Prior to 1902 the entire strip of land, "except | pear from the plat that the locus in quo was that portion actually occupied by the company in any of the spaces indicated on the plat as for its terminals, was vacant property, but it streets; that there was no testimony that was used by the public generally for business, the land had been accepted by the public as commerce, and pleasure in the same manner a street, nor that it had been used as such as other vacant property of similar charac- prior to 1902. The court said that if purter." Some of the residents of the city re- chasers of lots have rights under the condigarded the entire strip of land as a public tions under which they bought, they would park; others regarded it as private property. not be affected by the suit. It appears from The city council adopted a resolution in 1903, the opinion in that case that the court "declining to accept the dedication of said thought that the platting of land by the owner strip as a park if such dedication was in- and the sale of lots according to the plat tended by the filing of the Knowlton plat." merely evinced an intention to dedicate the The company sought an injunction against streets shown thereon to public use as streets, the defendants who had cut the fence and and cited Price v. Stratton, supra, and Floriotherwise committed trespasses upon the da E. C. R. Co. v. Worley, supra, in support strip of land from further trespassing upon of the doctrine. the property. On final hearing the chancellor dismissed the bill upon the theory that the entire strip of land between Biscayne drive and the bay was a public park. Upon appeal this court held that decree to be erroneous. That decision seems to have settled the one point only, viz. that the strip of land which had been fenced and upon which the defendants committed the trespass was not a public park. So much of the opinion therefore which seems to repudiate the common-law doctrine of tender and acceptance as necessary to constitute a dedication of a park or street to the public must be regarded as obiter dictum. In the case of McGourin v. Town of De Funiak Springs, 51 Fla. 502, 41 South. 541, the complainant owned certain lots south of the railroad and opposite to Eighth street which was opened to the north side of the railroad. The city undertook to open Eighth street south of the railroad through complainant's lots, claiming that the former owner of the land had platted the land, showing spaces on the plat for streets which included the property which complainant claimed, that the lots had been sold according to said plat to persons under some of whom complainant claimed, and that said property had been "dedicated to the public uses by the owner and was accepted and used by the public long before and at the time it was assumed to give the complainant and his grantor an interest therein other than that of the general public." Testimony was taken, and on final hearing the chancellor dissolved the injunction which had been granted against the city, restraining it from interfering with the complainant's property, and ordered a dismissal of the bill. This decree was reversed by this court, which held that the burden of proof was upon the city to show that the "locus in quo was dedicated to the use of the public and accepted and used as such by the public," and that such burden had not been met by the city; that the locus in quo was never prior to 1902 used as a street or highway; that a fence was built around a large tract including the locus in quo and a building erected on it in 1884, and the fence prevented the use of the land as a street, and that it did not ap In Raymond v. Whitcomb, 66 Fla. 19, 62 South. 832, a distinction was made between a dedication of a strip of land, as a street, to the public use and a private easement of egress and ingress over the strip or space in controversy. In the case of City of Gainesville v. Thomas, 61 Fla. 538, 54 South. 780, the court treated the making of a plat of land showing spaces for streets and the placing of the plat on record and sale of lots according to the same as a proffer to the public of the spaces designated as streets for use as such, to be accepted at the convenience of the public. The opinion contains a suggestion that the offer may be revoked, but a general allegation of adverse holding was not deemed sufficient to show an "ouster or interference with the public easement." It is not clear whether the court intended by this language to convey the idea that after the public accepts an offer of dedication of streets or roadways it can be ousted of the easement, and the statute of limitations would then begin to run in favor of the person in possession, or that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could be invoked under some circumstances, or whether an "interference with the public easement" might, in some circumstances, be regarded as a revocation of the offer of dedication. The point, however, was not in that case necessary to be determined, as it did not appear from the allegations of the bill of complaint that the complainant had actually tak en possession of the so-called streets and closed them against public use. There is no decision by this court to which our attention has been called which holds to any view inconsistent with the rule at common law upon the subject of the dedication of streets and highways by private persons which requires acceptance by the public to make the dedication complete. See 3 Dillon's Municipal Corporations, 1723; 8 R. C. L. 898; 4 McQuillin's Municipal Corporations, 3266. While in some jurisdictions it is held that the mere sale of lots with reference to a plat made by the owner of the land, which plat shows on its face certain spaces