Miners' Bank v. State of Iowa. 12 H. selves the power of disapproving and thereby annulling the acts of those governments, and had, in the exercise of that power, stricken out several of the provisions of the charter of the Bank of [8] Dubuque, enacted by the legislature of Wisconsin, assenting to the residue; that, therefore, the charter of this bank should be regarded as an act of congress, rather than of the territorial government; and, consequently, the decision of the state court, in favor of the repealing law of Iowa, must be held to be one in which was drawn in question and overruled the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under the United States, and as a decision also against a right, title, or privilege set up under a statute of the United States. The fallacy of this argument is easily detected. Congress, in creating the territorial governments, and in conferring upon them powers of general legislation, did not, from obvious principles of policy and necessity, ordain a suspension of all acts proceeding from those powers, until expressly sanctioned by themselves, whilst, for considerations equally strong, they reserved the power of disapproving or annulling such acts of territorial legislation as might be deemed detrimental. A different system of procedure would have been fatal to all practical improvement in those territories, however urgently called for; nay, might have disarmed them of the very power of self-preservation. An invasion, or insurrection, or any other crisis demanding the most strenuous action, would have had to remain without preventive or remedy till congress, if not in session, could be convened, or, when in session, must have awaited its possibly procrastinated aid. The argument would render, also, the acts of the territorial governments, even the most wholesome and necessary, and though indispensably carried to the extreme of authority, obnoxious to the charge of usurpation or criminality. The reverse of this argument, whilst it is accordant with the investiture of general legislative power in the territorial governments, places them in the position of usefulness and advantage towards those they were bound to foster, and subjects them at the same time to proper restraints from their superior. The charter of the Bank of Dubuque, enacted in all its details and powers ever possessed by it, (and according to which it was in fact organized,) by the legislature of Wisconsin, must be looked upon as the creature of that legislature. To regard it, as we are urged to do by the argument for the plaintiff in error, would constitute it rather a Bank of the United States, situated without the United States, and operating within the territory of Wisconsin, now the State of Iowa, independently of the power or local policy of that State, and beyond the reach of its faculties or obligations to be exerted for its own citi zens. Binns v. Lawrence. 12 H. We think that the positions urged for the plaintiff in error leave the objections to the jurisdiction, as above stated, in their full force. We regard both the charter granted by Wisconsin, and the repeal of that charter by Iowa,* alike as acts of the [ *9 ] territorial authorities, and not as the acts of any State of this Union; and that, as such, this court has no power, by writ of error, to take cognizance of them in virtue of, and for the objects designated by, the 25th section of the judiciary act. We therefore adjudge that the writ of error in this case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 19 H. 393. WILLIAM BINNS and C. STOCKTON HALSTEAD, Plaintiffs, v. COR NELIUS W. LAWRENCE. 12 H. 9. Under the tariff act of July 30, 1846, (9 Stats. at Large, 44, sched. B,) glass tumblers, hav ing the entire surface or bottom smoothed, or polished, or their sides figured, or ornamented by cutting, or grinding, are 'glass cut," and subject to a duty of 40 per centum ad valorem. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Patten, for the plaintiffs. Crittenden, (attorney-general,) contrà. DANIEL, J., delivered the opinion of the court. [ * 14 ] This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, importers of glassware, against the defendant, as collector of the port of New York, to recover a certain amount of money paid under protest to the defendant as collector, for duties exacted by him upon glass tumblers imported by the plaintiffs at the period set forth in an exhibit filed in the cause, by which are also shown the duties charged by and paid to the defendant, and the amount claimed by the plaintiffs, as having been improperly exacted; this last amount, consisting in each instance of the difference between the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, charged under schedule B of the tariff act of July 30, 1846, as on importations of "glass cut," and the duty of 30 per centum ad vlorem, at which rate the plaintiffs claimed to enter their importations of glass above mentioned, under schedule C of the same. act of congress, as "glass tumblers plain, moulded, or pressed, not cut or punted" Binns v. Lawrence. 12 H. The question of law upon the construction of the statute [* 15 ] * of 1846, upon which the judges differed in opinion, and the facts of the case out of which that question has grown, cannot be stated with greater clearness, or with more succinctness of form, than they have been in the certificate from the circuit court. This cause having been tried before his honor Justice Nelson, on the 3d of November, 1848, the jury impanelled returned a verdict for the defendant. The counsel for the plaintiff having excepted to the charge of the presiding judge on the trial, the cause was heard upon the exception reserved for the plaintiff, involving the question, whether, according to the true construction of the act of congress of 30th of July, 1846, entitled "An act reducing the duty on imports and for other purposes," glass tumblers, the bottoms of which have been smoothed or flattened by the process of cutting or grinding, and glass tumblers which have been engraved on the sides by a similar process, should be charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, under schedule B of said act, as "glass cut," or with the duty of 30 per centum ad valorem, under schedule C of said act, as "glass tumblers plain, moulded, or pressed, not cut or punted.” On which question, the opinion of the judges of the court were opposed. Whereupon, on motion of the said plaintiffs by their counsel, that the point upon which the disagreement hath happened may, during the term, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of this court to the supreme court to be finally decided. It is ordered, that the following statement of facts, which is made under the direction of the judges, be certified according to the request of the said plaintiffs, and the statute in such case made and provided. Statement of Facts. That the tumblers in question consisted of two kinds, as follows: 1. Glass tumblers, the entire surface of the bottoms of which had been smoothed by the glass-cutter or grinder, previous to their importation by the plaintiffs. 