penalty the act of selling an article different in name, in character, or in quality from that which is demanded; and it is submitted that the case must go back to the magistrate upon the question of the proper legal construction of the statute.

The respondent did not appear.

MATHEW, J.-In my opinion the learned stipendiary magistrate was wrong in the view which he took of the statute on this question, and consequently the case must be remitted to him. The reason and ground of his decision is stated by him, at the end of the case, as being that, in his judgment, it was not the intention of the framers of the statute in question, the Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), that the selling an article of food or a drug, pure and genuine in itself, but not being the precise article demanded by the purchaser, should be an offence subjecting the seller to a penalty; and he referred to and relied on the preamble of both the repealed Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 74), and the repealing Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), as supporting his view, and showing that the only object of the law was to prevent the adulteration of articles of food and drugs, and to insure the selling of these in a pure and genuine condition. Now, in my opinion, the learned magistrate has put too large an interpretation upon, and given too much effect to, the language of the preamble of the Act of 1875. The preamble of that Act recites that "it is desirable that the Acts now in force relating to the adulteration of food should be repealed, and that the law regarding the sale of food and drugs in a pure and genuine condition should be amended." This, although very wide no doubt, and seemingly referring to adulteration alone, cannot, I think, be held to control all the subsequent sections of the Act, or as showing that every one of them must necessarily be construed as applying solely to adulteration; and if any doubt existed with regard to the construction of the preamble, it would, I think, be removed upon a closer inspection of sect. 6 of the Act, as interpreted by sect. 2 of the subsequent Act, the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30). That 6th section enacts that no person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of food or any drug which is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser," under a penalty not exceeding 201. for each such offence. Then comes sect. 2 of the amending Act of 1879, which provides that "it shall be no defence to any prosecution under the provisions of the principal Act" (the Act of 1875) "to prove that the article of food or drug in question, though defective in nature, or in substance or in quality, was not defective in all three respects; thus evidently construing the words "any drug which is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded," as meaning any drug defective in its nature, or in substance, or in quality; so that sect. 6 must be read as if it ran no person shall sell, &c., any drug which is not of the nature or substance or quality of the article demanded," &c.

In this case the article demanded by the purchaser was "saffron," and that which was sold and delivered to her by the respondent was "savin," an entirely different article in every respect, though probably, as one may conclude,

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the two drugs may somewhat resemble each other in external appearance. Now, if the statute were really limited to and dealt with adulteration only, it would be binding on the court so to hold; a construction, however, which would lead to the escape of numerous and daily offenders; for instance, those who, where butter is asked for, sell a substance which contains not an atom of the desired article, or who supply chicory and nothing else in place of coffee, and sell boiled and exhausted tea leaves as tea fit for the purchaser's use and consumption. Cases of this kind all seem to me to be within the language of the Act, and the mischief it was directed against; and therefore, without saying that the learned magistrate should have convicted the respondent in this case, it is my clear opinion that he should have entertained and gone into the inquiry, on the assumption that the Act of Parliament was applicable to the case before him; and consequently the case must be remitted to him with this expression of the opinion of the court.

SMITH, J.—I am of the same opinion, for I cannot at all see my way to construing sect. 6 otherwise than as Mr. Bosanquet, on the part of the appellant, has asked us to construe it, and I think, therefore, that we must adopt his construction. At the same time I must say that I very much doubt whether, when this Act was passed, it was the intention of the Legislature to include within its penal provisions a case like the present, and to enact that, where one drug is demanded, and another and different one-albeit perfectly pure and genuine is delivered, and although the seller, for aught that appears, as here, may have bona fide believed he was delivering the article demanded, he, the seller, should thereby be committing an offence rendering him liable to a pecuniary penalty. But however that may be, I cannot get out of the words of sect. 6. The Act itself (the Act of 1875) is entitled "An Act to repeal the Adulteration of Food Acts, and to make better provision for the sale of food and drugs in a pure state," which of course means that they should be unadulterated; and the preamble is in the words and to the effect already stated by my brother Mathew; and of course, as he has already observed, neither title nor preamble is sufficient alone to control the express wording of the subsequent sections of the Act. Now, by sect. 3, the mixing of ingredients injurious to health with any article of food, with intent to sell the same, is penally prohibited; sect. 4 is directed against the mixing, or permitting to be mixed, with drugs any ingredients deleterious to health; and by sect. 5 it is provided that it shall be a defence if the accused person proves to the court's satisfaction that he did not know that the article had been so mixed. Then comes sect. 6, which is the all-important section in the present case, and that section, when, as I apprehend must be done, we read into it sect. 2 of the subsequent amending Act of 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30), which has already been read and referred to by my brother Mathew, must be held to enact as follows: "No person shall sell any drug which is not of the nature or substance or quality of the article demanded," &c. If, then, a person asks for "saffron " and the seller sells him "savin," or vice versa, the question arises, has the seller sold any drug which is not of the "nature of the article demanded?" There can