marked as streets, constitutes a complete dedication of such spaces for streets, so that there need be no acceptance of it by the public that rule has not been adopted in this state. We think it is more consistent with reason and more in harmony with the weight of authority in this country to hold that the platting of land and the sale of lots pursuant thereto creates, as between the grantor and the purchaser, a private right to have the spaces marked upon the plat as streets, alleys, parks, etc., remain open for ingress and egress and the uses indicated by the designations, but that, so far as the public is concerned, such acts amount to a mere offer of dedication, which must be accepted before there is a revocation to complete the dedication. See Hewes v. Village of Crete, 175 Ill. 348, 51 N. E. 696; Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 124 Ill. 235, 15 N. E. 854; Russell v. Chicago & M. Electric R. Co., 205 Ill. 155, 68 N. E. 727; Stacy v. Glen Ellyn Hotel & Springs Co., 223 Ill. 546, 79 N. E. 133, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966; Scott v. Donora Southern R. Co., 222 Pa. 634, 72 Atl. 282; State ex rel. v. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619; Smith v. Beloit, 122 Wis. 396, 100 N. W. 877; Anaheim v. Langenberger, 134 Cal. 608, 66 Pac. 855; Trammell v. Bradford (Ala.) 73 South. 894; Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 24 S. E. 830; Carter v. Barkley, 137 Iowa, 510, 115 N. W. 21; Chapman v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 146 Mich. 23, 109 N. W. 53; Baker v. Squire, 143 Mo. 92, 44 S. W. 792; Arnold v. City of Orange, 73 N. J. Eq. 280, 66 Atl. 1052; Healey v. Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 54 S. E. 749; Atlantic & S. R. Co. v. State Board of Assessors of New Jersey, 80 N. J. Law, 83, 77 Atl. 609; Riley v. Buchanan, 116 Ky. 625, 76 S. W. 527, 63 L. R. A. 642, 3 Ann. Cas. 788. In Village of Augusta v. Tyner, 197 Ill. 242, 64 N. E. 378, it was held that a municipality cannot enforce the private right of lot own ers to have streets remain open where the municipality has not accepted the offer of dedication. In City of Buffalo v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506, the court said that the proposed dedication may be withdrawn any time before acceptance by the public. In Stacy v. Glen Ellyn Hotel & Springs Co., supra, the court said, to constitute a dedication at common law there must be an intention on the part of the proprietor of the land to dedicate the same to public use; there must be an acceptance by the public, and the proof of these facts must be clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal. In the case of Russell v. Chicago & M. Electric R. Co., supra, it was held that the extension of the city's limits by taking in territory that had been platted was not an acceptance of the streets and alleys as shown on the plat. As to the time when the public must accept a tender of dedication the authorities seem to be in harmony, holding that acceptance may be made within a reasonable time, but venience of the public or those who live upon adjacent lots require. In Illinois and Michigan acceptance delayed for 50 years was held to be too late. City of Venice v. Madison County Ferry Co., 216 Ill. 345, 75 N. E. 105; Cass Co. Sup'rs v. Banks, 44 Mich. 467, 7 N. W. 49. In North Carolina acceptance of streets 12 years after offer of dedication was held effectual. Bailliere v. Atlantic Shingle Cooperage & Veneer Co., 150 N. C. 627, 64 S. E. 754. In Darling v. Jersey City, 73 N. J. Eq. 318, 67 Atl. 709, it was held that the burden of proving acceptance of an offer to dedicate is on the municipality alleging it. In the case at bar there is no contention that the county of Hillsborough ever through its officers formally accepted the offer of dedication of the locus in quo, nor that there was any acceptance by user. The evidence shows that the place was never open to the public, never used by the public for a passageway, was inclosed by a fence and under cultivation by the owner when the limits of the city of Tampa were extended to take in the territory covered by the plat. The only two persons who may be said to have had the right to keep the street open as shown on the plat appear from the evidence to have agreed among themselves to a division line between blocks 1 and 2 and to the closing of the way or passage. The owner of block numbered 4 has ingress and egress to and from his lot through Avenues 7 and 8, and according to the plat no other way to reach his land, so that the locus in quo appears to hold no interest for him. Jones on Easements, § 346; State ex rel. v. Hamilton, su pra. Although the blocks numbered 1 and 2 seem to be divided by the open space which is the land in controversy here, title to the center of such strip of land passed to the purchasers of the two blocks each respectively on his side of the proposed street. See Smith v. Horn, 70 Fla. 484, 70 South. 435. [5] Having acquired the property before the public had accepted the offer of dedication, and assuming, without deciding, that the two purchasers could have revoked the offer of dedication as made by their grantor as effectually as he could have done so, the case turns upon the question as to whether Kirkland and De Bona revoked the offer of dedication as made by their grantor, there being no contention that he attempted to revoke the offer. The burden of proof was upon the complainant. The evidence should have clearly established, not only an intention upon the part of Kirkland, but also upon De Bona's part, to revoke the offer of dedication. Kirkland alone could not revoke the offer; he was not the sole grantee. [6] The chancellor found the facts to be against the contention of the complainant that there had been a revocation of the offer of dedication. We are unable to say that the clearly that conclusion to be wrong; hence the decision of the chancellor will not be disturbed. See Dean v. Dean, 36 Fla. 492, 18 South. 