CT. OF APP.]

covenantee, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff here. There was undoubtedly a reservation to the covenantee, which was for the benefit of his land and the occupiers of it in relation to his right to cross this road in respect of and for agricultural purposes without paying tolls; but it is conceded that this right or easement, or whatever it was, is gone, and here we are dealing with a covenant in which the public is constantly referred to, not the owners and assigns of the land. The words are, "shall and will for ever hereafter' (that is, the road) "be kept open and used as and for a road for the use of the public." That shows this, that, although the covenantee thought it would benefit himself and the other owners of the adjoining land to have a road which they as members of the public might use, this covenant is not a covenant which was made and entered into in such a way as that it relates to or touches and concerns the land of the covenantee. In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff fails to make out that the benefit of this covenant can be said so to run with the land as to enable him, as the assign of the covenantee, to maintain this action. That being so, I think I need hardly go through many of the cases; but some of them, perhaps, one ought to mention. Holmes v. Buckley is one. It is doubtful whether that case was decided on the ground that the covenant ran with the land, because there the land of the plaintiff was nothing but the easement of a watercourse; and it is suggested that that decision really must not be looked upon as an authority that the benefit of the covenant would run with such an easement; but I should think myself that the watercourse must have been used to convey water to adjoining land of the plaintiff, and probably it was in respect of that land that the covenant was said to run with the land. However, I will not enter further into that case, because one of my learned brethren will do so more fully; but even if that is an authority as to the burden or a benefit of the covenant running with or against the land, one can see it has no application to the point on which I decide this case, because there the watercourse must undoubtedly have been for the benefit of the adjoining land of the grantee. Then as to the other case of Morland v. Cook, I have explained what the case really is, and although Lord Romilly did decide that that covenant would run with the land, I do not think, having regard to the explanation which I have given, one need consider that an authority which ought to trouble one either as regards the benefit or burden of the covenant; but, as regards benefit, a covenant for the keeping up of a sea wall which would prevent the land in question, owned by the plaintiff, from being flooded, from being drowned, was doubtedly a covenant with reference to the benefit to be enjoyed by the land by the keeping of the sea out. Then Western v. Macdermott was another decision of Lord Romilly, and he did express his opinion that there the covenant ran with the land, but there the covenant was one which was much more pointedly and directly for the benefit of the plaintiff or the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, because it was a covenant not to build on adjoining land, the evidence being that it was not for the benefit of mere members of the public other than the owner of the adjoining land, but to prevent the adjoining land being made less commodious by the erection of buildings on the

un

[CT. OF APP.

land of the covenantor. Then there is the case of Cooke v. Chilcott, which was before Malins, V.C., where he likewise expressed an opinion that the covenant ran with the land. He did not base his opinion on the cases I have mentioned, but it was a case where there was very little, if any, difficulty as regards the benefit of the covenant touching and relating to land of the plaintiff, because it was to erect a pump and pump water from the land of the defendant's predecessor in title to the land of the plaintiff's predecessor in title, and there was reference to the benefit of the land, which showed that that was the object of the covenant. As to whether it was right to express any opinion as to the burden running with the land I say nothing, but there is no authority which can in any way interfere, when fairly regarded, with the opinion which I express, that the covenant in the present case was neither in terms nor in its obvious sense such as to be a covenant relating to, or touching and concerning, the land of the plaintiff's predecessor in title. So, in my opinion, this point that there is a covenant on which the plaintiff can sue the corporation at law is one which cannot be maintained, and so far as this case depended on that, in my opinion the appeal fails. If one had been of opinion that either at equity or at law the plaintiff could have relied on this covenant as against the corporation, it would have been necessary to consider what would have been the effect of the 268th section of the Public Health Act 1875, which points out what is to be done if a person charged considers that he has been charged too much; but, as I decide this case on the other point, that neither in equity nor law can the plaintiff successfully rely on this covenant, think it is not necessary to enter into the question as to how far that section would prevent him from arguing the contention before us that what he has been called upon to pay should be reduced by striking off such proportion of this expense as is attributable to repairs which ought to be done by the trustees under the deed of covenant.

