'Ordered, That a copy of the above Resolution be transmitted to the Council of Massachusetts-Bay, and that they be desired to detain Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and keep him in safe custody till the farther order of Congress; and that a copy be also sent to the Committee of Congress, in Philadelphia; and that they be desired to have the prisoners, officers and privates, lately taken, properly secured in some safe place.'

February 20. Resolved, That the Board of War be directed immediately to order the five Hessian field-officers and LieutenantColonel Campbell into safe and close custody; it being the unalterable resolution of Congress to retaliate on them the same punishment as may be inflicted on the person of General Lee.'

GENERAL WASHINGTON to the PRESIDENT OF CONGress.

MORRISTOWN, 1 March, 1777.

SIR, I was this evening honored with your favor of the 23d ultimo, accompanied by sundry Proceedings of Congress. Those respecting General Lee, which prescribe the treatment of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and the five Hessian officers, are the cause of this letter. Though I sincerely commiserate the misfortunes of General Lee, and feel much for his present unhappy situation, yet, with all possible deference to the opinion of Congress, Í fear that these Resolutions will not have the desired effect, are founded in impolicy, and will, if adhered to, produce consequences of an extensive and melancholy nature. Retaliation is certainly just, and sometimes necessary, even where attended with the severest penalties; but, when the evils which may and must result from it exceed those intended to be redressed, prudence and policy require that it should be avoided. Having premised thus much, I beg leave to examine the justice and expediency of it in the instances now before us.

'From the best information I have been able to obtain, General Lee's usage has not been so disgraceful and dishonorable as to authorize the treatment decreed to those gentlemen, were it not prohibited by many other important considerations. His confinement, I believe, has been more rigorous than has been generally experienced by the rest of our officers, or those of the enemy who have been in our possession; but, if the reports received on that head be true, he has been provided with a decent apartment, and with most things necessary to render him comfortable. This is not the case with one of the officers comprehended in the Resolves, if his letter, of which a copy is transmitted, deserves your credit. Here retaliation seems to have been prematurely begun; or, to speak with more propriety, severities have been and are exercised towards Colonel Campbell, not justified by any that General Lee has yet received.

'In point of policy, under the present situation of our affairs, this

doctrine cannot be supported. The balance of prisoners is greatly against us; and a general regard to the happiness of the whole should mark our conduct. Can we imagine, that our enemies will not mete the same punishments, the same indignities, the same cruelties, to those belonging to us, in their possession, that we impose on theirs in our power? Why should we suppose them to possess more humanity than we have ourselves? Or why should an ineffectual attempt to relieve the distresses of one brave, unfor tunate man, involve many more in the same calamities? However disagreeable the fact may be, the enemy at this time have in their power, and subject to their call, near three hundred officers belonging to the army of the United States. In this number there are some of high rank; and most of them are men of bravery and of merit. The quota of theirs in our hands bears no proportion, being not more than fifty, at most. Under these circumstances, we should certainly do no act to draw upon the gentlemen belonging to us, and who have already suffered a long captivity, greater punishments than they have experienced and now experience. If we should, what will their feelings be, and those of their numerous and extensive connections? Suppose the treatment prescribed for the Hessians should be pursued, will it not establish what the enemy have been aiming to effect by every artifice and the grossest misrepresentations; I mean, an opinion of our enmity towards them, and of the cruel conduct they experience when they fall into our hands, a prejudice which we on our part have heretofore thought it politic to suppress and to root out by every act of lenity and of kindness? It certainly will. The Hessians would hear of the punishment with all the circumstances of heightened exaggeration,- would feel the injury, without investigating the cause, or reasoning upon the justice or necessity of it. The mischiefs, which may and must inevitably flow from the execution of the Resolves, appear to be endless and innumerable.

On my own part, I have been much embarrassed on the subject of exchanges already. Applications are daily made, by both friends and enemies, to complete them as far as circumstances of number and rank will apply. Some of the former have complained, that a discrimination is about to be adopted, perhaps injurious to their reputation, and certainly depriving them of their right of exchange in due course, as established upon the principles of equality proposed last year, acceded to by both parties, and now subsisting.* The latter charge me with a breach of faith, and call on me to perform the agreement.

'Many more objections might be subjoined,

I

shall only observe, that the present state of the army, if it deserves

* See the Resolve alluded to, in accordance with which the mode of exchange was established, July 22, p. 267.

that name, will not authorize the language of retaliation, or the style of menace. This will be conceded by all, who know that the whole of our force is weak and trifling, and composed of militia (very few regular troops excepted), whose service is on the eve of expiring. There are several other matters which might be mentioned upon this subject, would time and opportunity permit; but, as they will not, I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Walker,* who will deliver this, and give satisfaction to any inquiries that may be deemed necessary. Persuading myself that Congress will indulge the liberty I have taken upon this occasion, I have only to wish for the result of their deliberations after they have considered the Resolves, and to assure them that I have the honor to be, &c.' Lond. ed. vol. ii. p. 37. Wash. Writ. Sparks, vol. iv. p. 334.

ROBERT MORRIS to GENERAL WASHINGTON.

PHILADELPHIA, 27 February, 1777. 'I do not like to be sanguine, and yet it is necessary, in a contest like this we are engaged in, to view the best side of the picture frequently. Remember, good Sir, that few men can keep their feelings to themselves, and that it is necessary, for example's sake, that all leaders should feel and think boldly, in order to inspirit others who look up to them. Heaven, no doubt for the noblest purposes, has blessed you with a firmness of mind, steadiness of countenance, and patience in sufferings, that give you infinite advantages over other men. This being the case, you are not to depend on other people's exertions being equal to your own. One mind feeds and thrives on misfortunes, by finding resources to get the better of them; another sinks under their weight, thinking it impossible to resist; and, as the latter description probably includes the majority of mankind, we must be cautious of alarming them.

