instance; but this I was not able to effect. Every exertion was directed to obtain supplies; but, notwithstanding they were inadequate, too scanty, and insufficient to attempt any thing on a large and general scale, before the enemy withdrew themselves. With what we had, in case an experiment had been made, fortune might have decided in our favor for the present; but we should not have been afterwards in a situation to maintain the advantage we might have gained; and, if a repulse had taken place, and the enemy pursued, we might, for want of a reserve, have been exposed to the most imminent danger of being ruined. The distress of the soldiers for want of shoes was also a powerful obstacle to the measure. 'I could wish that our circumstances were now such as to authorize a general attack for dislodging them from the city; but I think they are not. This also is the opinion of my general officers, upon a full and comprehensive view of matters; as Congress will perceive by the enclosed copy of the minutes of council on the 29th ultimo, which I have taken the liberty to transmit, and lay before them. I have sent Colonel Hamilton, one of my Aids, to General Gates, to give him a just representation of things, and to explain to him the expediency of our receiving the reinforcements which have been determined necessary, if they will not interfere with and frustrate any important plans he may have formed. Indeed, I cannot conceive that there is any object now remaining, that demands our attention and most vigorous efforts so much, as the destruction of the army in this quarter. Should we be able to effect this, we shall have little to fear in future. 'The enclosed return will give Congress a general view of the strength of this army when it was made, and a particular one of the forces of each State which compose it. By this they will perceive how greatly deficient the whole are in furnishing their just quotas. The militia from Maryland and Virginia are no longer to be counted on. All the former, except about two hundred, are already gone; and a few days, I expect, will produce the departure of the whole or a chief part of the latter, from the importunate applications which some of them have made. Besides this diminution, I am apprehensive we shall have several men added to the sick list, by reason of the late excessive rain and want of clothes. 'I took the liberty, some short time ago, to mention to Congress the situation of the nine first-raised Virginia regiments, and the term for which they stand engaged. I thought it advisable to consult the officers commanding them, upon the mode which should appear to them best calculated to reënlist them. They accordingly met, and reported their sentiments in writing; a copy of which I have enclosed. I do not know that expedients more promising of success than those they have pointed out can be adopted. Congress will be pleased to give the matter their earliest attention, and to favor me with their opinion by the first oppor tunity, whether the indulgence and allowance they have proposed may be granted; and, if any additional bounty may be given, what it shall be. The high sums paid for substitutes and draughts of late, even in the militia service, will make this necessary; for the soldiers, being well apprised of that fact, will not be induced to engage again during the war or for three years, for the usual premium. - 'I would also lay before Congress a remonstrance by the subaltern officers of the Virginia line, founded on a reform I thought necessary to take place in the regiments from that State. These in their establishment were made to consist of ten companies,two more than were assigned to those of the States in general. This, and the great disproportion between the officers and men, induced me to reduce them to a level with the rest belonging to the Continent, in order to prevent a considerable unnecessary expense. I have made a short state of facts, and wish Congress to determine upon them and the remonstrance as they shall think proper.' November 3d. Agreeably to my expectation, the Virginia militia are gone; so that we have none now in aid of the Continental troops, but those of this State mentioned in the return, and a few from Maryland. I do not know what can or will be done to obtain further reinforcements of them; but it appears to me, taking matters in any point of light, that further aids should come from Virginia and Maryland. For, should we be able to accommodate the Continental forces with clothes, so as to carry on a winter campaign, their assistance will be material, either to maintain a blockade, or in any decisive stroke we may attempt. And, if they cannot be provided, and we should be obliged to retire into quarters, their service will be still more necessary, to assist in covering the country against incursions for forage and provisions. A time for their continuance should be fixed, or they will always be uneasy and pushing off; and the longer circumstances will admit it to be, the better; for, after the period recurs for which they come, it will be impossible to retain them a moment. * 'Mr. Thompson's letter of the 21st ultimo, with its enclosures, came to hand yesterday. I join Congress most sincerely in congratulations on our important success in the surrender of General Burgoyne at the head of his forces, and am happy they have received a confirmation of the event from General Gates. Lond. ed. vol. ii. p. 195. 'I have the honor to be, &c.' In view of the extremely critical state of affairs, and of the vastly momentous object of effort at that juncture, as seen through the descriptions of them in the preceding letters, it is presumed that a portion of the correspondence, showing some of the important incidents of that mission to General Gates, will be no less acceptable, than it is indicative of particular influences already noticed repeatedly, and which will still, for some time, become more and more apparent. COLONEL HAMILTON to GENERAL WASHINGTON. FISHKILL, November 2, 1777. DEAR SIR, — I lodged last night in the neighborhood of New Windsor. This morning early, I met Colonel Morgan with his corps, about a mile from it, in march for head-quarters. I told him the necessity of making all the despatch he could, so as not to fatigue his men too much, which he has promised to do. I understood from Colonel Morgan, that all the Northern army were marching down on both sides the river, and would probably be tomorrow at New Windsor and this place; and that General Putnam had held a council for the general disposition of them, in which it was resolved to send you four thousand men, and to keep the rest on this side the river. I came here in expectation that matters were in such a train as to enable me to accomplish my errand without going any further, unless it should be to hasten the troops that were on their march; but, on my arrival, I learned from Mr. Hughes, an Aid-de-Camp to General Gates, that the following disposition of the Northern army had taken place. "General Patterson's, Glover's, and Nixon's brigades, and Colonel Warner's Mountain Boys, to remain in and about Albany, barracks building for them. General Poor's brigade, marching down this side of the river to join General Putnam, will be here probably to-morrow. General Learned's brigade, Morgan's corps, Warner's brigade of Massachusetts militia, and some regiments of New York militia, on their march on the west side of the river. 