592; Lucas v. Wade, 43 Fla. 419, 31 South. 231; City of Jacksonville v. Huff, 39 Fla. 8, 21 South. 774; West v. Daniels, 57 Fla. 548, 49 South. 154; Davis v. Horne, 57 Fla. 396, 49 South. 505; Kelley Co. v. Pol lock & Bernheimer, 57 Fla. 459, 49 South. 934, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1101; Johns v. Bowden, 72 Fla. 530, 73 South. 603. The propriety of the decree in this case rests solely upon the fact as disclosed by the proofs that there had been no revocation clearly and definitely shown on the part of both Kirkland and De Bona of the offer to dedicate the strip of land to public use for a street. So far as Kirkland's acts were concerned, they may have been sufficient to show an intention on his part to revoke the offer, but, as we have shown, De Bona has the right to insist upon the passageway; and, although that is a private right which the city may not enforce in its name, yet until that right is waived by some act on his part clearly showing an abandonment of it and an intention to shut the public off from an acceptance of the offer to dedicate the strip of land, the public may, within a reasonable time, accept the offer and open the passageway. The city of Tampa, acting for the public, announced its intention to open the street. That was an acceptance, and as it was made within a reasonable time, and before revocation of the offer, the complainant's case failed. The decree is affirmed. therein, when the policy contracts are made in another state without reference to the laws vide that the policies shall be payable to the of this state, and such contracts expressly proadministrator of the insured, and payment to the administrator of the insured is authorized by the law of such other state. Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge. Action by Jules McRee, an infant, by his next friend, M. S. McRee, against the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States of America. Demurrers to pleas sustained, and judgment entered for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed. John C. Cooper & Son, of Jacksonville, for Dickenson & Dickenson plaintiff in error. and S. V. Ray, all of Tampa, for defendant in error. WHITFIELD, J. The amended declaration herein is as follows: friend, M. S. McRee, by his attorneys, Hill, "Jules McRee, an infant, plaintiff, by his next Hill, Whiting & Stern, Dickenson & Dickenson, and S. V. Ray, sues the Equitable Life Assurance Society, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York, defendant, which has been summoned to answer the plaintiff in a civil action for that whereas, "Heretofore, to wit, on the 24th day of July, 1896, in consideration of the payment by Julius S. McRee of the sum of $184.10, and of the like sum on the 14th day of July of every year thereafter during the continuance of the policy of insurance, the defendant made and delivered to Julius S. McRee its policies of insurance on the life of the said Julius S. McRee, two in number, each for $2,500, and thereby insured the life of the said Julius S. McRee in the sum of $5,000, said policies at the time of issuance made payable to Eugenia G. McRee, wife of the said Julius S. McRee, BROWNE, O. J., and TAYLOR, WHIT- but thereafter, to wit, on the 26th day of June, FIELD, and WEST, JJ., concur. (75 Fla. 257) EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. McREE. 1906, while the said Julius S. McRee was a resident of and domiciled in the state of Florida, the defendant, at the direction of the insured, changed the beneficiary of said policies of insurance, making the same payable after the death of the said Julius S. McRee to his executors, administrators, or assigns; that the said Julius S. McRee duly fulfilled all the conditions of said insurance on his part, including (Supreme Court of Florida. Feb. 13, 1918.) the payment of premiums as aforesaid; that The statutes of Florida have no force as such beyond the limits of the state. 2. INSURANCE 147(3)-LIFE INSURANCE PLACE OF CONTRACT. A life insurance policy, which by its terms does not become a completed contract until delivery on payment of first premium is to be construed as a contract made in the state where the first premium is paid and the policy delivered. 3. INSURANCE 583 (1)-LIFE INSURANCEPROCEEDS OF POLICY-STATUTE. Section 3154, Gen. St. 1906, does not affect the rights of an insurer under a contract made in another state; and neither the law nor the public policy of this state forbids the payment of the proceeds of insurance policies to an administrator of a person who dies in this state while a resident of and domiciled prior to the time of his death the said Julius S. McRee borrowed from the defendant the that, should he die before the repayment of said sum of $600, contracting with said defendant loan to the defendant, his said policies of insurance should be charged therewith, and thereafter, on the day of, 1909, died intestate at Tampa, Fla., leaving as his only heirs at law his wife, Eugenia G. McRee, and his son, Jules McRee, the plaintiff herein; that upon the death of the said Julius S. McRee, as aforesaid, there became due and payable under the terms of the said policies of insurance from the said defendant the sum of $1,872.54 each, or a total of $3,745.08, and by reason of his heirship this plaintiff became and was entitled upon the death of the said Julius S. McRee, to one-half of any and all sums due from the defendant upon the said policies of insurance, with lawful interest thereon from the time the same became