I

LINDLEY, L.J.-The controversy in this case has arisen in this way: There is a road called Shaw-road, in Oldham, and the defendants, who are the Corporation of Oldham, have recently paved, flagged, sewered, and repaired it. The plaintiff has some land adjoining the road, and the corporation have sought to charge him with what would be, under ordinary circumstances, his share of so making the road, paving, and draining it. He says that the corporation have no right to charge him with any of that expense; but if they have, they have no right to charge him with the whole of it. Now, the first point, whether they have a right to charge him with any of it, depends upon the question whether this Shaw-road is or is not a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large" within the meaning of sect. 150 of the Public Health Act. Mr. Austerberry maintains that it is a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. The ViceChancellor has expressed a doubt whether that expression in sect. 150-" highway repairable by the inhabitants at large"- -is synonymous with all highways; whether it does not mean highways repairable by the inhabitants at large primarily, and whether the turnpike roads, and so on, which are primarily repairable by the public, though they may be repairable at common law by the inhabitants

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CT. OF APP.]

at large, are within that expression. I think there is some doubt about that, but it is unnecessary to decide that question for the reasons that have been mentioned at length by Cotton, L.J., and to which I will very shortly refer. I think it is very doubtful, but it is unnecessary to decide, whether it is possible to dedicate to the public a highway subject to a toll. I do not say it is not, but I am very far from saying that it is. But whatever doubt there may be upon that point, which, if we had to decide, I should like to investigate further, it appears to me impossible to hold that a highway is dedicated to the public subject to a toll which may fluctuate from day to day. This highway was constituted under a trust deed giving the trustees a power to levy tolls if they liked, and to change them whenever they liked; and it appears to me quite impossible not to see that that is not a dedication to the public-it is liberty to such of the public as choose to pay the toll to use the road, that is all. I cannot come to the conclusion that the road was

ever dedicated to the public. That appears to me to be the short answer (I need not go further into it) to that first point; and in my opinion this road is within sect. 150 of the Public Health Act, and upon the first point the corporation is right. But then arises another and a totally different point. The plaintiff says: "You, the corporation, have bought or acquired this road under an Act of Parliament which places you in the position of, and in no better position than, those from whom you got it; you acquired it from certain trustees, and those trustees covenanted with my predecessors in title to keep this road open for the public, and to repair it. You are bound by that covenant to repair, and I am in a position to enforce against you that covenant." First, it seems to have been thought that that covenant was so worded as to cover everything which the corporation had done-I mean by "everything the metalling, and paving, and sewering; but when the covenant is looked at it is seen that it is not extensive enough to cover that; and, therefore, whatever may be the merits of the case, the corporation must be right as to a great portion of the charges made against the plaintiff. But, then, there is the covenant which extends (to use a short word) to repairing, and the plaintiff says that at all events to the extent to which the corporation have incurred expense in repairing the road, to that extent they are bound to exonerate him by virtue of that covenant. That gives rise to one or two questions of law. The first question which I will consider is, whether that covenant runs with the land, as it is called-whether the benefit of it runs with the land held by the plaintiff, and whether the burden of it runs with the land held by the defendants, because, if the covenant does run at law, then the plaintiff, so far as I can see, would be right as to this portion of his claim. Now, as regards the benefit running with the plaintiff's land, the covenant is, so far as the road goes, a covenant to repair the road; what I mean by that is, there is nothing in the deed which points particularly to that portion of the road which abuts upon or fronts the plaintiff's land-it is a covenant to repair the whole of the road, no distinction being made between the portion of that road which joins or abuts upon his land and the rest of the road; in other words, it is a covenant simply to make and maintain

[CT. OF APP.

