steps must be taken;-either to procure free trade by alliance with some naval power able to protect it; or, if we find there is no prospect of that, to shut our ports totally to all the world, and turn our Colonies into manufactories. The former would be most eligible, because most conformable to the habits and wishes of our people. Were the British Court to return to their senses in time to seize the little advantage which still remains within their reach from this quarter, I judge that, on acknowledging our absolute independence and sovereignty, a commercial treaty beneficial to them, and perhaps even a league of mutual offence and defence, might, not seeing the expense or consequences of such a measure, be approved by our people, if nothing, in the meantime, done on your part, should prevent it. But they will continue to grasp at their desperate sovereignty, till every benefit, short of that, is for ever out of their reach. I wish my domestic situation had rendered it possible for me to join you in the very honorable charge confided to you. Residence in a polite court, society of literati of the first order, a just cause, and an approving God, will add length to a life for which all men pray, and none more than Your most obedient and humble servant.' GENERAL WASHINGTON to GOVERNOR CLINTON, New York. - 'DEAR SIR, I see with the most sensible pleasure the exertions of your State, dismembered as it is, and under every discouragement and disadvantage. I lament, that any causes are sufficiently powerful to prevent that effectual aid from your Eastern neighbors, which the interest of the public cause, and the immediate safety of your particular State, so pressingly demand at this time. But, though it is dilatory in coming, I cannot but hope it will still come before it is too late. I imagine one cause, and not the least material, of their delay, is an apprehension of General Howe's army. It were to be wished, that his designs were once reduced to certainty. This I should be in hopes would serve to remove that inactivity and indecision which I believe proceed in a great measure from suspense and uncertainty. I am, however, advised, that a body of New Hampshire militia, under General Stark, had joined General Lincoln at Bennington; and that another of Massachusetts militia was partly arrived, and the rest arriving at the same place. A tolerable body of men once collected there would make General Burgoyne anxious for his rear; oblige him to advance circumspectly, and to leave such strong posts behind, as must make his main body very weak, and extremely capable of being repulsed by the force we shall have in front. I should not be very uneasy for the issue, if I could once see our Northern army recovered from their present dejection, and restored to a tolerable degree of confidence and animation. 'In addition to the two regiments which are gone from Peekskill, I am forwarding as fast as possible, to join the Northern army, Colonel Morgan's corps of riflemen, amounting to about five hundred. These are all chosen men, selected from the army at large, well acquainted with the use of rifles, and with that mode of fighting which is necessary to make them a good counterpoise to the Indians; and they have distinguished themselves on a variety of occasions, since the formation of the corps, in skirmishes with the enemy. I expect the most eminent services from them; and I shall be mistaken if their presence does not go far towards producing a general desertion among the savages. I should think it would be well, even before their arrival, to begin to circulate these ideas, with proper embellishments, throughout the country and in the army; and to take pains to communicate them to the enemy. I am of opinion, with the Council of Safety, that your presence to the Northward might have a very happy influ ence; and, if it were compatible with the many other calls there are and will be upon you, I could wish to see you with the Northern army at the head of the militia of your State. 'An enemy can always act with more vigor and effect, when they have nothing to apprehend for their flanks and rear, than when they have. The necessity of never losing sight of the means of a secure retreat, which ought to be the first object of an officer's care, must be exceedingly embarrassing, where there is a force in such a position as to endanger it. If a respectable body of men were to be stationed on the Grants, it would undoubtedly have the effects intimated above, and would render it not a little difficult for General Burgoyne to keep the necessary communication open; and they would frequently afford opportunities of intercepting his convoys. * These reasons make it clearly my opinion, that a sufficient body of militia should always be reserved in a situation proper to answer those purposes. there should be more collected than is requisite for this use, the surplusage may with propriety be added to the main body of the army. I am not, however, so fully acquainted with every circumstance that ought to be taken into consideration, as to pretend to do any thing more than advise in the matter. Let those on the spot determine and act as appears to them most prudent. Wash. Writ. 'I am, &c.' SAME to GENERAL GATES. Sparks, vol. v. p. 29. HEAD-QUARTERS, BUCKS COUNTY, 20 August, 1777. If 'SIR, By a letter from General Schuyler of the 13th instant, it appears that you had not reached Stillwater at that time, since which I have not had any accounts from you, but suppose you arrived there soon after that date. From the various representa 1 tions made to me of the disadvantage the army lay under, particularly the militia, from an apprehension of the Indian mode of fighting, I have despatched Colonel Morgan with his corps of rifle. men to your assistance, and presume they will be with you in eight days from this date. This corps I have great dependence on, and have no doubt but they will be exceedingly useful; as a check given to the savages, and keeping them within proper bounds, will prevent General Burgoyne from getting intelligence as formerly, and animate your other troops from a sense of their being more on an equality with the enemy. Colonel Cortlandt's and Colonel Livingston's regiments are also on their way from Peekskill to join you. They must, of course, be with you in a very few days. With these reinforcements, besides the militia under General Lincoln, which by this time must be considerable, I am in hopes you will find yourself at least equal to stop the progress of Mr. Burgoyne, and, by cutting off his supplies of provisions, &c., to render his situation very ineligible. on. 'Since the enemy's fleet was seen off Sinepuxent, on the 8th instant, we have no accounts from them which can be depended General Schuyler's sending a reinforcement up to Fort Schuyler, I think, was absolutely necessary. And I am of opinion, that particular attention should be paid to the inroads leading to that quarter; as a successful stroke of the enemy there might be a means of encouraging the whole of the Six Nations to unite against us. I am, Sir, &c.' Wilkinson's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 227. Sparks, vol. v. p. 37. SAME to DR. FRANKLIN, in Paris. HEAD-QUARTERS, 17 August, 1777. 