WASTE WATER hereditaments, to the disherison of him Whatever does lasting damage to the Any act or omission which diminished Waste, as used in § 3177, R. S., means WATERCOURSE WATER CRAFT. House Boat. A house boat drawn up on the bank of Dredge. A steam dredge, used solely for dig- WATER MILL. The term "water mill" as used in the WATER RATE. The compensation or equivalent to be WATERCOURSE. If the conformation of the land is such or WATERCOURSE If the surface water in fact uniformly habitually flows off over a given course, having reasonable limits as to width, the line of its flow is, within the meaning of the law applicable to the discharge of surface water, a watercourse. Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. 324; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Ass'n v. Schultz, 226 Ill. 414. If the surface water flows along a fixed and determinate course, there is a watercourse into which the owner of the dominant heritage has the right to discharge surface water which naturally flows in that direction. But such owner has no right to divert water from its natural course and cast it upon the servient estate. Voudrie v. Southern Ry. Co., 155 Ill. App. 282. A watercourse is a natural stream of water usually flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides or banks, and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. Falcon v. Boyer, 157 Ia. 745, 750. Watercourse is a stream which usually flows in a certain direction, and by a regular channel, with banks and sides. Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Eulrich v. Richter, 37 Wis. 226. A stream arising from springs and usually flowing in a particular direction, though sometimes dry, and having in some parts of its course a definite channel, a bed and sides or banks, held to be a watercourse, though the stream in some parts spread itself over wide reaches of marsh or swamp lands, and percolated the soil in many places. Case v. Hoffman, 84 Wis. 438; 20 L. R. A. 40. Ordinary Signification. A stream usually flowing in a particular direction, and in a definite channel, and usually discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. People v. Bridges, 142 Ill. 37. Restricted Meaning. Such a water-way as gives rise to riparian rights in the flow of the water. St. Louis, etc.. Ry. Ass'n v. Schultz, 226 Ill. 414. Pope-54 WAY FROM NECESSITY Depression or Natural Drain. A depression or natural drain which merely carries the water in rainy seasons is not a watercourse in the restricted meaning of the term. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Ass'n v. Schultz, 226 Ill. 414. WATERED STOCK. By watered or fictitious stock is meant stock which is issued as fully paid up, when in fact the whole amount of the par value thereof has not been paid in. If any amount less than the whole face value of the stock has not been paid, and the stock has been issued as fully paid, then the stock is watered to the extent of the deficit. Watered stock is, accordingly, stock which purports to represent, but does not represent, in good faith, money,. paid into the treasury of the company, or money's worth actually contributed to the working capital of the concern (quoting from Cook on Corporations). Loud v. Solomon, 188 Mich 7, 13. WAY APPENDANT. See Private Way. WAY BY PRESCRIPTION A way that has been established by a use that has been for a period of twenty years, under a claim of right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with the knowledge and acquiesence of the owner of the land in or over which the easement is claimed. It must appear the use was enjoyed under such circumstances as to indicate that it was claimed as a right, and was not regarded by the parties as a mere privilege or license, revocable at the pleasure of the owner of the soil. Stewart v. Andrews, 239 Ill. 192, 191; Chi. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Ives, 202 Ill. 71; Rose v. Farmington, 196 Ill. 227. WAY FROM NECESSITY. When a grant of land is made and the only way of enjoying the benefit of such a grant is to pass over other lands of the 1661 WAY IN GROSS grantor, there is an implied grant of such way. In such case there is a way from necessity. Nelson v. Randolph, 222 III. 540; Martin v. Murphy, 221 Ill. 638; Kuhlman v. Hecht, 77 Ill. 574. A way which is a necessary incident to a grant and without which the grant would be useless. Banks v. School Directors, 194 Ill. 250. WAY IN GROSS. See Dominant Tenement; Private Way. Though an easement, like a right of way, may be created by grant in gross, as it is called, or attached to the person of the grantee, this is never presumed where it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to some other estate. