The case was tried at Norfolk, Virginia, and a decree given in favor of the libelants. An appeal was taken by the German Government on behalf of the vessel to the Supreme Court of the United States. Most interesting questions not only of treaty interpretation but of the right to use neutral ports under the general rules of international law in time of war were argued. The further question of whether there remained any outstanding right in the original owners after the capture was also presented (spes recuperandi). Every known precedent from the earliest developments of international law was adduced. Analogies from the Roman law were applied and the court in a unanimous decision finally held that the vessel had violated our neutrality laws, and the complete title, not having passed by any decree of a prize court, the vessel must therefore be restored to her owners, the German right to possession having been forfeited by violation of American neutrality. (S. S. Appam, 243 U. S. 124).

During the war, it became the practice of foreign Governments to take over merchant ships and to commission them to go about the world carrying supplies or conducting what ordinarily would have been a regular business. This continued until long after the termination of hostilities. In many ways and under diverse procedures the question arose as to the liability of these ships and how far, if at all, they were subject to the ordinary processes of the court. (See the Muir Case, 254 U. S. 522, and others including the S. S. Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419).

This question, despite numerous adjudications, calls for some general international agreement. The courts of the United States and of England have held generally that if the vessels were operated by the Government they were akin to public vessels and not subject to ordinary process. There must however, be found some limitation to the extension of this rule, especially as Governments are tending more and more to embark upon what was once considered private business. Questions of this kind, however, may still come before the ordinary practitioner, and more particularly before those who practice in admiralty.

There arose recently in our Federal courts, as a result of the Great War, a most interesting case involving questions both of private and of public international law.

The British Public Trustee, appointed under British statutes to act as Alien Property Custodian, took possession of large blocks of certificates of stock in American corporations owned at the outbreak of the war by German corporations or individuals. These certifi

cates of stock were endorsed in blank and were physically situate in England where they had been dealt in. Subsequent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the Public Trustee requested transfers from the American corporations to his nominees. These transfers were refused by the American corporations because of demands filed with them by the former German owners. The latter claimed that the seizure of the certificates did not transfer the title of the stock which was an intangible thing situated in legal contemplation at the domicile of the corporation.

The Public Trustee contended,

(1) That endorsed securities were the equivalent of bearer securities and were in the nature of chattels, all the rights evidenced by the certificates being, by modern law, merged in the documents themselves, and,

(2) That the seizure had been ratified by the German authorities by specific provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

The older authorities appeared to indicate the plausibility of the German view. The more recent authorities, however, in the United States, in accordance with modern commercial usage, held that the certificates so endorsed were in themselves property subject to the jurisdiction of the authorities in the territory where situated.

The case was decided by the United States District Court in favor of the British Public Trustee, (Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 300 Fed. Rep. 741), and this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a brief but sweeping opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, (267 U. S. 22). The doctrine that the documents themselves were not only evidence of the ownership of the shares, but that the rights of ownership were merged in them was categorically adopted. The British authorities had jurisdiction over them and were able to pass title in accordance with the settled rules as to jurisdiction over things.

Thus the more modern view has become the law of the landanother clear instance of the evolution and development of legal principles in accordance with custom, usage and changing needs of society.

The questions as to the effect of the Versailles Treaty, although fully argued, were not passed upon by the court as they had become unnecessary in view of the sweeping decision as to the nature of the stock certificates.

New statutes dealing with ship and seamen's rights, such as the Jones Act, have given rise to considerable litigation, as has the Eighteenth Amendment, and the treaties extending the three mile limit. (Strathearn case, 252 U. S. 348, and Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100.)

How far can the courts refuse to regard contracts made abroad, or payments of advance wages in countries where such is the law and the custom? Should these statutes be so construed? In how far are they constitutional, and in their construction how far should the court go in considering their anomalous nature and the injury done by such construction to foreign nations?

All these cases involve legal reasoning and a knowledge of precedents drawn from almost every department of the law. They can only be dealt with by trained lawyers who have had general experience and a wide practice. Over-specialization is a dangerous thing; it often prevents a catholicity of view and a breadth of concept. The international lawyer should be, in the first place, a sound discriminating and highly educated man. With that qualification he may readily adapt himself, if opportunity presents, to specialize in those cases which present international aspects, but in so doing he must be prepared to keep in contact with the general current of the law, for there are no watertight compartments, and international law and general private law are too closely related to permit a practitioner in any one sphere to ignore developments in another.

