sense interstate commerce. That part of the contract was to be performed wholly in Michigan. It can make no difference whether in doing such business the contractor hires his help in the State or from without, or whether he buys what articles he needs for repairs in the State or without. It is local business, and corporations who undertake such work, even in a single transaction, come within the prohibition of the statute. See Rough v. Breitung, 117 Mich. 48. Judgment affirmed. BLAIR, C. J., and MONTGOMERY, MOORE, and McALVAY, JJ., concurred. HARRIS v. BOW. WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-PRESUMPTIONS-REMEDY AT LAW. Appeal from St. Clair; Law, J. Submitted January 21, 1909. (Docket No. 16.) Decided March 16, 1909. Bill by Edward W. Harris, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, of the estate of Samuel Dunbar, deceased, against Frances Bow, Wealthy Sherman, Margaret D. Parkhurst, Marietta D. Annis, George B. Tunningly and Jeanetta L. Tunningly for a construction of said will. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendants Tunningly appeal. Reversed, and bill dismissed. Thomas Wellman, for complainant. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill filed in this case, the defendants Tunningly appeal. The bill sets forth that one Samuel Dunbar died testate in 1877, leaving surviving as his heirs at law three daughters and two grandchildren, the daughters of a deceased son. These two grandchildren are the defendants Parkhurst and Annis. The daughters were then unmarried and were named, respectively, Elizabeth, Sybil, and Mary. He died seised of 40 acres of land occupied as his homestead. His will, after providing for payment of his debts and funeral expenses, reads as follows: "The remainder of my personal estate and all my real estate of which I shall die possessed, I give and bequeath to my three daughters, named as follows, Elizabeth Elyshel, Sybil Matilda and Mary Adeline, as follows, to wit: Each of my said daughters above mentioned shall have the right to use and occupy all my estate, both real and personal, share and share alike, so long as they all shall remain single and unmarried. But in case either of my daughters shall marry, then from and after the time of said marriage or marriages, said daughter or daughters so married shall not be entitled to have any further right to use or occupy any of my estate, either personal or real, so long as my remaining daughter or daughters shall live or remain single. "But in case all my daughters above named shall marry, then and in such case, at and immediately after the marriage of my last living or single daughter, then and in such case all my estate both real and personal shall be sold for the best price or prices that can be obtained for the same and divided equally between my three daughters above named, share and share alike, if they are all living at that time. "But in case either of my daughters above named should die before such division takes place, leaving heirs, then and in such case her heirs shall be entitled to their mother's portion of said estate. At the marriage of my last single daughter, if it shall be agreeable to all then living, either of my daughters may purchase and buy out their sister's right to said estate, if they can so agree, in preference to having said estate sold and equally divided as above described." He named two executors. The will was duly admitted to probate December 24, 1877, and the executors named therein confirmed as executors. None of the daughters married, and all are deceased. His daughters occupied the premises so long as they lived. Elizabeth and Sybil died first. Mary died October 1, 1906. On June 9th the same year she executed a warranty Ideed to the defendants Bow and Sherman. After this bill was filed Bow and Sherman conveyed to the defendants Tunningly. Complainant was appointed administrator de bonis non with the will annexed on January 21, 1907, and filed this bill to obtain a construction of the will. The defendants Tunningly demurred on the ground that the remedy at law is complete and adequate, and that neither the complainant nor the estate of Mr. Dunbar has any interest in the real estate described in the bill. GRANT, J. (after stating the facts). The defendants Parkhurst and Annis, while nominal defendants, are really complainants, for in their answer they ask the same relief that the complainant asks by his bill. This suit is evidently instituted in their interest and an administrator appointed for that purpose. The bill does not allege that the estate was not closed by the executors named in the will, who have long since died. Presumptively the probate court and the executors did their duty and settled the estate. Presumptively there are no creditors. These pre sumptions follow after the lapse of 30 years, in the absence of any allegations in the bill to the contrary. The bill fails to allege that there is any personal property. It is filed for the sole purpose of determining who was entitled to the real estate described in the will. The question involved is purely a legal one, namely, In whom is the title in fee after the death of the three daughters? The contest is between the two daughters of the deceased son and the grantees of Mary. There is no occasion for the appointment of an administrator, or for the filing of a bill in chancery to determine this question. All the questions raised are questions of law, and can readily be determined in an action of ejectment. The demurrer should have been sustained. Warren v. Warren, 151 Mich. 95. Decree reversed, and decree entered in this court dismissing the bill of complaint, with the costs of both courts. BLAIR, C. J., and MONTGOMERY, MOORE, and MCALVAY, JJ., concurred. GRANGER v. DARLING. 1. APPEAL AND ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS-PREJUDICE. One alleging error upon an instruction to the jury must show that he was prejudiced thereby. 2. WITNESSES-EXAMINATION-LEADING QUESTIONS. Appellant cannot complain that the trial court erred in sustaining an objection to a question on the grounds that it was suggestive and leading, where he was given an opportunity to gain the information desired by further questions and did not take advantage of such offer. Error to Saginaw; Gage (William G.), J. Submitted January 21, 1909. (Docket No. 108.) (Docket No. 108.) Decided March 16, 1909. Case by Annie E. Granger against Harry Darling for personal injuries. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Beach, O'Keefe & Rockwith, for appellant. GRANT, J. Plaintiff was calling at the house of the defendant on business. As she was upon the steps leading into the house, she was attacked and bitten by a dog, claimed to be the defendant's. She brought suit against him and recovered a judgment for $500. Three errors are assigned. 1. The court instructed the jury as follows: "And I will say right now that in every case, in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses, if you are satisfied that any witness has testified falsely with regard to any material fact in the case, then you have a right to reject the testimony of that witness entirely, unless it is supported by other evidence in the case; but you have a right to give it such weight as you think it is entitled to, notwithstanding you are satisfied that the witness has testified falsely in some respect." It is urged that the instruction is erroneous, in that it fails to state to the jury that the rule given them only applies where the witness has knowingly, wilfully, or intentionally testified falsely, and cites many cases claiming to sustain the proposition. No requests were made by either party. Counsel for neither party called the attention of the court to the point now raised. Counsel for the plaintiff cite several authorities where the language of the charge has been used and approved. Whitaker v. Engle, 111 Mich. 205; Fraser v. Haggerty, 86 Mich. 521; Cole v. Railway Co., 95 Mich. 77. An examina |