may easily be thrown, by taking away what there are of those articles which, you observe, have never been in great abundance. I am doubtful whether Burgoyne will attempt to penetrate far; and whether he will not content himself with harassing our back settlements, by parties assisted by the savages; who, it is to be feared, will pretty generally be tempted, by the enemy's late successes, to confederate in hostilities against us. 'This doubt arises from some appearances, that indicate a Southern movement of General Howe's army; which, if it should really happen, will certainly be a barrier against any further impressions of Burgoyne; for it cannot be supposed he would be rash enough to plunge into the bosom of the country, without an expectation of being met by General Howe. Things must prove very adverse to us indeed, should he make such an attempt, and not be ruined by it. I confess, however, that the appearances I allude to, do not carry a full evidence in my mind; because they are opposed by others of a contrary kind; and because I cannot conceive upon what principle of common sense, or military propriety, Howe can be running away from Burgoyne to the Southward. 'It is much to be wished he may, even though it should give him the possession of Philadelphia; which, by our remoteness from it, may very well happen. In this case, we may not only, if we think proper, retaliate, by aiming a stroke at New York; but we may come upon him with the greatest part of our collective force, to act against that part which is under him. We shall then be certain, that Burgoyne cannot proceed; and that a small force of Continental troops will be sufficient for that partisan war, which he must carry on the rest of the campaign. A small force will also be sufficient to garrison the posts in the Highlands, and prevent any danger there; so that we shall be able to bring nearly the whole of the Continental army against Mr. Howe. The advantages of this are obvious. Should he be satisfied with the splendor of his acquisition, and shut himself up in Philadelphia, we can ruin him by confinement. Should he have a garrison there, and go forward, we can either fall upon that, or his main body, diminished as it will be by such a measure, with our whole force. There will, however, be many disagreeable consequences attending such an event; amongst which, the foremost is the depreciation of our currency; which, from the importance in which Philadelphia is held, cannot fail to ensue. 'I am, dear Sir, your most obedient servant.' Hamilton Papers, vol. i. p. 261. COLONEL HAMILTON to DOCTOR KNOX. HEAD-QUARTERS, July, 1777. The consequences of this Northern affair [the evacuation of Ticonderoga] will depend much upon the part that Howe acts. If he were to coöperate with Burgoyne, it would demand our utmost efforts to counteract them. But, if he should go towards the Southward, all or most of the advantages of Burgoyne's success will be lost. He will either be obliged to content himself with the possession of Ticonderoga, and the dependent fortresses, and with carrying on a partisan war the rest of the campaign; or he must precipitate himself into certain ruin, by attempting to advance into the country with a very incompetent force. 'Appearances lead us to suppose, that Howe is fool enough to meditate a Southern expedition; for he has now altered his station at Staten Island, and has fallen down to the Hook. Judging it morally certain that there would be a coöperation of the two armies, we thought it expedient to march northerly; and had accordingly reached within fourteen miles of New Windsor, the place where we could cross the North River without danger of interruption. But this new movement of the enemy's fleet has induced us to return a few miles, and make a disposition for marching southerly. We shall, however, be cautious how we proceed on that course; lest nothing more than a feint is intended, to divert us from the real object. If they go to the Southward in earnest, they must have the capture of Philadelphia in view; for there is no other sufficient inducement. We shall endeavor to get there in time to oppose them; and shall have the principal part of the Continental force, and a large body of spirited militia, many of them, from their services during the last campaign, pretty well inured to arms, -to make the opposition with. Yet I would not have you to be much surprised, if Philadelphia should fall; for the enemy will doubtless go there with a determination to succeed at all hazard; and we shall not be able to prevent them, without a general action, the expediency of which will depend upon circumstances. If the militia turn out with that zeal we have a right to expect, from their conduct when the enemy made their last experiment in the Jerseys, and were supposed to be going to Philadelphia, we may do it without much inconvenience. If they fall materially short of it, we shall be obliged to confine ourselves to a skirmishing opposition, which we cannot expect will be effectual. It may be asked, -if, to avoid a general engagement, we give up objects of the first importance, what is to hinder the enemy from carrying every important point, and ruining us? My answer is, that our hopes are not placed in any particular city or spot of ground; but in preserving a good army, furnished with proper necessaries, to take advantage of favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal. Every new post they take, requires a new division of their forces, and enables us to strike with our united force against a part of theirs; and such is their present situation, that another Trenton affair will amount to a complete victory on our part; for they are at too low an ebb, to bear another stroke of the kind. Perhaps, before I may have an opportunity of sending this, facts will uufold what I am now endeavoring to anticipate by conjecture. You will expect some animadversions on the temper and views of the French nation. I presume you are nearly as well acquainted with the assistance they are giving us, as I am; both by their intrigues in foreign courts, and by supplies of every kind of warlike stores and apparatus. 'It does not admit of a doubt, that they are interested to wish us success; and their conduct plainly shows, they are willing to give us every aid essential to our preservation. But it is natural they should desire to do it with as much convenience to themselves as they can. I apprehend they are not over-fond of plunging themselves into a war with England, if they can avoid it, and still answer the end they have to pursue; and, indeed, from the evident reluctance shown on the part of the latter, to do any thing that may bring about such an event, it becomes extremely difficult to draw her into it. The conclusion we may make, is, that France will not wish to force England into a war, unless she finds our affairs require it absolutely; and England will not enter into one, till she is compelled to do it. 