this road as a public highway; there is no covenant to do anything whatever on the plaintiff's land, and there is nothing pointing to the plaintiff's land in particular. Now it appears to me to be going a long way to say that the benefit of that covenant runs with the plaintiff's land. I do not overlook the fact that the plaintiff as a frontager has certain rights of getting on to the road, and if this covenant had been so worded as to show that there had been an intention to grant him some particular benefit, in respect of that particular part of his land, possibly we might have said that the benefit of the covenant did run with this land, but when you look at the covenant, it is a mere covenant with him, as with all adjoining owners, to make this road, a small portion of which only abuts on his land, and there is nothing specially relating to his land at all. I cannot see myself how any benefit of this covenant runs with his land. But it strikes me. I confess, that there is a still more formidable objection as regards the burden. Does the burden of this covenant run with the land so as to bind the defendants? The defendants have acquired the road under the trustees, and they are bound by such covenant as runs with the land. Now we come to face the difficulty: does a covenant to repair all this road run with the land - that is, does the burden of it descend upon those to whom the road may be assigned in future? We are not dealing here with a case of landlord and tenant. The authorities which refer to that class of cases have little if any bearing upon the case which we have to consider, and I am not prepared to say that any covenant which imposes a burden upon land does run with the land, unless the covenant does, upon the true construction of the deed, amount to either a grant of an casement, or a rentcharge, or some estate or interest in the land. A mere covenant to repair, or to do something of that kind, does not seem to me, I confess, to run with the land in such a way as to bind those who may acquire it. It is remarkable that the authorities upon this point, when they are examined, are very few, and it is also remarkable that in no case that I know of, except one which I shall refer to presently, is there anything like authority to say that a burden of this kind will run with the land. That point has often been discussed, and I rather think the conclusion at which the editors of the last edition of Smith's Leading Cases have come to is right, that no case has been decided which does establish that such a burden can run with the land in the sense in which I am now using that expression. The case of Holmes v. Buckley (1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 27) looks a little like it at first; but the observation to be made on that case I think is this: in the first place it is quite plain that there the plaintiff bad a cause of action; he was entitled to an injunction of some sort to restrain the defendants from interrupting his watercourse. The right of the plaintiff to enforce specifically the covenant to repair, or rather to cleanse the watercourse, is obscure, and we have not got the decree which was pronounced, and I confess that, having only that short note of it which is to be found in Equity Cases Abridged, I fail to understand the exact grounds of that decision, if it was a decision specifically enforcing that covenant to cleanse. I doubt whether it was a decision to that effect, but the case is too loosely

CT. OF APP.]

case

reported to be a guide on the point. Now, Morland v. Cook (ubi sup.), another case in which it was said that the covenant ran with the land, is intelligible on this ground-that there was there that which amounted to the creation of a rentcharge for the repair of the sea wall, which was in question. That is intelligible enough, and if the covenant in the present amounted to anything of the kind, of course the observations I am now making would not be applicable. The case before Malins, V.C. of Cooke v. Chicott has been so shaken that I cannot rely upon it as an authority at all. I think the Vice-Chancellor did intimate an opinion that the covenant there would run with the land. I confess I doubt the correctness of that opinion. He decided the case upon another point, and upon that other point only has it been followed. There is no other authority that I am aware of that such a covenant as this runs with the land, unless it is Western v. MacDermott, where the Court of Appeal did not sanction the notion that the covenant in that case ran with the land, although the covenant was a purely restrictive covenant. I am not aware of any other case which either shows, or appears to show, that a burden such as this can be annexed to land by a mere covenant, such as we have got here; and in the absence of authority it appears to me that we shall be perfectly warranted in saying that the burden of this covenant does not run with the land. After all

it is a mere personal covenant. If the parties had intended to charge this land for ever, into whosoever hands it came, with the burden of repairing the road, there are ways and means known to conveyancers by which it could be done with comparative ease; all that would have been necessary would have been to create a rentcharge and charge it on the tolls, and the thing would have been done. They have not done anything of the sort, and therefore it seems to me to show that they did not intend to have a covenant which should run with the land. That disposes of the part of the case which is perhaps the most difficult. Now the other point was this: that even if it did not run with the land at law, still, upon the authority of Tulk v. Moxhay, the defendants having bought the land with notice of this covenant, take the land subject to it. Mr. Collins very properly did not press that upon us, because after the two recent decisions in the Court of Appeal in Haywood v. The Brunswick Permanent Building Society and The London and SouthWestern Railway Company v. Gomm that argument is untenable. Tulk v. Mochay cannot be extended to covenants of this description. It appears to me therefore, I confess, that upon all points the plaintiff has failed, and that the appeal ought to be dismissed.

