has secured the very object the Legislature intended, I am not prepared to say, but, I may say generally it seems to me to have been wise and prudent, though no doubt it is open to the observation made by Mr. Bosanquet to the effect that some cases may arise where it will work the very mischief which the general policy of the Act intended to prevent. I cannot help thinking that in the great majority of cases the policy is not only sound and good, but, in my opinion, according to the plain meaning of the Legislature. I am glad to find that my brother Cave concurs in the views I have expressed, but, although we have arrived at the same conclusion, our grounds are quite independent of each other. I entertain the same view as I have before expressed, and therefore I now hold that in my opinion the order of the quarter sessions is quite right, and must be affirmed.

CAVE, J.-The question in this case is, what construction is to be placed on the 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 35-a question not free from difficulty owing partly to the language of the section and partly to the interpretation which appears to have been placed upon it by judicial decisions. The section first enacts that "No person shall be deemed to have derived a settlement from any other person, whether by parentage, estate, or otherwise." Now, stopping there for a moment, it may be observed that there are only two species of derivative settlements, viz., settlement by marriage and settlement by parentage. By the former, if a woman married a man who had a known settlement, she acquired the husband's settlement, and she took every subsequent settlement which he might obtain until his death. If the husband had no settlement, then the prior settlement of the wife continued. By the latter, legitimate children took the settlement of their father, and they took successively any settlement which the father might from time to time acquire before their emancipation. If the father had not a settlerent acquired by his own act, they took the settlement he derived from his parents till it could be traced no further, and recourse was then had to the maiden settlement of the mother. If neither father nor mother had a known settlement acquired or derivative, the children were settled in the place of their birth until they acquired another settlement by their own act. The case of an illegitimate child differed. Previous to the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 the settlement

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arising from the place of birth of a bastard was in general only superseded by a settlement subsequently acquired by the bastard in his own behalf; but by sect. 71 of that Act it was enacted that "every child born a bastard after the passing of this Act shall have and follow the settlement of the mother of such child until such child shall attain the age of sixteen or shall acquire a settlement in its own right." In Reg v. St. Mary Newington (4 Q. B. Rep. 581) it was held that by virtue of this section illegitimate children (differing in this respect from legitimate children) followed the mother's settlement acquired by marriage after their birth and while they were under sixteen years of age; and in Bodenham v. St. Andrews (1 Ell. & Bl. 465) it was held that illegitimate children followed the mother's settlement only until they were sixteen, and that a bastard who had attained that age without having acquired any settlement of its own was settled in the place of its birth, though the mother was settled elsewhere. Now, applying so much of the 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 35, as has been already cited to the previous law, a wife could no longer have taken the settlement of her husband, nor a legitimate child that of its parents or a bastard that of its mother. The section, however, proceeds to make the following exceptions from the generality of this first part: "Except in the case of wife from her husband and in the case of a child under the age of sixteen, which child shall take the settlement of its father or of its widowed mother, as the case may be, up to that age, and shall retain the settlement so taken until it shall acquire another.” Now, the exception in the case of a wife has been held entirely to exclude derivative settlement by marriage out of the operation of the first part of the section, so that a wife will take the settlement the husband has at the time of the marriage, whether acquired or derivative, and every subsequent settlement which he may obtain until his death: (Great Yarmouth v. City of London, 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 712; 3 Q. B. Div. 232.) The subsequent exception seems to exclude derivative settlement by parentage out of the operation of the first part of the section to this extent, that a child will take the settlement of its father so long as he lives, and the subsequently-acquired settlement of its widowed mother only up to the age of sixteen, and not up to emancipation as before. The latter part of this exception seems intended to preclude the interpretation which was put on sect. 71 of the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 in Bodenham v. St. Andrews (ubi sup.) since it goes on to provide that the child shall retain the settlement so taken (that is, the settlement of its father or widowed mother which it actually has at the age of sixteen) until it shall acquire another. The next part of the section, "an illegitimate child shall retain the settlement of its mother until such child acquires another settlement," seems obviously intended to abrogate the rule laid down as to illegitimate children in Bodenham v. St. Andrews. Had the section stopped here a doubt might have arisen whether the settlement of its father or of its widowed mother which the legitimate child was to take and retain, or the settlement of its mother which the bastard was to retain, included not only their birth settlements or settlements acquired in their own right, but also, in the case of the father, a settlement derived

