by W., instead of the bankrupt, was not mate- | Buente gave his wife a bill of sale covering rial to the question whether payment of the bank debt constituted a preference. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 165.*] 2 TRIAL (219*)-INSTRUCTIONS WORDS-INTENT. DEFINING In a civil action in which there is an issue as to the intent with which a particular act was done, an instruction defining intent was for. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. 8 627-641; Dec. Dig. § 255.*] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1001*)-VERDICTREVIEW. Where a case is properly tried to a jury, the verdict will not be set aside on appeal, if there was any substantial testimony in support of the various issues. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3928; Dec. Dig. § 1001.*] 5. BANKRUPTCY (§ 303*)-PREFERENCES-EVI DENCE. In an action by a bankrupt's trustee to recover a preference, evidence held to warrant a finding that the bankrupt, at the time he executed the mortgage alleged to constitute the preference, was insolvent, that he intended to give a preference by the execution thereof, and that the mortgage thereby intended to secure itself to the exclusion of the other creditors, with knowledge of the debtor's insolvency. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. 303.*] Appeal from District Court, Hamilton County; R. M. Wright, Judge. Action at law to recover an amount paid to the defendant by Chas. F. W. Buente, an alleged bankrupt, upon a chattel mortgage indebtedness of the said Buente, which chattel mortgage is said to have been received by defendant as a preference under the national bankruptcy law, and therefore void. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. A N Boeye, for appellant. Wesley Martin and G. D. Thompson, for appellee. his entire stock of goods for an expressed this bill of sale was in fact a mortgage consideration of $1,000. It is claimed that to secure an indebtedness due the wife. This bill of sale was filed for record on the day of its execution. Learning of this bill of sale, the officers of the defendant went to Buente and demanded security for its note, and on August 1st he (Buente) and his wife executed a chattel mortgage to the bank, covering the entire stock of goods, to secure the $400 note. This mortgage was filed for record on the day of its execution. On Au gust 6, 1908, Buente traded his stock of goods to one Whitham for some Wisconsin land, and executed a bill of sale to Whitham for the goods, which bill of sale was subject to the bank's mortgage. As a matter of fact, Whitham, as part consideration for the exchange, undertook to pay the bank's mortgage, and he in fact paid the indebtedness secured thereby on the day the trade was finally consummated, to wit August 6, 1908. The bank official who took the mortgage from Buente died before this case was reached for trial, and his testimony was not taken. On September 8, 1908, the creditors of Buente filed a petition, alleging that he was a bankrupt, and asked that he be so adjudged. To this Buente appeared and consented to an order so finding, and in October of the same year he was duly adjudged a bankrupt. This action was brought by the trustee in bankruptcy to secure judgment for the amount paid the defendant by Whitham, on the theory that Buente had made the defendant a preferential creditor within four months immediately pre ceding the adjudication of bankruptcy, and that the amount received by the defendant should be returned to the trustee. The case was tried to a jury upon issues duly joined, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. Judgment was rendered thereon, and the appeal is from this judgment. 1. Several of the instructions are challenged, and error is predicated upon the ruling denying defendant's motion for a new trial, which challenges the sufficiency of the testimony to support the verdict. The theory on which the case was tried can best be stated by quoting a few of the instructions. These are as follows: DEEMER, J. Chas. F. W. Buente was engaged in the general merchandising business at Webster City, Iowa, for five or six years prior to August 6, 1908. During the latter part of this time, he did his banking business with the defendant. Something over a year before the transaction hereafter referred to, he borrowed of defendant $400, and gave his note therefor. This note was due in 90 days, and was renewed five or more times for 90-day periods until May 6, 1908, when the last note in the series was executed. This note was for $400, and matured August 6, 1908. On July 31, 1908, the said C. W. F. Buente. "(3) Under the issues thus joined, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following propositions: "First. That at the time of the making of the mortgage to the defendant, and the payment of the $400 to the defendant, said C. W. F. Buente was insolvent. Second. That after the making of the said mortgage and the payment of the said $400, and within four months thereafter, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against Third. That since the filing of the said petition the said Buente has been adjudged a bankrupt, and that there are outstanding creditors of his whose claims have been allowed, but are still unpaid. Fourth. That, at the time of the making of the said mortgage and the payment of the said $400, the said Buente intended to give to the defendant a preference over his other creditors, and that the