the lands selected and purchased by them,, from the most favorable standpoint for them, but relied upon representations made by said simply creditors of the partnership sought agents as to the description of the lands to be dissolved and for which a receiver shown them; that in the deeds received has been appointed by the court. It is altherefor other lands than those so selected leged in the petition for intervention "that and purchased were conveyed to them; that your petitioners are creditors of the said petitioners are informed that a portion of the Winter Haven, Citrus Fruit Farms Comconsideration paid by them for said land was pany, lately doing business in Polk county, paid to the Southern Land & Securities Com- Fla., as aforesaid, and your petitioners are pany, the owner, and the balance was paid informed that the receiver so appointed has to said agents who sold the lands under in his hands sufficient funds belonging to said sales contracts; that the petitioners have partnership to pay off the amount as agreed reached an agreement with the Southern to be refunded to your petitioners by said Land & Securities Company and with the partnership." complainant, to the effect that upon a reconveyance to said company by said petitioners of the lands conveyed by it to them it will return to them the amounts received by it for said lands, the complainant agree ing that said Winter Haven Citrus Fruit Farms Company, which was the agent effecting said sale, will return to petitioners the amounts received by it, namely, the sum of $3,431.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from March 1, 1912, to the date of settlement.

The prayer is that a decree may be granted in favor of petitioners and against said Winter Haven Citrus Fruit Farms Company, requiring it to pay petitioners the amount | of their claims with interest, and that the receiver be required, “out of the funds and assets in his hands belonging to said partnership, to pay your petitioners the said sums of money."

The

In this situation no ground for intervention by these petitioners is shown. fact that the petitioners may be contract creditors of the partnership does not entitle them to intervene and be made parties to the dissolution suit. Bouden v. Longacre Square Bldg. Co., 92 App. Div. 325, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1080; Welborn v. Eskey, 25 Neb. 193, 40 N. W. 959; Kansas & C. P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 33 Neb. 137, 49 N. W. 1100; Dennis v. Spencer, 51 Minn. 259, 53 N. W. 631, 38 Am. St. Rep. 499; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Snowden, 68 Md. 118, 12 Atl. 549; May v. Disconto Gesellschaft, 211 Ill. 310, 71 N. E. 1001; Lincoln v. New Orleans Exp. Co., 45 La. Aṇn. 729, 12 South. 937.

[2, 3] The rule authorizing intervention has been stated as follows:

"It has generally been held that the interest which will entitle a person to intervene under this provision must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate char

lose by the direct legal operation and effect of be that created by a claim to the demand in the judgment. In other words, the interest must suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation." 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 181; Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62, 73 Am. Dec. 569; Smith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 509, 12 Sup. Ct. 674, 36 L. Ed. 521; Isaacs v. Jones, 121 Cal. 257, 53 Pac. 217 Ill. 371, 75 N. E. 502, 108 Am. St. Rep. 793, 1101; Wightman v. Evanston Yaryan_Co., 258, 3 Ann. Cas. 1089.

The complainant filed an answer, admit-acter that the intervener will either gain or ting the error in the description of the lands conveyed to petitioners, and admitting "that, since the institution of this suit and the appointment of said receiver, this complainant agreed with the said petitioners that from the assets now in the hands of the said receiver the amount agreed upon should be refunded to them in satisfaction of their claims against the said Winter Haven Citrus Fruit Farms Company, and this complainant is still willing that such settlement should be made, provided the said interveners should reconvey the lands actually conveyed to them through error."

The Southern Land & Securities Company, the grantor in the deeds in which the alleged error occurred, is not a party to the suit.

The defendant moved to strike the petition, which motion was overruled. The defendant demurred to the petition, and his demurrer was overruled. He then filed a plea to the petition, which was also overruled by the court, whereupon an appeal was taken to this court, and, the orders of the court below -overruling defendant's motion to strike the petition, his demurrer and plea thereto were assigned as errors.

[1] From this record it appears that the petitioners are at most, looking at the case

In the latter case the court said:

"From the foregoing text and decisions we understand the rule to be no more nor less than that partics having an interest in the subjectmatter of the suit in equity, and who are either necessary or proper parties to such suit, if not made so by the plaintiff, may come in by way of application to intervene and be made parties complainant or defendant, to the end that their interests may be adjudicated and protected."

Tested by this rule we think the petitioners have not, by their petition, stated such a case as entitles them to intervene and be made parties to this suit.

The orders appealed from are reversed, with directions to grant defendant's motion to strike the petition. It is so ordered.

BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, WHIT. FIELD, and ELLIS, JJ., concur.

Sparkman & Carter and Jas. F. Glen, all of Tampa, for appellant. Howard P. Mac-ous reasons said transfer and conveyance was farlane, of Tampa, for appellee.