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be no doubt that he has, and of course therefore has brought himself within the terms of this Act cf Parliament. I cannot escape from this reading and construction of the section, although, as I said at first, I entertain much doubt whether the Legislature, when it passed that Act, amending it as they do by the subsequent Act of 1879, intended that what has been done by the respondent here should be an offence. The case must be remitted.

Case remitted to the magistrate. Solicitors for the appellant, Thos. White and Sons, agents for Hand, Blakiston, Everitt, and Hand, Stafford.

Tuesday, March 31, 1885.

(Before GROVE and LOPES, JJ.) MOORHOUSE v. LINNEY AND ASHTON.

THORPE v. LINNEY AND ASHTON. (a)

Municipal corporation-Election of councillorsNomination paper-Signature of assenting burgess-Inaccurate description on burgess rollMunicipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 § 46 Vict. c. 50), 8. 241.

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By sect. 241 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), no misnomer on inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place named in any schedule to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, or in any roll, list, notice, or voting paper required by this Act, shall hinder the full operation of this Act with respect to that person, body corporate, or place, provided the description of that person, body corporate, or place be such as to be commonly understood." At an election of town councillors the nominations of the petitioners were objected to on the ground that one of the assenting burgesses, Charles Arthur Burman," was not upon the burgess-roll, and the mayor allowed the objection, and declared the respondents duly elected. The assenting burgess, whose full and correct name "Charles Arthur Burman," was entered on the burgess roll as Charles Burman" only. It was a fact in the special case that "Charles Arthur Burman" was generally known to his friends as Charles Burman," and the description in the burgess roll would, by any one acquainted with Charles Arthur Burman, have been commonly understood to refer to the said Charles Arthur Burman, and to no other person. Held, that the mayor was right in allowing the objection, and that it was not a "misnomer or inaccurate description" within the meaning of sect. 241 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. The words "commonly understood" in the above section mean commonly understood by any person comparing the nomination paper and the burgessroll.

was

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By an order of Wills, J. the petitions of the petitioners against the return of the respondents, as councillors for the Dukinfield Ward, in the borough of Stalybridge, were consolidated, and the case raised by the petitions respectively stated as a special case for the opinion of the High Court of Justice.

SPECIAL CASE.

1. The borough of Stalybridge, in the counties of Lancaster and Chester, is divided into four (a) Reported by H. D. BONSEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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wards, one of which is called the Dukinfield Ward, and the election of the two councillors for the said ward was appointed to be holden on the 1st Nov. 1884. The petitioners, Sydney, Moorhouse, and Daniel Thorpe, and the respondents, Nathan Edward Linney and Joseph Ashton, were respectively candidates at the said election, and the said respondents have respectively been declared to be duly elected in the manner herein. after appearing.

2. The petitioners and respondents were respectively duly qualified to be elected, and were respectively duly nominated, unless the objection to the respective nomination papers of the peti tioners hereinafter mentioned and allowed by the mayor of Stalybridge, was a valid objection.

3. The following is a copy of the nomination paper of the petitioner Sydney Moorhouse, which was duly signed by the persons whose names appear therein as proposer, seconder, and assenting burgesses respectively, who, unless the said objection allowed by the mayor was a valid objection thereto, were respectively entitled to subscribe the same, and subject to the said objec tion the said nomination paper was in all respects good and sufficient :

NOMINATION Paper. Borough of Stalybridge. Election of councillors for Dukinfield Ward, in the said borough, to be held on the 1st day of November 1884.

