The Richmond, &c. Railroad Company v. The Louisa Railroad Co. 13 H. The court of appeals having refused to entertain an appeal, the superior court of chancery of the Richmond circuit, was the highest court of the State, to which the complainants could carry the case; and it is to the decision of that court we must look. The questions are whether that court erroneously decided against a right claimed by the complainants under the constitution of the United States, and whether the bill was dismissed by reason of that erroneous decision. The points decided are set out with great clearness upon the face of the decree. Their substance is, that the construction of this extension road is lawful, the legislature having power to authorize it; that it may lawfully be used for the transportation of passengers, who, but for the existence of the Louisa road, would never have come on to the line of the Fredericksburg road; that whether the Louisa company will use the extension for the transportation of any other passengers, and thus infringe complainants' rights, does not appear; when the supposed case shall occur, it may be proper to interfere by injunction, if, upon the facts of that case as they shall appear, there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. It is clear, then, that the chancellor decided against the right claimed by the complainants, under the constitution, that this extension should not be constructed. In my opinion, this decision was erroneous. It is clear, also, that he decided against their right, under the constitution, to be protected in the enjoyment of the passenger travel coming upon their road, in consequence of the existence of the Louisa road. I think this was also erroneous. By reason of these decisions, the bill was dismissed. They left nothing but a case of contingent damage, which would not happen at all, if the Louisa company should carry only the passengers coming upon the line of the complainants' railroad by reason of the existence of the Louisa road; there was no certainty to what extent, or under which circumstances, or whether at all, the complainants' rights would be infringed. Upon these views of the contract of the State, and the rights of the complainants, it necessarily followed that the bill was to be dismissed; for equity would not interfere in a case where the defendants had valuable rights and powers, which they might not [ * 92 ] * exceed, and which they ought not to be restrained from exercising. But on the other hand, if the defendants had no such rights, or powers; if they were claiming them, and about to exercise them, in a manner certain to inflict great and continuing injury on the complainants, the extent of which injury a court of law could not fully ascertain, and could redress, even partially, only by a great multiplicity of suits, then no court of chancery would hesitate Parish v. Murphree. 13 H. to grant relief. It is certain, therefore, that this bill was dismissed, by reason of, what I consider, the erroneous views taken by the chancellor, of the rights claimed by the complainant under the constitution of the United States. It has been argued that by the local law of Virginia, contained in the general railroad act of that State, the chancellor had not jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the construction of the extension road. If the chancellor had so decided and dismissed the bill, for that reason this court could not reverse that decision. But he did not so decide; and I cannot infer that he would so decide if this case were to be remanded, because I am of opinion that the statute relied on has no application to this case. My opinion is, that the decree of the superior court of chancery should be reversed and the case remanded, with such directions as would secure to the complainants the remedy to which they are entitled, to prevent the violation of rights, secured to them by the constitution of the United States. 16 H. 416; 1 B. 858, 486. HENRY PARISH, DANIEL PARISH, LEROY M. WILEY, JOHN R. MARSHALL, THOMAS P. NORRIS, and THOMAS PARISH, Merchants and Partners trading under the Firm and Style of PARISH AND Co., Appellants, v. CALEB MURPHREE, Administrator of GEORGE GOFFE, deceased; LOUISA C. GOFFE, THOMAS WILLIAMS, Jr., JOHN H. HENDERSON, Trustee, &c., MARTHA LUCY, ADDISON BOYKIN and Wife, ELIZABETH G. GOFFE, CALVIN NORRIS, and DAVID STRODER. 13 H. 92. To avoid a post-nuptial settlement, insolvency need not be proved. A merchant, largely indebted, and whose means of payment were subject to many contingencies, was not in a condition to make such a settlement of a large landed estate, and it is voidable by his creditors. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Volney E. Howard and J. A. Campbell, for the appellants. Wilcox, contrà. M'LEAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal in chancery, from the district court of northern Alabama. [⚫ 97 ] The bill was filed to set aside a deed of settlement, made by George Goffe, dated the 12th September, 1837, on his wife and four daughters, on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors. Parish v. Murphree. 13 H. At the date above stated, Goffe and wife, by deed of general warranty, conveyed to Thomas Williams, Jr., six hundred and forty acres of land, including the "Blount Spring Tract," in Blount county, State of Alabama, for the consideration of sixty-four thousand dollars. To secure the payment of the consideration, on the same day, Williams executed a deed of trust on the same property, to Joseph M. Goffe and George Goffe, for which notes bearing interest were given, five thousand dollars payable 1st March, 1838, five thousand payable on the 1st of October following, ten thousand the 1st of October, 1840, ten thousand the 1st of October, 1842, ten thousand the 1st of October, 1844, ten thousand the 1st of October, 1846, and fourteen thousand the 1st of October, 1848. Williams was to remain in possession of the land, and was authorized to sell parts of it, to meet the above payments. On the same day, George Goffe executed a deed of settlement signed also by Joseph M. Goffe, by which he appropriated to his four daughters the four ten thousand dollars notes above stated, and the fourteen thousand dollars note to his wife, in consideration of "the natural love and affection he had for them." The complainants represent that George and J. M. Goffe did business together as merchants, and that, on the 2d of February, 1837, they executed to them their promissory note for $5,169, payable in thirteen months; and, on the same day, another note payable [98] in twelve months, for five thousand one hundred and *sixtyeight dollars and twenty-five cents; also