CT. OF APP.] SMITH V. LAMBETH ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE. on the part of the company, they the tenants will pay to the company for each and every year of the term the rent or sum of 1., by twelve equal monthly payments on the first day of each month in the year, and in addition to the yearly rent or sum of 7. hereby reserved, pay or cause to be paid to the company quarterly in each and every year such a sum of money as shall be equal to a clear per cent. of the gross amounts from time to time received by the tenants from the public for placing, affixing, &c., all such advertisements, &c., at the several stations before referred to. Provided always, and it is hereby expressly agreed that in case any monthly payment of the said yearly rent or sum of 1. or any quarterly payment of such additional sum as is herein before mentioned shall be in arrear and un paid for the space of fourteen days after notice in writing, the same shall be recoverable by the company in addition to any other remedies by distress as in the case of rent in arrear. And further, that the tenants will not assign or demise the benefit of the grant, licence, or agreement hereby made, or any part thereof, to any person' or persons whomsoever, except to any person or persons who may become a partner or partners with the tenants without the written consent of the secretary or general manager. And further, that the tenants will, in the exercise of the licence and privilege hereby granted, cause all such bookstalls, &c., to be of neat and suitable appearance, &c., and shall abide by, obey, and observe the regulations which may be from time to time made by the company, touching or concerning the placing on the platforms of the said several stations of any of the necessary bookstands, &c. and that such bookstands, &c., shall be of neat and suitable elevation, &c., and shall be constructed in every way to the satisfaction of the engineer." Covenant by the company not to permit other persons to vend newspapers, books, &c., or exhibit advertisements, &c., at their stations (except their own train books, time tables, &c.). "And the company do hereby warrant unto the tenants the quiet and peaceable enjoyment and benefit of the grant, licence, powers, privileges and benefits hereby granted for the period upon the terms and stipulations and in manner aforesaid according to the true intent and meaning of these presents. Provided always, and it is hereby agreed that if any of the said monthly or quarterly payments of the said yearly rent, or sum of 1., or of such additional sum as aforesaid respectively, or any part or parts thereof, shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of eight days after the same shall have become due, or if the tenants shall wilfully break or neglect to fulfil or observe any of the covenants herein contained on their part to be observed, it shall be lawful for the company to put an end to the grant hereby made" (by a month's notice in writing)" of the intention of the company to put an end to the said grant, and at the determination of such notice the said term hereby granted shall cease and determine, but without prejudice to the rights of the company under the covenants, and agreements herein contained up to such determination. And it is hereby further agreed that on the expiration of the said term of seven years the licence and privilege hereby granted shall" (unless determined at the end of the term by three months' previous notice)" continue in full force and effect and subject to the stipulations and conditions herein contained and provided" (until determined by three months' notice), “and at the expiration of such notice the said licence and privilege shall cease and determine." The questions for the opinion of the court (who were to be at liberty to draw inferences of fact) were first, whether the appellants (W. H. Smith and Son) were liable to be rated in respect of the bookstalls, or any of them; secondly, whether the rate was a good and valid rate. The Divisional Court (Field and Cave, JJ.) gave judgment against the rate, answering both questions in the negative. From this decision (which is reported 9 Q. B. Div. 585) the Lambeth Assessment Committee now appealed. E. Clarke, QC. and Archibald, for the assessment committee, in support of the appeal.-On [CT. OF APP. the true construction of the agreement under which the bookstalls are held, Messrs. Smith and Son are liable to be assessed to the poor rate. They are in exclusive possession and occupation of the spaces occupied by the bookstalls, which distinguishes the present case from Willing v. St. Pancras Assessment Committee (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 126; s. c. nom. Reg. v. St. Pancras Assessment Committee (2 Q. B. Div. 581). The stalls are structurally of a character which renders the Occupier rateable. In The Electric Telegraph Company v. The Overseers of the Poor of Salford (11 Ex. 181; 24 L. J. 146, M. C.) the telegraph company was held liable to be rated in respect of telegraph wires and posts, and the land in which the posts were fixed. In that case Sir Fitzroy Kelly, arguing on behalf of the telegraph company, contended that they had only a qualified right or easement, as in the case of a licence to put a bookstall on a platform, on which Pollock, C.B. said: "Is not a bookstall rateable, like a refreshment room?" (24 L. J. M. C., at page 149). They also referred to The London and North-Western Railway Company v. Buckmaster, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 835; L. Rep. 10 Q. B. 70, 444; Reg. v. Morrish, 32 L. J. 245, M. C.; Cory v. Bristowe, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 797; 33 L. T. Pimlico Tramway Company v. Greenwich, 29 L. T. McIntyre, Q.C. and Prosser, for Messrs. W. H. Smith and Son, in support of the judgment of the Divisional Court, were not called on. BAGGALLAY, L.