Upon the appeal, immediately preceding this appeal, the final decree entered in the case was affirmed by this court. In that de-on complainant further secured its possession cree the chancellor directed the possession of the property involved to be restored to the complainant. On this point the decree is in the following language:

possession of the land, upon cancellation plaintiff was entitled to writ of possession; in short, to have every right or advantage obtained under the deed annulled."

against the will of complainant, and therefore unlawfully from one to two hours before the bill of complaint was filed. Such occupancy as this will not deprive equity of jurisdiction for two reasons: First, because it was on the same day, and complainant, being admittedly in possession when the day began, must, in the eyes of the law, be considered to hold throughout the day; and, second, a tortious occupancy or, 'scrambling possession,' should not deprive complain-formable with the case established by him, ant of his right to sue in equity."

[1] The rule is that the prayer for relief in a chancery suit must be predicated upon appropriate allegations of the bill, and that the nature and extent of the relief granted is determined by the pleadings in the cause and the proof in support of the allegations of the pleadings.

[2] It is also well settled that under the prayer for general relief any relief may be given which the nature of the case may require and which is agreeable to the case made by the pleadings and proof and not inconsistent with the relief specifically prayed for. Story's Equity Pleading, § 40; Pensacola & Georgia and Atlantic & Gulf Central R. R. Co. v. Spratt & Callahan, 12 Fla. 26, 91 Am. Dec. 747; Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works, 2 Allen (Mass.) 524, 79 Am. Dec. 799; Raper v. Sanders, 21 Grat. (Va.) 60; Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss. 570; McMillan v. James, 105 Ill. 194; De Perez v. Everett, 73 Tex. 431, 11 S. W. 388; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 340, 36 L. Ed. 82.

In this view of the case the provision of the final decree directing that the complainant be put in the possession of the property, is con

and, that being true, it follows that the ques-
tion presented on this appeal was foreclosed
on the previous appeal in this case.
The order will be affirmed.

BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, WHIT FIELD, and ELLIS, JJ., concur.

(75 Fla. 271)

KIRKLAND v. CITY OF TAMPA. (Supreme Court of Florida. Feb. 14, 1918.)

(Syllabus by the Court.) 1. DEDICATION 19(5), 31-PLATTING LAND -RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS.

The platting of land, leaving spaces for streets, alleys, and parks, and the sale of lots according to such plat or plan, creates as between the grantor and such purchasers a private right in the latter to have the spaces marked upon the plat as streets, alleys, and parks remain open for ingress and egress, and the uses indicated by the designations, a private right of ingress and egress and light and air; and as to the public it is an offer of dedication of the strips and parcels of land designated on the plat as streets, alleys, and parks for that purpose, and must be accepted by the public before revocation before the dedication becomes complete.

It appeared from the testimony that contemporaneously with the institution of the suit the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully dispossessed the complainant and entered into possession of the property. But the chancellor held that such possession was not suf-2. ficient to oust the jurisdiction of a court of equity, found the equities of the case to be with the complainant, decreed that the deed from complainant to defendant be canceled and declared of no force and effect, and that

DEDICATION ~~35(2), 37 FORM. may be by formal resolution of the proper auAcceptance of such an offer of dedication thorities or by public user.

3. DEDICATION 19(5), 29-PLAT-STREETS,

the defendant restore the possession of the ALLEYS, AND PARKS.

property to the complainant. As we have seen, this decree was upon appeal to this court affirmed.

[3] It is perfectly clear, we think, that the court below, having found and decreed that the deed upon which the defendant based its claim to the property was fraudulent and should therefore be canceled, was warranted, upon the pleadings and proof as we find them in the record, in proceeding to make its decree effectual by directing that the defendant restore to the complainant the possession of the property of which it had wrongfully, about the time of the institution of the suit, dis

possessed him.

In the case of De Perez v. Everett, supra, the Supreme Court of Texas, in considering a case in which the facts were almost identical with the facts in this case, said:

"If plaintiff was entitled to a cancellation of the deed she was entitled to complete relief, under the prayer for general relief; and, if defendant had by virtue of the deed obtained

One who makes a plat of his land, showing strips of land for streets and alleys and places for public parks, and who causes the plat to be recorded in the public records of the county where the land lies, and who offers the lots for sale according to such map or plat, thereby makes a tender to the public of such strips and parcels of land indicated on the plat as streets, alleys, and parks for such purpose, and before the public accepts such offer he may revoke the

same.

4. DEDICATION
OF PROOF.

29-REVOCATION-BUrden

Whether the grantees of one who has made such a tender to the public of land for streets, alleys, and parks, to whom the owner has conveyed all the lots embraced in the plat, may, before the public accepts the tender, revoke the same as the original owner may have done-not decided. But in such case the revocation must appear clearly and conclusively to have been made, and the burden of proof in either case is upon the person asserting such revocation. 5. DEDICATION 42-ACCEPTANCE-Burden OF PROOF.