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill. 462. WE. The fact that in the body of a note it reads "we promise to pay," is not significant in a note of a corporation. The word "we" may not improperly be used to denote a corporation aggregate. New Market Sav'gs. Bank v. Gillet, 100 Ill. 254-262. It is familiar usage to speak of a corporation as "they" or "them," and the word "we" is in common use by officers and employes of corporations. Conducted by stockholders, managed by directors and officers, the use of "we" is entirely natural and not likely to be misunderstood by those having occasion to Ideal with such bodies. The use of the words "I or we" in the body of a note does not change the legal import of the instrument. The word "we" is frequently used by corporations aggregate instead of the words "the company" or "the corporation," and when used in a promissory note to which the name of a corporation is appended it means the company or the corporation. Whether the pronoun "I" or the pronoun "we" is used in the body of a note, if it is signed by the corporation acting by its officer or officers, it is the obligation of the corporation. Derby v. Gustafson, 131 Ill. App. 282; Williams v. Harris, 198 Ill. 505; Thompson v. Has "These words ('reasonable wear and tear') no doubt, include destruction to some extent-destruction of surfaces by ordinary friction-but we do not think they include total destruction by a catastrophe which was never contemplated by either party;"-even though such catastrophe may have resulted from the reasonable use of the premises demised (per Lindley, J., in delivering the judgment of the court in Manchester Bonding Warehouse Co. v. Carr, 49 L. J. C. P. 809; 5 C. P. D. 507). WEEK. "The word 'week,' in its legal significance, as we understand the term, means a period of time commencing on Sunday morning and ending on Saturday night.” Medland v. Linton, 60 Neb. 260. Though "a week" usually means any consecutive seven days, it will sometimes be interpreted to mean the ordinary notion of a week reckoning from Sunday to Sunday. Bazalgette v. Lowe, 24 L. J. 368, 416. And, probably, a "week" usually means seven clear days:-thus where a statute provided that notice of appeal should be given "within one week" before such appeal was to be heard, and notice was given on the 22nd for the 29th, it was held that the notice was insufficient. v. Sweeney, 2 Ir. L. R. 278. R. WEIGH WEIGH. To regulate the weighing of a thing is not to weigh it. Savanna v. Robinson, 81 Ill. App. 480. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. See Preponderance of the Evidence. The trier's honest estimate of its power or tendency to convince, one way or the other, as to a matter of fact in disputeto be made by a candid and thorough consideration of each item as affected by a like consideration of all others that are pertinent to the same question, and not merely by the number of witnesses. Brown v. People, 65 Ill. App. 60. WEIR. A contrivance for regulating the amount of water that should pass from the feeder through the flumes. Merrifield v. Canal Commissioners, 212 Ill. 461. WELFARE OF A CHILD. Where the action of a Court of Chancery in determining whether or not a parent is to have custody of his or her child is based on considerations regarding the child's "welfare" that word is to be taken in its widest sense, and must include its moral and religious as well as physical welfare, and also the ties of affection. The Queen v. Gyngall [1893] 2 Q. B. 232, citing Lindley, L. J., in In re McGrath. [1893] 1 Ch. 143. WELL. "The word 'well,' as a general term of description in a deed, designates the portion of land under and occupied by the excavation and its surrounding retaining walls, and by any structures or appliances built upon the land to facilitate its use, and also the water actually at any time in the excavation." Davis v. Spaulding. 157 Mass. 435, citing Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray 107. Mixer v. Reed, 25 Vt. 254. WHARF WELL DISPOSED TO THE GOOD ORDER. See Good Character. One who habitually, knowingly and wilfully violates section 259 of the Criminal Code (J. & A. ¶ 3946), known as the Sunday Closing Act, is not "well disposed to the good order and happiness" of the United States within the meaning of section 4 of the Federal Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596). U. S. v. Hrasky, 240 Ill. 561. WEST SIDE. A levy describing the land seized as "ten acres off the west side" of a named tract of land refers, by the use of the quoted expression, to the west half of such tract. Hill v. Blackwelder, 113 Ill. 295. WHACK. The word "whack" is a slang word meaning "to divide into shares; apportion; parcel out; make a division