so due and payable, together with a reasonable sum as fees and compensation for the plaintiff's attorneys in prosecuting this suit, all of which will more fully appear by copies of the said policies of in- "The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the "VII. Privilege of Changing Beneficiary. This policy is issued with the express understanding that the assured may, providing this policy has not been assigned, change the beneficiary, or beneficiaries, at any time during the continuance of this policy, by filing with the secretary a written request duly acknowledged, accompanied by this policy; such change to take effect upon the indorsement of the same on the policy by the society." The defendant filed twenty-five pleas to the amended declaration, the first three being: (1) Never was indebted as alleged; (2) did not promise as alleged; (3) payment. One special plea denied: "That the said Julius S. McRee was a resident of and domiciled in the state of Florida when the defendant, at the direction of the insured, changed the beneficiaries of said policies of insurance, making the same payable after the death of the said Julius S. McRee to his executors, administrators, or assigns, but avers the truth to be that the said Julius S. McRee was at the time the defendant changed the beneficiaries of said policies of insurance, at the direction of the insured, making the same payable after the death of the said Julius S. McRee, to his executors, administrators, or assigns, a resident of and domiciled in the state of Georgia, that the request for the said change was made by said McRee in the state of Georgia, and that payment has been made to the beneficiary named in the policies as changed according to the law of Georgia." Other special pleas in effect set up that the policies were contracts made in the state of Alabama to be performed in the state of New York, that the beneficiary of the policies was changed by the insured by a request made by him in the state of Georgia while he was a resident of and domiciled in the state of Georgia, and that they were discharged by payment to the beneficiary named in the policies, and who was entitled to receive the same according to the laws of the state of Alabama, in which they were made, and according to the laws of the state of That the law of Alabama and of New York "provides and requires that when policies of insurance similar to those sued on are made payable to the assured's executors, administrators, or assigns, the sums to be paid under said policies of insurance are to be paid to the assured's executors, administrators, or assigns, upon the death of the assured on proper proofs of such death," and that by the law of Georgia the insured "may direct the money to be paid to his personal representatives, or to his widow, or to his children, or to assignees; and upon such direction, given and assented to by the insurer, no other person can defeat the same. But the assignment is good without said assent," and that payment had been made "to Eugenia G. McRee, as administratrix of the estate of Julius S. McRee." The tenth plea is as follows: "And for a tenth plea the defendant says that the said policies of life insurance sued on provide that they are granted in consideration of a written and printed application for the policies of insurance which applications are made a part of the contract of insurance, and that the policies and the applications taken together shall constitute the entire contract between the parties; that in said applications made by said Julius S. McRee it is provided that the contract of insurance shall not take effect until the first premiums shall have been paid during the good health of insured; that the said applications were taken in the state of Alabama; that the first premiums on said policies of insurance were paid by the said Julius S. McRee to this defendant in the state of Alabama, and that the policies sued on were delivered to the insured, Julius S. McRee, in said state of Alabama; that the statute law of the state of Alabama provides in section 4583 of the Code of Alabama that 'all contracts of insurance the application for which is taken within the state shall be deemed to have been made within this state, and subject to the laws thereof'; that the unwritten or common law of the state of Alabama, as evidenced by the books of reports in cases adjudged in the courts of the said state of Alabama, provides and requires that, when policies of insurance similar to those sued on are made payable to the assured's executors, administrators, or assigns, the sums to be paid under said policies of insurance are to be paid to the assured's executors, administrators, or assigns, upon the death of the assured on proper proof of such death; that under the terms of said contract of insurance and the law of said state of Alabama this defendant then and there became obligated to pay all sums of money due to be paid under said contract of insurance to the assured's executors, administrators, or assigns, upon the death of the assured, and proper proof thereof; that section 3154 of the General Statutes of the state of Florida, which provides in effect that upon the death of the assured in the state of Florida the proceeds of said policies of insurance are not to be paid to the executors, administrators, or assigns of assured, but are to be paid to the widow and child or children of assured in equal shares, is contrary to section 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States of America, in that it impairs the aforesaid obligations of said contracts of insurance." Still others of the special pleas aver that, as applied to the averred facts as to the mak Ing of the contracts of insurance, the quoted statute conflicts