another note on the 22d September, 1837, for $953.25, payable nine months after date. On all which notes judgments were obtained in the district court, amounting to the sum of $14,667.42, at November term, 1841. Executions having been issued on the judgments, were returned no property, and the defendants are alleged to be insolvent. And the complainants pray that George Goffe may be decreed to pay the amount due them, and, on failure to do so, that Williams may be decreed to pay the same, and in default thereof, that the lands and real estate or debts assigned to Mrs. Goffe and her children, may be converted into money, by sale or otherwise, so as to pay the sum due the complainants. The defendants deny the allegations of the bill, and aver that, at the time of the settlement, the Goffes were able to pay their debts; that their assets exceeded their liabilities, and that the complainants have failed to collect their claims through their own negligence. The statute of frauds of Alabama declares that "every gift, grant, or conveyance of lands, &c., or of goods or chattels, &c., by writing Parish v. Murphree. 13 H. or otherwise, had, made, or contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the end or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, &c., shall be from henceforth deemed and taken only as against the person or persons, his, her, or their heirs, &c., whose debts, suits, &c., by such means, shall or might be in anywise disturbed, hindered, delayed, or defrauded, to be clearly and utterly void," &c. This statute appears to have been copied from the English statute of the 13th Elizabeth; and most of the statutes of the States, on the same subject, embrace substantially the same provisions. The various constructions which have been given to the statutes of frauds by the courts of England and of this country, would seem to have been influenced, to some extent, from an attempt to give a literal application of the words of the statute instead of its intent. No provision can be drawn so as to define minutely the circumstances under which fraud may be committed. If an individual being in debt, shall make a voluntary conveyance of his entire property, it would be a clear case of fraud; but this rule would not apply if such a conveyance be made by a person free from all embarrassments and without reference to future responsibilities. But between these extremes numberless cases arise, under facts and circumstances which must be minutely examined, to ascertain their true character. To hold that a settlement of a small amount, by an individual in independent circumstances, and which, if known to the public, would not affect his credit, is fraudulent, would be a perversion of [* 99 ] the statute. It did not intend thus to disturb the ordinary and safe transactions in society, made in good faith, and which, at the time, subjected creditors to no hazard. The statute designed to prohibit frauds, by protecting the rights of creditors. If the facts and circumstances show clearly a fraudulent intent, the conveyance is void against all creditors, past or future. Where a voluntary conveyance is made by an individual free from debt, with a purpose of committing a fraud on future creditors, it is void under the statute. And if a settlement be made, without any fraudulent intent, yet if the amount thus conveyed impaired the means of the grantor so as to hinder or delay his creditors, it is as to them void. In the case before us, two of the debts, exceeding ten thousand dollars, were contracted in February, 1837, seven months before the settlement deed was executed. The other debt of nine hundred fiftythree dollars and twenty-five cents, was contracted the 22d of September, ten days after the settlement. The property conveyed amounted to sixty-four thousand dollars, fifty-four thousand of which were covered by the settlement. Parish v. Murphree. 13 H. This conveyance is attempted to be sustained on the ground that Mrs. Goffe relinquished her dower to the tract conveyed, and that George Goffe, including the partnership concerns, held an aggregate property, after the settlement, amounting to the sum of sixty-five thousand dollars; and that the debts against Goffe individually, and also against the partnership, did not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars. It appears that in the fall of 1837, and in the early part of 1838, a large amount of his paper being due, at New York, including the plaintiff's, was not paid. Suits were commenced against him, and early in 1839, his property, within the reach of process, was all sold. Goffe, it is proved, sent to Texas in 1839, by his brother, ten negroes and other property, worth about ten thousand dollars. In 1840, George Goffe went to Texas, where he afterwards died. Twenty-seven judgments were rendered against him, four of which were on notes dated the 27th of February, 1837, and four on notes given in September and October following, independent of the plaintiffs' judgments. These facts are incompatible with the assumption that Goffe's assets were more than double his liabilities. His aggregate of property must have been made of exaggerated values, and too low an estimate was made of his eastern debts. After the settlement, and, as it would seem, before it was known to his eastern creditors, his purchases of merchandise were large, and his business at home was greatly extended. Several stores were established by him in partner * ship with his brother. After having abstracted from his [100] means fifty-four thousand dollars, this enlargement of his business shows a disposition to carry on a hazardous enterprise, at the risk of his creditors. In less than three years after the settlement, judgments were obtained against the partnership for between twenty-five and thirty thousand dollars; no inconsiderable part of which had been contracted and was due at the time of the settlement. These facts prove that, after the voluntary conveyance, Goffe was unable to meet his engagements. Nothing can be more deceptive than to show a state of solvency by an exhibit on paper of unsalable property, when the debts are payable in cash. Such property, when sold, will not, generally, bring one fifth of its estimated value. And such seems to have been the result in the case before us. But to avoid the settlement, insolvency need not be shown nor presumed. It is enough to know that, when the settlement was made, Goffe was engaged in merchandising principally on credit; his means consisted chiefly of a broken assortment of goods, debts due for merchandise scattered over the country in small amounts, wild lands of little value, a few negroes, and a very limited amount of |