reckoned from the date of the service of notice of demand. Where such expenses have been settled and apportioned by the surveyor of the local authority as payable by such owner, such apportionment shall be binding and conclusive on such owner, unless within three months from service of notice on him by the local authority or their surveyor of the amount settled by the surveyor to be due from such owner, he shall by written notice dispute the same. The local authority may, by order, declare any such expenses to be payable by annual instalments within a period not exceeding thirty years, with interest at a rate not exceeding five pounds per centum per annum, until the whole amount is paid; and any such instalments and interest, or any part thereof, may be recovered in a summary manner from the owner or occupier for the time being of such premises, and may be deducted from the rent of such premises, in the same proportions as are allowed in the case of private improvement rates under this Act. By sect. 268: Where any person deems himself aggrieved by the decision of the local authority in any case in which the local authority are empowered to recover in a summary manner any expenses incurred by them, or to declare such expenses to be private improvement expenses, he may, within twenty-one days after notice of such decision, address a memorial to the Local Government Board, stating the grounds of his complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the local authority; the Local Government Board may make such order in the matter as to the said Board may seem equitable, and the order so made shall be binding and conclusive on all parties. Charles, Q.C. and C. Gould for the appellant.As a part of the land, in respect of which the expenses for the payment of which the order in question has been made were incurred, is no part of a street within the meaning of the Public Health Act 1875, therefore the provisions of the Act have no relation to such land, and the whole of the proceedings relating to the pavement of such land were unauthorised. The jurisdiction given by the Act to make an order for payment only enables the magistrate to make an order for the payment of such expenses as are legally payable under the Act. Here the urban sanitary authority were not entitled to recover the expenses, and therefore the magistrate was not justified in making the order for payment, but such order was made without jurisdiction, and ought to be brought up by certiorari and quashed. The Solicitor-General (Sir F. Herschell, Q.C.) (with him J. E. Barker and C. S. Hunter) for the respondents.-The argument in support of the appeal is based on a fallacy arising from a confusion between a magistrate giving a wrong decision and a magistrate acting without jurisdiction. A magistrate is not acting without jurisdiction because he decides wrong either in fact or in law. If, therefore, the magistrate made a wrong order the proper remedy was by appeal to quarter sessions, but the magistrate was right, for he was bound to make an order for payment of the amount apportioned by the surveyor. What is really complained of is that the local authority wrongly decide that the place in question was a street, and that the appellant was liable for the expense of repairing it. For this the proper remedy is by appeal to the Local Government Board, as provided by sect. 268. [He was stopped by the Court.] Charles, Q.C. replied. [CT. OF APP. The following authorities were cited: Cook v. Ipswich Local Board, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 579; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 451; Reg. v. The Local Government Board, 48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 173; 10 Q. B. Div. 309; Hesketh v. Atherton Local Board, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S 530; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 4; Bunbury v. Fuller, 9 Ex. 111; Reg. v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 66. BRETT, M.R.-In this case everything that was done was intended to be done under and by virtue of the statute, and if the case is within the statute, the statute has pointed out the whole course of procedure. The statute imposes on certain persons liabilities not known to the common law, and gives to other persons powers and duties which also were not known to the common law. It seems to me to follow that where a statute imposes a new liability and shows the means of enforcing it, then if a case is within the statute, the only mode of procedure is the mode so pointed out. If the present case is within the statute, the course of the transaction is this: The local authority is bound to decide whether there shall be expenditure, and to determine the proper amount of that expenditure, then the amount is laid before the surveyor who is bound to apportion it among the frontagers according to the measurement of their frontages. The surveyor has no authority to inquire whether the expenditure was upon a subject matter within the statute, or whether it was proper or reasonable; he has merely to apportion the amount. When the amount has been apportioned, the local authority is entitled to give notice to each frontager of the amount apportioned against him, and to demand payment, and, if payment is refused, to go before the magistrate and obtain an order for payment. It 18 not necessary to inquire what the remedy would be in a case where the person charged found