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Where Mis

takes in a Judgment may be corrected without

Review.

Procedure

proof on 15th February. The proof was subsequently, at his re-
quest, postponed till the 16th, and on that day he did not appear.
On 25th February, on the motion of the petitioner, the Sheriff-
Substitute renewed the diet for leading the petitioner's proof. On
appeal to the Sheriff he reversed this interlocutor, refused the peti-
tion for interdict, and recalled the interim interdict. The petitioner,
Murphy, then appealed to the Supreme Court. It was held that the
appeal to the Sheriff was competent, and the interlocutor pronounced
by him was approved of and affirmed. Observed by the Lord Justice-
Clerk:- 66
I have no doubt that an interlocutor renewing allowance
of proof is the same as one allowing proof. Such interlocutors are
just those that can be competently appealed." The impropriety of
having granted interim interdict in the circumstances, was remarked
upon by the Bench, the petitioner not having shown any title to the
bark, which was not in his possession, and having simply averred
that it was his property. Murphy v. M'Keand, 15 February 1866,
4 Macph. 444, 38 Jurist 207.

20. It shall be competent to any Sheriff-Substitute or Sheriff to correct any merely clerical Error in his Judgment at any time before the Proceedings have been transmitted to the Judge or Court of Review, not being later than Seven Days from the Date of such Judgment.1

1 In the case of Cleland v. Clason, cited under section 16, it was held that when an interlocutor was not signed until seven days after having been verbally pronounced, the date of signature was rightly given as the date of the decree.

In Cumming v. Spencer, November 21, 1868, 7 Macph. 156, 41 Jurist 88, which was a case under the Debts Recovery Act brought by appeal before the Court of Session, the Court corrected a clerical error in the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute, by substituting the word "defender " for the word "pursuer.'

21. The Procedure in Consistorial and Maritime in Consis Causes shall be as nearly as may be the same as is hereinbefore provided with reference to ordinary Actions.

torial and Maritime

Causes.

Judgment

Causes not

22. It shall not be competent, except as hereinof Sheriff in after specially provided for, to remove from a Sheriff exceeding Court, or to bring under Review of the Court of Session, final. or of the Circuit Court of Justiciary, or of any other

£25, to be

Court or Tribunal whatever, by Advocation, Appeal, Suspension, or Reduction, or in any other manner of Way, any Cause not exceeding the Value of Twentyfive Pounds Sterling, or any Interlocutor, Judgment, or Decree pronounced or which shall be pronounced in such Cause by the Sheriff.

By this section the Court of Session has been deprived of the appellate jurisdiction which it formerly possessed, as regards causes not exceeding the value of £25. In virtue of the above provisions, in order to exclude an appeal, it devolves on the party objecting to its competency, to show from the pleadings that the value of the cause does not exceed that sum. If the Sheriff, by erroneously dismissing a case which may be for a less sum, declines to exercise his jurisdiction, the Court may interfere. See Dick v. North of Scotland Ry. Co., infra. Actions ad factum præstandum are generally appealable, because it often happens that the value of specific performance or restraint from performance, cannot be so measured as to show that the value of the conclusion of the action does not exceed £25. But if there should be an alternative conclusion for a money payment, which brings the value of the action clearly under the above limit, an appeal is incompetent. Thus, in an action for delivery of two cows, "or to pay the sum of £15, 6s., being the price of said cows," advocation was held incompetent.-Cameron v. Smith, February 20, 1857, 19 D. 517, 29 Jurist 238. But had the conclusion been for £15, 6s., being the price of said cows, 66 or such other sum as shall be ascertained to be the value thereof," that would have left the value of the cause so far indefinite that it would not necessarily be within the prescribed limit, and an appeal would therefore be competent. Shotts Iron Co., infra.

The construction put by the Court on this section as regards the competency of appeals arising from the criterion of value will appear from the following cases:

It was held by a majority of the whole Court incompetent to bring under review a case the conclusion in which was for less than £25, although the decree, including expenses, exceeded that sum. The conclusion in the action, exclusive of expenses, was held to be the measure of the value. Hopkirk v. Wilson, December 22, 1855, 18 D. 299, 28 Jurist 129.

