Dissenting Opinion, per JONES, J.

dence. It could go farther and provide that there can be no reversal on the ground that there is error in the charge of the court, and so on, until there would remain no ground upon which a reversal could be had, and the rule, carried to its logical end, would result in the general assembly not only limiting the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in the reversal of judgments but abrogating it entirely.

We think, therefore, that Section 11577, which limits the power of the court of appeals in reviewing the judgments of the common pleas and superior courts, is irreconcilably in conflict with the provisions of the constitution.

JONES, J., dissenting. I concur in the judgment and in the first, second and fourth propositions of the syllabus, for the reason that this case was a "pending case" in the court of appeals on January 1, 1913, to be thereafter determined under the then existing laws.

I dissent from the latter part of the third proposition of the syllabus. Section 6, Article IV of the Constitution, embraces the plenary jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, both original and appellate, and included in that section is the limitation on its jurisdiction or power to reverse on the weight of the evidence. This constitutional provision, ex proprio vigore, definitely seized the subject-weight of the evidence-from the realm of statutory jurisdiction and legislative control, and incorporated it in the constitutional section dealing with the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. This appellate jurisdiction or power of reversal is unqualified, save

Statement of the Case.

by the single, specific limitation that a reversal on the weight of the evidence must be by a concurrence of all the judges of the court of appeals. The statute in question, Section 11577, General Code, affecting the power of the court to render a judgment, is jurisdictional and not procedural, and became inoperative by the adoption of the section of the constitution above referred to.

THE STATE OF ОHO V. BAYER..

Intoxicating liquors-Shipments into dry territory-False or fictitious name or title-Section 13216, General Code-VenueOffense committed where liquor bought and delivered to carrier, when.

The word "ship," as used in Section 13216, General Code, means to deliver to a common carrier for transportation; and where intoxicating liquor is bought and paid for in one county, with instructions to the seller by the buyer to ship by express to him in another county, if it be shipped under a false or fictitious name or title, the offense under Section 13216 is complete in the county where the liquor is bought and delivered to the express company, and the shipper must be prosecuted there. (No. 14796-Decided November 16, 1915.)

ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Union county.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Milton Haines, prosecuting attorney; Mr. John H. Willis and Mr. James A. White, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. O. H. Mosier and Mr. Timothy S. Hogan, for defendant in error.

Opinion, per Newman, J.

NEWMAN, J. The prosecuting attorney of Union county filed an information in the probate court of that county based upon an affidavit filed by one W. B. Mathews, charging the defendant, Harry Bayer, with the violation of Section 13216, General Code, in unlawfully and knowingly shipping and transporting into the village of Marysville intoxicating liquor under a false and fictitious name, to-wit, one paper box containing eight pint bottles of whiskey, said box marked and labeled "glass." The case was heard in the probate court and the defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and costs. He prosecuted error to the court of appeals and the judgment of the probate court was reversed and the defendant discharged for the reason, as shown by the journal entry, that the probate court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law.

Counsel for defendant in error suggest several reasons why the judgment of reversal of the court of appeals should be affirmed. It is insisted if there was any violation of Section 13216, under which the prosecution was had, the offense was committed in Franklin county, Ohio, and the probate court of Union county had no jurisdiction to try the defendant.

The only evidence offered upon the trial of the case in the probate court was that offered by the state and is contained in the bill of exceptions filed in this court. One M. C. Bump, an employe of W. B. Mathews, a secret-service officer for Union county, purchased from The Golden Hill Distilling

Opinion, per NEWMAN, J.

Company, at its place of business in the city of Columbus, with money furnished for that purpose by Mathews, a gallon of whiskey, to be shipped to him, Bump, at Marysville, Ohio. Bump paid for the whiskey, to one of the clerks in the employ of the company, the sum of $2, and ordered it shipped in pint bottles, by express, the express charges to be paid by Bump at Marysville. The box containing the whiskey was prepared for shipment in the office of The Golden Hill Distilling Company and turned over by that company to the American Express Company with this designation on the box: "M. C. Bump, Marysville, Ohio, G. H. D. Co., 139 E. Town St., Columbus, Ohio. 'Glass, handle with care.' Upon receipt by the express company, the the agent of that company pasted on the package a carbon copy of the waybill, as follows: "5199, July 18, 1914, Marysville, M. Bump. Liq. 18 G. H. D." The package was carried to its destination by the express company and upon the order of Bump was delivered to Mathews, who paid the express charges and thereupon took the package to the office of the prosecuting attorney of Union county. There is evidence tending to show that at the time of this transaction Harry Bayer was the president, treasurer, chairman of the board of directors, and manager of The Golden Hill Distilling Company, and was in charge and control of the business. Plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the journal entry of the court of common pleas of Union county, showing the result of the election on local option in that county and that Marysville

Opinion, per NEWMAN, J.

was in dry territory, which was objected to by the defendant and the same was withdrawn.

Section 13636, General Code, provides that all criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed. The question for determination is whether the defendant committed an offense in violation of Section 13216 in Union county. In that section it is provided: "No railroad or common carrier, or agent thereof, drayman or other person, corporation or firm, shall ship, receive, transport, carry or handle intoxicating liquor under a false or fictitious name or title.' It is to be observed that this statute makes it an offense to ship. It makes it an offense to receive. It makes it an offense to transport; also to carry or to handle. The one who transports is the express company or the carrier which carries the goods. It is not claimed that the defendant committed an offense as the transporter of the goods. But it is suggested by counsel for plaintiff in error that the person who ships the intoxicating liquor under a false or fictitious name or title is far more guilty than the man who transports, carries, handles or receives the same, and it is urged that the prosecution may be had anywhere along the line, including the county where it is received. In view of the language used in the statute, it seems to us it was not intended that the act of shipment should include the whole movement of the goods from the time they leave the hands of the consignor until they reach the consignee. The legislature has treated the several acts which go to make up the entire movement separate offenses.