of being suspected to be a party to the fraud, and without his having an opportunity of exculpating himself. There is no privilege in the case which I have suggested of a party consulting another, a professional man, as to what may afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the best mode of accomplishing it." Upon these grounds we think that the question asked of Mr. Goodman in the present case was properly put and answered. We now proceed to consider the cases, some of which have produced a different impression. We may first shortly notice three Chancery cases to which we have been referred. In one of these (Kelly v. Jackson, L. Rep. 13 Ir. Eq. 129) it was decided that a solicitor who had suggested a fraud to his client could not claim privilege on the ground that his knowledge of the matter was derived from his client. In the other two (Mornington v. Mornington, 2 J. & H. 697, and Charlton v. Combes, 32 L. J. 284, Ch.) it was held that where client and solicitor were Coconspirators in a fraud, the solicitor must be charged with the fraud if discovery was required of him, but nothing was said as to the case of fraudulent or criminal communications by a guilty client to an innocent solicitor. We may accordingly pass by these cases without further notice. The cases decided at Nisi Prius, or in the Courts of Common Law, are as follows, taking them in order of time. The first is Annesley v. Anglesey (17 St. Tr. 1139), tried in Dublin in 1743. We have already mentioned the principal point in this case as having been quoted with approval by Lord Hatherley in Gartside v. Outram. The question was whether Lord Anglesey had caused Annesley, the true heir to the property, to be kidnapped and carried off to America in order that Lord Anglesey might enjoy the family estates. The evidence offered was that Lord Anglesey had employed an attorney to prosecute Annesley for murder in respect of the death of a person whom Annesley had accidentally killed, saying he would "Give 10,000l. if he could get him hanged." On this evidence the remarks already quoted, and others to the same effect, were made on a trial at bar. The next case was Rex v. Dixon decided in 1765 (3 Burr. 1687). In this case one Peach had produced forged vouchers before a master in Chancery, and Dixon, his attorney, was subpoenaed to produce them to the grand jury before which Peach was indicted. He refused, and an attachment was moved for against him, but the court refused to grant it. It does not appear how the papers came into Dixon's hands. There is certainly nothing to show that Peach gave them to him for any unlawful purpose. He may have deposited them with him after the crime, and for the purposes of his defence. The next case is Cromack v. Heathcote (2 B. & B. 4) decided in 1820. In this case the question was whether a deed was fraudulent, and "to prove the fraud the defendant proposed, amongst other evidence, to call Smith, an attorney, to whom the father" (the assignor) "had applied to draw the assignment, and who had refused to draw it, knowing that an execution had been issued against the father." The full Court of Common Pleas, Dallas, C.J. and Burrough and Richardson, JJ., held that this evidence was rightly rejected at the trial. This case closely resembles the one now before us. Indeed, the only distinction is that the objection

[CR. CAS. RES.