'SIR, I have been honored with your favor of the 2d of April, by Monsieur de Cenis, written in behalf of that gentleman on the credit of Monsieur Turgot's recommendation. I should have been happy, had it been in my power, in deference to your recommendation founded upon that of so respectable a character as Monsieur Turgot, to afford Monsieur de Cenis the encouragement to which his zeal and trouble, in coming to America to offer his services, give him a claim; but such is the situation of things in our army at this time, that I am necessarily deprived of that satisfaction. Our troops, being already formed and fully officered, and the number of foreign gentlemen already commissioned, and continually arriving with fresh applications, throw such obstacles in the way of any future appointments, that every new arrival is only a new source of embarrassment to Congress and myself, and of disappoint and chagrin to the gentlemen who come over. Had there been only a few to provide for, we might have found employment for them in a way advantageous to the service, and honorable to themselves; but, as they have come over in such crowds, we either must not employ them, or we must do it at the expense of one half of the officers of the army; which, you must be sensible, would be attended with the most ruinous effects, and could not fail to occasion a general discontent. It is impossible for these gentlemen to raise men for themselves; and it would be equally impolitic and unjust to displace others, who have been at all the trouble and at considerable expense in raising corps, in order to give them the command. Even where vacancies happen, there are always those who have a right of succession by seniority, and who are as tenacious of this right as of the places they actually hold; and in this they are justified by the common principle and practice of all armies, and by Resolutions of Congress. Besides this difficulty, the error we at first fell into, of prodigally bestowing rank upon foreigners without examining properly their pretensions, having led us to confer high rank on those who had none, or of a very inferior degree in their own country, it now happens that those who have really good pretensions, who are men of character, abilities, and rank, will not be contented unless they are introduced into some of the highest stations of the army; in which it needs no arguments to convince you that it is impossible to gratify them. Hence their dissatisfaction, and the difficulty of employing them, are increased. * * From these considerations it would be both prudent and just to discourage their coming over, by candidly opening the difficulties they have to encounter; and if, after that, they will persist in it, they can only blame themselves. I am sensible, Sir, that it is a delicate and perplexing task to refuse applications of persons patronized, as I suppose often happens, by some of the first characters in the kingdom where you are, and whose favor it is of importance to conciliate; but I beg leave to suggest, whether it would not be better to do that, than by compliance to expose them to those mortifications which they must unavoidably experience, and which they are too apt to impute to other causes than the true ones, and may represent under very disadvantageous colors. Permit me also to observe to you, that even where you do not promise any thing but simply give a line of recommendation, they draw as strong an assurance of success from that, as from a positive engagement; and estimate the hardship of a disappointment nearly the same in the one case as in the other. I am, &c.' Wash. Writ. Sparks, vol. v. p. 32. SAME to the PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS. NESHAMING CAMP, 18 August, 1777. 'SIR,I last night had the honor of your favor of the 17th, with its enclosure. You will perceive by my letter of yesterday, transmitted by favor of the Marquis Lafayette, that I had been so happy as to anticipate the views of Congress, by ordering Colonel Morgan to march with his corps to the Northern army.' Camp, Bucks County, August 20th. SIR,I do myself the honor to forward you a packet, which just came to my hands from General Schuyler. In his letter to me, he communicates an agreeable account of the face of affairs at Fort Schuyler.* I therefore do myself the pleasure of enclosing you an extract. Lond. ed. vol. ii. p. 149. I have the honor to be, &c.' SAME to the PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS. HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP AT CROSS-ROADS, 22 August, 1777. 'SIR,I am honored with your favor containing the intelligence of the enemy's arrival in Chesapeake Bay, and the Resolution of Congress thereupon. I have, in consequence of this account, sent orders to General Nash immediately to embark his brigade and Colonel Proctor's corps of artillery, if vessels can be procured for the purpose, and to proceed to Chester. I have also directed General Sullivan to join this army with his division as speedily as possible, and I have issued orders for all the troops here to be in motion to-morrow morning very early, with intention to march them towards Philadelphia, and onwards. 'I am happy to find Congress have ordered the removal of the stores from Lancaster and York to places of greater safety; which is, without doubt, a very proper and necessary measure. With much respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient servant.' Lond. ed. vol. ii. p. 154. August 23d. 'SIR, I beg leave to inform you that the army marched early this morning, and will encamp, I expect, this evening, within five or six miles of Philadelphia. To-morrow morning it will move again; and I think to march it through the city, but without halting. I am induced to do this, from the opinion of several of my officers and many friends in Philadelphia, that it may have some influence on the minds of the disaffected there, and those who are dupes to their artifices and opinions. The march will be down Front and up Chesnut street, and, I presume, about seven o'clock. I would take the liberty to mention, that I think the several works for the defence of the city should be carried on with the usual industry, and that no pains should be omitted to complete them. I would also advise, that the same look-outs for intelligence should be continued at the Capes, and the earliest information communicated of any thing material; for, though the fleet is in Chesapeake Bay, the enemy may push in a number of vessels with troops, and make an effort to effect some * The repulse of the British at that post, and the victory over them at Bennington, had then just occurred. Some of the circumstances connected with those important events will appear in the next Number. |