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Case made from Kent. Submitted January 19. Decided April 13.

REPLEVIN. Plaintiff had judgment below. Affirmed.

Taylor & Eddy for plaintiff.

Drury & Maher for defendant.

CAMPBELL, J. Hansen replevied certain household furniture taken from him by defendant Prince as agent for one Young under a provision in the nature of a chattel mortgage in a lease, August 15, 1877. Young, as owner of certain premises in Grand Rapids, leased them to Hansen for three years, at $500 per annum, payable monthly in advance. The lease contained clauses whereby a lien or mortgage was to exist on all property then or thereafter on the premises, with authority in default of rent or other covenant broken, to seize and sell enough to pay the amount due and costs.

On the 29th of July, 1878, when no rent was in arrears, and none would accrue until August 15, Young sold and conveyed the leased property by warranty deed to Mrs. Lucinda E. Judd. At about that time it was agreed between Mrs. Judd and Young that Hansen should pay to Young the rent to grow due up to December 1st, and Hansen was notified of this and paid rental to Young up to September 15th. It is not found that this agreement was in writing or was in the deed or in any way referred to in it, and it is not found it was made at any particular time as simultaneous, anterior or subsequent.

On September 16, 1878, Mrs. Judd sued Young before a justice and garnished Hansen, who answered and admitted. his liability as before described. In each instance of suing out garnishee process the rent sought to be reached by it had already accrued. Judgment was recovered before the justice against Young, for more than the amount disclosed, and he removed it by certiorari into the circuit court, and gave the statutory bond. The judgment was affirmed March 20, 1880.

The present replevin suit was begun August 15, 1879, and tried on April 26, 1880. The circuit court held that by the sale to Mrs. Judd all of Young's rights under the lease itself and the security contained in it passed to the vendee, and that the arrangement to allow rent to be paid to him until December did not give him any right to enforce the mortgage clanse. It was also held that the garnishee proceedings were not destroyed by the certiorari.

We think that the court held correctly that the right to receive payments up to December, 1878, did not involve any assignment of the lease itself or any direct interest in it. The agreement was simply that certain moneys which belonged to Mrs. Judd should be paid to Young. There was no reservation whatever in the deed to Mrs. Judd, and she was thereby vested with the entire title to the land, subject only to Hansen's tenancy. She was thereafter the only landlord, and Young ceased to have any interest in the freehold, or any claim except such as Mrs. Judd gave him, which is not found to be any control over the securities. Such an interest carries no legal title. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Davenport 37 Mich. 609.

The claim that under our present laws a deed of land does not transfer rights to enforce existing leases is unfounded. It has been decided otherwise. Perrin v. Lepper 34 Mich. 292; McGuffie v. Carter 42 Mich. 497. There can only be one landlord at a time, entitled to enforce claims under leases. The questions relating to the garnishee proceedings are, therefore, not important and we do not consider them. The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

JOHN R. GATES V. HIRAM FISK.

Partnership note a joint contract.

A partnership note is a joint contract within the meaning of Comp. L., § 7165, so that a payment thereon by one partner within the period of the statute of limitations will not bind the other if the firm had previously dissolved to the payee's knowledge.

The partnership name represents the constituents of the firm, and when it is rightly pledged the respective partners are jointly bound.

The Supreme Court will not weigh evidence in law cases and ascertain facts as a ground of final judgment.

Error to Washtenaw. Submitted January 21. Decided April 13.

ASSUMPSIT. Defendant brings error.

Reversed.

Beakes & Cutcheon for plaintiff in error. After dissolution of a firm the power of one partner to bind the firm to a more extended liability on a partnership debt by payment on new promise wholly ceases: Atwood v. Gillett 2 Doug. (Mich.) 216; Pennoyer v. David 8 Mich. 408; Thompson v. Waithman 3 Drew 628; Bristow v. Miller 11 Irish L. R. 461; Kilgour v. Finlyson 1 H. Bl. 155; Van Keuren v. Parmelee 2 Const. 523; Bloodgood v. Bruen 4 Seld. 362; 2 Pars. N. & B. 657; 1 Dan. Neg. Inst. § 370; payment by one partner after dissolution does not destroy the effect of the statute of limitations as to the other: Rogers v. Anderson 40 Mich. 290; Myatts v. Bell 41 Ala. 222; Balcom v. Richards 6 Cush. 360; Graham v. Selover 59 Barb. 313; even when made with the other's consent: Sigler v. Platt 16 Mich. 206; Cockrill v. Sparkes 1 H. & C. 699; see Bush v. Stowell 71 Penn. St. 208; Coleman v. Fobes 22 Penn. St. 156; Levy v. Cadet 17 S. & R. 126; Searight v. Craighead 1 Pen. and Watts 135; Schoneman v. Fegley 7 Penn. St. 433; Hance v. Hair 25 Ohio St. 349; Day v. Baldwin 34 Ia. 380: Cowing v. Vincent 25 U. C. (Q. B.) 427; after disso

lution the liability of the partners on a firm debt is that of joint debtors, and the remaining member cannot bind the others as partners: Coleman v. Fobes 22 Penn. St. 156; F. & M. Bank v. Kercheval 2 Mich. 518.