taken to the evidence was that the privilege of solicitors extended only to communications made in the progress of a cause. The court accordingly do not seem to have had before them the considerations to which we have addressed ourselves. If the case cannot be supported on this ground we differ from it, as it seems to us to be opposed not only to all principle but to the series of authorities which we have already referred to. It is right to say that Cromack v. Heathcote is approved of in Greenough v. Gaskill and in other cases, but it is cited only as a general statement of the doctrine of privilege, and the particular point now under consideration is not discussed or mentioned. The point for which it is cited is that it decides that privilege is not confined to communications made in the course of a suit. The next case is Rex v. Smith (1 Phillips on Evidence, by Arnold, 118, A.D. 1822). In this case Holroyd, J. refused to compel an attorney to produce a forged promissory note which the prisoner had given to him in order to sue upon it. It had been produced before the magistrates and returned to the attorney at his request, as he said he had a lien on it. We do not agree with this decision. It was said not to be law by Pattison, J. in Reg. v. Avery (8 C. & P. 596, A.D. 1838), though some years afterwards he said that "the observations he was reported to have made about it seem too strong:" (Reg. v. Tuff, 1 Den. C. C. 324.) The Nisi Prius case of Doe v. Harris (5 C. & P. 592), decided in 1833 by Justice, afterwards Baron, Parke, was precisely similar to Cromack v. Heathcote, and was decided expressly on the authority of that case. The case of Knight v. Turquand (2 M. & W. 101, A.D. 1836) was also mentioned to us. It is enough to say of it that it was not a case of fraud or crime. The next case is Reg. v. Hayward and others (2 C. & K. 234, A.D. 1846). In that case Pollock, C.B. admitted a forged will which the prisoners by a trick had got into the possession of the attorney who produced it, hoping that he might act on it, as he did. The judges held that this will was rightly admitted, there having been no professional confidence, "even if that could have made any difference." This case is an authority in favour of the view taken by us. There can in reason be no distinction between getting a will into a solicitor's possession by fraudulently putting it amongst other documents and getting his advice by telling a lie as to the object for which it is asked. The last case to be mentioned is Reg. v. Tuff (1 Den. C. C. 325, A.D. 1848, reported also as Reg. v. Tylney, 18 L. J. 37, M. C.). In this case the indictment was for forging a will. It had been put into the hands of an attorney in order to be put in force, and the question was whether he could produce it in evidence. evidence was admitted, and on the prisoner's conviction a case was reserved for the fifteen judges. They recommended a pardon on another point, and gave no opinion as to the admissibility of the evidence. From the observations made during the argument by different learned judges, as reported in the Law Journal, it would seem that there was some difference of opinion on the subject (see Reg. v. Tylney, 18 L. J. 378, M. C.). From this examination of the authorities it will be seen that we differ from one decision of the full Court of Common Pleas, and from two decisions at Nisi Prius, but we do so on the

The

CR. CAS. RES.] strength of other decisions which appear to us not only to be of greater authority, but also to be more in accordance with legal principles as well as with justice and expediency. We have one other matter to notice. We were greatly pressed with the argument that, speaking practically, the admission of any such exception to the privilege of legal advisers as that it is not to extend to communications made in futherance of any criminal or fraudulent purpose would greatly diminish the value of that privilege. The privilege must, it was argued, be violated in order to ascertain whether it exists. The secret must be told in order to see whether it ought to be kept. We were earnestly pressed to lay down some rule as to the manner in which this consequence should be avoided. The only thing which we feel authorised to say upon this matter is, that in each particular case the court must determine upon the facts actually given in evidence or proposed to be given in evidence, whether it seems probable that the accused person may have consulted his legal adviser, not after the commission of the crime for the legitimate purpose of being defended, but before the commission of the crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in committing it. We are far from saying that the question whether the advice was taken before or after the offence will always be decisive as to the admissibility of such evidence. Courts must in every instance judge for themselves on the special facts of each case, just as they must judge whether a witness deserves to be examined on the supposition that he is hostile, or whether a dying declaration was made in the immediate prospect of death. In this particular case the fact that there had been a partnership (which was proved on the trial of the interpleader issue), the assertion that it had been dissolved, the fact that directly after the verdict a solicitor was consulted, and that the execution creditor was met by a bill of sale which purported to have been made by the defendant to the man who had been and was said to have ceased to be his partner, made it probable that the visit to the solicitor really was intended for the purpose for which, after he had given his evidence, it turned out to have been intended. If the interview had been for an innocent purpose, the evidence given would have done the defendants good instead of harm. Of course the power in question ought to be used with the greatest care not to hamper prisoners in making their defence, and not to enable unscrupulous persons to acquire knowledge to which they have no right, and every precaution should be taken against compelling unnecessary disclosures. Conviction affirmed.

Solicitor for the prosecution, The Solicitor to the Treasury.

Solicitors for the defendants, Palmer and Bull.

[CT. OF APP.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Tuesday, Oct. 28, 1884.

(Before BRETT, M.R., COTTON, and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) THE MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD V. THE OVERSEERS OF LLANEILIAN. (a)

Poor rate-Lighthouse-Tower of lighthouse used as telegraph station - Rateability—"Beneficial occupation"-The Mersey Docks Acts.

The appellants appealed against a poor rate made by the respondents in accordance with a supplemental valuation of rateable hereditaments in the parish of Llaneilian, wherein the appellants were assessed in respect of a lighthouse, telegraph station, houses, buildings, and land at Point Lynas, at the gross estimated value of 3051., and rateable value of 2441.