settlement; square accounts; pay." Schook v. Zimmerman, 188 Mich. 617, 632, citing Century Dictionary. WHARF. A "wharf" is not a part of a public “highway,” and township authorities cannot build a public landing place or wharf on private land on pretense of establishing a highway. Highway Com'rs Hope Tp. v. Ludwick, 151 Mich. 498, 501, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170. "A wharf is a structure on the margin of navigable waters, alongside of which vessels can be brought for the sake of being conveniently loaded or unloaded." Prior v. Swartz, 62 Conn. 138, quoting Landon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 151. A "wharf" is a bank or other erection formed on the shore of a harbor, river or canal for the convenience of lading and unlading ships or boats. Harris v. Helens, 72 Ore. 388, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1077. WHAT MAY BE LEFT WHAT MAY BE LEFT. "I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Antonia, all my real and personal estate, wherever situated, in fee simple absolute forever, that is to say, that my said wife shall have all of the benefits thereof, until the expiration of her life, at which time my son, Anton, shall be the only heir of real or personal estate, what may be left." Held, that the wife took only an estate for life in the real estate, and remainder in fee to the son. Siegwald v. Siegwald, 37 Ill. 435. WHAT REMAINS. A will devising property to a wife for life, and disposing of "what remains" at her death shows that the testator contemplated and intended that the widow might or would expend all or a part of the money derived from the property, and implies that his disposition was intended to be only of that which she had not disposed of and used. Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill. 303. WHATEVER SHALL REMAIN. Where money or other property is devised to one for his or her life, and the will provides that "whatever shall remain," or all of the property so devised, or so much thereof "as may remain unexpended," the language will clearly imply a power of disposition by such devisee or life tenant, in his or her discretion. In re Estate of Cashman, 134 Ill. 95. WHATSOEVER. "Whatsoever," as a rule, excludes any limitation or qualification, and implies that the genus to which it relates is to be understood in its utmost generality. Per Fry, L. J., Duck v. Bates, 53 L. J. Q. B. 344; 13 Q. B. D. 843; 50 L. T. 778; 32 W. R. 813; 48 J. P. 501. WHEN. See From and After. "When" usually creates a condition precedent. Jolly v. Hancock, 22 L. J. Ex. 38; 7 Ex. 820. WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION Where there is a testamentary gift to A., "if," or "when," or "provided," or "in case," or "so soon as" (phrases which are synonymous, Shrimpton v. Shrimpton, 31 Bea. 425), a certain event happens,-e.g., attaining a stated age, such a gift, standing unaffected by the context, confers only a contingent interest, and requires the happening of the event to give it validity. But with the aid of a context such words may, without difficulty, not defer the vesting of the subject-matter of the gift, but merely refer to the futurity of its possession. Boraston's Case, 3 Rep. 19a: Phipps v. Ackers, 3 Cl. & F. 703; nom. Phipps v. Williams, 5 Sim. 44; Scotney v. Lomer, 54 L. J. Ch. 558; 55 Ib. 443; 29 Ch. D. 535; 31 Ib. 380: Re Wrey, Stuart v. Wrey, 54 L. J. Ch. 1098; 30 Ch. D. 507. "It is the general rule that a legacy to a person 'when' or 'as' he shall attain to a given age is prima facie contingent, but circumstances, even though but slight, in the context, may be sufficient to show that the attainment of the specified age was not intended as a condition, but only to fix the time of payment, in which case it will be held to be a vested legacy." Fisher v. Johnson, 38 N. J. Eq. 47. Standing unqualified and uncontrolled it is a word of condition; denoting the time when the gift is to take effect in substance. Hanson v. Graham. 6 Vesey 243. WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ARISEN. The words, "when a cause of action has arisen," as they occur in the statute of limitations, should be construed as meaning, when jurisdiction exists in the courts of a state to adjudicate between the parties upon the particular cause of action if properly invoked; or, in other words, when the plaintiff has the right to sue the defendant in the courts of a state upon the particular cause of action, without regard to the place where the cause of action had its origin. Delta Bag Co. v. Frederick Leyland & Co., 173 Ill. App. 42; McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 Ill. 258; Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 259; Strong v. Lewis, 204 Ill. 37. |