FRY, L.J.-I have very little to do in this case except to express my assent and concurrence with the conclusion of my learned brothers. Upon the question of dedication, I think it plain that there has been no dedication to the public of the road in question. I doubt whether there can be a dedication of a road to the public with a levy of a toll, unless under a grant from the Crown; but that point is one which it is not needful now to decide. In the present case what is relied upon as a dedication is the language used in the deed of settlement; but I regard that as a mere convention between the parties who associated them

[CT. OF APP.

selves together for a private enterprise, and covenanted that they would open the road to the public subject to a toll to be varied from time to time, with an eye, no doubt, to the dividends which they were to declare amongst the shareholders. I consider that they no more dedicated the road to the public than a company formed for the purpose of carrying on a theatre or a pleasure garden dedicates the theatre or the pleasure garden to the public because they agree among themselves that they will admit the public, subject to the payment of a toll. Upon the second point I have not much to add. It appears to me that the questions are three. In the first place, did the benefit of this covenant run with the land -the land of Mr. Elliott? Upon that point my opinion is perhaps not quite as confident as that of my learned brothers. I am rather more inclined to think that the road connecting the land with the public highway was so far an incident to the use and occupation of the remainder of Mr. Elliott's land that it might be conceivable that it came within the principles of covenants relating to things incident to the land; but, at the same time, I do not desire to express any difference of opinion upon that. But upon the point whether the burden of the covenant ran with the land of the covenantors, I am clearly of opinion that it did not so run; and I share the doubt which has been expressed by my learned brothers whether in any case, except that of landlord and tenant, the burden of covenants of this description does ever run with the land. There is one case which appears to me very closely parallel to the present case. I think that the most favourable way of stating the case of the present appellant is to hold that there was the grant of an easement by the covenantors to Mr. Elliott of a right of way over the land of the covenantors, with a covenant by the covenantors that they would maintain the land, subject to the right of way, in repair as a road. Now, putting the case in that manner, it is extremely like the circumstances which occurred in the case of Brewster v. Kidgill, which is best reported in Modern Reports, vol. 12, p. 166. That was a case which came before Lord Holt and the King's Bench, and was evidently very elaborately argued. There one Brewster, who was seised in fee of a manor, in consideration of 8001. granted a rentcharge in fee of 40l. per annum, and on the back of the deed was indorsed a memorandum declaring it to be the true intent and meaning of that deed, "that the grantee and his heirs shall for ever hereafter be paid the said rentcharge without any deduction or abatement of taxes, charge, or payment out of, for or concerning the said rent, or the said manor or lands charged herewith." The question then arose whether the memorandum was really part of the grant of the rentcharge, or a covenant collateral to the grant. Lord Holt conceived it to be a collateral covenant; the other judges of the King's Bench, thought that it was part of the grant. They all agreed in the view that if it was a part of the grant it ran with the land; but that if it was a covenant to pay it did not run with the land. Now what Lord Holt said upon that point is this (12 Mod. 170): "I make no doubt but that the assignee of the rent shall have covenant against the grantor, because it is a covenant annexed to the thing granted; but that

CT. OF APP.]

covenant should run with the rent against the assignee of that land, I see no reason. If this rent was granted so to be paid, it would be another matter; but here is only a covenant, and no words amounting to a grant, and therefore there can be no relief in this case against the terretenant, but," his Lordship added, "in equity; "-I will consider that point hereafter"and, therefore, for this point I do not see how the plaintiff can have his judgment." The learned judges differed on the question of construction, but they do not appear to have differed on the point of law which Lord Holt discussed. There remains, therefore, only the question whether there is any relief in equity in a case of this description where there is none at law. The point is not pressed upon us by the appellant. I do not think it is arguable after the recent decisions. A covenant of this description requiring the outlay of money upon the land is not a covenant which, if it does not run at law, runs at equity by reason of any doctrine such as that of Tulk v. Morhay. I agree, therefore, that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Field, Roscoe, and Co., for Henry Wrigley, Oldham.

Solicitors for the defendants, Chester and Co., for H. Booth, Oldham.

July 15 and 16, 1885.

(Before COTTON, LINDLEY, and BOWEN, L.JJ.) NEWHAVEN LOCAL BOARD v. NEWHAVEN SCHOOL BOARD. (a)

Local board-Resignation of members — Number less than quorum-Transaction of business by— Filling up vacancies-Lapse of board-Acts done by irregularly constituted board — Building line-Right to prescribe after commencement of building--Injunction to pull down buildingsPublic Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 4, 7, 155, 158; schedule 1, part I., rules 2, 9; schedule 2, part I., rule 65; schedule 2, part II. On the 1st April 1884 a local board, consisting of nine members, was duly elected.