'My best respects to all friends; and I beg you will believe me to be, with unabated regard, dear Sir, 'Your most obedient servant.' Hamilton Papers, vol. i. p. 265. Life of Hamilton, vol. i. p. 80. GENERAL WASHINGTON to GENERAL LINCOLN. RAMAPO, 24 July, 1777. 'DEAR SIR,I have just received information that the fleet left the Hook yesterday; and, as I think the Delaware the most probable place of their destination, I shall immediately move the army that way. I desire that you will, agreeably to what I hinted to you, set off immediately; and proceed, as quick as your health will permit, to join the Northern army under the command of Gen. eral Schuyler. My principal view, in sending you there, is to take the command of the Eastern militia; over whom I am informed you have influence, and who place confidence in you. You will concert such plans with General Schuyler, as shall seem to you most conducive to the public good. I shall be glad to hear from you a state of Northern affairs, as soon as you arrive there. I wish you health, and a safe journey; and am, with great regard, dear Sir, &c.' Wash. Writ. Sparks, vol. iv. p. 505. SAME to GENERAL SCHUYler. HEAD-QUARTERS, RAMAPO, 24 July, 1777. DEAR SIR, Your two favors of the 21st and 22d instant, with their enclosures, are come to hand. The information of the prisoners and others, transmitted by you, does not make the numbers of the enemy to exceed the idea first entertained of them; nor do I see any thing in it to induce a belief that their progress will be so rapid, as not to give you time to make proper preparations and receive sufficient accessions of force to enable you to give them a vigorous and successful opposition. As they can never think of advancing without securing their rear, by leaving garrisons in the fortresses behind, the force with which they can come against you will be greatly reduced by the detachments necessary for the purpose. And as they have to cut out their road, and remove the impediments you have put in the way, this circumstance, with the incumbrance they must feel in their baggage, will inevitably retard their march a considerable time, and give you leisure and opportunity to prepare a good reception for them. If they continue to act in detachments, you will have it in your power to improve it to very great advantage, by falling vigorously upon some one of them with your whole force; which, if you are fortunate enough to succeed in, will be fatal to them. 'I have directed General Lincoln to repair to you as speedily as the state of his health, which is not very perfect, will permit him. This gentleman has always supported the character of a judicious, brave, active officer; and as he is exceedingly popular and much respected in the State of Massachusetts, to which he belongs, he will have a degree of influence over the militia, which cannot fail of being very advantageous. I have destined him more particularly to the command of them; and I promise myself it will have a powerful tendency to make them turn out with more cheerfulness, and to inspire them with perseverance to remain in the field, and fortitude and spirit to do their duty while in it. The confidence they have in him will certainly go a great way towards producing these desirable ends. You intimate the propriety of having a body of men stationed somewhere about the Grants.* The expediency of such a measure appears to me evident; for it would certainly make General Burgoyne very circumspect in his advances, if it did not totally prevent them. It would keep him in continual anxiety for his rear, and oblige him to leave the posts behind him much stronger than he would otherwise do, and would answer many other valuable purposes. General Lincoln could not be more serviceable than in command of this body, and no person could be more proper for it. 'From the view I have of the matter, I should also think it * Then usually called the New Hampshire Grants, now the State of Vermont. necessary to send General Arnold, or some other sensible, spirited officer, to Fort Schuyler, to take care of that post, keep up the spirits of the inhabitants, and cultivate and improve the favorable disposition of the Indians. This is recommended on the supposition, that any thing formidable should appear in that quarter. IN CONGRESS, July 31, 1777. 'Whereas the Marquis de la Fayette, out of his great zeal to the cause of liberty, in which the United States are engaged, has left his family and connections, and, at his own expense, come over to offer his service to the United States without pension or particular allowance, and is anxious to risk his life in our cause: 'Resolved, That his service be accepted, and that, in consideration of his zeal, illustrious family and connections, he have the rank and commission of Major-General in the army of the United States.' GENERAL WASHINGTON to GOVERNOR HENRY. PHILADELPHIA, 4 August, 1777. 'SIR,The great expense and loss of time which has attended the recruiting service in most of the States, and the little advantage derived from it, have induced Congress to recommend to the executive powers of each, to adopt certain new regulations for promoting this important and essential business, and for taking it entirely out of the hands of the officers of the army. The Resolve on this subject, and the regulations recommended, passed on the 31st ultimo; and will, I presume, be transmitted to you by the President. 'I will not urge the expediency of carrying this proceeding into immediate execution. I shall only observe, that the necessity is obvious, and that it demands our most active attention. The principal cause of my troubling you at this time is to request, that, after the persons recommended are appointed in your State, you would be pleased to transmit to me their names, their places of residence, and those also designed for the rendezvous of recruits and deserters. As soon as I am advised upon these subjects, I shall recall all the officers who are recruiting, and order them forthwith to join their respective corps. Before I conclude, I would beg leave to mention, that the success of this interesting business, in all its parts, will depend much upon a judicious choice of those At that time Lafayette was some less, and Hamilton little more, than twenty years of age. Hamilton was born on the 11th of January, and Lafayette on the 6th of September, 1757. † See the Journal of Congress, July 31. |