The progress of international law is due to lawyers, not to philosophers or moralists. A knowledge of international law is a necessary part of the equipment of any American lawyer, first, that he may fulfill his role in the community as a good citizen and as a member of the profession, and, second, that he may properly safeguard the interests of his client.

The law schools of this country have done much for the scientific development of municipal law. They have taken a similar place to the great university schools of jurisprudence on the continent of Europe. They can now do much for international law at a time. when world peace and progress can only be attained through international co-operation based upon international law.

Wars can never be averted where they are the only alternative to real or supposed injustice. The creation of the World Court marks a turning point in history and is a great triumph for the lawyer class to whom the world so largely looks to substitute legal justice for armed force.

Procedure*

PIERRE LE PAULLET

Most of the value of the law comes from the fact that its precepts have sanctions back of them. Sanctions means nearly always judicial sanctions. Hence procedure is the cross-road of the law, and studies in comparative law should begin with comparative procedure. Taking for granted that common law procedure is known to the reader, we have contrasted it with civil law procedure. But as civil law is more or less an abstraction, we have chosen a concrete example: French procedure as a most representative illustration, since French Law has been taken as a model in many other countries. As law must always be looked at as a living thing, organisms and functions have to be considered. Indeed they should be studied at the same time. For the sake of exposition we will consider first, organisms, second, functions.'

A. THE ORGANISMS

3

French territory is divided into a certain number of districts. The smallest unit is a "canton", determining the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. A certain number of "cantons" form an "arrondissement", determining the jurisdiction of the lower civil court,2 and of the commercial court, where it exists. A certain number of "arrondissements" form a "circonscription", determining the jurisdiction of the court of appeal. Above the court of appeal there is only the supreme court whose jurisdiction extends to all French territory. The tribunals of arbitration are created by a special decree and the scope of their territorial jurisdiction is determined by that decree.

The justices of the peace, the judges of the civil courts, of the supreme court, and of the divers administrative tribunals are appointed by the President of the Republic. Once appointed they cannot be divested of their office, except as a punishment pronounced by the

*Based essentially upon French procedure.

†Of the bar of Paris, lecturer in the Paris Faculty of Law, who delivered a course of lectures on the Jacob H. Schiff Foundation at Cornell Law School in 1925. 'We have left aside criminal procedure and all incidents that might be grafted on the normal civil procedure.

2Tribunal de première instance.

"Where it does not exist the civil court fulfills its function.

4Cour de cassation.

'Conseil des prud'hommes.

supreme court, sitting in full bench, or when they have reached the age limit, or when the court in which they sit is suppressed, or when they are transferred to another tribunal with the same position and the same dignity. The judges of the tribunals of commerce are elected by all the men of trade. They must be French citizens, and must have been themselves in trade for at least five years within the jurisdiction of the tribunal to which they are elected. They are elected for two years and are reeligible twice; afterwards, a period of one year must elapse before they can be elected again. The judges of the commercial courts can, while they exercise their functions, continue their trade, and they may be also senators or members of the Chamber of Deputies. They are not subjected to the authority of the Supreme Court, but only to that of the Secretary of Justice and of the Court of Appeal.10 Therefore one of the most important judicial functions is exercised by judges who are not trained in law. Is it the reason why the statistics show that they have less judgments reversed than their colleagues of the civil courts who are professional jurists?

The same is true of the judges who have to settle controversies arising out of the employment or out of the contract of employment: the "prud' hommes," who are elected, half by the employers, half by the employees."1

The prosecuting officers, representing the State district-attorneys and attorneys-general are also appointed by the President of the Republic. They are under the authority of the Secretary of Justice who may order them to prosecute or enjoin them from prosecuting, and may request the President of the Republic to remove them if they do not comply. But at the trial the prosecuting officers are free to conduct the case according to their own discretion. 12 A great difference between civil and common law procedure is that, in the civil law system, there is always a representative of the State (district attorney) in all civil suits. In a case of breach of contract, for example, the district attorney may argue the case one way or the other, as he believes the law to be. In nine cases out of ten their presence is not necessary, but sometimes it is quite useful to have

'Law of August 30, 1883.

"Law of January 16, 1824. "Députés."

"Garde des Sceaux."

10Law of August 30, 1883, art. 14 and 17.

"Law of March 27, 1907.

12That is the significance of the well-known proverb: "la plume est serve et la

parole est libre".