Sawyer & Knowlton for defendant in error. A partnership debt once created always continues such unless changed by the act of the creditor: Botsford v. Kleinhans 29 Mich. 332; Bedford v. Deakin 2 B. & Ald. 210; Ault v. Goodrich 4 Russ. 430; Cady v. Shepherd 11 Pick. 400; Bridge v. Gray 14 Pick, 55; Gay v. Bowen 8 Met. 100; Wood v. Braddick 1 Taunt. 104; even after dissolution, since they are still partners as to existing debts in making settlement: Coll. on Part. § 432; Bissell v. Adams 35 Conn. 299; Smith v. Winter 4 M. & W. 461; Butchart v. Dresser 10 Hare 453; Patterson v. Choate 7 Wend. 441; Murray v. Mumford 6 Cow. 441; the statute of limitations does not apply to partners, while making payments on partnership debts: Parsons on Part. (3d ed.) 307, note y y; Willis v. Green 5 Hill 232-234; Gates v. Beecher 60 N. Y. 518; Story on Part §§ 89-90; Lind. on Part 31-32; a distinction has always been made between payments made by partners before and those made after the statute of limitation has attached: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 112; Coll. on Part. 177; Bowdre v. Hampton 6 Rich. (S. C.) 208; Fisk v. Frank 1 McCourt, Ch. 175; Scales v. Jacob 3 Bing. 638; Gardner v. M'Mahon 3 A. & E. (N. S.) 566; until the payee knows of the dissolution, any contract made by one partner within the scope of the partnership business binds the other partner also: Pratt v. Page 32 Vt. 15; payment by the liquidating partner would take the case out of the statute of limitations: Reppert v. Colvin 48 Penn. St. 248; a partnership debt remains so after dissolution: Parsons on Part. (3d ed.) 395, 398, 388, 421, 457; Coll. on Part; § 106; Whiting v. Farrand 1 Conn. 60; Gay v. Bowen 8 Met. 100; the partners are all responsible in solido, and all the joint property of the firm is just as liable for the partnership debts after as before dissolution, any arrangement between the partners to the contrary

notwithstanding: Parsons on Part. (3d ed.) 428, *395; Story on Part. § 334; Coll. on Part. § 106; the power of a partner to bind each member of the firm remains the same after as before dissolution, when his acts or admissions are confined to partnership matters then existing in which they all still have a common interest, even with creditors having knowledge of the dissolution, but he cannot create a new debt or revive one barred by the statute: Pennoyer v. David 8 Mich. 407; Smith v. Shelden 35 Mich. 42; Cady v. Shepherd 11 Pick.400; Holmes v. Shands 27 Miss. 44; Parsons on Part. § 395; he can close all business transactions of the firm: Palmer v. Dodge 4 Ohio St. 21; settle up the business of the firm: Parker v. Cousins 2 Gratt. 372; Long v. Story 10 Mo. 637; Marton v. Walton 1 McCord 16; Parker v. Macomber 18 Pick. 505; Fellows v. Wyman 33 N. H. 351; settle all demands in favor of or against the firm: Lockwood v. Comstock 4 McLean 383; sign the firm name for that purpose: Hamilton v. Seaman 1 Ind. 185; Martin v. Kirk 2 Humph. 529; assign to a creditor of the firm a demand due to the partnership: Milliken v. Loring 37 Me. 408; Daby v. Ericsson 45 New York 786; Loeschigk v. Hatfield 51 N. Y. 660; but not indorse a note due the firm; Sanford v. Mickles 4 Johns. 224; draw bills upon debtors, and when accepted, bring suit in name of firm: King v. Smith 4 C. & P. 108; collect, compound and release debts of the firm: Napier v. McLeod 9 Wend. 120; Huntington v. Potter 32 Barb. 300; sell goods consigned to the firm before dissolution: Heberton v. Jepherson 10 Penn. St. 134; acknowledge in the partnership name a balance due from the firm: Ide v. Ingraham 5 Gray 106; Temple v. Seaver 11 Cush. 314; Bank v. Pratt 51 Me. 563; Gannett v. Cunningham 34 Me. 58; Cunningham v. Bragg 37 Ala. 436; arrangeliquidate and pay existing firm indebtedness: Darling v. March 22 Me. 184; borrow money to pay partnership debts: Estate of Davis & Desanque, 5 Wheat. 530; pay from his own means a valid subsisting debt against the firm and the right to claim an allowance and contribution from the others therefor: Gates v. Beecher 60 N. Y. 524; do "every act of

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