of things will suggest to the insatiate ambition and the restless and inventive spirit of the French. But why talk of distant possessions, when our attention will, in all human probability, be limited to the defence of our own Island, our own homes, our own existence, threatened, at every point, by that monstrous power, whose whole malice and whose whole force will be directed against Great-Britain herself? Intent only on averting present destruction, all our cares, all our efforts, will be confined to the field of battle, on which our fate must be decided. But what would be our lot, my Lord, if this enemy, to whose good faith you have confided interests so dear to us, and so opposed to his own, should, by an act of perfidy which would set a seal upon all preten-' sions of a similar nature, and at the same time, render the repetition of them perfectly needless, attack us in time of peace!—I turn from the contemplation of this horrid prospect, on which, however, it will be the first duty of His MAJESTY'S Ministers to keep their eyes constantly fixed.

But the noisy partisans of Peace, of any Peace whatever, even of the name of Peace, will exclaim— Is England, then, condemned to wage perpetual War with France? Yes, my Lord, she is; and it

is

your

Peace which has reduced her to this lament

T-2

ab.e

able necessity. It has suddenly transported to France a part of our force and of our riches; and in a few years it will give her a naval superiority. In all quarters, and with inconceivable rapidity, it multiplies her means of attack, and diminishes our means of defence. It leaves our enemy armed and prepared; it compels us to remain also under arms, This Peace, then, my Lord, is a real state of War; for you know, as well as I do, that the duration of a siege is not estimated by the days of assault, nor the length of a campaign by the days of battle.

And even had we been obliged to embrace the measure of an eternal and active War, instead of this eternal and passive War, which you have signed, while you fondly imagined you were signing a Peace, it perhaps would not be impossible, my Lord, to prove that such a War, well conducted, in confor. mity with our actual position, and limited to its proper objects, would be less expensive than the defensive War, which has become necessary, especially when we consider the superiority of trade and revenue, which we should enjoy during the existence of your Peace; that such open War should have been incomparably more burthensome to France than to us; and that, by harrassing and molesting the

French, in all quarters, by excluding them from every sea; by deriving their industry of all the raw materials which their own soil does not produce, and their commerce of the carriage and sale of their own productions; by compelling them to purchase from us many articles of indispensable necessity to them; by so increasing and prolonging the discontents, as well in France herself, as in countries which she has subdued, and by giving to those Powers, who are now thrown into consternation by our late conduct, a well-founded motive of hope, we should either have succeeded in overthrowing the French Government, or reduced our enemies to the necessity of soliciting from us a Peace, very different indeed from that, which they have recently dictated to us. A full discussion of this important subject would greatly exceed my ability, nor, indeed, would it be possible to reduce it within the necessary limits of a Letter. I shall, therefore, content myself with having suggested it to your Lordship, and leave it to become the object of your serious reflections, in those hours of repose when the Statesman shall give place to the Student.

But, my Lord, amongst so many things to blame, I gladly give my approbation to one part of

your

your conduct: as a peace-maker you are rather of the lamest, but you are an excellent hand at a truce; for you may rest assured that BUONAPARTÉ will never break his compact with you, until all the places which you have so liberally yielded to him, shall be safely lodged, either in his own hands, or in those of his Dutch and Spanish receivers.

For the present, my Lord, I think (and here I am sure you will agree with me in opinion), it prò. per to close my observations on the Peace of Downing-street, and on the danger and disgrace to which it has for ever doomed our country. I cannot, however, conclude without submitting to your consideration the means of preventing, or rather postponing, some of the evils of this Peace.

The engagement of the 1st of October is certainly not superior to the first law of every state, which is the salus populi, the first law of nature, selfpreservation; but the will of BOUNAPARTE has now superseded all law, human and divine, and, therefore, if he chooses to hold this fallen kingdom to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, she will be thereunto holden and bound. It remains, then, for us to make the best of the hard terms which have been dictated to us. The more diastrous the conditions

of

of the agreement are, the more necessary it is for our Government to insist on an unreserved, unequivocal, and faithful execution of those clauses which leave the nation some hope, and some small means of palliating the fatal effects of the Treaty in general. Now, my Lord, these clauses are:

1. The real neutrality and independence of Malta, so that this most important Island may, as far as human prudence can go, be prevented from falling into the hands of France, or of Russia, if she should be fixed on as the guaranteeing Power.

2. The freedom of the Cape of Good Hope, an expression to which you, doubtless, attach some meaning or other, but in which I can discern none at all.

3. The integrity (if we must talk French) of our Allies.-1st. I can hardly think that the integrity of the Porte is secured, when France obliges that Power, eight days after the date of our unfortunate and disgraceful Treaty, to recede from its engagements with us, and to take from our commerce and navigation those favours, which we so well deserve at her hands.-2d. You have omitted, in speaking of the integrity of Portugal, the words as before the War." They were, in fact, not necessary;