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by parentage, or, in the case of the mother, a settlement derived by parentage or marriage. The section accordingly goes on to provide as follows: "If any child in this section mentioned shall not have acquired a settlement for itself, or, being a female, shall not have derived a settlement from her husband, and it cannot be shown what settlement such child or female derived from the parent without inquiring into the derivative settlement of such parent, such child or female shall be deemed to be settled in the parish in which he or she was born," or, in other words, a legitimate child will, up to the age of sixteen, take the last settlement which the widowed mother may have acquired in her own right after the death of its father, or, failing that, it will take the last settlement the father shall have acquired in his own right, or, in the absence of any such settlement, it will take the father's birth settlement, and it will retain the settlement which it had at the age of sixteen until it had acquired another in its own right, but it will in no case take any derivative settlement acquired by the widowed mother by a second marriage (Keynsham Union v. Bedminster Union, 3 Q. B. Div. 344), or any derivative settlement acquired by either parent by parentage; while an illegitimate child up to the age of sixteen will take the last settlement, which the mother may have acquired in her own right. and, in the absence of any such settlement, it will take her birth settlement, and will retain the settlement which it had at the age of sixteen until it has acquired another in its own right, but will in no case take any derivative settlement acquired by the mother by parentage or (abrogating Bodenham v. St. Andrews) by marriage. This being, as it seems to me, the natural construction to put on the section in question, I am next led to inquire whether any other construction has been put upon the section by any previous case. The first case to which we were referred is that of Westburyon-Severn v. Barrow-in-Furness (38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 315; 3 Ex. Div. 88). In that case the pauper, who was more than sixteen at the time of the passing of the 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, had acquired no settlement of his own, but before he had attained the age of sixteen his father had acquired a settlement in his own right by estate. The appellants contended that the first two lines of the 35th section were retrospective so as to take away the derivative settlement the pauper would otherwise have gained, but that the exception in the same clause of the Act was not retrospective and consequently that the pauper had lost the old derivative settlement, and had not acquired the new modified. It is not surprising that this contention was unsuccessful, but the decision (with which I entirely agree) in no respect conflicts with the view which I have taken above of the construction of the section. Indeed, the observation at page 94 of the judgment directly supports that view. It is there said that " If, in order to prove the place of settlement of the pauper, as derived from the father, it had been necessary to prove the derivative settlement of the father, then, by the direct enactment of the 35th section, the pauper would be deemed to be settled in the parish where he was born." The next case which was cited to us was Great Yarmouth v. The City of London (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 712; 3 Q. B. Div. 232), in which it was held that the wife of a man

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who had while under the age of sixteen derived a settlement from his father took this derivative settlement of her husband, and not his birth settlement. There is no doubt that in that case the husband, being within the clear language of the Act, took a derivative settlement from his father, and all that the case decided is that, under these circumstances, the wife takes the derivative settlement of her husband under the exception in the first paragraph of the section, "except in the case of a wife from her husband." For myself, I should not like to express au opinion on this point without further consideration; but, at any rate, this case is no authority for holding that, notwithstanding the third paragraph, the children of the husband would have taken the settlement which their father derived from his parent. The next case in point of time is Woodstock Union v. St. Pancras (39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 256; 4 Q. B. Div. 1), in which it was held that a female pauper whose father had never acquired a settlement of his own, did not take the derivative settlement which the father while under sixteen had acquired from his father, but was settled in the place of her birth by virtue of the third paragraph of the section. This decision again is entirely in conformity with the construction I place on the section in question, and I heartily subscribe to the judgment delivered in that case, especially to that of my brother Field. The next case is Manchester v. St. Pancras (41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 218; 4 Q. B. Div. 409), in which it was held that an illegitimate child under sixteen is, by the third paragraph of the section, precluded from taking the settlement of its mother where such settlement has been derived from her marriage. In that case the pauper, who was nine years of age, was born three years after his mother, who had since died, had been divorced from her husband, and Lush, J. says that the words in the third paragraph, "Any child in this section mentioned," mean any legitimate or illegitimate child, and that there is nothing to confine the expression "any child" to any particular class of children. The next case is The Guardians of Hollingbourne v. The Guardians of West Ham (44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 520; 6 Q. B. Div. 580), and as that case was much pressed upon us, and has caused me to hesitate greatly, it is necessary to examine it somewhat closely. By an order of removal, affirmed at quarter sessions, it was adjudged that the last legal settlement of Sarah Thorndycraft and her four children, who were all under the age of sixteen, was in the parish of Sutton Valence. John Thorndycraft the younger, husband of Sarah, was born in Hackney, but acquired no settlement in his own right. John Thorndycraft senior, the father of the husband, was born in Sutton Valence in 1804, but lived and was married in the parish of Hackney, and never acquired any settlement in his own right. It was admitted that Sarah Thorndycraft was legally settled in the parish of Sutton Valence, I presume on the ground that she took the derivative settlement of her husband, and not his birth settlement, and in deference to the authority of Great Yarmouth v. The City of London (ubi sup.). The question for the court was what settlement the children took, and it was held that they took the settlement of the mother, although that settlement would only be arrived at by inquiring MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIII.

