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taken by the Queen's Bench Division and by the Master of the Rolls and Lindley, L.J., but I still feel much doubt and difficulty. Judgment affirmed.

Solicitor for prosecution. The Solicitor to the Treasury.

Solicitors for defendants, Nicholson and Herbert.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.
Tuesday, Dec. 4, 1883.

(Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., STEPHEN and MATHEW, JJ.)

WEST LANCASHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY (apps.) v. IDDON (resp.). (a)

Railways Clauses Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 92), . 15-Bridge with an opening span-Detention f any vessel, barge, or boat-Barge with mast which could be lowered.

By sect. 15 of the Railwayo Clauses Act 1863, "where the company constructs a bridge with an opening span, it shall not be lawful for the company to detain any vessel, barge, or boat for a longer time than may be necessary for admitting a carriage or engine traversing the railway, and approaching the bridge, to cross the bridge, and for opening the bridge to admit the vessel, barge, or boat to pass; and the company shall be subject to, and shall abide by, such regulations with regard to the user of the bridge as may from time to time be made by the Board of Trade. If the company detains a vessel, barge, or boat longer than the time aforesaid, or fails in any respect to abide by such regulations as aforesaid, they shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, without prejudice to any remedy against them for any loss or damage sustained by any person."

The railway of the appellant company was carried over the river D., which was a navigable river, by a bridge with an opening span. Held, that the railway company were not bound to open the bridge for a barge with a mast so constructed that it could be lowered, and that refusing to open the bridge for such a vessel was not a detention within the meaning of the Act.

CASE stated by two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Lancaster, under sect. 33 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879.

1. Upon the hearing of a certain information and complaint preferred by the respondent against the appellants, for that the appellants on the 9th Feb. 1883, at Tarleton in the said county, then being incorporated by the West Lancashire Railway Act 1871, and which Act is incorporated with and forms part of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and part 1 (relating to cancellation and surrender of shares), and part 3 (relating to debenture stock) of the Companies Clauses Act 1863, the Companies Clauses Act 1869, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts 1845, 1860, and 1869, the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and part 1 (relating to construction of a railway)

(a) Reported by H. D. BONSEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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of the Railways Clauses Act 1863, unlawfully did detain a vessel, barge, or boat belonging to the respondent at a certain bridge with an opening span, belonging to the appellants, for a longer time than was necessary for admitting a carriage or engine traversing the railway and approaching the bridge, to cross the bridge, and for opening the bridge to admit the vessel, barge, or boat to pass, contrary to sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863, and sect. 31 of the West Lancashire Railway Act 1871, we adjudged that the appellants had detained the respondent's barge for a longer time than aforesaid, and we convicted the appellants in a penalty of 108. and costs.

2. The following facts were either proved before us or admitted by both parties:

3. Sect. 13 of the Act 6 Geo. 1, c. 38, is as follows:

And it is hereby also further enacted and declared by the authority aforesaid, that the said river Douglas, alias Asland, is and for ever hereafter shall be esteemed and taken to be navigable from the said river Ribble to the said place called Miry Lane End, in the township of Wigan aforesaid, and that all the King's liege people whatsoever may have and lawfully enjoy their free passage in, along, through, and upon the said river Douglas, alias Asland, or any part thereof, between the said river Ribble and the said place called Miry Lane End in the township of Wigan aforesaid, with boats, barges, lighters, and other vessels, and also all necessary and convenient liberties for navigating the same without any let, hindrance, or obstruction from any person or persons whatsoever, paying such rate and duty, rates and duties, as are by this Act appointed to be paid to the said undertakers, their heirs or assigns.

4. The railway of the appellants is carried over the river Dougles or Asland by a bridge having two opening spans. By sect. 31 of the West Lancashire Railway Act 1871, sub-sect. D., it is enacted that sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863 (incorporated with that Act) shall extend and apply to the bridge or viaduct, not only when constructed, but also during the construction thereof. Part I., which includes the said sect. 15 of the Railway Clauses Act 1863, is incorporated with the West Lancashire Railway Act 1871.

5. Sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863 is as follows:

Where the company constructs a bridge with an opening span, it shall not be lawful for the company to detain any vessel, barge, or boat at the bridge for a longer time than may be necessary for admitting a carriage or engine traversing the railway, and approaching the bridge to cross the bridge, and for opening the bridge to admit the vessel, barge, or boat to pass, and the company shall be subject to and shall abide by such regulations with regard to the use of the bridge as may from time to time be made by the Board of Trade. If the company detains a vessel, barge, or boat longer than the time aforesaid, or fails in any respect to abide by any such regulations as aforesaid, they shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds without prejudice to any remedy against them for any loss or damage sustained by any person.

6. The respondent is the owner of a vessel or barge fitted with a mast, and with such vessel or barge has the right to navigate the said river at the point where it is crossed by the said bridge.

7. The said vessel or barge passes along canals, and on account of the low arches of canal bridges is fitted with an apparatus whereby the mast can be raised or lowered. The canal lock nearest to the bridge is distant therefrom about three-quarters of a mile. The sail is not always raised on the river, but before the bridge was constructed there was no need to lower the mast at that point. The

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river is tidal, and the respondent's vessel or barge | passes up or down only with the tide. The height of the bridge above the river is not sufficient to allow the vessel or barge to pass under with raised mast, except when the tide is at still water. At the time of the detaining complained of the vessel or barge could not pass under with raised mast. The respondent had before such time given notice to the appellants that his vessel or barge would be passing the bridge at 10 a.m., and requested the appellants to have the bridge open. The respondent's vessel or barge approached the bridge coming down from the lock with hoisted sail, arriving at the bridge half an hour later than the time he had fixed. The respondent had to lower his sail and mast in order to get through the bridge, which would take, as stated by witness, from fifteen to twenty minutes, and he then had to put it up again when he got through the bridge. No evidence was given, nor was it contended by appellants, that any carriage or engine was traversing the railway and approaching the bridge at the time respondents vessel or barge arrived at the bridge. It was admitted on behalf of the appellants that they would have refused to open the bridge for the respondent if he had come punctually at ten o'clock or any other hour.

8. The respondent had paid toll to the Leeds and Liverpool Canal Company for his voyage.

9. It was admitted by both appellants and respondent that no regulations with regard to the use of the bridge have been made by the Board of

Trade.

10. The respondent contended that he had a right, under sect. 13 of the Act 6 Geo. 1, c. 38, set out above, to enjoy free passage along the said river at the point in question, and to pass the bridge with hoisted sail as a convenient liberty for navigating such river without obstruction, and therefore to have the bridge open for him accordingly.

11. The appellants contended that, as the barge could, and in fact did pass with lowered mast without the bridge being opened, they, the appellants, had not detained the barge within the meaning of sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863.

12. We were of opinion that, as a matter of fact, the progress of the respondent's vessel or barge was retarded by the bridge being unopened for a longer time than allowed by sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863, and as a point of law this was a detaining of the vessel or barge within the meaning of sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863, and convicted the appellant in the manner before stated.

13. The question of law therefore upon which this case is stated for the opiniou of the court is, whether upon the facts and admissions stated, and having regard to the provisions of sect. 13 of the statute of 6 Geo. 1, c. 38, and sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863, the appellants ought to have opened the bridge for respondent's vessel or barge to pass through.

A. T. Lawrence for the appellants.-The construction put upon the statute by the justices is an unreasonable one. It would make the traffic of the railway impossible; the train could not leave the preceding station until the bridge is re-connected. Of course it must be opened for ocean

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going vessels, but that traffic is very much less than the barge traffic. By the Act the bridge had to be built a certain height, and that in itself shows that it was never intended that it should be opened for all kinds of vessels. These barges have masts which are made in such a way that they can be lowered, and therefore they are not the class of vessels for which the railway company are bound to open the bridge.