The appellants were incorporated as a body of public trustees by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Act 1857, and the property, powers, rights, and privileges of the Liverpool Dock Trustees, including the right to levy certain harbour and light dues on vessels entering the port of Liverpool, were vested in the appellants. The tolls were so fixed that, with the other receipts of the appellants applicable to conservancy purposes, they should not be higher than necessary for conservancy expenditure, and therefore no profits were receivable by the appellants from the occupation of any of the property.

The lighthouse consisted of a tower and a dwellingIn the tower there was the house adjoining. light-room, which contained the flash-light, with clockwork for regulating the flashes, and also a room used for working a telegraph wire, which was one of the connections of the wire from Birkenhead to Holyhead, maintained by Her Majesty's Postmaster-General for the exclusive use of the appellants under an agreement. The dwelling-house adjoining the tower and the other premises were occupied by the light-keepers as servants of the appellants.

The tower of the lighthouse had no occupation value, except as a lighthouse and as a telegraph

station.

The appellants contended that it was not rateable on the ground that it was not and could not be the subject of any beneficial occupation; and they contended that the premises other than the tower ought to be assessed upon their value to be let from year to year, supposing they were not used for the light or telegraph, but were disconnected therefrom, and applied to any other purposes for which they might be available.

The respondents contended that the whole of the premises ought to be assessed upon their existing value to the existing occupiers.

Held, that the tower was incapable of profitable occupation either as a lighthouse or as a telegraph station, in consequence of the restrictions as to profits contained in the Mersey Dock Acts, and was therefore not rateable; but that the adjoining premises must be assessed at a valuation which took into consideration the existence of the tower and its use as a lighthouse and telegraph station, (a) Reported by A. A. HOPKINS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

CT. OF APP.]

and not at their value supposing them to be disconnected from and independent of the tower. Judgment of Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Mathew, J. (51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 62) varied.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Mathew, J. (reported 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 62) on a special case.

Bigham, Q.C. and Carver for the Board.-We do not argue the point that was taken in the court below upon the 430th section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), conceding that it does not apply to the present case. The appellants are expressly restricted by statute from making any profit out of their property used for conservancy purposes, and here the tower, both as a lighthouse and as a telegraph station, is so used. In neither capacity therefore is the tower rateable. There is no such distinction between the two uses of the tower as the Divisional Court has drawn. The adjoining premises must be considered without reference to the tower. [COTTON, L.J.-Supposing a collection of artisans' houses to be built in the immediate neighbourhood of some great factory, are not the values of those houses enhanced by the existence of the factory ?] It does not follow that they will be. They cited

The Commissioners, &c. of New Shoreham v. The
Overseers of Lancing, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 434;
L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 489;

The Metropolitan Board of Works v. The Overseers of
West Ham, 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 490; L. Rep.
6 Q. B. Div. 193;

Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 643; 11 H. of L. 443.

M'Intyre, Q.C. (Marshall with him) for the overseers. A tenant might rent the whole of the dock estate, and the lighthouse would increase the value of that estate. The lighthouse therefore is rateable. It does not follow that property is not rateable because you cannot get a hypothetical tenant for it. They referred to

R. v. Coke, 5 B. & C. 797.

The

BRETT, M.R.-I cannot say that the facts are very clearly stated in the case, or that the questions asked are put in very clear terms, but it seems to me that there are two kinds of buildings upon Point Lynas, first, a tower, which is occupied by the appellants, and, secondly, certain houses close to the tower, which are also occupied by the appellants. As to the tower, it is used as a lighthouse, and for the purpose of working a telegraph wire from it, and, as far as I can see, I should say that the truth is, that it is neither used for nor useful for any other purpose. houses, however, close to it, are used and occupied as dwelling-houses by the servants of the appellants, who are there for the urpose of working the light and the telegraph. These houses are dwelling-houses, and, with the tower, are all the property of the dock board. The use of the tower is certainly regulated by Acts of Parliament, which deals with its use both as a lighthouse and a telegraph station. Those Acts of Parliament have treated it as what is called conservancy apparatus-that is, apparatus for the safety of shipping coming into the port of Liverpool. That conservancy apparatus causes to the dock board large expenditure, and in respect of that expenditure the dock board is certainly entitled to the receipts from its other sources of income, but it seems to me plain that, upon the proper construction of the Acts of Parlia

