LIEN property for the payment of a debt or duty, and for which the property may be sold in discharge of the lien. Bliss v. Clark, 39 Ill. 594. A lien is a claim upon a fund, recognized by the law. The fund may be money, a debt, real or personal property. Chandler v. Green, 101 Ill. App. 413. A lien is not in strictness either a jus in re or a jus ad rem, but it is simply a right to possess and retain property until some charge attaching to it is paid or discharged. Webster et al. v. Nichols et al., 104 Ill. 179. A lien is not, strictly speaking, a property in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a right of action for the thing. "At law, a lien is usually deemed to be a right to possess and retain a thing, until some charge upon it is paid or removed. There are few liens which at law exist in relation to real estate. The most striking of this sort undoubtedly is the lien of a judgment creditor upon the lands of his debtor. But this is not a specific lien on any particular land, but is a general lien over all the real estate of the debtor, to be enforced by execution, or other legal process, upon such part of the real estate of the debtor as the creditor may elect. Liens at law generally arise, either by the express agreement of the parties, or by the usage of trade, which amounts to an implied agreement, or by mere operation of law." Story's Eq. Jur., sections 1215-16; Village of Palmyra v. Warren, 114 Ill. App. 562. In its most extensive signification, this term includes every case in which real or personal porperty is charged with the payment of any debt or duty; every such charge being denominated a lien on the property. In a more limited sense, it is defined to be a right of detaining the property of another until some claim be satisfied. Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 507. A lien appears, by all the cases, to be a personal right, and can endure no longer than the possession of the party holding it continues. Urquhart v. McIver, 4 John. (N. Y.) 112. A lien is a charge on property for the LIEN payment of a debt or duty, and for which it may be sold in discharge of the lien. Bliss v. Clark, 39 Ill. 594. A lien is a special right which one has in that of which another has the general property; and, to the extent of the lien, it is an abridgment of the dominion which the latter has in the thing. Hayden v. Delay, Littell's Sel. Cases. (Ky.) 279. The right which one person, in certain cases, possesses of detaining property placed in his possession, belonging to another, until some demand which the former has is satisfied. Crommelin v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 10 Bos. (N. Y.) 80. At the common law the lien of a mechanic, manufacturer, or other laborer "is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re; that is to say, it is not a right of property in the thing itself, or a right of action to the thing itself"; but it is a security, derived from a "general principle of the common law, which gives to a man who has the lawful possession of a thing and has expended his money or his labor upon it, at the request of the owner, a right to retain it until his demand is satisfied." Jacobs v. Knapp, 50 N. Hamp. 75. A lien is not a property in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a mere right of action for the thing. It more properly constitutes a charge upon the thing. Ocean National Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 17. Lien is, strictly speaking, said to be, neither a jus in re, nor a jus ad rem, but simply the right to possess and retain property until some charge, justly attaching to it, is paid or discharged. Neil v. Kinney, 11 Ohio St. 68. * * "A lien is the right which a creditor has of detaining in his possession the goods of his debtor until the debt is paid. 'A lien is a mere right to retain possession of a chattel, which right is immediately lost on the possession being parted with'." Fishell v. Morris, 57 Conn. 551, quoting Cockburn, C. J., in Donalds v. Suckling, L. R., 1 Q. B. 612; Story on Bailments, sec. 440; case of an Hostler, Yelverton, 67 note; Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 115. LIFE ESTATE The right of creditors through an administrator to subject land of a deceased person to sale in payment of their claims, though sometimes spoken of as a lien, is, in strictness, something less than a lien, in the ordinary signification of that word. Noe v. Moutray, 170 Ill. 174. A mortgage is a lien. Gage v. Cameron, 212 Ill. 158. A tax is a lien. Gage v. Cameron, 212 Ill. 158. Debt Distinguished. A lien is always either a statute, a writ, a record, an instrument or a proceeding, and so necessarily distinct from the debt. Stephani v. Catholic Bishop, 2 Ill. App. 253. "Distress" Compared. A lien is in many cases like a distress at common law, and gives a party detaining the chattel the right to hold it as a pledge or security for the debt, but not to sell it. McCaffrey v. Knapp, 74 Ill. App. 93. Equitable Lien. Equitable liens are such as exist only in equity. It may be generally stated that they arise from constructive trusts. They are independent of the possession of the thing against which they operate as an incumbrance. The lien of a tenant in common, or life tenant, for the amount expended for permanent improvements on real estate held in common; of the party making the same for the cost of improvements upon real estate where the true owner stands by and suffers them to be made without notice of his title; the marshaling of rights of priority between encumbrancers, are instances of equitable liens arising from the doctrine of constructive or implied trusts. Village of Palmyra v. Warren, 114 App. 564, 565. LIFE ESTATE. In Personalty. A life estate in personal property gives the donee the right to consume such articles as cannot be enjoyed without con By the common law every estate in lands for an indefinite period, which might endure for the life or lives of persons in being, and not longer, is an estate for life. Thus where the owner in fee of homestead premises dies, and the right of homestead devolves upon the surviving husband or wife, who takes no estate in the inheritance, such right of homestead is an estate for life. Browning et al. v. Harris et al., 99 Ill. 462. The estate of homestead in a widow in the lands of which her husband died seized is a conditional life estate subject to the joint occupancy of the children of the deceased husband during the minority of the youngest thereof, and upon condition that it shall not be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned. Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 124; Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ill. 33. LIFE INSURANCE. See Life Insurance Contract. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. A fraternal beneficiary society, although a life insurance company in an "enlarged sense" of the term, is not such a company within the meaning of section 1 of the act of 1869, requiring such companies to have a capital of at least $100,000, to be invested as provided by the section. Commercial League v. People, 90 Ill. 166. A mutual benefit society is not a life insurance company in the more "restricted sense" in which that term is used in the statutes. Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 403. A fraternal beneficiary society, such as the Order of Modern Woodmen of America, although classifiable as an insurance company in an "enlarged sense" of the term, is not an insurance company in such a sense that proof that an applicant for insurance in a regular company has formerly been rejected by such a society LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT will amount to a showing of breach of a warranty, in the application, concerning the correctness of a negative answer given to the question, "Have you ever been declined or postponed by any company?" Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ill. 336, rev'g 115 Ill. App. 426. A mutual benefit association is a life insurance company within the statutory provision giving the circuit court of a county where plaintiff or complainant resides jurisdiction of a suit against an insurance company; although such associations are relieved of the more burdensome rules applicable to life insurance companies generally. Railway Passenger and Freight Conductors' Mutual Aid and Benefit Ass'n v. Robinson, 147 Ill. 151. A mutual benefit association in issuing certificates of insurance and paying death benefits is classifiable as an insurance company under that one of the acts of June 22, 1893, which is entitled, "An act to incorporate companies to do the business of life or accident insurance on the assessment plan and to control such companies," etc. Lehman v. Clark, 174 Ill. 291. LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT. The contract commonly called life-assurance, when properly considered, is a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a person, in the consideration of the due payment of a certain annuity for his life. Dalby v. Life Assurance Co., 80 Eng. C. L. 387. Life insurance is a contract in which one party agrees to pay a given sum upon the happening of a particular event consequent upon the duration of human life in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical payments by another. The State v. Mer. Ex. Mut. B. Soc. 72 Mo. 159. A certificate of membership in a benevolent society formed "to give financial aid and benefit to the widows, orphans, heirs or devisees of deceased members," and undertaking to pay a member a certain sum upon his attaining a particular age, or after his membership in good standing has continued for a certain pe LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY riod, is a contract of insurance within the meaning of the state laws prohibiting contracts of the type indicated. Rockhold v. Canton Masonic Benev. Society, 129 Ill. 456. LIFE INSURANCE POLICY. A certificate of membership in a mutual benefit society, while not a "policy of life insurance" in the more "restricted sense" of the term, is "in the nature of a mutual life insurance policy." Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 403. A life insurance policy payable to a beneficiary named therein is a species of property; it is in the nature of a chose in action which, subject to certain conditions, varying according to the terms of a contract, is payable upon the contingency of death or at a stated time. Armster v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 207 Ill. App. 515. LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY. The words "life," "liberty" and "property," embrace every personal, political and civil right which any person within the State may possess, including the right to labor, to make and terminate contracts and to acquire property. By no authority can any person be deprived of any of these rights or restricted in their exercise except by due process of law, by a statute general in its operation and affecting in the same way all persons similarly situated. Josma v. Western Steel Car Co., 249 Ill. 514. The terms, "life," "liberty" and "property," are representative terms, and intended to cover every right, to which a member of the body politic is entitled under the law. These terms include the right of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests, the right freely to buy and sell as others may. Indeed, they may embrace all our liberties, personal, civic and political, including the rights to labor, to contract, to terminate contracts, and to acquire property. None of these liberties and rights can be taken away except by due process of law. 2 LIFE, LIBERTY AND HAPPINESS Story on Const. 5th Ed. sec. 1950. The rights of "life," "liberty" and "property" embrace whatever is necessary to secure and effectuate the enjoyment of those rights. The rights of liberty and of property include the right to acquire property by labor and by contract. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 104. If an owner cannot be deprived of his property without due process of law, he cannot be deprived of any of the essential attributes, which belong to the right of property, without due process of law. Labor is property. The laborer has the same right to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as any other property owner. The right of property involves, as one of its essential attributes, the right not only to contract, but also to terminate contracts. Ritchie v. People, supra; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; Gillespie v. The People, 188 Ill. 182, 183. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PUR SUIT OF HAPPINESS. The expression, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," used in section 1 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1870, is general in its character, and includes many rights which are inherent and inalienable. Many of the rights referred to are included in the general guaranty of "liberty," and the happiness referred to may consist in many things or depend on many circumstances, including the right of the citizen to follow his individual preference in the choice of an occupation. Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 138. LIFE OR LIVES IN BEING. Rule Against Perpetuities. The "life or lives in being," taken as the measure of time for the application of the rule against perpetuities, need not be the life of one or more having an interest in the estate. French v. Calkins, Co., 54 Wis. 433. LIGHTNING. "Lightning," as used in a policy insuring against "any loss or damage Pope-6 LIKEWISE caused by lightning," applies to all known effects of a sudden or violent discharge of electricity, occurring in the course of nature, between positively and negatively electrified bodies,-disruption as well as combustion. Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 252 Ill. 255. LIKE. This term applies to the character as well as to the details of proceedings. People v. Jackson, 8 Mich. 112. "Like penalty," means a penalty of like amount, recoverable in a like way. Per Selborne, L. C., Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 52 L. J. Q. B. 507; 8 App. Ca. 357. Distinguished from "Same." "The like" is not equivalent to "the same." Therefore, where a sum of money was settled to A for life, and in default of appointment to her next of kin, as if she had died intestate, and the settlement contained a covenant that her afteracquired property should be settled "upon the like trusts, intents and purposes," it was held that, in default of appointment, after-acquired realty went to her heirsat-law, personalty to her next-of-kin. Brigg v. Brigg, 54 L. J. Ch. 464. LIKEWISE. See also Item. When a clause begins with "likewise" or "item," it is, generally speaking, to be read independently of the former clause, as a fresh departure, and starting upon a new disposition. 1 Jarm. 831, 832, citing Lethieullier v. Tracy, 3 Atk. 774; Amb. 204: Pearson v. Rutter, 3 D. G. M. & G. 398: Boosey v. Gardener, 5 D. G. M. & G. 122. "It is not, however, to be assumed that whenever the word 'item' or 'likewise' begins a sentence, it creates a complete severance of all that follows from the previously-expressed contingency. It cannot be put higher than this, that such expressions make a prima facie case for the disconnexion, which the context of the will may either maintain or rebut" (1 Jarm. 893 LIMITATION 832, 833); and where there is a devise, e. g., for life, upon condition, and that is followed by another devise of the same estate, commencing with "likewise," such other devise will, probably, be construed as subject to the same condition as the prior devise. Paylor v. Pegg, 24 Bea. 105, stated 1 Jarm. 833. LIMITATION. See also Covenant. When an estate is so expressly confined and limited by the words of its creation that it cannot endure for any longer time than till the contingency happens upon which the estate is to fail, this is denominated a limitation. Fifty Associates v. Howland, 11 Met. (Mass.) 102. A clause creating or transferring an estate or interest in lands or tenements which is limited, either directly or indirectly, to take effect in possession or enjoyment, or in both, subject only to any term of years or contingent interest that may intervene immediately after the regular expiration of a particular estate or freehold previously created together with it or by the same instrument out of the same subject of property is a "limitation" of a remainder. Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 Ill. 619. LIMITATION LAW. A law barring a legal remedy. Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 381. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. A limited partnership is one in which one or more of the partners are so in the usual way, in respect to power, property and obligation, and one or more of them have placed a certain sum in the business and may lose that, but are not liable further. Taylor v. Webster, 10 Vroom (N. J.) 104. LINEAL CONSANGUINITY. LINE OF CREDIT LINEAL DESCENT. The expressions "lineal descent," "lineally descended," indicate, prima facie, a direct line of descent from father to son (see hereon note to Craik v. Lambe, 1 Coll. 491); but under the peculiar circumstances of that case, yet still with difficulty, Knight-Bruce, V.-C., held that collateral next-of-kin were meant by "Relations by Lineal Descent" (14 L. J. Ch. 84; 1 Coll. 489). Again in Boys v. Bradley (22 L. J. Ch. 623; 4 D. G. M. & G. 58), the same learned judge, when L. J., said, "Whatever may be the range of the word 'lineal,' considered by Mr. Collyer in his note to Craik v. Lambe, to speak of a man's collateral kindred, as related to him in any line, is not an improper use of language, but equally allowable with the genealogical transversa linea of the civil lawyers." "The eldest male lineal descendant" is inapplicable to male person claiming in part through a female. Oddie v. Woodford, 7 L. J. Ch. 117; 3 My. &C. 584. Lineal consanguinity is that relation which exists among persons where one is descended from the other, as between the son and the father or grandfather, and so upward in the ascending line, and between the father and the son or grandson, and so downward in the descending line. Willis, etc., Co. v. Girzzell, 198 Ill. 317. See Lineal Descent. For the purpose of determining the applicability of the rule that actual damages are presumed in favor of "lineal kindred" of one whose death has wrongfully been caused, the phrase quoted will not be construed to include lineal "descendants" only, but the line extends upward as well as downward. Huff v. Peoria & Eastern Ry. Co., 127 Ill. App. 249. LINEAL KINDRED. See Lineal Descent. LINE OF CREDIT. The term has reference to the amount, not the time of credit. Am. B. H. O. & S. M. Co. v. Gurnee, 44 Wis. 49. |