KEEPER OF THE JAIL

Gambling Table.

"Keeping a billiard table, even though the loser pays for the use, is not keeping a gambling table within the statute [a statute licensing hotel keepers on condition that they will not keep gambling tables]." Healey v. Forbes, 52 Hun 32.

Intoxicants.

"It was conceded by the defendant that at the time alleged he had in his pocket, on his person, intoxicating liquor which he intended to sell in violation of law. He was 'keeping' the liquor in his pocket. The case is strictly within the provisions of the statute under which he was indicted." [A statute prohibiting the unlawful keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.] Commonwealth v. Ryan, 160 Mass. 172.

Inn.

It is keeping a house, publicly, openly and notoriously, for the entertainment and accommodation of travellers and others, for a reward. State v. Stone, 6 Vt. 298.

KEEPER OF THE JAIL.

The expression "keeper of the jail," as used in section 2 of the Jails and Jailers Act of 1874 with reference to the duties of the sheriff, means one who has in custody or charge, and includes that kind of service for which fees are allowed to the sheriff by clauses of section 19 of the Fees and Salaries Act. Goff v. Douglas County, 132 Ill. 326.

KEPT AND USED

ing it in possession, or occupying it. Stoltz v. People, 5 Ill. 169.

KEPT.

"The word 'kept,' as used in the policy, [of insurance providing that it shall be void if certain oils and burning fluids shall be kept on the premises] implies a use of the premises as a place of deposit for the prohibited articles for a considerable period of time." First Congregational Church v. Holyoke Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 475, citing Williams v. New England Ins. Co., 31 Me. 219; O'Niel v. Buffalo Ins. Co., 3 Comst. 122; Williams v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 569; Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 92 Penn. St. 15; Putnam v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 18 Blatchf. C. C. 368.

A provision in a fire-insurance policy that benzine, naphtha, or other explosives shall not be "kept, used, or allowed" upon the premises insured is to be understood as prohibiting only the habitual keeping, using, or allowing of these articles on the premises, and not their occasional introduction for some temporary purpose connected with the occupation of the premises, such as making ordinary or necessary repairs. Thus, the keeping of a five-gallon can of gasoline in the building for several weeks, from which to supply torches used in removing old paint from the outside of the building preparatory to repainting it, does not constitute a violation of this provision of the policy. Smith v. German Ins. Co., 107 Mich. 270.

KEPT COMPANY

KEPT COMPANY.

Evidence that defendant "kept company" with prosecutrix is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that prosecutrix was an unmarried woman, the jury properly understanding from the quoted phrase that defendant had been paying his addresses to her with a view to marriage, thus implying that she was unmarried. Durham v. People, 49 Ill. 233.

KEPT MISTRESS.

The expression "kept mistress," as used in modern times, amounts to the same thing as "concubine." Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 616.

KEPT OR ALLOWED.

"Kept or allowed" in a clause of an insurance policy prohibiting gasoline being kept or allowed on the premises do not refer to the mere temporary presence of gasoline thereon. Clute v. Clintonville Mut. F. Ins. Co., 144 Wis. 638, 641.

KEPT, USED OR ALLOWED.

The provision of a policy of fire insurance rendering it void if gasoline be "kept, used or allowed" on the premises is not violated by the mere bringing of gasoline on the property, but the words "kept, used or allowed" mean that the prohibited article must not only be upon the premises, but must be there for the keeping or storing of it, that there must be some degree of permanence in its continuance there. D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., Limited, of London, 284 Ill. 343.

KETTLE BOTTOMS.

What is called "kettle bottoms" is inorganic matter, such as sand or gravel, which settles to the bottom of kettles or tanks. Fairbank Co. v. Nicolai, 167 Ill. 245.

KICK SIGNAL.

A "kick signal" means that the speed shall be sufficiently increased to throw

KINDRED

the cut off car into the side track by the force of the increased momentum without following the car into the switch with the rest of the train. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 15.

KICKING.

Operating cars under the impulse of motion imparted prior to their being uncoupled. C. & A. R. Co. v. O'Neil, 172 Ill. 528.

KILL.

"Killing is causing the death of a person by an act or omission but for which the person killed would not have died when he did, and which is directly and immediately connected with his death. The question whether a given act or omission is directly and immediately connected with the death of any person is a question of degree dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case" (Steph. Cr. 151, 152). See also Arch. Cr. 712-731.

KINDRED.

See also Next of Kin.