Fullarton for the respondent.-It is not found as a fact in the case that this boat is not an oceangoing vessel; these barges go on both the canal and the river. The Act does not apply to one class of vessels more that another. The public have a right to use a navigable river without any obstruction, and such right is preserved by the Act which compels the railway company to open the bridge. The bridge is made in this way for the very purpose of protecting the right of the public in navigating the river. The justices have found as a fact that there was a detention," and therefore there is no appcal.

66

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-It is clearly the duty of the railway company to open the bridge for ships having masts which will not lower, but the question here is, whether they are bound to open the bridge for vessels having masts which will lower. I am of opinion that they need not do anything of the kind. By sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863 the company are liable to pay a penalty not exceeding 201. if they detain a vessel, barge, or boat for a longer time than is necessary for admitting a carriage or engine traversing the railway and approaching the bridge to cross the bridge, and for opening the bridge to admit the vessel, barge, or boat to pass; but here it is not necessary that the barge need be detained at all, because the mast can be lowered, and it is constructed for that purpcse. I think the true construction of the Act is, that it is not necessary to open the bridge for a barge which can lower the mast; and refusing to open the bridge in such a case is not a detention within the meaning of sect. 15 of the Railways Clauses Act 1863. The appellants are entitled to succeed, and the conviction must be quashed.

STEPHEN and MATHEW, JJ. concurred.

Conviction quashed. Solicitors for the appellants, Sandys and Trevener.

Solicitors for the respondent, Hamlin and Grammer.

Monday, Dec. 10, 1883.

(Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., STEPHEN and MATHEW, JJ.)

DINNING (app.) v. SOUTH SHIELDS GUARDIANS (resps.). (a)

Wife

chargeable-Maintenance by husband-Payment towards cost of relief-Limit of amount to be ordered-31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, 8. 33. By the Poor Law Amendment Act 1868, s. 33, when a married woman requires relief without her husband, guardians or overseers may apply to justices, who may summon such husband to appear before them to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to maintain his wife, and make an order upon him to pay such (a) Reported by M. W. MCKELLAR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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sum weekly or otherwise towards the cost of the relief of the wife, as after consideration of all the circumstances of the case shall appear to them to be proper, and shall determine in such order how and to whom the payments shall from time to time be made.

Respondents proved upon an application under this section that they had granted relief to the appellant's wife to the amount of 38. a week, and that the appellant was able to maintain her at 158. a week.

Held, upon a case stated by Stephen and Mathew, JJ. (dissentiente, Lord Coleridge, C.J.), that the justices had no power under this section to order payment beyond the actual relief granted, and that an order of 158. a week was bad. THIS was a case stated by two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the borough of South Shields in the county of Durham, under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the court on questions of law which arose before them as therein stated.

1. At a petty sessions holden at South Shields aforesaid, in and for the said borough, on the 17th Nov. 1882, a complaint preferred by the respondents against the appellant, charging the appellant for that on the 2nd day of Nov. 1882, Elizabeth Dinning, being a married woman, and requiring relief without her husband, did become chargeable to the South Shields Poor Law Union, and that the said Thomas Dinning was the husband of the said Elizabeth Dinning, and liable to maintain her, and why an order should not be made upon him for a sum to be paid weekly towards the relief of his said wife pursuant to sect. 33 of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122 was heard and determined, the said parties then being respectively present, and upon such hearing the said appellant was by us ordered to pay the sum of 158. per week for his wife's relief and maintenance.

2. And whereas the appellant, being dissatisfied with this determination upon the hearing of the said complaint, as being erroneous in point of law, duly applied in writing to state and sign a case, setting forth the facts and the grounds of such determination, for the opinion of this court, but the said justices being of opinion that the application of the appellant was merely frivolous, refused to state and sign such case, and at his request signed and delivered to him a certificate of such refusal. And whereas the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice have since granted a rule calling upon the justices to state such case, setting forth the facts and the grounds of their determination.

3. Now therefore the said justices, in obedience to the said rule and rrder of the said Queen's Bench Division, and the provisions of the said statute, stated and signed the following case :

4. Upon the hearing of the complaint it was proved on the part of the respondents, and found as facts, that the said appellant had allowed his lawful wife, the said Elizabeth Dinning, to become chargeable to the respondents' poor law union, that she was unable to maintain herself, that the said appellant was liable to maintain her, and that he was able by work and other means to provide for her, that the appellant was rated to the poor for property for which he was owner on an annual value of 3291., exclusive of the annual value

[Q.B. DIV.

of the house in which the appellant resided, and of his business premises, and that he was also a coal merchant.