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division, who have held that Messrs. Smith and Son are not rateable in respect of the bookstalls at Waterloo Railway Station, which are held by them under a grant from the London and South-Western Railway Company, the terms of which have been brought before us in the course of the argument. No question is raised as to whether these bookstalls are rateable, in the sense that a rate must be paid by somebody in respect of them. It is admitted that they are rated as a portion of the station. It is now suggested on behalf of the appellants that Messrs. Smith and Son's posses sion of the bookstalls is such as to make them rateable. In delivering judgment in the court below, Field, J. stated that the real question to be considered is whether the grant gives exclusive occupation, or exclusive enjoyment. In stating the question in this way, he was following in substance a series of decisions of many judges of great experience in rating cases. Having set before him that as the question to be decided, he does what it is our duty now to do, that is, he proceeds to consider what is the effect of the deed. He says: "From the beginning to the end of this document the parties carefully avoid all expression of intention to create a tenancy." (9Q. B. Div. at page 594.) I entirely agree with this observation. It is true that, for the sake of convenience, Messrs. Smith and Sons are referred to as the tenants," but the agreement is in reality a grant of a sole and exclusive licence and privilege. I concur with Field, J.'s criticism, and I think that, on the true construction of the agreement, the railway company does not grant to Messrs. Smith and Son exclusive possession o 66 r CT. OF APP.] GUARDIANS OF SALFORD UNION v. OVERSEERS OP TOWNSHIP OF MANCHESTER. [Q.B. Div. occupation of the bookstalls, but only exclusive enjoyment, so as to enable them to carry on their trade in the most convenient manner. If that is the right view of the construction of the agreement, as I think it is, it follows that Messrs. Smith and Son are not rateable in respect of these bookstalls, and that is Field, J.'s construction. He considers the authorities in the course of his judgment, and I do not think it necessary now to comment on them in detail, but I may observe that the same question has been proposed in each case, and where the judges have come to the conclusion that there was exclusive occupation, they have held that the persons so occupying were rateable, and where they have come to the conclusion that there was no such exclusive occupation they have decided against the rate. For these reasons I am of opinion that the appeal fails, and the judgment of the Divisional Court ought to be affirmed. BRETT, L.J.-The question in these cases is not always whether there is a demise, for there may be exclusive occupation without a demise, but here the question is whether this agreement is a demise or a licence to sell books and the other articles referred to in the agreement, with subsidiary leave to display such books and other articles on such parts of the platform as may be approved of by the company. This question turns on the construction of the indenture. There are parts of the deed which look like part of an agreement for a tenancy. It is a fallacy to take singly each part of the deed which is opposed to the view that there is a tenancy, and argue that the expressions there used are not absolutely inconsistent with the existence of a tenancy. You must take all these parts of the deed together, and see on the whole whether the deed amounts to a demise or is a mere licence to sell. I find that Messrs. Smith and Son can only go to these stalls at particular times and for a limited purpose. This is consistent with a licence, and inconsistent with a tenancy. Again, the money payable under the agreement is paid for the whole licence, and what is supposed to be a demise of a particular place is more like what might be called a movable demise, for the position of the bookstalls may be changed. It is clear that this is not a demise of n particular place, and consequently that it is only a licence to sell books and other goods, together with an auxiliary right to display such goods at different places upon the railway company's premises. I am therefore of opinion that there is no occupation within the meaning of the Act of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 2). The only way in which these bookstalls are brought within the purview of rating is that the railway company is rated in respect of the increased value of their premises which is caused by the payment they receive for the use of the bookstalls. As to the cases which have been referred to, I do not think it necessary to consider them all in detail, but I wish to say that, with regard to the case of The Electric Telegraph Company v. The Overseers of Salford (11 Ex. 181), I reserve my opinion as to whether I agree with that decision or not. LINDLEY, L.J.