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into her derivative settlement. Looking at the judgment, the court there seems to have held that the first paragraph referred only to children who had a father or widowed mother alive, the second to illegitimate children of any age, and' the third to legitimate children who had not a father or mother alive, and to illegitimate children of any age. I find myself unable to assent to this division. By the first paragraph, as I read it, children on their birth take their father's settlement, as they would have done before the Act, except that they take no settlement he may acquire after they have attained the age of sixteen years. If that is so, they take on their birth the settlement their father then has, and they continue to follow each successive settlement acquired by him in his own right (Cumner v. Milton, 2 Salk. 528) until they attain sixteen, when they no longer take any future settlement he may acquire, but retain that they had at sixteen until they acquire another in their own right. If the father dies before they are sixteen, they retain the settlement they had at his death, unless the widowed mother subsequently acquires one in her own right, in which case they take each successive settlement she may so acquire in her own right up to the time of their attaining the age of sixteen, when they retain the settlement last acquired from her until they acquire another in their own right. The assumption that they only take the father or widowed mother's settlement so long as he or she is living, is, it seems to me, inconsistent with the provision at the end of the first paragraph that the child shall take the settlement of the father, &c., up to sixteen, and shall retain the settlement so taken until it shall acquire another. To my mind the words "in the case of a child under the age of sixteen" include all legitimate children, whether the parents are alive or dead. I am also unable to assent to the proposition that the second paragraph includes legitimate children of any age. As I have shown above, under the Act of 1834 illegitimate children took the settlement of their mother only up to the age of sixteen, and on arriving at that age lost her settlement, and took their birth settlement only. The second paragraph of the section in question does not say that illegitimate children shall take any settlement acquired by their mother after they have attained the age of sixteen, but only that they shall retain the settlement of the mother which by the previous law they took only up to that age until they have acquired another settlement. This construction put an illegitimate child on the same foo'ing with reference to a settlement derived from its mother as a legitimate child is with reference to a settlement derived from its father, or after his death from its widowed mother, except that, had the section stopped there, an illegitimate child would have taken the settlement acquired by its mother by marriage subse quently to its birth, while a legitimate child would not have done so : (Keynsham Union v. Bedminster Union (ubi sup.) I am also unable to accede to the view that the third paragraph applies to legitimate children under sixteen not having a father or mother alive, and also to illegitimate childrer, whether under or over sixteen. The words are "any child in this section mentioned" which to my thinking must include both the legitimate children mentioned in the first paragraph, and the illegitimate children men,

L

tioned in the second, and cannot refer to any children not included in one or other of those paragraphs. If I am right, the effect of the third paragraph is to cut down both the first and second so as to prevent children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, taking any derivative settlement of their parents, and also, again, to put legitimate and illegitimate children on the same footing by preventing the latter from taking the settlement of the mother acquired by subsequent marriage; while, if Guardians of Hollingbourne v. Guardians of West Ham is right, a distinction is introduced between legitimate children under sixteen who have a parent alive and those who have not, and also between legitimate children under sixteen and illegitimate children of the same age in respect of the settlement they take from their respective mothers. Although, however, I am unable to agree with the decision of the court in this case, I should probably have felt myself bound by it had it not been, as it seems to me, inconsistent with the principles laid down in Manchester v. St Pancras (ubi sup.). Both cases were before the court which decided the still later case of Reg. v. Guardians of Portsea (7 Q. B. Div. 384); and, although the two cases were alleged in the argument to be inconsistent, the court there followed the case of Manchester v. St. Pancras without attempting to distinguish it from the later case. I think, therefore, that I am free in this conflict of authority to follow that which approves itself to my judgment. Applying the principles I have referred to to the present case, I am of opinion that the children in this case come within the first paragraph, and would have taken the settlement of their father William, or, failing that, the settlement of their mother, had they not also fallen within the third paragraph which precludes their taking the settlement of either, because neither father nor mother had any but a derivative settlement. As to the argument drawn from the supposed policy of the law against separating the children from their parents, I am, I confess, unable to discover what that policy is. It is true that if a father has none but a derivative settlement, on my interpretation of the section, he will be separated from his children if all become chargeable together; but that, as it seems to me, will also be the case if the widowed mother marries again. Looking, however, at the facility given for acquiring a settlement by sect. 34 of the Act of 1876 it seems probable that questions as to derivative settlement will not be very frequent in future.