'I hate deception, and cannot wish any thing like it should ever escape you; but I really think, if the bright shade of our affairs were sometimes to be painted by your pen, or sanctioned by your name, it would draw forth the exertions of some good men, sooner than distress does from others. I hope you will excuse me for this style of writing, which almost amounts to confidential; and, were I sure of such being received in the same light in which I write it, I should lament to you the absence of many great, good, and valuable men from Congress; for, if great care is not taken, that body, so respectable from the nature of the appointment, the importance of its objects, and the respectable characters of its heretofore individual members, will lose great part of its weight and consequence in the eyes of our own people. We have now to lament the absence from the public councils of America, of Johnson, Jay, R. R.

* One of General Washington's Aids-de-camp.

Livingston, Duane, Deane, W. Livingston, Franklin, Dickinson, Harrison, Nelson, Hooper, Rutledge, and others not less conspicuous, without any proper appointments to fill their places; and this, at the very time they are most wanted, or would be so, if they had not very wisely supplied the deficiency by delegating to your Excellency certain powers, that they durst not have entrusted to any other man. But what is to become of America and its cause, if a constant fluctuation is to take place among its counsellors, and at every change we find reason to view it with regret?'

Wash. Writ.

Sparks, vol. iv. p. 339. Note.

GENERAL WASHINGTON to ROBERT Morris.

MORRISTOWN, 2 March, 1777. 'DEAR SIR,- The freedom with which you have communicated your sentiments on several matters, is highly pleasing to me. For be assured, that nothing would add more to my satisfaction than an unreserved correspondence with a gentleman of whose abilities and attachment to the cause we are contending for, I entertain so high an opinion as I do of yours. Letters, however, being liable to various accidents, make a communication of thoughts that way rather unsafe. But, as this will be conveyed by a gentleman on whom I can depend, I need not scruple to disclose my mind and situation more freely, than I otherwise should do.

The reasons, my good Sir, which you assign for thinking General Howe cannot move forward with his army, are good, but not conclusive. It is a descriptive evidence of the difficulties he has to contend with, but no proof that they cannot be surmounted. It is a view of one side of the picture, against which let me enumerate the advantages on the other, and then determine how we would act in his situation.

'General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have been able to get, have less than ten thousand men in the Jerseys and on board of transports at Amboy. Our number does not exceed four thousand. His are well disciplined, well officered, and well appointed; ours, raw militia, badly officered, and under no government. His numbers cannot in any short time be augmented. Ours must be very considerably, and by such troops as we can have some reliance upon, or the game is at an end. His situation with respect to horses is bad, very bad, I believe; but will it be better? No; on the contrary, worse, and therefore an inducement, if no other, to shift quarters. General Howe's informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted with all these circumstances, to suffer him to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, then, can he miss so favorable an opportunity of striking a capital stroke against a city, from whence we derive so many advantages, the carrying of which would give such eclat to his arms, and strike such a damp upon ours? Nor is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined.

All the heavy baggage of the army, their salt provisions, flour, and their stores, might go round by water; whilst their superior numbers would enable them to make a sweep of the horses for many miles around them, not already taken off by us.

'In addition to all this, his coming himself to Brunswick, his bringing troops which cannot be quartered, and keeping them on shipboard at Amboy, with some other corroborating circumstances, did induce a firm belief in me, that he would move, and towards Philadelphia. I candidly own, that I expected it would happen before the expiration of my Proclamation.*

'The longer it is delayed, the better for us: and happy shall I be, if I am deceived. My opinions upon these several matters are known only to those who have a right to be informed. As much as possible I have endeavored to conceal them from every one else; and, that no hasty removal of the public stores should take place, thereby communicating an alarm, I early recommended this measure, and have since been urging it; well knowing that a measure of this kind, set hastily about, when the enemy were advancing, would give unfavorable impressions, and be attended with bad consequences. To deceive Congress, or you, through whose hands my letters to them are to pass, with false appearances and assurances, would, in my judgment, be criminal, and make me responsible for the consequences. I endeavor, in all these letters, to state matters as they appear to my judgment, without adding to or diminishing aught from the picture. From others my sentiments are hidden.

'I wish, with all my heart, that Congress had gratified General Lee in his request. If not too late, I wish they would do it still. I can see no possible evil that can result from it; some good, I think, might. The request to see a gentleman or two came from the General; not from the Commissioners. There could have been no harm, therefore, in hearing what he had to say on any subject; especially as he had declared, that his own personal interest was deeply concerned.

The Resolve to put in close confinement Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and the Hessian officers, in order to retaliate upon them Gen. Lee's punishment, is, in my opinion, injurious in every point of view, and must have been entered into without due attention of the consequences. Does Congress know how much the balance of prisoners is against us; that the enemy have, at least, three hundred officers of ours in their possession, and we not fifty of theirs; that Generals Thompson and Waterbury are subject to be recalled at any time? Do they imagine that these officers will not share the fate of Campbell? Or, possibly, by receiving very different treatment, mixed with artful insinuations, their resentment may be roused to acts highly injurious to our cause. It is much easier to raise a fer

* See pp. 420, 421.