estate. Lands purchased and owned by copartners as partnership property may, for many purposes, be considered personal property, yet for all purposes of taxation, it is real estate. The fact that this property was held and used by the railroad companies to facilitate the working of their roads did not destroy its character as real estate. It is claimed that the property is exempt from taxation as real estate, under the authority of Wayne County v. Del. & Hud. Canal Company, supra, notwithstanding the act of 1859. At first view that case might appear to sustain that claim. A careful examination of the case, however, leads to a different conclusion. The act authorizing the canal company in that case to improve the navigation of the river, declared that "the property of said company whether real or personal within this State, shall at all times be liable for its debts, and subject to taxation in like manner as similar property held by an individual or by a corporation, now is or may be. The preamble to the act recites the fact that the canal company had been incorporated by the legislature of the State of New York; and by the act of our legislature of 1st April, 1825 (P. L. 141), the company was authorized "to purchase and hold any quantity of lands situate at any place within ten miles of the waters of the Lackawaxen, not exceeding 5,000 acres." Undoubtedly the purpose of the clause first quoted was to make all the property of the company within this State liable for its debts and subject to taxation. How liable and how subject? It did not attempt to create any new forms of proceeding; but to preserve and apply the forms of law then applicable to each kind of property. Its property was to be liable for its debts and subject to taxation, "as similar property held by an individual or by a corporation." That is, so much of its property as was subject to sale on execution, or to taxation as individual property might be so sold and taxed; but such other property as it held and used as essentially necessary for the enjoyment of its franchise, was to be held liable for its debts and subject to taxation in like manner as similar property held by a corporation--that is, by other corporations. The exemption of such property, of a corporation from taxation as real estate, was then well recognized law. The act does not contain anything indicating an intention to change the manner of its taxation. The court, therefore, ruled that case on the general principle recognized in other cases where the charters did not contain such language. It is not applicable to the present case. We discover nothing to exempt the passenger railway company from the operation of the act of 1859. Such a company is within the intent and spirit of the act, making its real estate subject to taxation as such. Hestonville, Mantua and Fairmount Passenger Railroad Company v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 210. The alleged error in the mode of proceeding to make the assessments was not so strongly pressed in the argument. We think the several acts of assembly justified the proceeding. The act of 1859 subjecting this property to taxation declares: "All taxes levied in pursuance of this act may be collected as debts of similar amounts are recoverable by law." The act of March 22, 1877 (P. L. 16), March 28, 1872 (P. L. 606), and May 5, 1876 (P. L. 124), appear to justify the mode of proceeding. We discover no error in the judgments. Judgment affirmed in each case. When Railroad Company's Real Estate Exempt from Taxation.-In some cases it has been held that the real estate belonging to railroad companies, which is essential to their proper operation cannot be taxed, as the, company is supposed to be taxed upon its entire capital, including real estate, in some other manner. Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. R. Co., 4 Metc. 564; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 237; Wayland v. County Commis., 4 Gray, 500; City of Charlestown v. County Commis., 1 Allen, 199; Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Co., 12 Allen, 75; Railroad Co. v. Berks Co., 6 Pa. St. 70; State v. Collector of Middle Township, 38 N. J. L. 270. Railroad Company's Real Estate Taxable.-But the road, stations and other real estate of the company, is usually taxable as such in the county, city or town where it is actually situated. Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; People v. Barber, 48 N. Y. 70; Buffalo & S. R. Co. v. Erie Co., 48 N. Y. 93; New Haven v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422; Providence & W. R. Co., 2 R. I. 459; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster Co., 7 Neb. 33; People v. Comm. of Taxes, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 343; Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 583; Alexandria C. R. & B. Co. v. District of Columbia, 7 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 325; Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Lancaster Co., 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 664. FRANKLIN COUNTY v. NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY. (12 Lea's Reports (Tenn.), 521.) The Tennessee act of 1879, Chap. 79, authorizing the tax-collectors to assess all property which, by mistake of law or fact, has not been assessed, applies to a case where there has been a failure to assess at all, and not to a case where the property has already been legally assessed, although not in every respect correctly. The circuit court has jurisdiction of an assessment and suit for taxes under the act of 1879, Chap. 79, by appeal from the judgment of the justice, and by certiorari to bring up the proceedings before the county judge upon the assessment to test the question of the authority to assess. Under the State constitution, the mode of ascertaining the value of particular kinds of property for taxation is left to the discretion of the legislature, and that body may adopt a mode of assessment by assessors for the State at large, and such a mode for ascertaining the value of the franchise, road-way, rolling-stock, and other property not having a local situs, of a railroad company is eminently proper. The franchise of a railroad company for the purposes of taxation is a unit; so is the roadway, and so the rolling-stock; and the situs of the choses in action and personalty may be fixed by the legislature, and treated like the franchise. No better mode of determining the value of the portion of the road-way of a railroad company in any one county for taxation, and of the value of the franchise, rolling-stock, and other property without a situs, for that part of the road-way, has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole road, the whole rolling-stock, and the whole of the non-local property, and apportioning the value for county taxation by the relative length of the road within the county to the whole length. The act of 1875, Chap. 78, and the acts amendatory thereof, which provide for the appointment of a Board of State Assessors to value the property of railroad companies, and a revising board of examiners, are so far constitutional, notwithstanding some severable unconstitutional provisions in the earlier acts, that assessments under them acquiesced in by the railroad company by paying, and by a county by receiving, the county tax on the county's proportional part of the valuation, are binding, when it appears that the county has received a larger amount of taxes than it would have been entitled to upon a strictly legal assessment. APPEAL in error from the Circuit Court of Franklin county. Metcalf, for Franklin County. COOPER, J.