fault with the apportionment of the surveyor, for in the present case he does not find fault with what the surveyor has done, but with the decision of the local authority,on the ground that, although they might properly have paved the street upon which he was a frontager, and might have fixed the sum to be paid for doing so, yet the sum which they decided should be expended, and which they did expend, was expended partly on the street and partly upon private land which formed no portion of the street. He says there is a wrong decision of the local authority to the extent that they have fixed a wrong sum to lay before the surveyor, by not having confined it to the amount expended upon the street, but by having added to it the sum spent upon the private land. The objection, therefore, is not that the local authority can make no order upon the applicant at all, but that they have laid before the surveyor a larger sum, part of which was composed of expenditure on private land. If the case is within the statute, his complaint is, that he is aggrieved by the decision of the local authority, and therefore, the grievance would be within the exact terms of sect. 268. The statute gave the local authority the power and imposed upon them the duty of deciding these matters; that authority has aggrieved the appellant by what he considers a wrong decision, and if that be so, sect. 268 has pointed out the course to be pursued, that is, it shows that he must appeal to the Local Govern. CT. OF APP.] HENRY AND OTHERS (apps.) v. ARMITAGE (resp.) ment Board. If the case is within the statute, the statute has imposed a new liability, and as regards the new grievance, the statute gives a particular remedy, and therefore, that is the only remedy the person aggrieved has under the statute. If the case is within the statute, Mr. Wake ought to have appealed under sect. 268 to the Local Government Board, and when he failed to do so, and the local authority went before the magistrate to ask for an order for payment, it seems to me that the magistrate could not determine whether the decision of the local authority was right or wrong. That was not for him, but for the Local Government Board. The magistrate could only inquire whether the proper notice had been given and the order made, and if that was so, he could only make the order for payment. But it is said that the magistrate was bound to inquire whether the case came within the Act, and that if the local authority has assumed to impose a liability in respect of a subject-matter not within the statute, as for paving land which is not part of a street, and therefore not within the statue, then the case is not within the Act at all, and if the magistrate, on inquiry, finds that it is not, then he has no jurisdiction. On the other side, it was said that if the magistrate has to make that inquiry, he has jurisdiction to make it and to enter upon the facts, and that if he does so and comes to a wrong conclusion, inasmuch as he is exercising a summary jurisdiction given by another Act of Parliament, there is an appeal to quarter sessions. It seems to me that it is unnecessary to decide either of those points. It may be that the magistrate has power to inquire whether the case is within the Act, and that if it is not he may have no jurisdiction to make any further order. It may be that he is bound to make the inquiry, and that if he comes to a wrong decision there is an appeal to quarter sessions. It may be that he has no power to enter on the inquiry; but it is unnecessary to inquire into that question now, because, assuming the magistrate has jurisdiction to try the question whether the case is within the Act, and that, if it is not, he has no jurisdiction to make any further order, I cannot come to the conclusion that in this case the matter was wholly without the statute. The case would be wholly without the statute in that view, if the facts were such that no order at all could be made by the local authority. Upon that view of the case, if there had been no pavement in respect of a street within the statute, no order could properly have been made against anyone. But if any part of the expenditure has been made with regard to a street within the statute, it is obvious that as to that part the local authority may fix upon a proper sum and obtain an apportionment from the surveyor and make orders upon the frontagers. In this case it cannot be denied that part of the expenditure was in respect of a street within the Act, or that Mr. Wake was a frontager upon that street. It follows that an order might properly be made upon him. The order has been made, and, the only defect he can point out is that although an order can be made, yet a wrong one has been made. The case of Cook v. The Ipswich Local Board (ubi sup.) seems to me to be an authority that where an order can be made, but that which has been made is wrong, it is no defect of jurisdiction but an error in judgment [CT. OF APP. in respect of an order within the jurisdiction. Here the local authority had power to make an order and has made what is said to be a wrong order. Then, with respect to that grievance, the magistrate could not inquire, and could not set it right by modifying the order of the local authority. If the local authority had power to come to a decision at all, the magistrate could not inquire whether it was right or wrong, but was bound to make an order for payment, because, if the decision