"At common law collateral kin took to the exclusion of a surviving spouse. Indeed, the spouse never was regarded as 'next to kin' or one of the 'kindred.' In Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446, this court said: 'He (the husband) can not claim to be next of kin to his wife, for in no sense is he such, nor is the wife next of kin to the husband. Watt v. Watt, 3 Ves. Jr. 247; Garrick v. Lord Camden, 14 Ves. Jr. 386; Bailey v. Wright, 18 Ves. Jr. 49; Kent's Com. 136 (5th ed.).'

"It is contended that under the sixth clause of the Statute of Descent appellant, Lockwood, took the entire real estate. The sixth clause directs that if there be a widow or surviving husband and no kindred, the entire real and personal estate shall descend to the widow or surviving husband. In construing this section, appellant insists that the word 'kindred,' in this sixth clause, should be restricted to

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'parents, brothers and sisters and their descendants,' thus excluding next of kin (other than those named) in favor of the surviving spouse. He cites Webber v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 'that where an enumeration of specific things is followed by general words or phrases the latter are held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified.' But in the same connection we further said: 'But this is only one of many rules of construction, all of which are to be employed for the attainment of the same end, viz., that of ascertaining the intention of the legislature or the contracting parties, as expressed in the statute or contract sought to be construed; and where, from the whole instrument, a larger intent may be gathered, the rule under consideration will not be applied in such manner as to defeat such larger intent. Bishop on Contracts, sec. 409.'

"By application of the rule that a general expression may be limited by the specific words preceding, appellant would make the word 'kindred,' in said sixth clause of section 1, mean only 'parents, children, brothers and sisters, and their descendants.' This construction, in view of the language used, cannot be sustained. The word 'kindred' is used, in a larger sense, and must be held to include the phrase 'next of kin.' The phrase 'next of kin' is used in the fifth clause of the statute, and if 'kindred,' as used in clause 6, is to be limited to such kindred as are specified and provided for in the preceding clauses, then 'next of kin' must be included as among the 'kindred' so expressly specified and provided for. appellee says, if the word 'kindred,' as used in the sixth clause of the statute, must, for the reasons alleged by appellant, be held to mean only 'parents, children, brothers and sisters, and their descendants,' then for the same reasons must the word 'kindred,' as used in the seventh clause, receive the same construction, because, as said in Reeve on Descents, 32, 'the same words ought certainly to receive the same construction in both parts of the statute.' If under clause 6 the spouse inherits all the realty, to the

As

KINDRED

exclusion of 'next of kin,' then it follows that under clause 7, there being no surviving spouse, the county would take by escheat the whole of the property to the exclusion of the 'next of kin,' which would cause the disinheritance of 'next of kin,' in all cases, and is inconsistent and irreconcilable with section 5.

"In Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, which was a bill filed asking for a partition of 116 acres of land, Alexander Wunderle, the owner of the land, died intestate, leaving no issue, but leaving him surviving a widow and one brother and sister, who were non-resident aliens at the time of the intestate's decease. This court said (p. 67): 'Inasmuch, therefore, as the appellants cannot inherit from their deceased brother by reason of their alienage, the interest in the land which would otherwise have gone to them descends to the next of kin competent to take under the statutes of Illinois. We are of opinion that under the facts of this case, as presented by the record, the appellee must be regarded as such next of kin. Our Statute of Descent provides, that 'if any intestate leaves a widow or surviving husband and no kindred, his or her estate shall descend to such widow or surviving husband.' Rev. Stat., chap. 39, sec. 1, clause 6. The kindred here referred to are evidently such kindred as are capable of inheriting. It not appearing that the deceased had any other kindred than his non-resident alien brother and sister, his widow is entitled to take the whole of the land in controversy.' The construction placed upon the word 'kindred' in this case is contrary to the construction claimed by appellant." Lockwood V. Moffett, 177 Ill. 55, 56, 57.

In its proper signification the word, means such persons as are related by blood; and, accordingly, relations by marriage are generally incapable of bringing themselves within the description of "next of kin" in a will; and neither husband nor wife can be entitled under a bequest to the "next of kin" of either of them. Wetter, Trustee, v. Walker, 62 Ga. 145.

KINDERGARTEN

KINDERGARTEN.

"We find that the term 'kindergarten' (meaning literally ‘a garden of children') was devised by Friedrich W. A. Froebel, German philosopher and educator, to apply to a system which he elaborated for the instruction of children of very tender years. 'Children's garden' ought to be taken in its allegorical sense. The child is a plant, the school is a garden and Froebel calls teachers 'gardeners of children.' Sinnott v. Colombet, 107 Cal. 190 citing Compayré, History of Pedagogy, § 537, Payne's translation.