The burden of proving acceptance of an offer to the public to dedicate lands for streets, alleys, and parks is upon the county or municipality asserting it.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

6. APPEAL AND ERROR 931(1) TION-DECREE OF CHANCELLOR-EVIDENCE. A decree of the chancellor is presumed to be county in the clerk's office in May of that correct, and, when based upon evidence taken year. The northern boundary line is shown before an examiner and reported to the chancel- to be Eleventh avenue and the southern lor, will not be disturbed, unless an examina- boundary Seventh avenue. These avenues tion of the evidence as disclosed by the record appear to be open to the eastern side of the subdivision. Tenth avenue likewise appears to be open to the east side, but the avenues numbered 9 and 8 appear from the map to terminate at the west boundary of the tract.

PRESUMP-1 and recorded in the records of Hillsborough

clearly shows the conclusion to have been erro

neous.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.

Bill by S. T. Kirkland against the City of Tampa. From a final decree dismissing the bill and dissolving a temporary injunction, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Dickenson & Dickenson, of Tampa, for appellant. Lunsford & De Vane, of Tampa, for appellee.

ELLIS, J. This is an appeal from a final decree dismissing the complainant's bill of complaint and dissolving a temporary injunction against the city of Tampa upon complainant's application restraining the city, its agents, servants, and employés from opening a street, alley, or roadway across certain lands of the complainant described in the bill as "blocks two and three of Garytown subdivision according to map recorded in Plat Book 2 at page 22 of the records of Hillsborough County."

In February, 1904, the appellant entered into a contract with the owner of the land for the purchase of blocks numbered 1, 2, and 3. At that time these blocks were inclosed by a fence which extended from the north line to the south line across Tenth avenue, both on the west and east sides of the land, completely closing the avenue if the same had indeed ever been opened. This inclosure had been erected several years before the plat was made and filed. The complainant below entered into possession of the land, erected a dwelling house thereon, made other improvements, and began the cultivation of the lands and moved into his dwelling house with his family in June, 1904. In 1907 the appellant, having agreed with the owner to surrender his right to block 1, obtained a deed to blocks 2 and 3. The description of the land as contained in the deed is as follows:

"Blocks Nos. two and three (2 & 3) of Garysubdivision recorded on page twenty-two (22) town subdivision according to plat of the said in Plat Book No. Two (2) of the Public Records of Hillsborough County, Florida."

The bill of complaint alleged that the land was in one tract or contiguous body; had been cultivated by complainant for years; was inclosed by a substantial fence, and that the complainant had never donated, either directly by deed or gift or indirectly by abandonment to the city, any street or road-limits of the city of Tampa were extended way through the land; that the city of Tampa was attempting to open a street through the lands without proper procedure and without authority of law.

About a month afterwards the corporate

to include the territory covered by this subdivision. The Tampa Northern Railroad runs along the eastern boundary line of blocks 1, 2, and 3. The complainant conveyed to the The answer denied that the city was at company a strip of land from the east side tempting to open a street through the lands, of his blocks about 12 feet wide. The railand averred that it intended to open a street road track is about 4 feet higher than comnorth of block 2 of the Garytown subdivi- plainant's land. Tenth avenue is open besion; that Tenth avenue is a public thor-yond the railroad to the east about one mile. oughfare of the city of Tampa, and extends In 1907, about the time complainant obfrom Twenty-Sixth street to Thirtieth street along the northern limits of block 2, and does not cross or encroach upon the complainant's land.

It appears from the evidence which was taken by a master and reported to the chancellor that in 1903 Mr. Giddens was the owner of a small tract of land situated beyond the corporate limits of the city of Tampa near a suburb called Garytown. The land is in the form of a parallelogram, and lies east of and adjacent to Garytown between Eleventh avenue on the north and Seventh avenue or the six-mile creek road on the south. The tract of land is 590 feet wide and about 1,000 feet long. A plat of this tract was made, dividing the land into four blocks numbered from 1 on the north end to 4 on the south end. The plat was made in 1903,

tained his deed, the owner of block 1 sold it to Phillip di Bona, and executed a deed therefor. Complainant and Bona agreed upon a dividing line between blocks 1 and 2, and a fence was erected upon this line, which is about 12 feet north of Tenth avenue if the same extended across the blocks. The street has never been opened across this land, nor has it ever been used by the public, nor has there ever been, so far as the evidence shows, any formal acceptance by the county commissioners or the municipal authorities of Tampa of the strip of land as a highway or street. Complainant's possession and use of the property since he entered into possession of it in 1904 has been inconsistent with any easement in the public over any part of it as a roadway or street. It does not appear that Bona, the owner of block 1, is insisting

upon the opening of Tenth avenue, nor that pra, the controversy was between persons the owner of block 4 desires it.