On the 1st May seven members of the board resigned. On the 29th May the two remaining members of

the board elected three other members, and on the same day the same two members and the three new members elected four other members, thus making up the full number of nine.

The board thus constituted, purporting to act under sect. 155 of the Public Health Act 1875, prescribed a building line to be observed in the re-erection of schools by the defendants.

Subsequently, three new members of the local board were duly elected by the ratepayers, and the board thus constituted commenced proceedings to restrain an infringement by the defendants of the prescribed building line.

By rule 2 of schedule 1, part I. to the Act, "no business shall be transacted at any meeting of the local board unless at least one-third of the full number of members be present thereat. Held, that the election of new members was "business" within the meaning of rule 2 of sched, 1, part I., and that the election by less than a quorum of three members, and the subsequent election of four members, were invalid; but that (a) Reported by FRANK EVANS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[CT. OF APP.

the proceeding of the improperly constituted board in prescribing a building line was rendered valid by rule 9 of schedule 1, part I.

Held also, that the board had never ceased to exist as a corporation, and, therefore, that the board existing when the action commenced could maintain such action.

The decision of Pearson, J. reversed.

Observations as to the circumstances which will cause a local board to “lapse" within the meaning of schedule 2, part I.

Semble, that rule 9 of schedule 1, part I., would not be an answer to a quo warranto information. Quære, whether the same rule would validate business transacted by less than a quorum with persons not members of the board.

A school board having determined to pull down their school and erect a new school on the same site, which abutted on South-lane, in Aug. 1884 sent plans of the intended new school to the local board. The local board objected to their plans, and in Nov. 1884 the school board sent in fresh plans. The local board objected to these plans also, on the ground that they infringed the byelaws of the local board, inasmuch as the annexes to the main building were beyond the line of the new street which the local board intended to form by widening South-lane, and which line the local board supposed they had the power to define under the bye-laws and sect. 158 of the Act. The bye-laws referred to applied only to dwellinghouses, and required a new street (which Southlane was not) to be of a certain width.

The school board, having been advised that the byelaws and sect. 158 did not apply, pulled down their old building, and on the 6th Jan. 1885 sent to the local board plans which were substantially the same as those sent in Nov. 1884. On the 12th Jan. the school board had laid some of the foundations of their main building. On the 22nd Jan. the local board, acting under sect. 155 of the Act, prescribed a building line, which was so drawn that, although the main building of the new school would within the line, the annexes would be beyond it. On the 23rd Jan. notice of the resolution prescribing this line was served on the school board. The school board subsequently erected their annexes according to the plans and beyond the line. Held, that the school board had not been misled by the local board into the belief that the latter did not intend to prescribe a line, that the local board were therefore not acting inequitably in exercising their powers under sect. 155, and that an injunction must be granted to compel the school board to pull down the buildings so far as they extended beyond the prescribed line.

Slee v. Corporation of Bradford (8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 491; 4 Gif. 262) and Corporation of Folkestone v. Woodward (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 574; L. Rep. 15 Eq. 159) distinguished.

THIS action was commenced on the 21st May 1885, the plaintiffs, by the indorsement on their writ, claiming an injunction to restrain the defendants from rebuilding their schools at Newhaven, so far as they fronted South-lane, in such a manner as to contravene or extend beyond the building line prescribed by the plaintiffs in a notice delivered on the 23rd Jan. 1885, and shown on a plan delivered to the defendants in Feb. 1885, and that the defendants might be ordered

CT. OF APP.]

to pull down and remove any walls, erections, foundations, or works which had been already begun or erected by them beyond such building line.

On the 12th June the plaintiffs moved before Pearson, J. for an interim injunction in the terms of the writ.

A preliminary objection was taken that, at the time when the building line was fixed, there was not a quorum of the local board competent to act, and this was the only point argued before Pearson, J.

It appeared that on the 1st April 1884 the local board, which consisted of nine members, was duly elected.

On the 1st May 1884 seven members of the local board resigned.

