CHAPTER IV.

QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION.

QUESTION arose concerning Sect. 1 of the law of 1888, which declares that "the provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of passengers and property, . . . and shall also be held to apply to shipments of property made from any point within the State to any point within the State, whether the transportation of the same shall be wholly within this State or partly within this State and an adjoining State or States." A case in which the constitutionality of this clause was tested was brought in the District Court of Lyon County. At different times during the months of October, November, and December, 1889, and January, 1890, D. J. Carpenter shipped from Beloit, Ia., to Sioux City, Ia., fifteen car-loads of live-stock over the road of the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Company, for which he was charged $56.76 more than the schedule rates of the Board. A complaint of overcharge was made to the Commission, which ordered the railroad company to conform to the schedule rates and refund to Carpenter the overcharge. The defendant refused to obey the order, and action was brought in the District Court of Lyon County to enforce it. The railroad of defendant. is sixty-seven miles in length between Beloit and Sioux 1 "Northwestern Reporter," 53, 351. 2 Report, 1890, p. 849.

City, and in this distance crosses the State line four times, a little more than half of its line being in Iowa, and the remainder in South Dakota. On this ground the company held that it was an interstate shipment, over which the Commissioners had no control. Their position was sustained by the District Court; and the case was brought on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, where a decision was rendered by Justice Robinson, Oct. 24, 1892, reversing the decision of the District. Court, and declaring the statute constitutional, following a Federal decision' which involved the same principle.

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Another case, in which this important question of the jurisdiction of the State courts over State railroad matters was discussed, is that commonly known as the Dubuque switching-case, in which the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul refused to switch cars of oil from Dubuque to certain lime-kilns near the city, the oil having come from Lima, Ohio, over the Chicago, St. Paul, and Kansas City Railway. The Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul held that the shipment was interstate, over which the Commission had no jurisdiction. Furthermore, the company denied the right of the Commission. to compel it to give the use of its terminal tracks and facilities in the city of Dubuque to any other company competing with it for business for the purpose of delivering or receiving freight from any depot, warehouse, or other place of business, regardless of whether said freight was interstate commerce or otherwise; and asserted that it would at all times deny and resist the

1 Railroad company vs. Penna., 12th Supreme Court Reporter, 806. 2 Report, 1889, p. 1032.

power and authority of the Commission to make such order, for the reason that it was manifestly unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive. The Board held unanimously that the service required of the respondent road was purely local, confined to the city limits, and yards of respondent company; that the interstate character of the shipment ceased when Dubuque was reached. Moreover, Sect. 4 of the Act requires railroad companies to switch all cars tendered by connecting roads on such terms as are prescribed by the Commissioners. They therefore ordered respondent to take all shipments. tendered. The Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway immediately established a station at the lime-kiln, three and one-half miles outside of Dubuque, and put in the Commission rates for five miles, thus making a charge of $13.00 to $15.00 per car, instead of $2.50, the regular switching-rate. Complaint was made; and the Board reaffirmed its decision, leaving the switchingcharges at the rates formerly established. The company refusing to comply, suit was brought in the District Court of Dubuque County. The case was removed by defendants to the United States Circuit Court, upon the ground that the controversy was wholly of an interstate character, between corporations created under Wisconsin law and citizens of Iowa, and presented questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. A motion was made in the United States Court to remand the case to the Iowa Court; and this motion was upheld by Judge Shiras, Judge Caldwell, the Circuit judge, concurring. This opinion was of the greatest importance, because it settled the matter, 1 Report, 1891, p. 862.

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as far as it could be settled without appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, that suits brought to enforce orders made under the State law are not removable under the Acts of Congress to United States courts. "The real question to be solved," said Judge Shiras, "is whether a Circuit Court of the United States can entertain jurisdiction of a proceeding brought under the provisions of a State statute to enforce by decree the orders made by the Board of the Railroad Commissioners touching the management and operation of the railways within the State of Iowa." Judge Shiras draws a distinction between cases in which the object is to enforce private rights and those in which the State as a party seeks to maintain public rights. In the former cases, a right of action might be created over which the Federal Court would have jurisdiction, provided the amount at stake and the citizenship of the parties were such as to confer jurisdiction; but when proceeding is brought under the State statute for the purpose of compelling the common carrier to manage its business in the manner required by the rules or orders adopted by the Commissioners, then the State is seeking to compel obedience to its public laws, and the State, whether the suit is in its own name or in that of some board of officials created by the law of the State, is acting in its sovereign or governmental capacity, and in so doing it must act. through agencies of its own creation, that is, through the State courts. The case was therefore remanded to the District Court of Dubuque County, and there tried; and the order of the Commission which required the restoration of the switching-charge by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad Company was over

ruled. On May 23, 1893, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed this decision, holding that the service in controversy was not a switching-service, and that the railroad company was entitled to charge local rates therefor.1

1 Report, 1893, p. 39. See also 1890, pp. 901, 920, Wylie vs. C., M., & St. P. See also 1893, p. 254, Wolff vs. C. & N. W.