we can say that this statute should be interpreted as if it read: Provided, that in all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be for life or any number of years, the court having in its discretion imposed a sentence for a term of years shall fix both the maximum and minimum sentences. This statute having repealed no criminal statute, the discretion remained in the court before which this case was tried to sentence respondent for life or any term of years, and the court in the exercise of that discretion sentenced respondent to prison for the term of his natural life. No error was committed. The judgment is affirmed. OSTRANDER, HOOKER, MOORE, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. PEOPLE v. KLISE. 1. CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-PROOF OF OTHER OFFENSES. On the trial of respondent charged with an assault with intent to murder, testimony of the sheriff that respondent told him of making threats and displaying weapons on prior occasions, was inadmissible. 2. SAME-WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION. Where, on the trial, respondent takes the witness stand in his own behalf, he subjects himself to the rules of cross-examination applicable to other witnesses. Exceptions before judgment from Emmet; Shepherd, J. Submitted February 11, 1909. (Docket No. 147.) Decided April 24, 1909. Elmer Klise was convicted of an assault with intent to kill and murder. Reversed. W. A. Seegmiller, for appellant. Wade B. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. MOORE, J. The respondent was charged with having made an assault with the intent to kill and murder. He was convicted of an assault with intent to do great bodily harm, less than the crime of murder. The case is brought here upon exceptions before sentence. A great many assignments of error are made, but they may properly be divided into two groups; the first relating to the admission of testimony, and the second to the charge of the court. The people, in presenting their affirmative testimony, called the sheriff, who had an interview with the respondent. Over objection he was allowed to testify as to occurrences, other than the one involved in this trial, as follows: 66 Q. What instances did he tell you about in which he had used threats or a display of weapons? "Mr. Dunham: I object to it as not competent, and not related to this transaction in question. "The Court: The objection is overruled. "A. He told me of one occasion where he had drawn a gun on either a filer or a sawyer. It was some employé. My recollection is that it was a filer. He spoke at the same time of drawing a knife on somebody up there. I don't remember the occasion. He told me that somebody had assaulted him in front of the store the night previous to the night that I was up there. He said he ought to have killed him. I think he said it was a man by the name of Perry. He said he had a perfect right to kill him. He assaulted him in front of the store, and ought to have done so." This testimony was clearly inadmissible under the following authorities: Lightfoot v. People, 16 Mich. 507; People v. Schweitzer, 23 Mich. 301; People v. Pinkerton, 79 Mich. 110; People v. Bennett, 122 Mich. 281; People v. Henry, 129 Mich. 100; People v. Peck, 139 Mich. 680; People v. Collins, 144 Mich. 121., The respondent offered himself as a witness. He was cross-examined at great length. Error is assigned as to many parts of this cross-examination. The respondent, having offered himself as a witness, subjected himself to the rules of cross-examination applicable to other witnesses. Some of the cross-examination was within the rule, and some outside of it. Without calling attention to the testimony in detail, it will be sufficient to say that the rule which should be followed in the new trial may be easily gleaned from the opinions in People v. Farrell, 137 Mich. 127, and People v. Peck, supra. The assignments of error relating to the charge of the court do not call for extended discussion. That part of the charge which it is claimed is error relates to references made in the charge to the consideration of the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from it, some of which we have found was improperly admitted. A similar error is not likely to occur again. For the reasons stated, the conviction is set aside, and a new trial ordered. OSTRANDER, HOOKER, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. WEADOCK v. JUDGE OF THE RECORDER'S COURT OF DETROIT. 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWERS - ORDINANCES-VALIDITY. The charter of a municipality authorizing the common council to license and regulate the keepers of junkshops, and to regulate the purchase and sale of old junk, authorizes an ordinance regulating the storage or keeping of the same; said storing or keeping being necessarily incident to said business.' 2. SAME. An ordinance prescribed a restricted district in which the keeping of junkshops was prohibited, with a proviso that it should not be applicable to such shops as were already established at the time of its passage. It appeared that such business had then become centralized in such restricted locality. Held, that such ordinance was void on the ground of unreasonableness and discrimination. Mandamus by Bernard F. Weadock to compel William F. Connolly, judge of the recorder's court of Detroit, to vacate certain orders dismissing complaints for the violation of an ordinance. Submitted February 16, 1909. (Calendar No. 23,196.) Writ denied April 24, 1909. Bernard F. Weadock (P. J. M. Hally, of counsel), in pro. per. Miner & Anhut, for respondent. MCALVAY, J. This is an application by relator, who is assistant corporation counsel for the city of Detroit, for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to vacate certain orders made by him, dismissing two cases brought by the proper authorities under an ordinance of the city As to the municipal power to regulate business of junk dealers, see note to Grand Rapids v. Braudy (Mich.), 32 L. R. A. 120. As to municipal power over business of junk dealers as nuisance, see note to Ex parte Lacey (Cal.), 38 L. R. A. 657. of Detroit. The undisputed facts are that two complaints were duly made, and two cases instituted in said court against Moses Rosenzweig, one complaint charging him with unlawfully and wilfully establishing and maintaining, at a specified location, "a place for the storage of junk, rags, old rope, papers, bagging, old iron, brass, lead, commonly known as a junkyard, said premises being located within the district established by the common council within which district a junkyard is prohibited to be established or maintained," contrary to the provisions of a certain ordinance; the other complaint charging him with unlawfully and wilfully establishing and maintaining a junkshop at another and different location, contrary to the provisions of the same ordinance. The answer of respondent admits all the material facts. Answering the order to show cause, respondent asserts that the cases were dismissed and the defendant discharged for the reason that the ordinance under which the complaints were made was invalid and unconstitutional (a) because the charter gave the common council no authority to enact the ordinance; (b) because the ordinance is unreasonable. The charter provision referred to, as far as it relates to this case, reads: * * "The said council may also license and regulate ** the keepers of junkshops *and to regulate * * * the buying or selling of old junk. Charter (1904), § 187. * * *" Detroit The ordinance in question under which the cases were brought provides as follows: "It is hereby ordained by the people of the city of Detroit: "SECTION 1. That section 1 of an ordinance entitled, 'An ordinance prescribing certain limits within the city of Detroit where a junkshop or what is commonly known as a junkshop, for the purchase, storage and sale of junk, rags, old rope, papers, bagging, old iron, brass, copper, tin, empty bottles, slush or lead, shall not hereafter be established or maintained and the storage or buying and selling of the same be carried on,' approved Sept. 3, 1907, |