2. Glass tumblers, on the sides of which ornamental figures had been engraved by the glass-cutter or engraver, previous to such importation. That the tumblers in question of the first class, are only known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as "plain tumblers," or as "plain smooth-bottomed tumblers," or as "plain tumblers with flattened bottoms." That the tumblers in question of the second class, are only Binns v. Lawrence. 12 H. 'known in trade and commerce in said city as "engraved [ 16 ] tumblers." That the tumblers in question (of both classes) are not known in trade and commerce in said city as "cut glass." That all the material witnesses for the plaintiffs were merchants, importing and dealing in glassware. That all the material witnesses for the defendant were manufacturers of glassware, or glass-cutters and grinders. That the designation "cut glass," as used in trade and commerce in said city, applies only to tumblers the sides of which have been cut or ground, and that the importers of glassware and dealers in glassware in said city do not consider tumblers of the description in question in this suit, as coming within the designation, and if they received an order from a customer for "cut glass tumblers," would not regard it as including either smooth-bottomed or engraved tumblers. That by the testimony of the manufacturers and operatives, glass tumblers are manufactured entirely by the glassblower, or in part by the glassblower and in part by the glasscutter or grinder, and that glass blowing and glass cutting are distinct and separate trades, and processes of manufacture. By the same witnesses. That the bottoms of glass tumblers, manufactured entirely by the glassblower, are rough, particularly in the centre, being there broken off from the punt or stick on which made; and that when sold in this condition, such tumblers are known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as "plain," or "plain rough-bottomed tumblers." By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter, or grinder, by whom the centre of the bottoms of such tumblers is cut or smoothed, for the purpose of removing the particular roughness of that part of the tumbler, and that the process of thus cutting or smoothing the centre of the bottoms of such tumblers is called punting; and that tumblers manufactured by the glassblower, but the centre part of the bottoms of which have been so cut or smoothed by the glasscutter, are known in trade and commerce as "punted" tumblers. By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter or grinder, by whom the entire surface of the bottoms of such tumblers is cut or smoothed, and that tumblers manufactured by the glassblower, but the entire bottoms of which have been cut or smoothed by the glasscutter or grinder, are known in Binns v. Lawrence. 12 H. trade and commerce as "plain tumblers," or as * "plain [ *17 ] smoothed-bottomed tumblers," or as "plain tumblers with flattened bottoms," and are similar to the tumblers in question of the first class. By the same witnesses. That tumblers known in trade and commerce, and amongst manufacturers, as "moulded tumblers," or "pressed tumblers," are also made entirely by the glassblower; and are also rough-bottomed until subjected to the process of punting, or smoothing and cutting above described. By the same witnesses. That all cutting of glass is done by means of grinding upon wheels, and that there is no such thing as the cutting of glass in the manufacture of "cut glass" in any other way. By the same witnesses. That the cutting or smoothing of the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is done by the glasscutter, and that the process of cutting and smoothing is identical with that of punting, except that it extends to the entire surface of the bottom of the tumblers, whereas the "punting" is limited, as above stated, to the centre of the bottom merely. By the same witnesses. That the process of "punting," and the process of "cutting or smoothing" the bottoms of the tumblers in question, are identical in their operation with that of cutting the sides of tumblers, known in trade and commerce as "cut glass." It was proved that the time required to cut or smooth the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is four or five times as long as that required for "punting" the bottoms of punted tumblers; and that tumblers with the bottoms cut or smoothed, cost from eighteen to twenty-two cents per dozen more than punted tumblers. It was proved that the "punted" tumblers are charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem under the tariff act of 1846. It was proved by the manufacturers and operatives, that the process of engraving the tumblers of the second class is similar to that of cutting the tumblers of the first class, but is a finer species of work, requiring more experienced and skilful workmen, and the use of copper wheels instead of wood and stone wheels, and oil and emery instead of sand. The question referred to this court by the aforegoing certificate, and the solution of that question, are supposed to lie within a comparatively narrow compass. In the construction of the act of congress of July 30, 1846, as in that of every other statute, one cardinal rule must govern, and it is this: that wherever the will or intention of the lawmaking power is declared in plain and unequivocal terms, that will or intention must be followed-absolutely fol[18] lowed. It would not be admissible under such circum |