-When this deed is looked at carefully, it is impossible to hold that it amounts to a demise. On the contrary, the language is chosen as if for the purpose of excluding that view. It is true that the words "tenants" and "rent" are used, but there is no reddendum, and there are no appropriate words to create a tenancy. Messrs. Smith and Son have the right of going into the station and erecting stalls where the officers of the company point out. This right is movable, and there is no grant of an exclusive right over any portion of the railway. company's premises. If this is a grant of an easement and nothing else, there is an end of the case. The cases which have been referred toElectric Telegraph Company v. Overseers of Salford (11 Ex. 181), Cory v. Bristow (2 App. Cas. 262) and Pimlico Tramway Company v. Greenwich (L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 9)-are all distinguishable. Here the parties have intentionally avoided creating a tenancy. I am therefore of opinion that the judgment of the court below is correct, and the appeal should be dismissed. Judgment affirmed. Solicitors for W. H. Smith and Son, Harvey, Oliver, and Capron. Solicitor for the assessment committee, G. W. Barnard. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Dec. 13 and 21, 1882. (Before HAWKINS and WATKIN WILLIAMS, JJ.) THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE SALFORD UNION V. THE OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF THE TOWNSHIP OF MANCHESTER. (a) Poor law-Settlement-Illegitimate pauper-Idiot -Residence for three years-Divided Parishes Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), 8. 34. By a residence for three years in a parish, an illegitimate idiot above the age of sixteen years acquires a settlement in such parish, notwithstanding that she is incapable of taking care of herself, and that she resides with her mother and her mother's husband as part of their family. A. G., an adult illegitimate idiot, and a person incapable of taking care of herself, resided with her mother and her mother's husband in the appellant union for more than three years. three then removed to the respondent township, where A. G. (before three years had expired) became an inmate of the workhouse. An order of justices adjudicating the settlement of A. G. to be in the appellant union having been made: Held, that such order was right. Reg. v. The Leeds Union (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 521; 4 Q. B. Div. 323) followed. All THIS was an appeal by way of special case, stated by consent and by the order of North J., in pursuance of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45 s. 11. On the 31st July 1882 the respondents obtained an order of the justices of the city of Manchester, adjudicating the settlement of Alice Gerard, an idiot pauper, to be in the township of Pendleton in the county of Lancaster, and in the appellant union. 1. The pauper, a single woman, is the illegitimate daughter of Margaret Gerard (afterwards Margaret Harding), and was born at Warrington, in the said county of Lancaster (not in the appellant union), on the 18th Jan 1854, and she is now, and always has been, an idiot. 2. The mother of the pauper, before the pauper had attained the age of sixteen years, videlicet in (a) Reported by DUNLOP HILL, Esq, Barrister-at-Law. Q.B. Div.] GUARDIANS OF SALFORD UNION v. OVERSEERS OF TOWNSHIP OF MANCHESTER. 1864, intermarried at Warrington aforesaid with one George Harding, a glass cutter, who was born at Birmingham, and served seven years legal apprenticeship there, and is now dead. 3. In the year 1875 the pauper and her mother and the said George Harding came to reside in the said township of Pendleton, where they resided together until Sept. 1881, when they removed to Manchester, where they resided together until the pauper became an inmate of the Manchester workhouse. 4. Previously to and since 1875 the pauper has always resided continuously with her mother and the said George Harding, as part of their family, and has never separated herself therefrom. 5. The pauper is now, and always has been, incapable of taking care of herself, through imbecility of mind. The respondents contend, and the appellants deny, that the pauper upon the above facts is settled in the township of Pendleton in the appellant union by reason of her residence therein for three years, under the provisions of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 34, which provides : Where any person shall have resided for the term of three years in any parish, in such manner and under such circumstances in each of such years as would, in accordance with the several statutes in that behalf, render him irremovable, he shall be deemed to be settled therein until he shall acquire a settlement in some other parish by a like residence or otherwise; provided that an order of removal in respect of a settlement acquired under this section shall not be made upon the evidence of the person to be removed, without such corroboration as the justices or court think sufficient. The question for the opinion of the court is, whether, on the above facts, the legal settlement of the pauper is in the township of Pendleton. If the court should be of opinion in the affirmative, the order of justices is to stand; if otherwise, to be quashed. Marshall for the appellant. Smyly for the respondents. The judgment of the court (Hawkins and Watkin Williams, JJ.) was delivered by HAWKINS J.