It was held by a majority of the whole Court, that it was competent to advocate a cause in which the amount concluded for, and interest at the date of the summons, were together less than £25, but which, when decree was pronounced, by accumulation of interest exceeded that sum. Murray v. Mitchell, March 10, 1855, 27 Jurist, 289. The decision in this case was approved of by the House of Lords, in Tennent v. Earl of Glasgow, March 3, 1864, 2 Macph. H. L. 22, 36 Jurist 400.

An application for interdict which, on the merits, did not involve any sum of money, and in which the question of expenses came to be the main point at issue, was held to be competently advocated. Robertsons v. Wilsons, March 3, 1857, 19 D. 594, 29 Jurist 275.

An action was raised for £32. The defenders admitted liability for £26, which was consigned and uplifted by the pursuer; and after further litigation as to the balance, the defenders were assoilzied. Held that advocation was competent, in respect that the true criterion of the value of the cause was the conclusions of the action. Wilson v. Wallace, March 6, 1858, 20 D. 764, 30 Jurist 415.

An action concluded for £92, deducting therefrom £58, for an account due by the pursuer to defender, leaving a balance of £34, which was restricted in the summons to £25, and expenses were also concluded for. On decree for pursuer, advocation was held competent, in respect that the value of the interest which both parties had in the cause is greater than £25, being in fact £25 plus £58. Inglis v. Smith, May 17, 1859, 21 D. 822, 31 Jurist 461.1

Where the conclusions in a summons were for more than £25, and after considerable litigation in the Inferior Court, the pursuer restricted his claim to £14, it was held that he could not thereby deprive the defender of the right of appeal to which he was entitled by the conclusions as stated in the summons. An appeal was accordingly held to be competent. Buie v. Stiven, December 5, 1863, 2 Macph. 208, 36 Jurist 103.

Brydon purchased a mare from Macfarlane, and gave him in exchange £9 in cash, an I O U for £5, and another mare. Brydon then alleged that the mare he received was disconform to warranty, and he raised an action against Macfarlane for repetition of £9, and for £14 as the value of the mare given to Macfarlane, and reserving right of action as regards the IO U. Decree having been given for pursuer, the defender advocated. Held that advocation was competent, the value of the action being £28 and not £23. Macfarlane v. Brydon, November 2, 1864, 37 Jurist 3.

It was

A process, which commenced by a petition in the Sheriff Court for delivery of a tup, was advocated to the Supreme Court. objected that this was incompetent, as the price paid for the subject in dispute, as appeared from the pleadings, was only £3, 5s. It was held that advocation was competent. The price paid was not conclusive as to value, and it was incumbent on the party objecting to prove from the pleadings themselves that the value did not exceed £25. Purves v. Brock, July 9, 1867, 5 Macph. 1003, 39 Jurist 558.

A landlord let business premises for five years; but before the tenant entered into possession they were damaged by fire, and he renounced the lease. The landlord brought an action against him in the ordinary Sheriff Court of Glasgow for £12, being one year's rent, and got decree. Held that advocation was competent, inasmuch as judgment for either party disposed of liability as regards the other rents under the same lease, which, together, considerably exceeded £25. Drummond v. Hunter, January 12, 1869, 41 Jurist 203, 7 Macph. 347.

A complaint was brought before the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, under the Summary Procedure Act, 1864, against the owners and principal agent of a colliery, for contravention of the Mines Inspection Act, 1860, section 10, under which it was set forth that the owners were liable to a penalty not exceeding £20, and the agent to a like penalty. The Sheriff convicted and adjudged the owners to pay £10, and the agent a like sum. An appeal to the Supreme Court was held competent, in respect the proceeding was one cause, the value of which was £40; but after being partially heard, the appeal was held incompetent on another point which emerged during the argument. Dykes v. Merry, March 4, 1869, 41 Jurist 355.

An appeal taken against the decision of a Sheriff, on a petition for delivery of a bill for £8, 13s. 1d., was held competent in respect. that the value to the petitioner was not necessarily less than £25. Galloway v. M'Ghie, May 18, 1869, 41 Jurist 400.