-The legislature, by the act of 1875, Chap. 78, undertook to declare the mode and manner of valuing the property of a railroad company for taxation. This act provided for the filing by each railroad company on or before the 1st of May of each year of certain schedules of its property, and the value thereof, for the appointment of a board of State assessors to assess the value of the property and franchises of each company, and a board of examiners, consisting of the governor, secretary of State and treasurer, to revise the work of the assessors. The assessors, after having ascertained the total value of the property in the mode pointed out, were directed to deduct therefrom $1,000, as well as the real cash value of the individual shares of each shareholder. The balance thus found was to be divided by the number of miles in the entire length of the road, and the result was to be the value per mile of the property of such company for the purpose of taxation. The product of this value multiplied by the number of miles in the State, was to constitute the sum to be taxed to such railroad for State purposes. The product of the value per mile multiplied by the number of miles or fractions thereof, lying and being in any county, was to constitute the sum to be taxed for county purposes. Sec. 10 of this act reads thus: "That the erty of any railroad company lying company lying or being in any city or incorporated town, may be taxed for city purposes, upon a valuation thereof made upon the same basis as of the property belonging to a citizen tax-payer." The eleventh section of the act exempted prop from its provisions, companies that would accept an amendment to their charter to pay annually for ten years one and one-half per cent. on their gross receipts. In the case of Ellis v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, one opinion in which is reported in 8 Baxt. 530, and another opinion cited in the Memphis & Charlestown Railroad Company v. Gaines, 3 Tenn. Chan. 606, the eleventh section of this act was held to be unconstitutional and void. By the act of 1877, Chap. 19, the act of 1875 was amended so as to take away from incorporated towns and cities the right conferred upon them by the tenth section to tax the property of the railroad companies lying within their boundaries, and to restrict the right of taxation of these corporations to the amounts apportioned to such towns by the railroad tax assessors. In the case of the City of Chattanooga v. Railroad Company, 7 Lea, 561, this amendment was held to be unconstitutional and void. It was also held that the provision of the act of 1875, directing the tax assessors to deduct from the aggregate value of the property of each company the cash value of the individual shares of the shareholders was equally unconstitutional and void. That provision was intended to be repealed by the sixth section of the act of 1877, which is: "That the railroad tax assessors, in giving railroad companies exemptions under Sec. 3 of the act passed March 20, 1875, shall deduct only $1,000." And it appears from the testimony in the case now before us that the cash value of the shares was not deducted from the value of the property of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway in the assessments made by the State assessors during the period in controversy. The act of 1877, Chap. 19, Sec. 13, contains this further provision: "That nothing in this act shall prevent the authorities of the various counties and incorporated towns from assessing the value of all railroad property held in their respective counties and towns not included in the assessment herein provided for, or which may not be assessed by the assessors as herein provided." The act of 1875 has been further amended by the acts of 1881, Chap. 104, and 1882, Chap. 16. The latter act was passed to meet the objection to the acts of 1875 and 1877, pointed out by the decision in the case of the City of Chattanooga v. Railroad Company, that they practically prohibited counties and municipal corporations from taxing the real property of the company, lying inside their limits, at their actual value. It provides that the road-bed, rolling-stock, franchise, choses in action, and personal property, having no actual situs of a railroad company, shall be known as its distributable property, and shall be valued by the assessors separate from the other property of the company, and the value thereof, after a deduction of $1,000, is to be divided by the number of miles of the whole road, and the result shall be the value per mile of such dis tributable property of such company for the purpose of taxation. The product of this value multiplied by the number of miles in the State shall be the sum to be taxed to such company upon such distributable property for State purposes. And the products of the value per mile multiplied by the number of miles or fractions thereof in each county and incorporated city or town through which the road passes, shall be the sums to be taxed upon such distributable property by said counties, towns, and cities respectively. The depot buildings, yards, grounds, and other property, real, personal, and mixed, having an actual situs, the act further provides, shall be known as the localized property of such railroad, and shall be valued by the county assessors and city assessors of the several districts and wards in which said property is situated, in the same manner and upon the same principles as the assessment of similar property owned by individuals. The State, counties, and towns shall be entitled to a tax upon the value of such property as in other cases. The act of 1879, Chap. 79, Sec. 1, provides: "That all collectors of taxes are hereby made assessors to assess all property which, by mistake of law and fact, has not been assessed, and it is hereby made the duty of such collectors in all cases whereby property has not been assessed, but on which taxes ought to be paid by law, to immediately assess the same, and proceed to collect the taxes, and if the owner of the property admits the liability of the property to taxation, but disputes the assessment, he may have a revaluation before the judge or chairman of the county court at any time within one month, and in such case the judge or chairman aforesaid may hear proof and fix the assessment or valuation, and this shall be final." In Otis v. Boyd, 8 Lea, 679, it was held that the power intended to be conferred by this act was simply to cure any omission of the assessors as to taxes accruing in the year for which the collector was elected, qualified, and gave bond. The act directs the collector, as the mode of collecting the tax thus assessed, to obtain from any justice of the peace of his county a warrant or warrants for the taxes, which shall be served on the owner of the property, and returned before a justice of the county, jurisdiction being expressly conferred to try such cases, no matter what the amount, to be tried at once, either party to have the right of appeal to the circuit court, that court, and this court impliedly upon a further appeal, to hear the cases in preference to all others. The Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway is a corporation chartered by the State of Tennessee, whose road extends from Chattanooga, through Nashville, to the Mississippi river at Hickman, in the State of Kentucky. The property of the company, including its road-way and superstructure, has been assessed for taxation during the years 1875, 1876, 1877, 1878, 1879, 1880, and |