[CT. OF APP.

pay

ment, the receipts may never legally exceed the expenditure. When, therefore, you come to consider the case of a hypothetical tenant who may be supposed to rent this tower, you must suppose him to rent it subject to the Acts of Parliament, because if he did not do so he would have no power to levy tolls at all. But if he takes it subject to the Acts of Parliament, he must also take it subject to the burden imposed thereby, which, in this case, is that he never can charge more than will be sufficient to pay the expenses. Therefore, if this is so, there never can be any profitable occupation of the tower, it has been struck with sterility by statute, and can have no beneficial value. Therefore, as far as regards the tower, both as a lighthouse and as a telegraph station, it being in both capacities subject to the Acts of Parliament, I think that in neither capacity is it rateable, for in neither capacity is it, or can it be, the subject of any beneficial occupation; and, apart from the purposes for which it is used, the case finds that it is not useful for any other purpose. As to the dwelling-houses, it is clear, to my mind, that they are capable of beneficial occupation, for there is nothing in the Acts of Parliament to prevent the dock board letting them at any time, and a hypothetical tenant would certainly be willing to But then the quessome rent for them. tion arises what is the true measure of rateable value in respect of these houses? The suggestion that in order to get at that value the revenues of the dock board are to be taken into account is contrary to every decided case. They must be treated as buildings capable of being let as dwelling-houses, but in a particular position with regard to something else. The neighbourhood must be taken into account-that is plain. house if it is in the neighbourhood of GrosvenorA house has a greater letting value as a dwellingsquare than if it is in the neighbourhood of St. Gile's; and similarly buildings which are capable of being let as workmen's cottages will certainly have a greater letting value if they are in the neighbourhood of some large factory than if they are not. In such a case, then, the existence of the factory might properly be taken into account, because it affects the letting value of the cottages. Coming, then, to the facts of this case, there is here a lighthouse and a telegraph station in existence, and to be used for those purposes in connection with the port of Liverpool. It is obvious that, as long as that state of things lasts, workmen will be wanted to work the light and the telegraph station. Where will these workmen live? It is obvious that they can most conveniently live in the adjoining houses. The hypothetical tenant, therefore, might fairly take into consideration the fact that the dock board would probably want these houses for its work people, and therefore the existence of the tower, used by the dock board as a lighthouse, and a telegraph station is a circumstance which the tenant might properly take into consideration, and in respect of which he might be willing to give a higher rent for these houses as dwellinghouses. To that extent, then, and to that extent only, as it seems to me, may we take into account the existence of the tower. This, I think, is the case put in the third question, and therefore the rateable value will be fixed at 761. Some question arose as to which of the questions did put this

CT. OF APP.]

[CT. OF APP.

Solicitors for the appellants, Venn and Co. for A. T. Squarey, Liverpool.

Solicitors for the respondents, Ravenscroft and Co., for W. Fanning, Amlwch.

COTTON, L.J.-In this case there are substantially two questions. The first two questions upon the case are in reality one, because they both relate to the tower in its two different capacities, the one as a lighthouse the other as a telegraph station. In my opinion the telegraph station and lighthouse are upon the same footing. They are both used for conservancy purposes, and the case finds that the tower has no value except as a lighthouse or telegraph station. But being thus used for conservancy purposes, the tower would only be capable of beneficial occupation by reason of the light dues and the use of the telegraph; but these receipts are so restricted by Acts of Parliament that they cannot be fixed so as to produce a beneficial or profitable result to the board. Any hypothetical tenant, therefore, who took these premises must take them subject to these parliamentary fetters, and the result of course would be that he could not possibly obtain any beneficial or profitable result. In my opinion, therefore, the tower cannot be rated in respect of the lighthouse and telegraph, and it is found that it has no other occupation value; therefore our answer must be in favour of the appellants. On the second point, as to the dwelling-house, the difficulty in my mind is to understand what are the alternatives presented, but I think that the fourth alternative means that the lighthouse is to be left out of sight in the calculation altogether, but that, according to the third alternative, if the existence of the tower is to be taken into account, 761. is to be the rateable value. I think the third alternative is the right one. The tower is not to be rated in respect of its use as a lighthouse or telegraph station, but as a fact it is so used, and the fact of its being so used necessitates that there shall be servants there, and the necessity of servants being there to work the tower may be taken into account in considering the value of such houses as those servants would probably Occupy. Any person taking these houses would be influenced as to the amount of rent by the fact of the adjoining tower being used for such a purpose, and there would be a greater probability of the houses being occupied at a beneficial rent from the fact that this tower existed and was so used. I think therefore that the tower cannot be disregarded altogether, but must be taken into consideration to this extent, though the board is not to be rated in respect of it. The third alternative seems to put this view, and therefore the rateable value is the amount there fixed, namely 761.