5. It was further proved by the evidence of Thomas Fosback, a relieving officer of the respondents, who was called as a witness in support of the complaint, that the amount of relief granted by the respondents to the said Elizabeth Dinning was the sum of 38. per week, and no more.

6. It was contended on the part of the appellant that the justices had no power to order a sum to be paid weekly which would more than cover the whole sum paid by the union to the defendant's wife for her relief, that the union having considered 38. per week sufficient for her relief had paid her that sum, and that as the statute under which the complaint was made only enabled the justices to make an order towards her relief, they could only make an order for a sum under the amount granted by the union, i.e., they might order 2s. 11d. per week, but could not order the full

sum of 38.

7. On the part of the respondents it was con. tended that the statute was an enabling statute, that there were other poor law provisions by statute enabling the respondents to recover the full sum expended by them in maintaining the appellant's wife by reason of her becoming chargeable to the union, and that the statute 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 33 expressly conferred power on justices to summon the appellant to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to maintain his wife, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and the means of the appellant, that they should make an order upon the appellant to pay such a sum weekly or otherwise as they should deem proper for the relief and maintenance of the appellant's wife.

8. The said justices carefully considered the whole of the facts and circumstances of the case, and respective contentions of the appellant and respondents, and decided that the appellant was bound to maintain his wife, and that as it had been proved that the appellant had ample means, the sum of 158. per week was a reasonable sum for the appellant to pay towards the relief and maintenance of his wife, which said sum they directed to be paid by the appellant weekly, and every week to Thomas Fosback, a relieving officer of the said union.

9. The question of law arising on the above statement for the opinion of the court was, whether the said order was valid or otherwise. And the court was solicited according to the power vested in the court by the statute to remit the case to the said justices with the opinion of the court thereon, or to make such other order as to the court might Leem fit.

By the Poor Law Amendment Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 122), s. 33:

When a married woman requires relief without her husband, the guardians of the union or parish, or the overseers of the parish, as the case may be, to which she becomes chargeable, may apply to the justices having jurisdiction in such union or parish in petty sessions assembled, and thereupon such justices may summon such husband to appear before them to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to maintain his wife, and upon his appearance, or in the event of his not appearing upon proof of due service of such summons upon him, such justices may after hearing such wife upon oath, or receiving such other evidence as they may deem sufficient, make an order upon him to pay such sum

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weekly or otherwise towards the cost of the relief of the wife as after consideration of all the circumstances of the case shall appear to them to be proper, and shall determine in such order how and to whom the payments shall from time to time be made; which order shall, if the payments required by it to be made be in arrear, be enforced in the manner prescribed by the Act of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, for the enforcing of orders of justices requiring the payment of a sum of money: Provided that such

order may be at any future time revoked by the justices in petty sessions assembled, if they see sufficient cause for so doing.

Bremner for the appellant.-The justices have no authority under this section to assess the maintenance which a husband ought to provide for his wife. The guardians are the persons empowered to make the application, upon whom is the duty to fix the amount of relief to be granted, and they can only recover something "towards the cost of the relief of the wife." The justices may order only part of this cost, or at all events not more than the whole, and may determine how and to whom the payments shall be made, but they cannot grant anything for maintenance beyond the actual cost of relief. This order therefore was beyond the jurisdiction of the justices.

Cock for the respondents.-The only words to be interpreted are "towards the cost of the relief of the wife," but they must be read with the rest of the section, which requires the husband to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to maintain his wife, and which directs con

sideration of all the circumstances of the case. If

it were intended to limit the order to the actual cost of relief, it is difficult to imagine why the justices' order should determine the person to whom payments were to be made. The persons who drew up the marginal note to the section certainly must have considered the justices to have the more extended jurisdiction which they have exercised in this case; that note is, "Order may be made in petty sessions upon a husband to maintain his wife."