-The question for our decision is whether the pauper was legally settled in Pendleton and removable thereto. We are of opinion that she was, and that her settlement in that township was acquired by her residence therein for three years, under the provisions of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 34. It was not denied by the appellants that the pauper's residence in Pendleton from 1875 to 1881 was such as to confer upon her a status of irremovability from that township from the expiration of the first year of that residence until her removal with Harding and her mother to Manchester in Sept. 1881, under the statutes 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 55, s. 1, and 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, s. 8; nor that such status of irremovability for upwards of three years gave her a settlement in Pendleton, under 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 34, if under the circumstances of such residence she was capable of acquiring a settlement in her own right; but it was contended that she was not so capable, because during all the time of such residence she was an idiot unable to maintain or take care of herself, and that such residence was a mere residence as a member of the family of Harding and her mother, and conferred upon her no independent status; and that she ought to be looked upon in the same [Q.B. DIV. The light as an unemancipated infant of tender years, who could not be removed from her mother. effect of the argument was to invite us to treat the pauper as legitimate for the purpose of incapacitating her to obtain either a settlement or a status of irremovability, but to treat her, as we are bound to do, as illegitimate for the purpose of preventing her from taking the settlement acquired by Harding by reason of his residence in Pendleton, as she would have done had she been legitimate. In support of his contention, Mr. Marshall cited passages from Nolan, vol. 1, p. 320, and vol. 2, p. 369: Rex v. Much Cowarne (2 B. & Ad. 861), and Reg. v. St. Mary Arches, Exeter (5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 637; 31 L. J. 77, M. C.) We do not in the least degree dissent from anything which is to be found in either of those passages or authorities; on the contrary, we entirely assent to them; but, in our opinion they have no applicability to the present case, for those authorities had reference to legitimate children, whilst we are dealing with an illegitimate pauper of full age. We take it to be clear law that, so long as a child, legitimate or illegitimate, is within the age of nurture, which covers the whole period from birth to the age of seven years, it cannot be legally, by any order of removal, separated from its mother. "It is entitled to remain with its mother so long as the purposes of nurture require" (per Bayley, J., Rex v. St. Nicholas, Leicester, 2 B. & C. 889); and even the consent of the mother cannot justify such a separation, for the rule is made for the benefit of the child: (R. v. Birmingham, 5 Q. B. 210; 13 L. J. 1, M. C.) The statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 3, extended this period of non-separation of a child from its parents by enacting that no child under the age of sixteen, whether legitimate or illegitimate, residing in any parish with his or her father or mother, shall be removed in any case in which such father or mother may not lawfully be removed. At this point there is a wide difference between the status of a legitimate and an illegitimate child. In the case of a legitimate child, the liability of its parents to maintain it is not limited to the age of sixteen, but extends to an indefinite period if the child, whether from imbecility of mind or of body, is unable to maintain or provide for itself. So long as it remains an unemancipated member of its father's family, no matter what its age may be, it follows and takes in law its father's settlement; it gains no independent status by reason of any residence in a parish so long as such residence is merely as a member of its father's family; and its right to take such newly-acquired settlement of its father ceases only upon its becoming emancipated or acquiring a new settlement for itself. After the happening of either of those events, even though residing with its father, its residence is for all purposes of settlement and removal an independent residence. See, among other cases, Reg. v. Everton (1 East, 526); Reg. v. Bleasby (3 B. & A. 377). The case of an illegitimate child is totally different. It is true its maintenance to the age of sixteen is provided for by statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 71, enacting that its mother shall maintain it as part of her family till it attains the age of sixteen; and if before that time arrives she marries, the liability to maintain such child as part of his family until it reaches that age is imposed on the husband of its mother. On the arrival, however, of an illegitimate child at the age of sixteen, all legal obligation towards it on the part both of the mother and her husband ceases: it is no longer legally attached to, and ceases to be a member of the family, in its legal sense, of either; and though, as an act of kindness, they may permit it to live with them and maintain it as one of the family, in the popular sense of the term, such residence amounts to no more than would the residence of a total stranger to whom food, lodging, and raiment might be voluntarily given as an act of pure Christian charity; and, as regards its settlement, that is by law (until it acquires one for itself) established in the place of its birth or in the place of its mother's settlement, if she have one which the child is capable of taking; but in nɔ case does it take any settlement the mother's husband may acquire, even during the time the child is a legal member of his family: (see 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 71; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 35; Reg. v. St. Mary, Newington, 4 Q. B. 581; Manchester v. St. Pancras, 41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 218; 4 Q. B. Div. 409.) The case of Rex v. Much Cowarne (2 B. & Ad. 861) would have been in point in favour of the appellants had the pauper in the present case been legitimate; but it is no authority, the pauper being illegitimate. The same observation may be made upon the case of