ment and Collection of Taxes, 4 S. Dak. 6. The constitution of Ohio of 1851 (article 12, § 2) provided that "laws shall be passed, taxing, by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits," etc., and it was in construing this constitutional provision that the rule in Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines was laid down. Soon after this decision, however, the legislature of Ohio enacted a statute which declared that the term "credit" meant the excess of the sum of all legal claims and demands over and above the sum of legal and bona fide debts owing by such person. In Hubbard v. Brush, 61 Ohio St. 252, the supreme court of Ohio said of this legislation that it had been acquiesced in for more than 40 years, and that Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, in so far as it denied the right to deduct liabilities from claims and demands, has been ignored. The court said: "The word 'credits,' in the connection in which it is used in the constitution, is not made at all clear by a resort to the lexicographers. It is apparent, however, that if the framers of the constitution had intended to specifically tax book accounts, promissory notes, and the like, it would only have required the addition of a few words, not at all incompatible with the brevity required in such instruments, to manifest that intention. The ease with which it could have been done gives to the omission a signification entitled to some consideration. * * * The difficulties, however, attending a deduction of liabilities from claims and demands, have not proved formidable since the practice was authorized by the legislature, and the practice itself has received general approbation. For these considerations, not to specify others, we are of opinion that the legislative declaration is in accord with the constitution, and therefore hold that the corporation involved in this controversy rightfully in listing its property for taxation deducted its liabilities from its claims and demands." The result of this opinion was that the term "credits,' as used in the constitution, might be held to mean the net credits. The same ruling was made by the supreme court of Nebraska in County of Lancaster v. McDonald, 73 Neb. 453. In the case of Florer v. Sheridan, 137 Ind. 28 (23 L. R. A. 278), the conclusion was reached that the true value of the taxpayer's credits was the balance due after deducting the debts. The case upon this point is well reasoned, and, we think, states the correct rule. See, also, State v. Moffett, 64 Minn. 292, and State v. Railway Co., 95 Minn. 43, and, for a general discussion, Gray on Limitations of Taxing Power, § 1395 et seq. Since the adoption of the Constitution, and, indeed, before, every tax law in the State has authorized the deduction of debits from credits in listing personal property for taxation, and, while the court has never been directly called upon to pass upon this question, the propriety of such legislation has been recognized in First Nat. Bank of St. Joseph v. Township of St. Joseph, 46 Mich. 526, and Beecher v. Common Council of Detroit, 110 Mich. 456. It is urged that the fact that the practice of deducting debts from credits has so long continued should not deter the court from declaring the law unconstitutional if convinced that it is beyond the legislative power. This statement of the duty of the court is undoubtedly correct. See Pingree v. Auditor General, 120 Mich. 95 (44 L. R. A. 679). But the fact that such statute has remained upon the statute books for over 70 years, and that the practice has continued from the formation of the State to the present time, does call upon the court to move with the utmost caution in asserting its invalidity. We are not convinced that the reasoning of the courts in the cases cited above from other jurisdictions is unsound, and are disposed to follow them. As to the further contentions of relator's counsel, the language of Judge COOLEY (1 Cooley on Taxation [3d Ed.], p. 389), quoted with approval by this court in Common Council of the City of Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78 (16 L. R. A. 59), is peculiarly appropriate: "Now, whether there is injustice in the taxation in every instance in which it can be shown that an individ ual who has been directly taxed his due proportion is also compelled indirectly to contribute, is a question we have no occasion to discuss. It is sufficient for our purposes to show that the decisions are nearly, if not quite, unanimous in holding that taxation is not invalid because of any such unequal results. It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that any possible system of tax legislation must inevitably produce unequal and unjust results in individual instances; and, if inequality in result must defeat the general law, then taxation becomes impossible, and governments must fall back upon arbitrary exactions." The order of the circuit court dismissing the petition is affirmed, with costs. GRANT, HOOKER, OSTRANDER, MOORE, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. BLAIR, C. J., did not sit PEOPLE v. PETERSON. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LOCAL OPTION LAW-CONSTRUCTION. The statute (Act No. 207, Pub. Acts 1889), the object of which is to prohibit the manufacture of, and all traffic in, intoxicating liquors, cannot be reasonably construed so as to apply to the individual use, or the keeping for use, of liquors by citizens; and where respondent, in his own home, upon the occasion of a surprise party in honor of his daughter's birthday anniversary, served his guests with beer, not purchased for the occasion, as a mere act of hospitality, with no intent to violate or evade the law, he was not guilty of an offense under said statute. Exceptions before judgment from Wexford; Chittenden, J. Submitted February 15, 1909. (Docket No. 155.) Decided April 6, 1909. William Peterson was convicted of violating the liquor law. Reversed, and respondent discharged. Gaffney & Miltner, for appellant. William H. Yearnd, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. OSTRANDER, J. The single question presented is whether the giving of liquor by a host to his adult guests, by way of hospitality in his own home, violates the provisions of Act No. 207, Pub. Acts 1889, known as the "local option law." It is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or by imprisonment, for any person to, himself, or by his clerk, agent or employé, directly or indirectly, manufacture, sell, keep for sale, give away, or furnish any vinous, malt, brewed, etc., liquors, or to keep a saloon or any other place where such liquors are manufactured, sold, stored for sale, given away, or furnished, with an exception relating only to druggists and registered pharmacists. The object of the act is to prohibit the manufacture of, and all traffic in, liquors. It cannot be reasonably construed so as to apply to the individual use, or the keeping for use, of liquors by citizens. Whether an individual might, even in his own house, dispense liquors purchased and kept for his own use, in such manner as to make his conduct obnoxious to the law, is a question not presented. In this case respondent served 11 pint bottles of beer to a large number of guests, who visited his home upon the occasion of the birthday anniversary of his daughter. It was a surprise party. The beer was not purchased for the occasion, and it is not claimed there was any intention to violate or to evade the law. The jury were told that the law had been violated, and that they should find respondent guilty. The conviction is set aside, and the respondent discharged. MONTGOMERY, MOORE, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. PEOPLE v. GORDON. 1. INTOXICATING Liquors-Keeping SalooNS OPEN ON Sunday— WHAT CONSTITUTES. Surrounding a bar in a saloon with a picket fence is not a sufficient compliance with the statute (sections 5295, 2 Comp. Laws), requiring saloons to be kept closed on the first day of the week. 2. SAME-DEFENSE-INTENT. It is no defense that respondents relied upon the advice or permission of the police officers in opening their saloon with the bar so guarded; since such officers have no authority to advise or consent to violations of law, and the intent with which respondents kept their saloon open on Sunday is immaterial. 3. SAME-INSTRUCTIONS. An instruction to the jury that "under the proofs in this case, * * * Exceptions before judgment from Saginaw; Gage (William G.), J. Submitted February 15, 1909. (Docket No. 156.) Decided April 6, 1909. John Gordon and Christian Trier were convicted of violating the liquor law. Affirmed. Beach, O'Keefe & Rockwith, for appellants. Miles J. Purcell, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. HOOKER, J. These defendants were convicted of a violation of section 5395, 2 Comp. Laws, which requires saloon keepers to keep their saloons closed on the first day of the week. The saloon in question consisted of two |