KNOWINGLY

ingly" testified falsely in regard to a material issue, although the word "wilfully" is usually coupled with "knowingly" in such instructions, since as so used the two words are equivalents. Peterson v. Pusey, 237 Ill. 208. To a similar effect see Peebles v. O'Gara, etc., Co., 239 Ill. 374.

While the words "knowingly" and "willfully" are usually coupled together in such an instruction, if a person knowingly testified falsely we think he must be held to have willfully testified falsely. The two words are equivalents. Fry v. Hubner, 57 Pac. Rep.,-Ore.-420. "Intentionally" is given as one of the meanings of each of these words. Standard Dict. This court has held that by a willful violation of the law is meant a violation of its provisions knowingly and deliberately. Catlett v. Young, 143 Ill. 74. We have also held that if a person consciously omitted to comply with a statutory requirement this constituted a willful violation. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Greig, 226 Ill. 519.

False Entries.

"The term knowingly, in the act of 1863 [providing a penalty if any owner, consignee or agent shall knowingly make an entry of goods by means of a false invoice, etc.] in the connection here under consideration, refers to the guilty knowledge of the owner, consignee, or agent, by whom the entry is made, or attempted to be made. The court below was pressed to instruct the jury that 'knowingly' is used in the statute as the synonym of fraudulently. The instruction given was eminently just, and we have nothing to add to it." Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 144.

*

Misappropriation of Money.

*

The adverb "knowingly," used in the statute, was intended to exclude from the definition of the offense (misappropriation of state moneys) mistakes of fact, accidents such as the loss of the money by fire or other casualty, or inadvertent appropriations. People v. Glazier, 159 Mich. 528.

KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY

KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY.

Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and wilfully, implies not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it or to omit doing it. Felton v. United States, 6 Otto (U. S.) 702.

KNOWINGLY PERMITS.

He knowingly permits a thing to be done who, knowing that it is being done, and being present where he can object, and who has an interest to object, does not object; and still more has he knowingly permitted it to be done if he takes part in doing it. Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Jones, 187 Ill. 203; McCarthy v. Miller, 122 Ill. App. 299; Hughes v. McCasland, 122 Ill. App. 365. In Com. v. Curtis, 9 Allen 266, the word "permit" was held to mean "to allow by not prohibiting." Wertz v. Mulloy, 144 Ill. App. 334.

KNOWLEDGE.

When it is said that an employee assumes all the usual known dangers incident to his employment, and that he must have knowledge of the unsafe and defective character of appliances, or that it must be shown that he has knowledge of the fact that defects render the appliances dangerous, the term "knowledge," as used in defining assumed risks, means no more than that all the facts and circumstances surrounding the given case must be sufficient to charge the employee with the required information. If the danger is obvious, knowledge of that fact will, of course, be attributable to the employee; but if, as already said, the risk is no more than that under which a prudent person would, under like circumstances, continue his employment, then certainly he cannot, as a matter of law, be held to assume the risk. Swift & Co. v. O'Neill, 187 Ill. 345. See, also, Henrietta Coal Co. v. Campbell, 112 Ill. App. 456, 457.

"The meaning of the words 'believe' and 'knowledge,' as defined by lexicographers will show that there is a distinct and well defined difference between them.

LABOR

'Believe: To exercise trust or confidence. To exercise belief in; to be persuaded upon evidence, arguments and deductions, or by other circumstances other than personal knowledge.' 'Knowledge: The act or state of knowing; clear perception of fact; that which is or may be known. Acquainted with things ascertained or ascertainable; specific information'." Ohio Valley Coffin Co. v. Goble, 28 Ind. App. 367.

Knowledge implies actual notice as distinguished from constructive notice. Dodge v. Grain Shippers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 176 Iowa 316.

KNOWN DANGERS.

Dangers which are so obvious that knowledge of their existence may be fairly presumed. Illinois, etc., Co. v. Bauman, 178 III. 355.

KURDI.

A certain kind of shells used among many of the native tribes on the headwaters of the Niger, as currency or a circulating medium, about 2500 kurdi representing the value of a dollar. Chicago, etc., Co. v. Keiron, 27 Ill. 507.

L. S.

By long usage and the general understanding of legal writers, "L. S." is regarded as the true representation of a seal, in a copy of all legal precepts.

* The letters "L. S." are the proper designation and copy of the seal. Smith v. Butler, 25 N. H. 524.

The letters "L. S.," appearing in the margin of an instrument, in the place where a seal is usually found, indicate a seal. Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Ill. 164. To the same effect see Bucklen v. Hasterlik, 155 Ill. 431.

LABOR.

The English word "labor" is defined as "the act of doing what requires a painful exertion of strength; pains; toil; work to be done; work done; performance; exercise; motion with some degree of violence; childbirth; travail." Bloom v.