Reg. v. St. Mary Arches, Exeter (5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 637; 31 L. J. 77, M. C.), for the doctrine of emancipation is altogether inapplicable to illegitimate children, whose unfortunate position is such that, after arriving at the age of sixteen, they have no title to be ranked as members of any family, and are in law looked upon in no other light than as mere strangers. The case of Reg. v. The Leeds Union (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 521; 4 Q. B. Div. 323) seems to me to be directly in point in favour of the respondents. We are unable to distinguish it from the present. In each case the pauper was illegitimate; in each case it was in fact separated from its mother. In the Leeds case it was away from its mother and was in the hands of strangers to it; in the present it was an inmate of the Manchester workhouse. In each case it was unable to choose a residence for itself, the one pauper being a mere infant, the other being an idiot. If any distinction can be pointed out, it is the fact that in the Leeds case the pauper was within the age of nurture, whilst here the pauper is upwards of twenty-one years old. In principle the cases are identical. Our judgment, therefore, is for the respondents. Judgment for the respondents. Solicitors for the appellants, Chester and Co., for Hulme, Foyster, and Waddington, Salford. Solicitors for the respondents, Johnson, Wetherall, and Co., for Lings, Manchester. Thursday, Jan. 25, 1883. Extradition-Foreign warrant-Warrant of committal-Sufficiency of description of offence"Fraud by an agent"-Extradition Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), s. 10-Treaty with France 1876-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75. A French subject and fugitive criminal was apprehended in England upon a warrant issued by the chief metropolitan police magistrate, after notice from the Home Secretary that a requisi (a) Reported by H. D. BONSEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [Q.B. DIV. A rule nisi for a writ of habeas corpus was granted on the 22nd Jan. directed to the Governor of the Middlesex House of Detention at Clerkenwell, commanding him to bring up the body of one Felix Auguste Piot (who had been committed under the Extradition Act 1870) with a view to his discharge from custody. On the 22nd Nov. 1882 the Home Secretary had, under sect. 7 of the Extradition Act, signified to Sir James Ingham, the chief magistrate of the Metropolitan Police Courts, that a requisition had been made to him by the diplomatic representative of the French Republic, for the surrender of Piot, accused of the commission of the crime of fraud within the jurisdiction of the French Republic, and thereupon Piot was arrested, and subsequently committed. In the French warrant which was issued for the arrest of Piot he was accused of the crime of fraud (abus de confiance), and in the warrant of committal by Sir James Ingham the offence was described as "fraud by an agent." Piot had formerly carried on the business of a banker at Reims, and had been adjudicated a bankrupt by the Tribunal de Commerce of Reims. The case for the prosecution was that one Mauclère, a commercial clerk residing at Elboeuf, had purchased through Piot twenty-five shares in the Société des Immeublés, and that Piot had misappropriated the sum of 3000f., which Mauclère had sent to him after writing the following letter: Reims, June 1, 1881. Mons. F. Piot,-I pray you to be so good as to cause to be taken up at the next settling day the twenty-five Immeublés of which I am buyer through you (chez vous). I will forward to you the funds either to-morrow or the day after.-Accept, Sir, my friendly greetings. (Signed) MAUCLÈRE. The receipt of this letter was denied by Piot, who also denied that he had acted as the agent of Mauclère. By the Extradition Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), 8. 10. it is enacted that: In the case of a fugitive criminal accused of an extradition crime, if the foreign warrant authorising the arrest of such criminal is duly authenticated, and such evidence is produced as (subject to the provisions of this Act) would, according to the law of England, prove that the prisoner was convicted of such crime, the police magistrate shall commit him to prison, but otherwise shall order him to be discharged. By the treaty with France for the mutual surrender of fugitive criminals, article 3, one of the crimes for which extradition is to be granted is as follows: 18. Abus de confiance, ou détournement par un banquier, commissionnaire, administrateur, tuteur, curateur, liquidateur, syndic, officier ministériel, directeur, membre ou employé d'une société, ou par toute autre personne. By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75, it is enacted that: Whosoever having been entrusted either solely or jointly with any other person, as a banker, merchant, broker, attorney, or other agent, with any money or security for the payment of money, with any direction in writing to apply, pay, or deliver such money or security or any part thereof respectively, or the proceeds or any part of the proceeds of such security, for any purpose, or to any person specified in such direction, shall in violation of good faith, and contrary to the terms of such direction, in anywise convert to his own use or benefit, or the use or benefit of any person other than the person by whom he shall have been so intrusted, such money, security, or proceeds, or any part thereof respectively, &c., shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. Sir Henry James, A.G. (A. L. Smith with him), for the Crown, showed cause.