An appeal taken from the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, against a judgment of the Sheriff, on a petition for delivery of four lambs, or for payment of the sum of £10 as the price or value thereof, “or such other sum as should be ascertained to be the value thereof," was held competent, in respect the value of the cause is thus indefinite, and does not appear from the pleading to be necessarily under £25. Shotts Iron Company v. Kerr, December 6, 1871, 10 Macph. 195, 44 Jurist 117.

The principle on which this decision was pronounced was fully considered by the whole Court, and was confirmed by a majority, in Aberdein v. Wilson, July 16, 1872, 10 Macph. 971, 44 Jurist, 540, and 9 Scot. Law Rep. 620.

An action raised in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, where the conclusions were for £25 of damages, and interest from the date of citation, it was held that the conclusion for interest brought the value of the cause above £25, and thereby rendered an appeal to the Supreme Court competent. Robertson v. Martin, July 10, 1872, 9 Scot. Law Rep. 605, 44 Jurist 534.

When appeal competent in cases of less value than £25.—If the Sheriff, by erroneously dismissing a case which may be for a less sum than £25, declines to exercise his jurisdiction, or where he pronounces an incompetent judgment, the Court may still interfere.

The Great North of Scotland Railway Co. was cited to the Sheriff Court at Banff, on a summons for £20, by service of a copy thereof at their station at Keith. The Sheriff sustained a plea of incompetent service, and dismissed the action. An appeal was presented to the Circuit Court at Aberdeen, under the provisions of the Heritable Jurisdiction Act. It was argued by the respondent that review of a cause in the Sheriff Court not exceeding £25 was expressly excluded by section 22 of the Sheriff Court Act. It was, however, held by the Court that the appeal was competent. It was observed that the case was not removed from the Sheriff Court to bring it under review in the sense contemplated by this section, the

Causes of any Value

ina sum

of all the

Parties.

true construction of which is that it prohibits review of the Sheriff's judgment in any action under £25. But the Sheriff has not only not pronounced judgment in this case, but he has refused to entertain it, on a ground which, in effect, resolves itself into a refusal to exercise his jurisdiction. In doing so, the Court further observed:

"He is committing an excess of power, which is the same in kind as if exercising jurisdiction over subject-matter of territory where he had no right of jurisdiction." The appeal was therefore sustained; and further, the service was held to be sufficient.-Lords Justice-Clerk and Ivory, Aberdeen Circuit, Dick v. Great North of Scotland Railway Co., October 8, 1860, 3 Irv. 617, 33 Jurist 2.

See also the case of Steuart v. M'Gregor, September 23, 1868, 40 Jurist 654, 1 Couper 92, cited under section 17 of the Debts Recovery Act, infra, in which the value of the action was £12, 15s. 2d., and which was appealed to the Circuit Court of Aberdeen on the plea of citation to a wrong court. The competency of the appeal was objected to, but the objection was repelled. Lord Deas observed:-"The Court of Justiciary has always jurisdiction to set aside incompetent judgments of the Sheriff Court where the value of the cause is under £25."

It will be observed that by the first section of this Act, its application to cases provided for by the Small Debt Act of 1837 is excluded in express terms.

23. It shall be competent in all Civil Causes above may be tried the Value of Twelve Pounds,1 competent before the mary Way Sheriff, for the Parties to lodge in Process a Minute, by Consent signed by themselves or by their Procurators, setting forth their Agreement that the Cause should be tried in the summary Way provided in the said first-recited Act,2 and the Sheriff shall thereupon hear, try, and determine such Action in such summary Way, and in such Case the whole Powers and Provisions of the said first-recited Act shall be held applicable to the said Action: Provided always, that the Parties, or any of them, shall be entitled to appear and plead by a Procurator of Court.

1 Section 4 of the Small Debt Act 1837 gives power to the Sheriff to remit from the Ordinary to the Small Debt Roll causes under the value of £12. A plea opposed to this view was repelled in the case of Philip v. Trustees of Forfar Building Investment

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