And there being conftant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its burfting into a flame, left, inftead of warming, it should confume.

over-balance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield.

Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indifpenfable fupports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotifm who fhould labour to fubvert thefe great pillars of human happinefs, thefe firmeft props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connection with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be asked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation defert the oaths, which are the inftruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the fuppofition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar ftructure, reafon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle.

It is important, likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country fhould infpire caution in thofe entrusted with its administration, to confine themfelves within their refpective conflitutional fpheres, avoiding, in the exercife of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments into one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft eftimate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of political power, by dividing and diftributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of the public weal against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; fome of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preferve them must be as neceffary as to inftitute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inftance, may be the inftrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent must always greatly

It is fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceflary fpring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or lefs force to every fpecies of free government. Who, that is a fincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to fake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. In proportion as the ftructure of government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinion fhould be ealightened. (M 3)

As

As a very important fource of ftrength and fecurity, cherifh public credit. One method of preferving it is to ufe it as fparingly as poffible; avoiding occafions of expence by cultivating peace, but remembering alfo that timely difburfements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater difburfen ents to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulation of debt, not only by fhunning occafions of expence, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to difcharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned; not ungenerously throwing upon pofterity the burthen which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of thefe maxims belongs to your reprefentatives, but it is neceflary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you should practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be a revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or lefs inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarraffment infeparable from the felection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifiye motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the meafures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Obferve good faith and juftice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct: and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no very diftant period, a great

nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel exam-. ple of a people always guided by an exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of fuch a plan would righly repay any temporary advantages which might be loft by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtues? The experiment, at leaft, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas is it rendered impoffible by its vices?

In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and pas. fionate attachments for others, fhould be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all fhould be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. Antipathy in one nation against another difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute occur. Hence frequent collifions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts, through paflion, what reafon would reject; at other times it makes the animo fity of the nation Tubfervient to

projects

projects of hoftility, inftigated by pride, ambition, and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes, perhaps, the liberty of nations has been the victim,

So, likewife, a paffionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favourite nation, facilitating the illufion of an imaginary common intereft in cafes where no real common intereft exifts, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or juftification. It leads alfo to conceffions to the favourite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the conceffions; by unnece@arily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealoufy, ill-will, and a dif. pofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are with-held and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favourite nation) facility to betray or facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous fenfe of obligation, a commendable deference for public opiMion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compli auces of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As the avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domeftic factions, to practife the arts of feduction, to

mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils? Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great or powerful nation, dooms the former to be the fatellite of the latter.

Against the infidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens) the jealoufy of a free people ought to be conflantly awake; fince history and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of a republican government. But that jealoufy, to be useful, muft be impartial; elfe it becomes the inftrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defence against it. Exceffive partiality for one foreign nation, and exceffive diflike of another, caufe thofe whom they actuate to fee danger only on one fide, and ferve to veil and even fecond the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may refift the intrigues of the favourite, are liable to become fufpected and odious; while its tools and dupes ufurp the applaufe and confidence of the people, to furrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial rela tions, to have with them as little political connection as poffible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.-Here let us ftop.

Europe has a fet of primary in- terefts, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence fhe muft be engaged in frequent controverfies, the causes of which are effentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwife in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary viciffitudes of her politics, or the (M 4)

ordinary

ordinary combinations and collifions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and diftant fituation invites and enables us to purfue a different courfe. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take fuch an attitude as will caufe the neutrality we may at any time refolve upon to be fcrupulously refpected; when belligerent nations, under the impoffibility of making acquifitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choofe peace or war, as our intereft, guided by juftice, fhall counfel.

Why forego the advantages of fo peculiar a fituation? Why quit our own to ftand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and profperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, intereit, hufour, or caprice?

'Tis our true policy to fteer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; fo far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronifing infidelity to exifting engagements. I hold the maxim no lefs applicable to public than to private affairs, that honefty is always the beft policy. I repeat it, therefore, let thofe engagements be obferved in their genuine fenfe. But, in my opinion, it is unneceffary and would be unwife to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves, by fuitable eftablishments, on a refpectable defenfive pofture, we may fafely truft to temporary al

liances for extraordinary emergen, cies.

Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and intereft. But even our commercial policy fhould hold an equal and impartial hand; neither feeking nor granting exclufive favours or preferences; confulting the natural courfe of things; diffufing and diverfifying by gentle means the ftreams of commerce, but forcing nothing; eftablishing, with powers fo difpofed, in order to give trade a ftable courfe, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to fupport them, conventional rules of intercourfe, the beft that prefent circumstances and mutual opinion will permit; but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances fhall dictate; conftantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for difinterefted favours from another; that it must pay with a proportion of its indepen dence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itfelf in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favours, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favours from nation to nation. It is a illufion which experience must cure; which a just pride ought to difcard.

In offering to you, my country. men, thefe counfels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the ftrong and lafting impreffion I could with; that they will controul the ufual current of the paffions, or prevent our