We the undersigned, being respectively burgesses, hereby nominate the following person as a candidate at the said election:

4. The nomination paper of the petitioner, Daniel Thorpe, was subscribed by the same proposer, seconder, and assenting burgesses respectively, and was in all respects precisely similar to that of which a copy is set forth in the last paragraph except that the surname, other names, place of abode, and description of the said Daniel Thorpe, were therein correctly inserted instead of those of the said Sydney Moorhouse.

5. On the 25th Oct. 1884, which was the day after the last day for the delivery of nomination papers, the mayor, accompanied by the assistant town clerk, duly attended at the town hall, when an objection in writing to the nominations of the petitioners respectively was handed into the mayor, the ground of objection being that one of the assentors, Charles Arthur Burnam, was not upon the burgess roll, and therefore was ineligible to subscribe to such nominations. The mayor allowed the said objection, and decided that the nominations were bad, upon the grounds that one of the assentors, upon the two nomination papers, named Charles Arthur Burman, was not a burgess

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of the borough of Stalybridge his name not appearing upon the burgess list for the borough. The respondents, Nathan Edward Linney and Joseph Ashton, were declared duly elected.

6. The said Charles Arthur Burman, who subscribed the said nomination papers of the petitioners respectively, was duly qualified to be enrolled on the ward roll for the said Dukinfield Ward, and the names Charles Arthur Burman was the surname, and other names in full of the person who was intended to be enrolled in the ward roll for the said Dukinfield Ward by the name of Charles Burman. The number (467) given in the said nomination papers respectively as the number on the burgess-roll of the said Charles Arthur Burman is the number on the ward roll of the said Charles Burman.

7. The said Charles Arthur Burman, and his brother Joseph Burman, live together as joint occupiers at No. 61, Caroline-street, in that part of the township of Dukinfield which is in the municipal borough of Stalybridge, and carry on business there as butchers in partnership under the style or firm of "Burman Brothers,' "Burman, Butcher," appears over the door of the said No. 61, Caroline-street. The said Joseph Burman is enrolled in the ward roll for the said Dukinfield Ward, and his number in such roll is 466.

8. There was no other person of the name of "Charles Burman " or Charles Arthur Burman" residing at the said address or elsewhere in the said ward. The said Charles Arthur Burman, and his brother the said Joseph Burman, were at the time of the last revision, and of the said election, the only persons of the name of Burman residing in the said ward or in the said borough of Stalybridge, and in the occupation of any qualifying property therein. Charles Arthur Burman was generally known to his friends as Charles Burman, and the name Charles Burman, and the description in the said roll would, by any one acquainted with Charles Arthur Burman, have been commonly understood to refer to the said Charles Arthur Burman, and to no other person. Anyone who did not know the said Charles Arthur Burman, but who had inquired for him by the name of Charles Burman, and the description in the said roll, or by the name of Charles Burman alone, would have been directed to the said Charles Arthur Burman, and to no one else. There was no doubt of the identity of Charles Arthur Burman, who subscribed the said nomination papers, with the Charles Burman whose name appeared on the said roll.

9. The following is a copy of the said entry in the said roll. [This is described in the judgment.] 10. At the time when the said objection was handed in to the mayor there were present, on behalf of the petitioners, the petitioner Daniel Thorpe, and John Renshaw, the cashier of the petitioner Sydney Moorhouse, and on behalf of the respondents Thomas Machell and Charles Johnson. There were also other persons representing candidates for other wards present. Before the mayor gave his decision the said Daniel Thorpe told him two or three times that Charles Arthur Burman was the same person as the said Charles Burman mentioned in the burgess-roll, that he lived in Caroline-street at the number mentioned in the burgess-roll, and that there was no other Charles Bur

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man at that house, in that street, or in the ward, and the said John Renshaw also said the same. No person contradicted the statements of the said Daniel Thorpe and the said John Renshaw (as was the fact) to have told the truth, but said he was bound by the burgess-roll that it was not within his province to amend the burgessroll; that that was the revising barrister's duty, and allowed the objection, giving his decision in writing as hereinbefore set out in the fifth paragraph.