with organic law by violating the obligation of the contracts and denying due process of law. The court sustained demurrers to all the pleas except the first three, which later were withdrawn by the defendant; and final judgment for the plaintiff was entered on the demurrer. The defendant took writ of error. [1, 2] Section 3154 of the General Statutes of 1906 is as follows: The question presented between the parties to this action is one of contract right, not of the situs or of the beneficiaries of a decedent's personal estate. Are the contract rights of the insurer, in view of the averments of the special pleas, which are admitted by the demurrers, controlled by the quoted statute as to the party to whom payment may be made? It is manifest that the statute can have no force beyond the limits of this state. If, as averred in the special pleas, the contracts of insurance were made in Alabama, and, if as averred, while the insured was a resident of the state of Georgia, he changed the beneficiary so as to make the policies payable to his executors, administrators, or assigns, the statute is not applicable, for the purpose of designating the parties to whom the proceeds of the policies may be paid by the insurer, though the insured afterwards died in Florida while he was a resident of and domiciled in this state, and though in such case the statute may designate the beneficiaries of the proceeds of the policies. It does not ap "Whenever any person shall die in this state leaving insurance on his life the said insurance shall inure exclusively to the benefit of the child or children and husband or wife of such person in equal portions, or to any person or persons for whose use and benefit such insurance is declared in the policy; and the proceeds thereof shall in no case be liable to attachment, garnishment, or any legal process in favor of any creditor or creditors of the person whose life is so insured, unless the insurance policy declares that the policy was effected for the benefit of such creditor or creditors: Provided, however, that whenever the insurance is for the benefit of the estate of the insured or is payable to the estate or to the insured, his or her executors, administrators, or assigns the proceeds of the insurance may be bequeathed by the insured to any person or persons what-pear that the laws of Florida were by the soever or for any uses in like manner as he or she may bequeath or devise any other property or effects of which he or she may be possessed, and which shall be subject to disposition by last will and testament." In Pace v. Pace, 19 Fla. 438, it was held that a policy of a foreign insurance company executed and delivered in this state is subject to the provisions of this statute, and that, where such a policy is issued "for the benefit of the estate of the insured," and the insured died leaving no wife, but an infant son, "the property and the right to collect the proceeds of the policy inured to the child, and not to the administrator of the insured," and that consequently the sureties on the administrator's bond were not liable for such proceeds collected by the administrator of the deceased insured. contracts made a part of the policies of insurance, or that the policies were applied for or made or issued in contemplation of or with reference to the laws of Florida. If the contracts of insurance were made in Alabama, and the beneficiary changed by the insured while he resided in Georgia, the assumption naturally is, in the absence of anything to the contrary appearing, that the contracts were made with reference to the laws of the state in which the transactions occurred, unless the contracts by intendment or otherwise had reference to the place of performance by the insurer. See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 11 Sup. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497; Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832; In Bradford v. Watson, 65 Fla. 461, 62 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. South. 484, it appears that: The "policy was issued and delivered, and the contract thereby made consummated, in Escambia county, state of Florida." Following the Pace Case it was held that: "Under the statute, where a life insurance policy is made payable to the 'executors, administrators, or assigns' of the decedent, the insurance is in law payable to the surviving widow and children of the decedent. Such insurance when the decedent leaves a widow and children is not a part of the decedent's estate for the purpose of paying debts, or for distribution; and the administratrix of the decedent's estate as such is not entitled to collect the insurance. Consequently the sureties on the bond of the administratrix are not liable for the application of the insurance actually collected by the administratrix." These decisions were upon the liability of the administrator's sureties under policies S. 389, 20 Sup. Ct. 962, 44 L. Ed. 1116; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262, 21 Sup. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, '24 Sup. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788. A life insurance policy which by its terms does not become a completed contract until delivery on payment of first premium is to be construed as a contract made in the state where the first premium is paid and the policy delivered, notwithstanding a recital that it is to be construed as though made in another state. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220, 56 L. Ed. 419, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57. As originally issued, the policies stipulated that upon the death of the insured the insurer would "pay [the stated amount] at its office in the city of New York to Eugenia |