MATHEW, J.-I am of opinion that the justices had not the power to make the order appealed against in this case. The section enables the guardians or overseers to apply to the justices, who may summon the husband of a wife chargeable to their union or parish; the husband is to show cause why an order should not be made upon him to maintain his wife, but the only order which the justices can make after hearing the husband, or in his absence, is "to pay such sum weekly or otherwise towards the cost of the relief of the wife, as after consideration of all the circumstances of the case shall appear to them to be proper, and shall determine in such order how and to whom the payments shall from time to time be made." I quite see room for doubt whether justices were not under this section intended to fix the proper amount the husband should pay for his wife's maintenance, but the guardians are expressly mentioned as the parties concerned, and they must make the application. The payment is to be towards the cost of relief, and I can see nothing in the subsequent words to extend the power of the justices beyond the amount of that cost. In this case the justices have interpreted the section differently, but it appears to me they were wrong.

STEPHEN, J.-I am of the same opinion, and I not only entertain the same doubts which have

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been mentioned by my brother Mathew, but I find them much strengthened by the difference in opinion of the Lord Chief Justice. The difficulty occurs from the use of the two words "maintain and "relief." Cause is to be shown why an order should not be made on the husband to maintain his wife. The section might have gone on to provide for payment for this purpose, but as it does not do so I think we can only give effect to the words it contains. The order which the justices can make may be to pay such sum as they think proper "towards the cost of the relief of the wife." If it had been intended to enable the justices to order a sum which they thought proper for the maintenance of the wife, the Legislature would more probably, as it seems to me, have enabled her to make the application. It must, however, be the guardians or overseers who are to apply, and they are the only persons interested. They can only be interested to the extent of the costs of the actual relief granted, and to my mind it seems that the costs of relief is the superior limit of the payment which the justices can order. I cannot think that the consideration of all the circumstances, nor the determination of how and to whom the payments are to be made, both of which are directed, throw much light upon the matter, for there may be circumstances under wh which the cost of relief might be appropriately paid to some other person than the guardians or overseers. I am at a loss to attribute any meaning to the change of expression in the latter part of the section from that used in the earlier part, unless it is meant thereby to lay down a limit to the payment which the justices may order.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I need scarcely say that I differ in opinion on this point with considerable doubt. I am far from saying that it is not exceedingly arguable, or that the statute is at all clearly expressed; indeed, whatever be the meaning of the section, it certainly is unfortunately expressed, for cause is to be shown against an order to maintain the wife, and the order is to be made for payment towards the costs of her relief. The only question for us is as to the meaning of the costs of relief, and whether it can refer to the same maintenance against which cause is to be shown, according to the fair sense of the words used in the section. I agree that the wife must first become chargeable as a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the justices, but that being established we are at liberty to consider what the Justices may do. If we can, we should read the whole section together, and interpret the various parts consistently. It is clear that the first part contemplates an order for the maintenance of the wife, without limiting the amount to the cost of relief. Cause is to be shown by the husband against an order to maintain the wife, the wife or other evidence is to be heard, and the justices may "make an order upon him to pay such sum weekly or otherwise towards the cost of the relief of the wife as after consideration of all the cir cumstances of the case shall appear to them to be proper, and shall determine in such order how and to whom the payments shall from time to time be made." The question for us is whether, taking together all the expressions of this section, the words "towards the cost of the relief of the wife." more appropriately fit the meaning of maintenance generally, or the sum already ascertained by the

guardians as the proper sum for her relief. I have some hesitation, but I think the order made by the justices should be upheld. I should add that I am unable to imagine how the justices could in in the first instance have thought the appellant's objection frivolous. We remit the case to the justices, and direct an order to be made against the appellant for payment of 38. instead of 158. a week.

Judgment for the appellant. Leave to respondents to appeal.

Solicitor for appellant, J. S. Coleman, for J. J. Bentham, Sunderland.

Solicitors for respondents, Iliffe, Russell, Iliffe, and Cardale, for Mabane and Graham, South Shields.