Solicitors for the appellants, C. R. and H. Cuff, agents for G. Burd, Ironbridge.

Solicitors for the respondents, Sole, Turner, and Knight, agents for Cooper and Haslewood, Bridgnorth.

Tuesday, Nov. 14, 1882.

(Before FIELD and STEPHEN, JJ.) THE OXENHOPE DISTRICT LOCAL BOARD (apps.) v. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF BRADFORD (resps.). (a)

Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), 88. 207, 210, 211, 216-Highway rate-Public works of paving.

By sect. 216, sub-sect. 3, of the Public Health Act (a) Reported by H. D. BONSEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

1875 it is provided that "where no public works of paving, water supply, and sewerage are established in the district, the cost of repair of highways in the district shall be defrayed out of a highway rate to be levied throughout the whole district by the urban authority as surveyor of highways."

The appellants, a local district board, made a general district rate, and a highway rate, and demanded the same from the respondents, who had constructed two compensation reservoirs in connection with the supply of water for the town of B.

The respondents contended that the local board had no power to levy a highway rate, because in 1880 they laid down in their district a curbstone (about 300 yards long) as a coping to a cinder pathway of a carriage road.

Held, that putting down the curbstone did not constitute the establishment of public works of paving within the meaning of sect. 216, sub-sect. 3 of the Public Health Act 1875, and therefore the appeilants were entitled to levy a highway rate. SPECIAL CASE.

This is a case stated by us, the undersigned four of Her Majesty's justices of the peace, in and for the West Riding of the county of York, under the 33rd section of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the court on questions of law which arose before us as hereinafter stated:

1. At a petty sessional court, holden at the sessions-house in Keighley, in and for the petty sessional division of Keighley, in the said riding, on the 5th day of May 1882, we heard and determined a summons, of which the following is a copy:

Between the Oxenhope District Local Board, by Joseph Heap, of Oxenhope, their clerk, plaintiffs, and the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford, defendants. To the above-named defendants.-You are hereby summoned to appear before the court of summary jurisdiction sitting at the sessions-house, in Keighley, in the West Riding of the county of York, on Friday, the fourteenth day of April 1882, at the hour of ten o'clock in the forenoon, to answer the plaintiffs to a claim, the particulars of which are hereunto annexed.

2. The following is a copy of the particulars annexed to the said summons :

To the Bradford Corporation. W. T. McGowen, Esq., Town Clerk.-Gentlemen,-I have to demand payment to the Oxenhope District Local Board of the sum of 2031. 88. 2d., being as to 361. 19s. 8d., part thereof, for a general district rate at fourp nce in the pound made on the 14th Oct. 1881, on the reservoir and water conduits at Leesham, Oxenhope, the rateable value of which is 915., and on the reservoir and conduits at Leeming, Oxenhope, the rateable value of which is 13041., and as to 1661. 8s. 6d., the remainder thereof, for a highway rate at 18. 6d. in the pound, made the 14th of October 1881, on the above-mentioned property. Also a sum of 1s. 5d., being for a general district rate at fourpence in the pound, made on the 14th of October 1881, on a cottage at Scar Hall, Oxenhope, in the occupation of John Stansfield, the rateable value of which is 4. 58., and 6s. 4§d. for a highway rate at 1s. 6d. in the pound, made on the 14th of October 1881, on the same property.-Yours truly, JOSEPH HEAP, Clerk.-March 17th, 1882.

3. Upon such hearing the appellants produced their rate book, from which it appears that the respondents were not rated therein for the said cottage at Scar Hall, Oxenhope, in the occupation of John Stansfield, in respect of which the said sums of 18. 5d. and 68. 44d. were claimed; but that the occupier of the same cottage was therein rated in respect thereof. The appellants there