11. The mayor had no personal acquaintance with, or knowledge of either the said Joseph or Charles Arthur Burman.

12. Before the mayor gave his said decision, the said Daniel Thorpe told him that his decision, if against him and the said Sydney Moorhouse, would be questioned by petition.

13. The petitioners, after the said election, in due course respectively duly petitioned against the return of the respondents, praying that it might be declared that the said respondents, Nathan Edward Linney and Joseph Ashton, were respectively not duly elected, and that the said election was void. A copy of one of the petitions is annexed to this case, and marked "A."

14. The petitioners and respondents respectively have agreed that the court shall be at liberty to draw inferences of fact.

15. The question for the consideration of the court is, whether the mayor was right, in the circumstances above mentioned, in allowing the said objection to the respective nominations of the petitioners.

16. If the decision of the mayor was wrong, the election of the respondents, Nathan Edward Linney and Joseph Ashton respectively, is to be declared void. If the decision of the mayor was right, the said petitions respectively are to be dismissed, and the court may in either case make such further order as to them shall seem meet.

Sir F. Herschell, S.G. (Aspland with him) for the petitioners.-The reference in the nomination paper to the number on the burgess-roll was right; there was no one else in the town of the same name. No one could be misled by the insertion of the second Christian name in the nomination paper. The omission of a second Christian name from the entry on the burgess-roll is not a variance which can invalidate the nomination. The defect is cured by the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 241. He cited

Attorney-General v. Hawkes, 1 Cr. & J. 121 ;
Gothard v. Clarke, 5 C. P. Div. 253;
Reg. v. Thwaites, 1 E. & B. 704;
Hinton v. Hinton, 14 L. J. C. P. 58.

Arbuthnot (E. Clarke, Q.C. with him) for the respondents. The principle laid down in Gothard v. Clarke (5 C. P. Div. 253) and Henry v. Armitage, is that the mayor is not to hold a court of inquiry for which there is no provision in the Act, but is to compare the burgess roll and nomination paper. The mayor did so, and rightly decided that Charles Arthur Burman was not entitled to subscribe the nomination paper as an assenting burgess, because Charles Arthur Burman was not an enrolled burgess. It is not a mere "misnomer or inaccurate description" within the meaning of sect. 241 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. Reg. v. Thwaites (1 E. & B. 704) was

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the converse to the present case. The burgess signed the voting paper with the name on the burgess-roll, although it was incorrect. The question then was as to his being entitled to vote, and the same principles do not appply. In Hinton v. Hinton (14 L. J. 58, C. P.) there was a mere error in spelling, which would not have misled anyone. Cur. adv. vult.

May 22.-The judgment of the court was delivered by

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LOPES, J.-We are of opinion the mayor was right in the circumstances mentioned in the special case in allowing the objection to the respective nominations of the petitioners. The ground of objection to the nominations of the petitioners was that one of the assentors, Charles Arthur Burman, was not upon the burgess-roll, and was therefore ineligible to subscribe to such nominations. Charles Arthur Burman was so described, and of 467, Dunkinfield Ward Polling District, in the respective nomination papers. The following is the entry in the burgess-roll :'M. 466. Burman, Joseph, 61, Caroline-street. House (joint), 61, Caroline - street. M. 467. Burman, Charles, 61, Caroline - street. House (joint), 61. Caroline-street." It is convenient first to consider the case independently of sect. 241 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. Has there been a sufficient compliance with the form? It has been held that the form is mandatory, and not directory (Henry v. Armitage, 53 L. J. 111, Q.B.). The reason why the form is to be complied with is that a person who sees the nomination paper may be able to decide whether the candidate is properly nominated and assented to by enrolled burgesses, and to determine this by a mere comparison of the nomination papers and burgess-roll without any further and laborious inquiry. Could this be done in the present case? We think not. No person by merely comparing the nomination paper and burgess-roll could tell that Charles Arthur Burman and Charles Burman were the same person. It is true the number 467 is the same in the nomination paper and burgess roll, but this does not assist a person who has before him nothing but the nomination paper and burgess roll. There is no reason, so far as appeared in the nomination papers and roll, why Charles Arthur Burman and Charles Burman should not be different individuals-for instance, one the father the other the son. But it is said the defect may be cured by sect. 241 of 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, which is as follows: "No misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place named in any schedule to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, or in any roll, list, notice, or voting paper, required by this Act, shall hinder the full operation of this Act with respect to that person, body, corporate, or place, provided the description of that person, body corporate, or place, be such as to be commonly understood. The case finds : "There was no other person of the name of Charles Burman or Charles Arthur Burman,"" residing at the said address or elsewhere in the said ward. The said Charles Arthur Burman and his brother the said Joseph Burman were, at the time of the last revision and of the said election, the only persons of the name of Burman, residing in the said or in the said borough of Stalybridge, and cupation of any qualifying property