-There are three objections raised to the prisoner being held in custody: First, it is said that the French warrant is insufficient in form for not disclosing with certainty the offence for which extradition can be maintained; secondly, that the depositions before Sir James Ingtam disclose no offence cognisable by our law, and therefore neither by the treaty nor the Act can the extradition be supported; and thirdly that the form of the warrant of committal under the hand of Sir James Ingham is insufficient for not disclosing with certainty the offence with which the prisoner is charged. The second objection is of course the substantial one upon which my friend will be disposed to rely. As to the form of the French warrant in which Piot is accused of fraud, the French words being abus de confiance, I submit that the case is concluded by authority and it is quite sufficient statement of the offence. It is a mistake to suppose that the foreign warrant need disclose any of the details of the offence; it is simply an authority for arrest. There is nothing in the Extradition Act requiring the foreign warrant to be in any particular form, or that it should enter into any particulars of the offence. In the case of Ex parte Terraz (39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 502; 4 Ex. Div. 63) the warrant was in the most general form, describing the offence as being the commission of a crime against the bankruptcy law, and that warrant was held to be good. Then there are two cases, one of which is almost identical: one is Reg. v. Ganz (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 592; 9 Q. R. Div. 93; 51 L. J. 419,Q. B), and the other Reg v. Jacobi, reported in the same place in the LAW TIMES Reports as a note to Reg v. Ganz. Jacobi's case is almost identical with this on the point of the sufficiency of the foreign warrant. There is also the case of Reg. v. Weil (47 L. T. Rep. N. S. 630; 9 Q. B. Div. 701), where it was held that a fugitive criminal already in custody may be detained for an offence within the Act, even though he was originally arrested without any warrant. Then as to Sir James Ingham's warrant, the words are, that the MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIII. [Q.B. DIV. out the prisoner was accused of "fraud as an agent." There is no authority for saying that the warrant of committal should set nature of the crime with particularity; there is nothing in the statute to that effect, the form of warrant of committal given in the schedule leaves it in blank. But after the judgment of Pollock, B. in Jacobi's case I do not think it is necessary to discuss this point any further. As to the other objection, which is the only substantial one, the only point is whether there is any evidence to put this man upon his trial, upon the depositions before Sir James Ingham. I submit that there was ample evidence to show that this accused person had been guilty of an offence which was parallel to the offence that would have been committed under the Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 75. The letter written by Mauclère before he sent the money for the payment of the twenty-five shares in the Société Immeublés which he had purchased through Piot, is a sufficient direction in writing within the meaning of this statute. The direction to apply the money need not be in express and formal terms, and in support of this proposition I will refer to Req. v. Christian (L. Rep. 2 C. C. R. 94). It may be said by my friend that the amount sent was only 3000 francs, whereas the price of the shares was 3271 francs; but that could not make any difference and allow the person who receives it to appropriate the money to his own use. The receipt of the letter is denied, but there is strong evidence to show that it was received, and all that is necessary is to show some evidence. There is clearly a primâ facie case which ought to be inquired into, and this court will not look beyond that. I submit that the prisoner is lawfully in custody, and all the objections raised on his behalf must fail. Besley (W. A. Metcalfe with him) in support of the rule. It should not be forgotten that, before the treaty with England, France insisted upon the right to try a man for anything, and if a French subject was once extradited he might be tried for any number of crimes. By Article 6 of the treaty it is provided that, "the ambassador or other diplomatic agent of Her Britannic Majesty in France shall send to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in support of each demand for extradition, an authenticated and duly legalised copy either of a certificate of conviction or of a warrant of arrest against a person accused, clearly setting forth the nature of the crime or offence on account of which the fugitive is being proceeded against." There must be sufficient indication of the nature of the offence to show that it is an extradition crime before the English court can say that the person shall be surrendered. The treaty shows that there is no such crime as abus de confiance. The terms are, Abus de confiance, ou détournement par un banquier, commissionaire," &c. What the treaty says, therefore, is that persons are to be delivered up who have committed the offence of abus de confiance in a particular capacity, and the man is not to be tried for any other than the extradition crime. The treaty does not include the crime of traud in a general sense, but only when cominitted by persons in a particular position. In the case of Reg. v. Jacobi, which is relied upon by the Attorney-General, Stephen, J. clearly lays down that the whole proceeding must be begun with reference to the law of England, that it must be followed by proof that it is accord S |