said defendant at said time knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that said Buente was in fact insolvent, and intended a pref erence. "(4) In the bankruptcy act, it is provided that if a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months before the filing of the petition, or after the filing of the petition, and before the adjudication, and the person receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such person. "By reference to the above and foregoing language in this instruction contained, you will see that one of the important things for you to decide in this case is this: Whether the defendant bank knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the said Buente was insolvent, and that it was intended by him in giving the said mortgage to it (the said bank), and in causing the payment to it of the $400, to give to the said bank a preference over his other creditors. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant bank had reasonable cause to suspect that Buente was insolvent and was preferring it over his other creditors; it (the said bank) must either have known, or have had reasonable cause to believe, that Buente was insolvent, and that it was receiving from him a preference over his other creditors. In still other words, it would not be enough for the bank to have had some reason to suspect the insolvency of the said Buente, but it must have had such a knowledge of the facts as to induce in it a reasonable belief of Buente's insolvency, in order to invalidate the mortgage taken by it to secure his debt to it (the said bank). "(5) In the course of these instructions, the term 'insolvency' has been several times used. Now, a person is said to be insolvent within the meaning of the law, in such cases as the one now before you, when the fair, reasonable, market value of his property which is not exempt from execution is less than the amount of his indebtedness." "(7) If, at the time the defendant took from Buente said mortgage, it either knew of the insolvency of the said Buente, if he was insolvent, or had reasonable cause to believe that he was insolvent, and that he intended to give the defendant a preference now insist on such preference as against the plaintiff in this suit." None of these are challenged, save it is insisted that there is no testimony in the record to show that Buente was insolvent when he made the mortgage to the bank. They must therefore be treated as the law of the case. The instructions complained of are 6 and 7%, which read as follows: "(6) If you find from the evidence that at the time the bill of sale was made by Buente to Whitham the same was made subject to the $400 mortgage, and that it was the intention of Buente and Whitham that said mortgage should be paid by Whitham as a part of the consideration for which the said bill of sale was made, and you further find that payment of the said $400 was in fact made in pursuance of the said intention, said payment, though made by Whitham will have the same legal effect as if it has been paid personally by Buente." "(72) In the course of these instructions, the words 'intended' and 'intention' have been several times used. Now, the intent with which an act is done, being the purpose or formulated design in the mind at the time the act is being done, is often incapable of direct proof; but its existence or nonexistence may frequently be ascertained by the jury from just and reasonable inference from all the facts proved. Thus you are instructed that you have in law a right to infer that a man intends to do that which he voluntarily does do, and that he intends all the natural, direct, and probable consequences of his own acts. Thus, in the case before you, if Buente, at the time of the making of the mortgage, was insolvent, and knew that he was insolvent, and nevertheless executed a mortgage to the bank, which act necessarily operated in giving a preference to the said bank, you would have a right to infer that he intended by giving the said mortgage to give said bank a preference." [1] Counsel say, with reference to the sixth, that they can find no authorities which condemn such an instruction, but that on principle it must be erroneous, for the reason that the payment to defendant was not made by Buente, but by Whitham, and therefore there should not be any recovery from defendant. We are not disposed to adopt this line of reasoning. The debt was Buente's, and, although Whitham actually paid the money to the bank, it was Buente's debt, and he at all times was the principal in the transaction. The money came into defendant's hands from Whitham by reason of the Buente chattel mortgage, and this mortgage is charged to be invalid because preferential in character. But for the mortgage defendant would not have received the money, and the payment was in fact made for gage was made to secure. Defendant received the money as in payment of the note, and surrendered the same to Whitham. The payment was in fact made for Buente, and the mere fact that Whitham actually turned over the money is not controlling. The instruction seems to be correct. a jury was justified in finding therefrom that Buente's liabilities were in excess of his assets, even if we treat the bill of sale to the wife as a mortgage, and not an absolute sale. There is a conflict in the testimony upon this proposition, but such conflict, even though to our minds it be such that a preponder [2] No. 72, also complained