LINDLEY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion, for the same reasons. Mathew, J. seems to have seen his way to distinguish between the case of the tower used as a lighthouse, and the case of the tower used as a telegraph station. I cannot find any ground for any such distinction in the Judgment varied.

case.

Nov. 7 and 8, 1884.

TODD v. ROBINSON. (a)

Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), 8. 193 -Penal action-Officer of board-" Concerned or interested in" a contract-Shareholder.

A clerk to a district local board, who is a shareholder in a gas company which supplies gas in the district, and is paid for such gas by the local board, is an officer "interested in" a contract made with the board, and is liable to penalties under sect. 193 of the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55).

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of Field, J. at the trial.

The action was brought for penalties under sect. 193 of the Public Health Act 1875, and was tried at Newcastle, on the 18th Jan. 1884, before the learned judge without a jury, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for 50l. and costs.

It appeared that the defendant, in July and Aug. 1882, and subsequently, was clerk to the Cowpen District Local Board, and at the same time was a shareholder in the Blyth and Cowpen Gas Company. This company, during the year 1882, supplied gas for the purposes of the Cowpen District Local Board, and was paid by the board at the rate of 46s. per lamp for the season. There was no contract under seal, but the terms were embodied in a letter written by the secretary of the gas company to the board, and were accepted by resolution of the board duly entered on the minutes of the board.

Sect. 193 of the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39Vict. c. 55) is as follows:

Officers or servants appointed or employed under this Act by the local authority shall not in any wise be concerned or interested in any bargain or contract made with such authority for any of the purposes of this Act. If any such officer or servant is so concerned or interested, or under colour of his office or employment, exacts or accepts any fee or reward whatsoever other than his proper salary, wages, and allowances, he shall be incapable of afterwards holding or continuing in any office or employment under this Act, and shall forfeit and pay the sum of 50l., which may be recovered by any person, with full costs of suit, by action of debt.

The defendant appealed.

T. W. Chitty for the defendant.-There was no contract under seal, as required by sect. 174. In law there was no contract with the board at all. The defendant was not " concerned or interested in the contract. He had nothing but an interest in the company, and that interest was nothing but an interest in the payment of dividends. It would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended the severe penalties named in sect. 193 to attach to any person who happened to be a shareholder in a company which, possibly without his knowledge, might make a contract with his board. The action was not brought within one year from the date of the alleged contract, as required by 31 Eliz. c. 5, and is therefore too late.

(a) Reported by A. A. HOPKINS Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Bosanquet, Q.C. and J. L. Walton for the plaintiff.-As to the point of limitation of time, the offence was continuing, the fixed date of the making of the contract must not be taken as the time from which the limitation runs. A contract under seal was not necessary under sect. 174, because this was a contract amounting to less than 501. from day to day. The defendant is clearly interested in the contract. The words

were meant to include the case of a shareholder. Where such an interest as the interest of a shareholder has been intended to be excepted out of such a section as this in an Act of Parliament, it has always been done in express terms. See the provision as to members in rule 64 of the schedule to this Act, and further see 5 & 6 Will, 4, c. 76, ş. 28; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, s. 5. A shareholder is clearly a person having an interest:

Dimes v. The Grand Junction Canal Company, 3 H. of L. Cas. 759.

Chitty in reply.