1

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therein. Charles Arthur Burman was generally known to his friends as Charles Burman, and the name Charles Burman and the description in the said roll would, by anyone acquainted with Charles Arthur Burman, have been commonly understood to refer to the said Charles Arthur Burman, and to no other person. Anyone who did not know the said Charles Arthur Burman, but who had inquired for him by the name of Charles Burman, and the description in the said roll or by the name of Charles Burman alone, would have been directed to the said Charles Arthur Burman, and to no one else. There was no doubt of the identity of Charles Arthur Burman who subscribed the said nomination papers with the Charles Burman whose name appeared in the said roll. We do not think the provision applies to a case like the present. We think commonly understood" means commonly understood by any person comparing the nomination paper and the burgess-roll. The abbreviations Frank for Francis, Fred. for Frederick, Harry for Henry, Joe for Joseph, would be covered by this provision, because everybody of ordinary sense would understand that was what was meant, and this upon a mere comparison of the nomination paper and burgess-roll without going further. Can it be said that Charles Burman is so commonly understood to be Charles Arthur Burman that no person would be misled, and that a mere comparison of the nomination paper and burgess-roll would prove this without further inquiry? We think not. If not, the mayor in every case where an objection like the present was taken would have to hear evidence and decide how far the inaccuracy was likely to mislead or had misled, and whether a person was commonly known by a name other than that by which he was described in a nomination paper. Such a proceeding it was said in Gothard v. Clarke (5 C. P. Div. 253) never could have been contemplated, and the inconvenience of it is too obvious for argument. We think the petitions respectively should be dismissed with costs.

Petition dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the petitioners, Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, and Sharpe.

Solicitors for the respondent, Shaw and

Tremellen.

Tuesday, May 5, 1885.

(Before POLLOCK, B. and DAY, J.) REG. on the prosecution of THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE EDMONTON UNION (apps.) . THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF ST. MARY, ISLINGTON (resps.). (a)

Poor law-Settlement-Person above the age of sixteen-Birthplace, or parent's settlement-The Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), s. 35.

By the 35th section of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61 it is provided that no person shall be deemed to have derived a settlement from any other person, whether by parentage, estate, or otherwise, except in the case of a wife from her husband, and in the case of a child under the age of sixteen, which child shall take the settlement of its father, or of its widowed mother, as the case may be, up to that (a) Reported by J. SMITH. Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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age, and shall retain the settlement so taken until it shall acquire another. An illegitimate child shall retain the settlement of its mother until such child acquires another settlement. Persons above the age of sixteen who have never acquired any settlement by any act of their own cannot, according to the true meaning of the section, be deemed to have taken and to retain the settlement of their father or widowed mother, but must be deemed to be settled in the place of their birth.

THIS was a case stated by justices of the county of Middlesex for the opinion of the court, in the following terms :—

This was an appeal against an order made by two justices bearing date the 10th Feb. 1884, for the removal of Alice Davis from the parish of St. Mary, Islington, in the county of Middlesex, to the parish of Enfield, in the same county, and in the Edmonton Union.