'I have directed General Putnam, in your name, to send forward, with all despatch, to join you, the two Continental brigades, and Warner's militia brigade: this last is to serve till the latter end of this month. Your instructions did not comprehend any militia; but, as there are certain accounts here that most of the troops from New York are gone to reinforce General Howe, and as so large a proportion of Continental troops have been detained at Albany, I concluded you would not disapprove of a measure calculated to strengthen you, though but for a small time, and have ventured to adopt it on that presumption. 'Being informed by General Putnam, that General Wynds, with seven hundred Jersey militia, was at King's Ferry, with intention to cross to Peekskill, I prevailed upon him to relinquish that idea, and send off an immediate order for them to march towards Red Bank. It is possible, however, unless your Excellency supports this order by an application from yourself, he may march his men home, instead of marching them to the place he has been directed to repair to. Neither Lee's, Jackson's regiments, nor the detachments belonging to General McDougall's division, have yet marched. I have urged their being sent; and an order has been despatched for their instantly proceeding. Colonel Hughes is pressing some fresh horses for me. The moment they are ready, I shall recross the river, in order to fall in with the troops on the other side, and make all the haste I can to Albany, to get the three brigades there sent forward. Will your Excellency permit me to observe, that I have some doubts, under present circumstances and appearances, of the propriety of leaving the regiments proposed to be left in this quarter? But if my doubts on this subject were stronger than they are, I am forbid, by the sense of council, from interfering in the matter. 'General Poor's brigade is just arrived here; they will proceed to join you with all expedition. So strongly am I impressed with the importance of endeavoring to crush Mr. Howe, that I am apt to think it would be advisable to draw off all the Continental troops. Had this been determined on, General Warner's sixteen hundred militia might have been left here. 'I have the honor to be, with the warmest esteem and respect, 'Your Excellency's most obedient servant.' Life of Hamilton, vol. i. p. 97. Hamilton Papers, vol. i. p. 273. SAME to GENERAL WASHINGTON. ALBANY, - November, 1777. DEAR SIR,I arrived here yesterday at noon, and waited upon General Gates immediately, on the business of my mission; but was sorry to find his ideas did not correspond with yours, for drawing off the number of troops you directed. I used every argument in my power to convince him of the propriety of the measure; but he was inflexible in the opinion, that two brigades, at least, of Continental troops, should remain in and near this place. His reasons were, that the intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton's having gone to join Howe, was not sufficiently authenticated to put it out of doubt; that there was, therefore, a possibility of his returning up the river, which might expose the finest arsenal in America (as he calls the one here) to destruction, should this place be left so bare of troops as I proposed; and that the want of conveniences, and the difficulty of the roads, would make it impossible to remove artillery and stores for a considerable time; that the New England States would be left open to the depredations and ravages of the enemy; that it would put it out of his power to enterprise any thing against Ticonderoga, which he thinks might be done in the winter and which he considers it of importance to undertake. 'The force of these reasons did by no means strike me, and I did every thing in my power to show they were unsubstantial; but all I could effect was to have one brigade despatched, in addition to those already marched. I found myself infinitely embarrassed, and was at a loss how to act. I felt the importance of strengthening you as much as possible; but, on the other hand, I found insuperable inconveniences, in acting diametrically opposite to the opinion of a gentleman whose successes have raised him to the highest importance. General Gates has won the entire confidence of the Eastern States. If disposed to do it, by addressing himself to the prejudices of the people, he would find no difficulty to render a measure odious, which it might be said, with plausibility enough to be believed, was calculated to expose them to unnecessary dangers, notwithstanding their exertions, during the campaign, had given them the fullest title to repose and security. General Gates has influence and interest elsewhere: he might use it, if he pleased, to discredit the measure there also. On the whole, it appeared to me dangerous to insist on sending more troops from hence, while General Gates appeared so warmly opposed to it. Should any accident or inconvenience happen in consequence of it, there would be too fair a pretext for censure; and many people are too well disposed to lay hold of it. At any rate, it might be considered as using him ill, to take a step so contrary to his judgment, in a case of this nature. These considerations, and others which I shall be more explicit in when I have the pleasure of seeing you, determined me not to insist upon sending either of the other brigades remaining here. I am afraid what I have done may not meet with your approbation, as not being, perhaps, fully warranted by your instructions; but I ventured to do what I thought right, hoping that, at least, the goodness of my intention will excuse the error of my judgment. I was induced to this relaxation the more readily, as I had directed to be sent on two thousand militia which were not expected by you, and a thousand Continental troops out of those proposed to be left with General Putnam, which I have written to him, since I found how matters were circumstanced here, to forward to you with all despatch. * Vessels are preparing to carry the brigade to New Windsor, which will embark this evening. I shall, this afternoon, set out on my return to camp, and on my way shall endeavor to hasten the troops forward. I have the honor to be, &c.' Hamilton Papers, vol. i. p. 276.. Life of Hamilton, vol. i. p. 100. SAME to GENERAL GATES. ALBANY, 5 November, 1777. 'SIR, By inquiry, I have learned that General Patterson's brigade, which is the one you propose to send, is by far the weak |