of, undoubted-ance of the testimony favors defendant's conly announces elementary propositions of law. The chief point made in argument is that such an instruction has no place in civil procedure, and is applicable only to criminal cases, where intent, motive, and purpose are involved. As we view it, the instruction announces a general rule of law, applicable to any case where motive, purpose, and intent are involved, no matter whether the action be criminal or civil in character. One of the issues in the case was whether or not Buente intended to give defendant a preference. In order to determine that issue, his acts and conduct, as well as his declarations of necessity, had to be considered, for these are the things indicative of intent, which, after all, is a state of mind that can only be shown by what one says and does. Logically and according to the rules of law, it follows as a general proposition that intent is to be inferred from what one does, and the presumption obtains that one intends all the consequences which directly and naturally flow from what he does. This instruction is correct, and it found proper place in the charge as given. [3] Complaint is made because the court used the word "preference" in its instructions, without defining the term in any part of the charge. In this there was no error. Defendant asked no instruction upon the subject, and definition of the term was not required, in the absence of a request. The instructions as a whole fairly covered the issues, and we see no error. [4] 2. The chief complaint of counsel is that there is no testimony tending to show Buente's insolvency when he made the mortgage, no testimony that any of defendant's officers knew of such insolvent condition, even if it existed, and no evidence showing or tending to show that they, or any of them, had reason to believe that Buente was insolvent, or was intending to give them a preference. The case was tried to a jury, and if there be any substantial testimony in support of these various issues we are not justified in interfering, no matter what our conclusions might be, were we to settle the facts. As will be observed from the instructions already quoted, the court defined insolvency, and as this definition is not complained of we shall assume it to be correct. [5] The inquiry then is this: Is there any substantial testimony showing or tending to show that Buente's assets, at a fair and reasonable valuation, were at the time the mortgage was made less than his outstanding indebtedness? Without setting forth the tes tention, is not enough to justify us in setting aside the verdict. According to the testimony, Buente, at the time of the giving of the mortgage, was indebted to an amount exceeding $3,600, and a jury may have found that his assets did not amount to more than $2,700 or $2,800. Moreover, he was found insolvent within 60 days from the time he made the mortgage, and his creditors commenced action to have him declared a bankrupt within 38 days after the mortgage was executed. Again, his deposits with the defendant bank had fallen off to a noticeable extent before the bank took its mortgage, and his creditors were then pressing him. For some reason, he gave a bill of sale to his wife, covering his entire stock, as he now says, as security to his wife. Even if that were the purpose, the fact that such a conveyance was made is indicative of a feeling on his part that he was so much involved that to protect his wife it was necessary to give her security, else she might lose her claim. Furthermore, the trade to Whitham was peculiar. Buente never saw Whitham's Wisconsin land, and no invoice of Buente's stock of goods was taken. Buente made no inquiry as to the value of the land, and Whitham had no reliable information as to the stock. The trade was made on the very day it was suggested, and without the usual investigations. Other creditors were pressing Buente for payment close to the time the mortgage was made, and one of these was satisfied by the defendant bank; another was offered 40 cents on the dollar by Buente. Surely there was enough upon this proposition to carry the case to a jury. Upon the question of defendant's officers' and agents' knowledge of Buente's insolvency when they took the mortgage, the case is not perhaps so clear. As already stated, the official who actually took the mortgage is dead, and we do not have his testimony. It is shown, however, that the bank officials noticed a marked falling off of Buente's deposits during the months of June and July of the year 1908; that he had overdrawn his account in the bank; that his account was unsatisfactory; and that the officials were worried over the situation. The making of the bill of sale was known to the bank, and the next morning one of the officials went to Buente with a demand for security of the bank note. It was suggested that the making of this bill of sale would stimulate all Buente's creditors into activity. Buente testified that the bank had been kind to him, and that be told the official who came for security that care of the bank. Before this, a creditor of Buente was pressing him for payment of his claim, and this claim was taken care of by the bank giving a check for a part of the claim directly to this creditor. This must have been in settlement of the entire claim, for it was not listed among Buente's liabilities. The bank official knew, of course, of the bill of sale to the wife, which in itself was