Opinion of the court. guard the rights of suitors in the courts of the United States, if a case should arise where State legislation had discriminated against them. It is possible, though not probable, that State legislation on the subject of the estates of decedents might be purposely framed so as to discriminate injuriously against the creditor living outside of the State; but if this should unfortunately ever happen the courts of the United States would find a way, in a proper case, to arrest the discrimination, and to enforce equality of privileges among all classes of claimants, even if the estate were seized by operation of law and intrusted to a particular jurisdiction. The legislation of Arkansas on this subject, instead of being unfriendly, is wise and just. All creditors are placed upon an equitable foundation, and judgments obtained in the courts of the United States have the same effect as judgments obtained in the courts of the State. The law simply places the assets beyond the reach of ordinary process, for the equal benefit of all persons interested in them, and all that is asked is that the construction of this law adopted by the State tribunals shall be the rule of decision in the Federal courts. The Federal court in Arkansas, in entertaining the suit of Gautier, recognized the power of the State to appoint an administrator and hold him responsible for the proper administration of the estate. If so, how can it reject the authority of the State to distribute the estate in accordance with a scale applicable to all creditors alike? There is no difference in principle on the point we are considering between the administration and the insolvent laws of a State. In the case of the Bank of Tennessee v. Horn,* this court held that by the law of Louisiana the estate of the insolvent vested in the creditors, to be administered by the syndic, as their trustee, and that an execution issued on a judgment obtained in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, after the cession had been accepted and the syndic appointed by the * 17 Howard, 160. Opinion of the court. creditors, could not be levied on the property of the iusolvent, although the suit was pending when the proceedings in insolvency were begun. The property had been seized by the operation of the law of the State, and was being administered for the benefit of creditors, and when the bank obtained a judgment the insolvent had no interest in the property subject to levy and sale. So in this case the law vested the assets of Du Bose's estate in a trustee, to be administered and sold for the benefit of creditors and distributees, and when the judgment was rendered against the administrator, the assets being held by him solely in his character as trustee, were no more subject to seizure and sale than they were when held by the trustee of an insolvent estate. The point decided in Payne v. Hook, relied upon by the plaintiff in error, does not touch the question at issue. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri, sitting as a court of chancery, as an incident to its power to enforce trusts, took jurisdiction of a bill filed by Mrs. Payne to compel the administrator of her brother's estate to account and distribute the assets in his hands. It was contended, as the complainaut, were she a citizen of Missouri, could only obtain relief through the local Court of Probate, that she had no better right because of her citizenship in Virginia; but this court held that the equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in Eugland possesses; is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by State legislation, and that a bill stating a case for equitable relief, according to the received principles of equity, would be sustained, although the court of the State, having general chancery powers, would not entertain it. The bill charged gross misconduct on the part of the administrator, and one of its main objects was to obtain relief against these fraudulent proceedings. This relief was granted, and the administrator compelled faithfully to carry out the trust reposed in him, and to pay to the complainant the distributive share of the estate of her brother, according to the laws of Missouri. Statement of the case. No greater rights in the estate were adjudged to her than were secured by the law of the State, and if she had been a creditor, instead of a distributee, and sought to obtain a preference over a local creditor, we think it safe to say her bill would have been dismissed. The powers of courts of equity are not in issue in the present suit, nor is there any question presented about restraining or limiting them. The laws of Arkansas required an administrator to make final settlement of his administration within three years from the date of his letters. The administrator of Du Bose not only failed to discharge this duty, but neglected even to convert the assets of the estate into money, in order to pay debts. Gautier was not compelled to resort to the local Probate Court to secure the performance of these obligations, but could, had he chosen, have invoked the equity powers of the Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas, to obtain a suitable measure of redress. This he could have obtained in less time than it has taken to conduct this litigation; but this measure of redress would only have placed him on an equality with other creditors, as prescribed by the laws of Arkansas. It would in no event have diverted the assets, so that his debt should have been satisfied to the exclusion of other creditors equally meritorious. JUDGMENT Affirmed. BAILEY, COLLECTOR, v. CLARK ET AL. The term "capital," employed by a banker in the business of banking, in the one hundred and tenth section of the Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, does not include moneys borrowed by him from time to time temporarily in the ordinary course of his business. It applies only to the property or moneys of the banker set apart from other uses and permanently invested in the business. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York; the case being thus: The one hundred and tenth section of the Revenue Act Statement of the case. of the United States, as amended on the 13th of July, 1866,* enacts "That there shall be levied, collected, and paid a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the capital of any bank, association, company, or corporation, and on the capital employed by any person in the business of banking beyond the average amount invested in United States bonds." And the seventy-ninth section of the same act as amended, declares "That every incorporated or other bank, and every person, firm, or company having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check, or order; or where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes; or where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes are received for discount or for sale, shall be regarded as a bank or as a banker."† During the years 1869 and 1870, Clark and others were bankers within the meaning of this statute, doing business in the city of New York, under the name of Clark, Dodge & Co.; and at various times between the 1st of April, 1869, and the 1st of February, 1870, they made returns, as required by law, to the assessor of internal revenue for the district, of the amount of their fixed capital employed in banking, and of the amount of moneys deposited with them by their customers. The assessor required more than this; he insisted, against the objection of Clark, Dodge & Co., that all moneys borrowed by them from time to time, and temporarily in the ordinary course of their business, formed a part of their capital employed in the business of banking, and were subject to the tax imposed upon capital, under the section cited. He accordingly assessed a tax upon the several amounts thus borrowed within the dates mentioned, as part of the capital of the company. One Bailey was at the time collector of internal revenue 14 Stat. at Large, 186. † Id. 115. Opinion of the court. in the district, and as such officer enforced the payment of the taxes thus assessed, amounting to over six thousand dollars. Clark, Dodge & Co. protested at the time against the legality of the assessment, and appealed from the decision of the assessor to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Failing to obtain any rescission of the assessment or restitution of the moneys paid, they brought the present action for their recovery. The action was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, by stipulation of the parties, under the recent act of Congress. The court found the facts as above stated, but with greater detail, and held that the money thus temporarily borrowed by the plaintiffs in the ordinary course of their business was not capital of the company employed in the business of banking, and was not, therefore, liable to assessment as part of such capital; and that the assessment and collection of the tax was, therefore, illegal and unauthorized. The court accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiffs. To review that judgment, the case was brought here on writ of error. Mr. G. H. Williams, Attorney-General, and Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-General, for the collector, the appellant; Mr. J. E. Burrill, for the appellecs. Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: As appears from the statement of the case the only question for determination relates to the meaning to be given to the term capital in the one hundred and tenth section of the Revenue Act. The term is not there used in any technical sense, but in its natural and ordinary signification. And it is capital not merely of individuals, but of corporations and associations, which is subject to the tax in question. When used with respect to the property of a corporation or associa tion the term has a settled meaning; it applies only to the property or means contributed by the stockholders as the fund or basis for the business or enterprise for which the |