BRETT, M.R.-I join with the learned judge who tried this case in his regret at having to come to this decision, but I feel obliged to affirm his judgment. The question is, whether it can be said that the defendant, who is merely a shareholder in the gas company that supplies the district with gas, is a person interested in the contract made with the board whose servant he is. The case in the House of Lords to which we have been referred decides that holding shares in a company is being interested therein; and the whole question now is, whether this Act of Parliament meant to strike at such an interest. We have been referred to another Act, drawn substantially in the same terms, for the omission of the words "directly or indirectly" does not make a substantial difference; and what do we find? We find that the Legislature subsequently, by an amending Act, enacted that the previous Act was not to apply to shareholders for the future. That assumes, as it seems to me, that without an express exemption a shareholder would be interested. If, then, the defendant is "interested in" this contract, he is liable in this action if it has been brought in time. Now, the penalty is, not in respect of making the contract, but in respect of being interested therein; and there is no suggestion that he was not so interested during all the time that the contract subsisted, and that was, in fact, down to the very time of trial of this action. The point as to time, therefore, falls to the ground, and this appeal must be dismissed.

COTTON, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. It is not suggested that the defendant has acted in any way corruptly, but he has transgressed the rule laid down in the statute, and the statute gives the penalty quite independently of any corruption. In my opinion, the defendant was "interested in" the contract. The schedule to the Act helps to show that he was, because participation in profits is there made a form of interest, and the defendant without doubt participated in the profits of the gas company. Holding of shares is, therefore, I think, such an interest as is aimed at by this section, and that interest the defendant had at the time the action was brought, and even later.

LINDLEY, L.J.-I agree. I see no escape from the words of sect. 193, explained as I think it is

[CT. OF APP.

by the light thrown upon it by rule 64 in the schedule. I regret that this appeal must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the plaintiff, Brownlow and Howe, for Clark, Newcastle-on-Tyne. Solicitors for the defendant, J. E. and H. Scott, for W. S. Daglish, Newcastle-on-Tyne.

Dec. 9 and 10, 1884.

(Before BRETT, M.R., COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) REG. v. WHITE AND OTHERS. (a)

APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Overseers-Bill in Parliament-Casting burden on rates-Expenses of opposition-Allowance by district auditor.

A private Bill, containing clauses which would have imposed a burden on the rates of a parish, was successfully opposed in Parliament by the overseers of the parish. The expenses of opposing the Bill were charged by the overseers in the parish accounts, and allowed by the district auditor. Held (reversing an order to quash such allowance), that, the expenses having been reasonably incurred in opposing a project which would cast a burden on the rates, were properly charged by the overseers, and rightly allowed by the auditor. R. v. The Inhabitants of Essex (4 T. R. 591) approved.

Judgment of Watkin Williams and Smith, JJ. (reported 49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 183) overruled. In the session of 1882, a Bill, entitled "The Bristol Port and Dock Commission Bill," was presented to Parliament, by which Bill power was sought to constitute a commission for the purpose of acquiring and working the docks at Bristol, and for the purpose of the Bill to raise, if necessary, moneys out of the poor rates of the city and county of Bristol and certain parishes adjoining, of which the parish of St. George was one. Upon its becoming known what powers the Bill sought to obtain, the overseers of the parish of St. George called a meeting of the vestry of the parish, which meeting passed a resolution that the Bill should be opposed, and authorising the overseers to oppose the Bill in Parliament, and to take steps and incur such expenses in opposing it as they should think necessary. The churchwardens and overseers thereupon proceeded to oppose the Bill, and presented a petition against it; and upon the Bill coming before a committee of the House of Lords, they were heard by counsel in opposition to the Bill, which was ultimately rejected by the Lords' committee. In opposing the Bill, the churchwardens and overseers incurred costs and expenses amounting, as allowed on taxation, to 3271. 148. 8d., which sum was paid by them out of moneys in their hands, arising out of the poor rates of the parish of St. George, and was charged by them in their parish accounts.

A rule nisi for a writ of certiorari was obtained on behalf of Thomas Dix Sibly, a ratepayer of the parish, to remove into the High Court the auditor's certificate of allowance.

This rule was made absolute with costs against the overseers by Watkin Williams and Smith, JJ. in a judgment (reported 49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 183), (a) Reported by P. B. HUTCHINS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.