suggestive of insolvency, and perhaps of an intent to defraud. If intended as security merely for $1,000, there is no reason why a mortgage should not have been executed, instead of an absolute bill of sale. The bank knew of other claims against Buente, and a jury was justified in finding that the bank knew or should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have known of Buente's insolvency. See Bank v. Jewelry Co., 123 Iowa, 432, 99 N. W. 121; Coleman v. Decatur Egg Case Co., 186 Fed. 136, 108 C. C. A. 248; Boudinot v. Hamann, 117 Iowa, 23, 90 N. W. 497; Jackman v. Bank, 125 Wis. 465, 104 N. W. 98, 115 Am. St. Rep. 955; Grant v. Dry Goods Co., 23 S. D. 195, 121 N. W. 95. That the bank intended to secure itself to the exclusion of other creditors is a fair inference from the testimony. Grant v. Dry Goods Co., supra; Ferguson v. Lederer Co., 128 Iowa, 286, 103 N. W. 794. It affirmatively appears that the bank official who took the mortgage made no inquiry of Buente as to his financial condition, and that the making of the bill of sale was the immediate cause for demanding security of the bank indebtedness. That these facts and circumstances were enough to take the case to a jury, see Coleman v. Decatur Egg Case Co., supra; Ferguson v. Lederer Co., supra. Appellant predicates its entire case upon Burnham v. Ft. Dodge Grocery Co., 144 Iowa, 577, 123 N. W. 220. The opinion in that case supports the charge as given by the trial court, and, although the . decision was against the claim of preference, the action was in equity, and we were there compelled to find the very truth; whereas in this case the only proposition involved is, Was there enough testimony to take the case to a jury? We find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed. SAWYER v. WAPELLO COUNTY. (Supreme Court of Iowa. Nov. 17, 1911.) 1. HEALTH (§ 16*)-DISINFECTING BUILDINGS -LIABILITY OF COUNTY. carrying out the above provisions and in establishing or raising a quarantine, including disinfection and the furnishing of any pesthouse or detention hospital, to be filed with the clerk of the local board of health, and requires the board of county supervisors to act upon the bill certified by the board. Held, that the counbuildings in which contagious diseases had exty was liable for the expenses of disinfecting isted, whether such buildings were quarantined or not. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Dec. Dig. § 16.*] 2. APPEAL and Error (§ 866*)—Record—EVI DENCE. Evidence which the record shows was admitted must be considered as in the case, though the trial judge thought he erred in admitting it, if that did not appear from the record. Error, Dec. Dig. § 866.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and 3. EVIDENCE (§ 142*)—RELEVANCy-Value of SERVICES. In an action by a health officer against a county for the value of services in disinfecting fected buildings could testify as to the charges buildings, persons who had theretofore disinmade by them for their work, where they stated what they had done, the material used, and its value and the time consumed, though they defendant not being liable for more than the were not physicians or experts in disinfecting; reasonable value of the services, if they were such as could be equally well rendered by nonexperts. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 416-423; Dec. Dig. 142.*] 4. HEALTH (§ 19*)-DISINFECTING BUILDINGS -APPROVAL OF EXPENSE BILL. Approval by the local board of health of a bill for services for disinfecting a building, as required by statute, was only prima facie evidence of the value of such services. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Dec. Dig. § 19.*] 5. HEALTH (§ 16*)-CONTRACTS RATIFICATION. If the local board of health ratified services rendered to a county in disinfecting buildtract for the work existed; the board of health ings, it was immaterial whether a prior conhaving power to authorize such work. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Dec. Dig. § 16.*] 6. HEALTH (§ 19*)-ACTION-JURY QUESTION. Where, in an action against a county for services rendered as a health officer for disinfecting buildings, there was no evidence that disinfecting after measles, as required by the board of health, was an unreasonable requirement, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such rule was not for the jury's consideration. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Dec. Dig. § 19.*] Appeal from District Court, Wapello County; M. A. Roberts, Judge. Action to recover for services rendered as health officer of the City of Eldon. There was a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Reversed. Code Supp. 1907, § 2570a, requires the Seneca Cornell and D. F. Steck, for appellocal board of health to make such provisions lant. Christy & Davis and E. K. Daugheras will best protect the inhabitants from contagious diseases, and to remove any person in- ty, for appellee. fected to a pesthouse or other hospital, and provide needful assistance, medical attendance, and supplies, and, if he cannot be removed, to care for him where he resides in such manner, and requires all bills for expenses incurred in SHERWIN, C. J. The plaintiff was the duly appointed health officer of the local board of health of the city of Eldon, and as provided for the removal and abatement of nuisances, who shall issue the warrant as directed in such cases, to remove such person or persons to the place designated