was erroneous, the only remedy given was an appeal to the Local Government Board. I am therefore of opinion that the decision of the Divisional Court was right and this appeal must be dismissed. nomination The Municipal Elections Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. e. 40), s. 1, sub-sect. 2 (which is repealed and in part re-enacted by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), enacted that at municipal elections of councillors "the shall state the surname and paper other names of the person nominated, with his place of abode and description, and shall be in the form No. 2, set forth in the first schedule to this Act, or to the like effect." A foot-note to form No. 2 in the first schedule to the Act directed the situation of the property in respect of which the burgess subscribing is enrolled on the burgess-roll to be placed after his signature to the nomination paper. Held, that the words of the section and form were imperative, and not directory only. In a nomination paper the Christian name of the person nominated, being William, was written Wm." 66 A burgess subscribing the same nomination paper placed after his signature "6, Belle Vue "Crescent," that being the place where he was living, while his qualification on the burgess-roll was "houses in succession, 6, Belle Vue Crescent, and Linden Terrace." Held, that the Christian name of the person nominated was sufficiently stated within the meaning of the section, and that the nomination paper was in the form set forth in the schedule to the Act, or to the like effect, and was valid. Judgment of Field and Watkin Williams, JJ. reversed. (a) Reported by P. B. HUTCHINS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. CT. OF APP.] HENRY AND OTHERS (apps.) v. ARMITAGE (resp.). APPEAL by the petitioners, on a municipal election petition, against the judgment of Field and Watkin Williams, JJ. (reported 48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 576), where the special case (containing the nomination papers and the objections thereto) and the material provisions of the Municipal Elections Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 40) are fully set out. The above-mentioned statute is repealed by the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 5, schedule I., which came into operation on the 1st Jan. 1883. The only point decided which can be material in questions arising under the Act now in force is the following: The first objection to the first nomination paper was made on the ground that the nomination paper did not state the surname and other names of the person nominated, as required by sect. 1, sub-sect. 2, of the (now) repealed statute. 66 The Christian name of Mr. Skinner, the person nominated, being William, what appeared on the nomination paper was the abbreviation " Wm." The repealed provisions relating to this point are re-enacted in the following terms: By 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 55 : The nomination of candidates for the office of councillor shall be conducted in accordance with the rules in part 2 of the third schedule. By the fifth of these rules: The nomination paper must state the surname and other names of the candidate, with his abode and description. The appeal was argued by McClymont and R. Lamb Wallace for the petitioners (appellants), and by Edward Clarke, Q.C. and Atherley Jones for the respondent. The arguments were similar to those used in the court below. The following authorities were referred to: Gothard v. Clarke, 42 L. T. Rep. N. S. 776; 5 C. P. Reg. v. The Mayor of Shrewsbury, 26 J. P. 84 ;' Ex parte McHattie, 10 Ch. Div. 398; Jones v. Harris, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 702; L. Rep. Reg. v. Tugwell, L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 704; Mather v. Brown, 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 869; 1 C. P. Reg. v. Bradley, 3 E. & E. 634; 30 L. J. 180, Q. B.; As to Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-On the best consideration I can give to this case I am of opinion that the judgment of the court below cannot be supported. I adhere to what I said in Mather v. Brown (1 C. P. Div. 596) as to the great importance of adhering to the words of the statute. the first question, I have come to the conclusion that the case of Reg. v. Bradley (3 E. & E. 634; 30 L. J. 180, Q.B.) is directly in point. As I understand that case, the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench there decided the very matter which now comes before us, for they held that "Wm." was a statement of the Christian name, and therefore that "Wm. Bradley" in a voting paper was sufficient to come within the words of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 14, containing the Christian names and surnames of the persons for whom he votes." I was under the impression at first that this had been treated as a misnomer, but had been MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIII. 66 [CT. OF APP. held to be cured by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 142, and that because the paper contained such a description as to be commonly understood the Court of Queen's Bench had held that sect. 142 applied so as to cure the defect. If that were so, the decision would be in point in favour of the objection; but, on looking at the judgments, I can come to no other conclusion than that the court held that the paper came within 