The appeal was tried at the Midsummer Quarter Sessions for the county of Middlesex, when that court quashed the said order with costs against the respondents, subject to the following case:

Alice Davis, the pauper, was born on the 27th June 1855, in the parish of Enfield, in the Edmonton Union, and is the legitimate daughter of Richard Davis and Jane his wife. She never acquired any settlement by any act of her own.

Richard Davis, the father of the pauper, was born on the 14th Nov. 1830, in the parish of St. Alphage, in the city of Canterbury. He acquired no other settlement.

On the 16th Feb. 1884 the said order of removal was obtained, on the ground that the pauper was born in the Edmonton Union.

It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the words "no person," commencing the 35th section of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, are by the context limited to a pauper whose settlement is under consideration, and that thus the present pauper, having arrived at the age of twenty-eight years at the time when her settlement was being inquired into, was to be deemed not to have derived a settlement from her father, but to be settled in the parish in which she was born. It was further contended that by force of the same section the birth settlement of the father was not a settlement which the daughter could derive.

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that, on the true construction of the section, this pauper was settled in the parish in which her father was born.

The court were of opinion that the contention of the appellants was right, and quashed the order.

The question for the opinion of the court is, whether the pauper is settled in the place of her birth, or in the place of her father's birth.

If the court shall be of opinion that the pauper was settled in the place of her birth, then the order of removal shall stand confirmed, and the order of sessions quashing the same shall be quashed; but if the court shall be of opinion that the pauper was settled in the place of her father's birth, then the order of sessions shall be confirmed.

Tickell (Besley with him) for the guardians of

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the poor of St. Mary, Islington.-The Court of Quarter Sessions were wrong in deciding that this pauper was settled in the parish in which her father was born. The 35th section of the Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61) (a) provides that no person shall be deemed to have derived a settlement from any other person by parentage or otherwise, except in the case of a wife from her husband, and in the case of a child under the age of sixteen, which child shall take the settlement of its father or widowed mother, as the case may be, up to that age, and retain it until it shall acquire another. This provision clearly means that, where inquiry is being made into the settlement of a child under the age of sixteen, it shall take the settlement of the father or widowed mother unless it has by its own act acquired some other settlement. But the section does not mean that, where you are inquiring into the settlement of a pauper over the age of sixteen, such pauper is to be deemed, if he or she has acquired no other settlement, to have acquired while under the age of sixteen the settlement of the father and retained it afterwards, for if that were so the whole mischief of long and useless inquiries into the derivative settlements of paupers, which it was the object of the section to do away with, would be still left in existence. This, then, is not the plain meaning of the section, and it is not the meaning placed upon it by the court in the case of Reg. v. The Guardians of Bridgnorth (48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 600; 11 Q. B. Div. 314),which has overruled the previous decisions on this point, and placed on the section the only construction which is compatible with the intention of the Legislature to abolish derivative settlements. In that case an order for the removal of a pauper wife and her three children, on the ground that the settlement of her husband was the birth settlement of his father within the union to which the removal was made, having been made and appealed against, the birth settlement of the husband's father in such union was proved, but no other settlement either of the husband or of his father being set up, the order was quashed by an order of the Court of Quarter Sessions, which was confirmed by the Queen's Bench Division and the Court of Appeal, on the ground that evidence of the settlement of the husband's father was inadmissible and could not be acted upon in making the order of removal, as it went to prove the derivative settlement of the parent of the

(a) The 35th section of the Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61) is as follows:

35. No person shall be deemed to have derived a settlement from any other person, whether by parentage, estate, or otherwise, except in the case of a wife from her husband, and in the case of a child under the age of sixteen, which child shall take the settlement of its father or of its widowed mother, as the case may be, up to that age, and shall retain the settlement so taken until it shall acquire another.

An illegitimate child shall retain the settlement of its mother until such child acquires another settlement. If any child in this section mentioned shall not have acquired a settlement for itself, or being a female shall not have derived a settlement from her husband, and it cannot be shown what settlement such child or female derived from the parent without inquiring into the derivative settlement of such parent, such child or female shall be deemed to be settled in the parish in which he or she was born.