The appellant was the owner and occupier of a private theatre which he gratuitously permitted to be used for dramatic performances on four occasions for the benefit of a charity. Tickets of admission were sold to the general public away from the building, no money was received at the doors, but the performances drew crowded audiences. The appellant kept control of the building, and his servants opened the doors and set the scenes, but he had no licence from the Lord Chamberlain or the Justices.

Held, upon a case stated, that the appellant was rightly convicted by a stipendiary magistrate of having or keeping a house or other place of public resort in Great Britain for the public performance of stage plays without authority, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 2.

THIS was a case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, on the hearing of four several complaints by the respondent against the appellant, charging_that the appellant, on the 13th, 15th, and 16th Dec. 1882, and on the 16th Jan. 1883, being the occupier and keeper of a certain house of public resort, called the Shelley Theatre, did have and keep open the said house for the public performance of stage plays therein without authority or licence, as required by law, contrary to sect. 2 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68.

The facts appear from the judgment.

Willis Bund for the appellant.-The circumstances of this case cannot constitute the having or keeping a house or other place of public resort for the public performance of stage plays, within the meaning of the 2nd section of this statute. The words "have or keep" must refer to habitual use, as was held in the case of Reg. v. Strugnell (L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 93). [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.— That case turned upon the appellants having parted with the control of the room. Here there is no suggestion of that kind. MATHEW, J.And I observe a penalty is provided for each day's infringement of the enactment.] The "have " and "keep" merely express the same meaning,

() Reported by M. W. MCKELLAR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
MAG. CAS.--VOL. XIII.

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and it could not be intended that one night's performance should constitute the keeping a place of public resort for a public performance; the fees for licences are for at least a month, and nothing less seems to have been contemplated as forbidden by the enactment.

Poland and Coleridge appeared for the respon. dents, but were not heard.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-It is reasonably clear that in this case Sir Percy Shelley, I dare say with the best possible intentions, has acted against the law, and has therefore been properly convicted, in a nominal penalty, for so acting. He has acted in violation of the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 2. That section enacts that it shall not be lawful for any person to have or keep any house or other place of public resort for the public performance of stage plays without the authority of Letters Patent from the Crown or a licence from the Lord Chamberlain. Here Sir Percy Shelley has built a theatre, which is constructed only as a theatre, and in which from time to time stage plays are performed, and it is proved that, on several occasions for the benefit of charities and other excellent objects, stage plays were performed in this house, which was thus intended for stage plays, and was erected for the purpose of having them from time to time performed. The performances were advertised and the tickets were sold, and on one occasion 300 tickets were sold, and as many as 200 or 300 persons were brought together, and all the ordinary incidents of a public performance of stage plays occurred in this house or theatre, which is owned by Sir Percy Shelley. It would be frittering away the language of the Act if we encouraged the slightest doubt whether this could legally be done without a Royal patent or a licence from the Lord Chamberlain. It is obvious that it is extremely important that the law on this subject should be maintained, for the collection of large numbers of persons in buildings for the purpose of public exhibitions leads to considerable danger of fire and otherwise, and it is therefore important that the jurisdiction of the Lord Chamberlain should be maintained, and that in a wealthy country persons of wealth and position should not be able to erect buildings which may possibly be open to grave public dangers or objections-I do not say it was so in the present case, but only say that it may possibly be somerely because he is able to dispense with the receipt of money. The very object for which the jurisdiction is kept up would be defeated. If we could countenance such a notion or encourage any doubt that where private theatres are built for the performance of stage plays, and such plays are performed there before large numbers of persons, and money is taken for those performances, the Act of Parliament is violated. It is not manifest that the words "have or keep are in this Act intended to be synonymous, for under this second section every single day on which such a performance takes place incurs the penalty. It is not necessary, therefore, that there should be a constant or habitual performance of plays, for a single performance, it is clear, incurs the penalty; and it is to my mind clear that the magistrate was perfectly right in convicting under the first of these two sections; and that on that ground, therefore, this conviction must be affirmed. As to the other section-the 11th-I do not express 2 P