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 14, and contained the Christian name of the person referred to. In the written judgment delivered by Hannen, J. in Reg. v. Plenty (L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 346) the Court of Queen's Bench took the same view of the decision in the earlier case. I am therefore of opinion that Reg. v. Bradley decides that "Wm." is a statement of the Christian name, and therefore that it comes within the words of the statute now before us. I prefer to go on the authority of the cases rather than to reason out the point. I am aware that similar questions may be raised as to other names, but this is unavoidable. It was clearly decided in Reg. v. Plenty and Mather v. Brown that a mere initial will not do, and Reg. v. Bradley is an authority that the abbreviation "Wm." will do. The other cases referred to on this question are not in point. (a) no BRETT, M.R.—I am of the same opinion, and as to the first point my opinion is stronger than that of the Lord Chief Justice. I think that in Reg. v. Bradley (3 E. & E. 634; 30 L. J. 180, Q. B.) the court did decide the point, but, whether it had been already decided or not, I should have come to the same conclusion, and therefore I decide not merely on authority, but from a clear conviction. I do not think this can be called a dangerous decision. The words of the statute are, "shall state the surname and other names of the person nominated," but there is nothing about spelling the names. The question is whether what is put in writing in this nomination paper is in a form which everyone would conclude meant that particular name, and other. Judges have come to the conclusion that the abbreviation "Wm." meant "William," because they had sufficient knowledge of the world to know that it would be taken to mean "William" and no other name, and everyone would think so. Mr. Clarke suggested it might be taken to mean Wilbraham," but I do not think this is so. Not one man in England would say it meant Wilbraham," while everyone would say it meant "William," and where something is put in writing which everyone would take to mean one name only, I think it may be said that that name is stated by the writing. Other instances have been suggested which do not come within the statute; clearly "W." is not a statement in writing of the name of " William;" or take "B.," or any other single letter; can it be said that a letter would state any name? There may be other abbreviations which would have the same 66 66 (a) The Lord Chief Justice then proceeded to give judgment as to the second objection to the first nomination paper, overruling the objection, and reversing the decision of the court below, as stated in the head-note to this report. Brett, M.R. and Bowen, L.J. also gave judgment to the same effect. This part of the judgment turned on the effect of the note at the end of form 2 in schedule I. to 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, which is repealed and not re-enacted by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50. The Court, having thus held the first nomination paper to be good, gave no decision as to the objections to the second. 2 Q CT. OF APP.] REG. v. MARSHAM. BOWEN, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. It is important to see that the forms which Parliament has laid down are not frittered away. It would be unfortunate if we were to fall into the notion that a little deviation from that which is prescribed by statute can make no difference. In the present case, however, both on authority and reason, I think the judgment of the court below cannot be supported. The first question is, whether the Christian name of the person nominated was stated within the meaning of 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, s. 1, sub-sect. 2), and I think this question is concluded by authority. What was written on the nomination paper was "Wm."; is that a statement of the Christian name of the person nominated within the meaning of the Act? I think this question is settled by Reg. v. Bradley (3 E. & E. 634; 30 L. J. 180, Q.B.). I agree with Mr. Clarke that the court there might have applied sect. 142 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 so as to cure the misnomer, but, on looking through the judgments, both as reported in Ellis & Ellis and in the Law Journal, and the judgment in Reg. v. Plenty (L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 346), I have formed the same opinion as the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, which is, that the court in Reg. v. Bradley did decide on the ground that " Wm." was equivalent to "William." It must be remembered that every abbreviation will not do, but everyone would see that, if this particular abbreviation means anything, it must mean "William." Appeal allowed. Solicitor for the petitioners, T. Balfour Allan. Solicitors for the respondents, Johnson and Weatherall, for Bowey and Brewis, Sunderland. Saturday, Aug. 4, 1883. (Before BRETT, M.R., COTTON and BOWEN, L.JJ.) REG. v. MARSHAM. (a) Rates Assessment-Appeal-Agreement to pay old rate-Order of judge-Jurisdiction-Refusal of magistrate to issue warrants-Valuation of Property (Metropolis) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 67) 8. 