by the local board of health, or to take possession of the condemned or infected houses or lodgings, and such officer shall receive a reasonable compensation for such services to be allowed by said local board." such performed the services and furnished | made to any civil magistrate, in the manner the material for which he seeks recovery in this action. Bills for such services and materials were duly audited and allowed by the local board of health, and the same were duly presented to the board of supervisors of the defendant county. A part of the plaintiff's charge was for disinfecting buildings in which there had been a contagious disease (measles), and where no quarantine had been maintained, and the principal question presented is whether the county is liable for such service. It is conceded that the rules of both the state and local boards of health required disinfection in all cases where the plaintiff disinfected. [1] The appellant contends that it is not liable for disinfecting buildings after diseases where quarantine is not maintained, and the appellee contends that the county is liable for disinfecting buildings where contagious diseases have existed, whether a quarantine was or was not maintained. These contentions must be disposed of by a construction of section 2570a of the Supplement to the Code of 1907; for the appellee concedes that, unless authority be therein found for holding the defendant liable, none exists. The section, so far as material to the instant case, is as follows: "When any person shall be sick or infected with smallpox or other infectious or contagious diseases dangerous to the public health, whether a resident or otherwise, the local board of health shall make such provisions as are best calculated to protect the inhabitants therefrom, and may remove such persons to a separate house, or to a pesthouse, or detention or other hospital, and shall provide needful assistance, nurses, medical attendance and supplies. If, in the judgment of said board, such person cannot be removed, then he shall be cared for at the place where he resides in the same manner as above provided. In case of the removal of more than one person to the same house, or to any pesthouse, or detention or other hospital, said board shall provide needful assistance, nurses, medical supplies and attendance necessary for their proper care. All bills for expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this section, and in establishing, maintaining, or raising a quarantine, including disinfection and the building and furnishing of any pesthouse, detention or other hospital, shall be filed with the clerk of the local board of health, which board shall examine the same and act thereon at its next regular meeting after the same have been filed with the clerk, and shall certify the amount allowed by it there on to the county auditor, and the board of county supervisors shall act upon said bills as thus certified at its first regular meeting thereafter. The forcible removal of sick or infected persons, as herein pro * The first clause of the section clearly empowers the local board of health, in all cases of infectious or contagious diseases dangerous to the public health, to take charge of the person or persons so afflicted, and to take possession of the infected house or lodgings where they may be. Such control over the person and premises is clearly manifest from the language used in the clause itself, and in the last clause quoted herein, which provides for the enforcement of the board's orders. It is further provided in the same clause that the local board shall make such provisions as are best calculated to protect the public from such diseases, and shall provide needful medical attendance, nurses, assistance, and supplies. The medical attendance and other things enumerated shall be furnished at the residence of the diseased person, if, in the judgment of the board, it should be done; and it cannot be doubted that it is the duty of the board to make as complete provisions for the protection of the public where there is no removal to a pesthouse, as where there is such removal. The law does not absolutely require a quarantine. That is left to the discretion of the board of health, and under section 2570a the board may take charge of the case and of the premises without in fact establishing a quarantine. The section then provides further: "All bills for expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this section, and in establishing, maintaining or raising a quarantine, including disinfection and the building and furnishing of any pesthouse," shall be paid by the county. Disinfection is here expressly made a charge against the county. But the appellant says that it is to be allowed only in case of a quarantine. But that, in our judgment, is too narrow a construction of the statute. Its entire purpose is to protect the public from the evil effects of infectious or contagious diseases, and it is made the duty of the board of health to make such provisions as shall, in its judgment, best afford such protection, and to this end the board is given absolute control over the diseased persons, and over the premises they occupy at the time. The board may quarantine, or it may remove the person, if it sees fit to do so; but, whether it does so or not, it may control the person and premises, and, in our judgment, in any and all events, it is just as incumbent upon the board to protect the |