On the 29th May the two remaining members of the board elected three other members, and at an adjourned meeting, held the same day, at which the five members were present, fcur other persons were elected members.

These nine members, purporting to act as the local board, on the 22nd Jan. 1885 passed a resolution prescribing the building line above mentioned.

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Cookson, Q.C. and Corrie Grant in support of the motion. By rule 2 of schedule 1 (part I.) to the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), no business shall be transacted at any meeting of a local board, "unless at least one-third of the full number of members be present thereat, subject to this qualification, that in no case shall a larger quorum than seven members be prescribed." In the first place, we contend that the election of new members is not "business within the meaning of this rule. But if electing members is business, a case like this, where by resignation or otherwise the number is reduced below one-third, is provided for by rule 9 of schedule 1 (part I.), which is as follows: "The proceedings of a local board shall not be invalidated by any vacancy or vacancies among their members, or by any defect in the election of such board, or in the election or qualification of any members thereof." To construe the Act the other way would lead to confusion. That it was intended that a board might legally act, notwithstanding the disqualification of some members, is shown by rule 70 of schedule 2 (part I.), which imposes penalties on persons acting as members when disabled or disqualified, but the same rule goes on to provide that all acts of such persons, if done previously to the recovery of the penalty, "shall be valid and effectual to all intents and purposes." The power to fill up vacancies is given by rule 65 of schedule 2 (part I), which provides that "any casual vacancy occurring by death, resignation, disqualification, failure duly to elect members, or otherwise, in a local board, shall be filled up by the local board out of duly qualified persons within six weeks, or within such further time as the Local Government Board may by order allow." The board still exists though only two members may remain, and a quorum of three was not necessary for the election of new members. If it were, there would be no power to fill up the proper number of members, except in the case of a lapse of the board, when, by rule 2 of schedule 2 (part II.), the owners and ratepayers of the district may elect a new board.

[CT. OF APP.

Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Ashton Cross for the defendants.

PEARSON, J.-There is no dispute that the original election of the nine members of the local board in April 1884 was a good and valid election. Nor is there any dispute that on the 1st May 1884 seven members of that board retired. Only two members of the board were left, and they were incapable of acting, for by rule 2 of schedule 1 (part I.) to the Public Health Act 1875 no business is to be transacted unless at least one-third of the full number of members are present. The full number of this board was nine, and the quorum required, therefore, was three. By the resignation of seven members the board became reduced to such an extent that it was impossible to have a quorum of the board, and the two members who were left were unable to transact any business. The counsel for the plaintiffs say that, although these two members were unable to transact any business, they had the power of electing new members of the board, inasmuch as, in the case of a casual vacancy, the members of the board are to elect members. I am of opinion that the election of new members of the board was as much "business" within the meaning of rule 2 of schedule 1 (part I.) as any other matter that could by possibility be brought before them. If, instead of seven members retiring, four members only had retired, so as to leave five members of the board, I should still come to the conclusion that the presence of three members was necessary to elect a new member of the board, and I come in like manner to the conclusion that, inasmuch as there were only two members of the board, the board could transact no business at all. However, on the 29th May, the two members of the board who were left did appoint three members, and that made five, and at an adjourned meeting held on the same day the five members elected four more. It is now said that they thus completed the full number of the board. The question I have to determine is, whether they have legally done so, or whether all their proceedings were absolutely null and void. It is said that the proceedings were good by virtue of rule 9 of schedule 1 (part I.). [His Lordship read the rule, and continued:] This case certainly does not come within the words of the rule with regard to any defect in the election of such board," because I conceive that applies to the original election of the whole board. The question is whether there was any board on the 29th May, and I am of opinion that there was no board on that day. I consider that under the circumstances the board had then lapsed. The whole board had been reduced to below the quorum required by the rules. The remaining members could do no business of any sort or description, and, if the opinion I have formed is correct, they could not add to their number so as to constitute a board with a quorum. I think, therefore, there was no board on the 29th May, and that being so, there is no proceeding of a local board to which rule 9 could apply, for there really was no board at all. I think, therefore, that all the proceedings on the 29th May were absolutely invalid; that the board had lapsed altogether; that the proper proceeding at that time would have been to have had a new election of a new board by the ratepayers under rule 2 of schedule 2 (part II.). I think, there

66