44-11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 5-20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The rateable value of certain property having been re-assessed at a much higher sum, the owners appealed. Before the hearing of the appeal it was agreed that a special case should be stated for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division, and that in the meantime rates should be paid on the former valuation, and these terms were embodied in an order made by Cave, J. on the 23rd March 1881. In 1883 the overseers applied to the magistrates for a distress-warrant for the amount of the rates according to the new assessment, but the application was refused on the ground that as the appeal was still pending the overseers were bound by the order of Cave, J. (a) Reported by W. C. Biss, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. The overseers then applied to the Queen's Bench Division for a mandamus to the magistrates to issue the warrant. Held, that in consequence of the provisions of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 67 s. 44, which enacts that, pending any appeal from any new assessment, the rate shall be paid according to the new assessment, Cave, J. had no jurisdiction to make the order, and that the consent of the assessment committee to that order did not bind the overseers. Held also, that the application for a mandamus was properly made under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, 8. 5, the issue of the warrants being a merely ministerial, and not a judicial act. THIS wa. an appeal from two orders of a Divisional Court, consisting of Pollock, B. and Manisty, J., by which it was ordered that R. H. B. Marsham, Esq., and J. Balguy, Esq., police magistrates of the Greenwich Police Court, should respectively issue their warrants to levy by distress on the goods of the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the City of London, the respective sums of 34191. 48. 4d., and 83251. 15s. 10d., being unpaid rates for the relief of the poor of the parish of St. Nicholas, Deptford, and other purposes, made and assessed between the 10th May and the 16th Aug. 1882, and between the 6th April 1881 and the 25th March 1883 respectively, in respect of the Deptford Foreign Cattle Market. In 1878 a provisional valuation of the Cattle Market was made, the gross value being assessed at 66051., and the rateable value at 54651. Upon the quinquennial valuation list being made out for the parish of Deptford in Nov. 1880, which was finally approved by the Greenwich Union Assessment Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Valuation of Property (Metropolis) Act 1869, the gross value of the property was assessed at 25,000l. and the rateable value at 20,000. This valuation came into effect on the 6th April 1881, and in Jan. 1881 the Corporation gave notice of appeal against it. Before the case came on for hearing the parties came to an arrangement, which was embodied in an order by Cave, J., dated the 23rd March 1881, by which it was ordered that the proceedings should be stayed, and that the facts should be stated in a special case under the 40th section of the Valuation of Property (Metropolis) Act 1869, for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division, such case to be settled in case of difference by Mr. Roland Vaughan Williams, and that, upon the Queen's Bench Division giving their decision upon the questions of law, Mr. R. V. Williams should fix the amount of gross and rateable value in accordance therewith if the parties should differ, and that in the meantime the appellants should pay rates upon the basis of the last valuation list in force before that then questioned by the appeal. On the 9th May 1882 a provisional valuation was made, by which the premises in question were rated at 35,000l. gross and 28,000l. rateable. Up to Aug. 1882 the overseers of the parish had acquiesced in the rates being assessed on the old basis; but on the 16th Aug. 1882 they took out a summons, at the Greenwich Police Court, calling on the Corporation to show cause why a distresswarrant should not be issued for 3419l. 4s. 4d. for arrears of rates from the 10th May, on the footing of the provisional assessment. On the 6th Sept. Mr. Marsham dismissed the summons on the ground that the appeal was still pending, and that, by the order of the 23rd March 1881, the rates were payable on the basis of the original valuation list until the decision of the special case. On the 27th Feb. 1883 the special case was heard by the Queen's Bench Division, and the valuation list of 1880 was affirmed. On the 13th May 1883 the new overseers issued a summons for a distress-warrant for 11,7457. 08. 2d., being the former amount of 34191. 48. 4d., together with a further amount of 8325l. 158. 10d. for rates levied on the same footing. This summons was dismissed by Mr. Balguy on the 11th of July 1883 upon the same grounds as those given by Mr. Marsham. The overseers then applied to the Queen's Bench Division for a mandamus to the said magistrates to compel them to issue their warrants in accordance with the said summons, on the ground that the order of Cave, J. was ultra vires in so far as it fixed the basis upon which the rates were to be paid until the disputes between the parties should be settled, such interim rates being provided for by sect. 44 of the Valuation Act 1869. That section is as follows: Notwithstanding any appeal under this Act which may be pending at the commencement of the year, the valuation lists shall come into force unaltered, and every assessment, contribution, rate, and tax in respect of which the valuation list is conclusive shall be made, required, levied and paid in accordance with such valuation list; and where, in consequence of the decision on any appeal under this Act to assessment sessions or a superior court, an alteration in such valuation list is made which alters the amount of the assessment, contribution rate, or tax levied thereunder, the difference, if too much has been paid, shall be repaid or allowed; and if too little, shall be deemed to be arrears of the assessment, contribution, rate, or tax (except so far as any penalty is incurred on account of arrears), and shall be paid and recovered accordingly. On the 30th July the mandamus was granted by the Queen's Bench Division, and from that order the present appeal was brought. Webster, Q.C., Poland, and F. Mead for the appellants. Sects. 33 and 40 of the Valuation Act are in our favour. Sect. 44 does not apply, as it did not contemplate the appeal being decided on a special case as here. Then this is not a ministerial act on the part of the magistrates, but a judicial act: Harper v. Carr, 7 T. Rep. 270. Therefore they must apply to the magistrates to state a special case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43: Sweetman v. Guest, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 52; L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 262. The assessment committee represented the overseers, and they are therefore bound by the order of Cave, J. Sir F. Herschell (Solicitor-General) and Glen for the respondents.-When it is shown that a rate has been made the magistrate's action is merely ministerial, and he has no discretion. This case is governed by Reg. v. Bradshaw (29 L. J. 176, M. C.). [BRETT, M.R.-Was Harper v. Carr cited in that case?] No. Our application is under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 5, as was that in Reg. v. Bradshaw. Webster, Q.C. in reply. BRETT, M.R.-In this case an order has been made upon two magistrates to issue their distress seers. [CT. OF APP. It warrants, that order being made under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44. That order would seem to be a right order if the magistrates were bound, as a matter of course, to issue a distress warrant. is said that they were not, and that the circumstances of the case show that they were not. The circumstances of the case are that two or more valuations have been made, which value the premises in question at particular amounts, and then an order was obtained from Cave, J. that a special case should be stated. The parties who were then before Cave, J. agreed that he should put into his order, as part of it, that the rates should be made upon a former valuation, until the dispute as to the then existing valuation was decided. The parties then before him were the assessment committee and the Corporation of London. Now, for myself, I have very little doubt that we should decide that the assessment committee and the Corporation of London could not by agreement give Cave, J. jurisdiction to make that part of the order and that part of the order, therefore, would not have bound them. Whether, if they had been the sole parties, the Queen's Bench Division would have acted, is another matter. That I say nothing about; but I do not think they could have bound themselves-they could not by consent give the judge jurisdiction to make an order which, it seems to me, is an order in the very teeth of the Act of Parliament. But, however that might be, the assessment committee and the corporation certainly could not by agreement between themselves give the judge jurisdiction to make an order as against the overI confess, myself, I do not think that the assessment committee represented the overseers on that appeal, so as to make them a party to that appeal and to that order, so that the consent of the assessment committee to that part of the order should be taken as the consent of the overseers. I do not agree with it. Therefore, the question must be, not whether the consent gave jurisdiction to the judge for if he had it not otherwise, I do not think the consent would give it to him-but whether he had jurisdiction to make that part of the order; and that depends, it seems to me, upon what is the true meaning of sect. 44 of the Valuation Act. That seems to me a plain enactment that, "Notwithstanding any appeal under this Act which may be pending at the commencement of the year, the valuation list shall come into force unaltered, and every assessment, contribution, rate, and tax, in respect of which the valuation list is conclusive, shall be made, required, levied, and paid in accordance with such valuation list," and then the section actually goes on to show that, although it must be levied and paid, yet upon the appeal the matter may be altered after it is so levied and paid; for says, And where, in consequence of the decision on any appeal under this Act to assessment sessions or a superior court"—that is, a case stated-"an alteration in such valuation list is made which alters the amount of the assessment, contribution, rate, or tax levied thereunder "that is, already levied-"the difference, if too much has been paid, shall be repaid or allowed, and if too little," and so on. Nothing can be plainer, as it seems to me, than this, that the valuation list is to be taken for the time to be conclusive as if there was no appeal, and the amount stated in the valuation list, or settled by it 66 |