eral months and until after the commence- | The evidence of the agreed price was admissiment of this suit; that the said oxen, at some ble. As to the Salem marble, resident citizens time in the month of January, 1886, were sold of this State cannot, by merely stepping across and killed; that the marble, or a part of it,-and its boundary line, make contracts and transfer whether that from West Rutland or Salem did property in fraud of the laws of this State and not appear, was taken into the State of New of creditors of one or the other of the parties, York without having been unloaded, but was and then return with the property and hold it returned to Fair Haven, where said five car- in defiance of the laws. loads were unloaded and placed among other marble in said defendant's yard, and that sales were made therefrom to the amount of about $75, and that the rest was still on hand; that the understanding between the defendant and the West Rutland Marble Company was that all said purchases were to be applied to the liquidation of defendant's claim against the West Rutland Marble Company, or so much thereof as would be necessary for the payment of the same. For the purpose of showing the value of said property, the plaintiff offered evidence to show the price which the West Rutland Marble Company sold the property for to the defendant, and the same was admitted; not as conclusive, but to be considered with the other evidence in the case, and in connection with the fact that it was taken upon a demand against the vendors of the property. This was admitted against the objection of the defendant, and exception was seasonably taken. The counsel for the plaintiff did not claim that the sums agreed to be paid for the property were, as matter of law, conclusive as to the values, but urged in argument that, as defendant had agreed to allow those prices at the time of the sale, they ought in fact to be taken at the trial as the true values for which defendant should be held liable. 3 Gray, 551; 7 U. S. Dig. 578; Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill, 377; 4 Johns. Ch. 485; Merrick's Estate, 5 Watts & S. 9; Smith v. Brown, 43 N. H. 44; 21 N. H. 106; 14 N. H. 38. Personal property has no situs, but follows that of the owner. And the assignment would have vested the property in the assignee, had it not been thus fraudulently turned out to the defendant. Cases supra. Messrs. C. H. Joyce and H. A. Harman, for defendant: A State insolvent law cannot affect a sale of chattels situated, contracted for, and delivered in another State, where there is no such law. The title to this marble completely vested in the defendant. Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291. No assignment of the owner's property had been made. The right of a debtor, however insolvent, to apply his property in payment of his debts in his own order is perfectly well settled. Spring v. South Carolina Ins. Co. 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 268 (5 L. ed. 614); Dudley v. Danforth, 61 N. Y. 626; Lyon v. Rood, 12 Vt. 233. The Constitution of the United States provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Early in our national judicial history certain principles were laid down as to the relation of insolvency laws to that prohibition. States may pass insolvency laws when Congress has not put a bankrupt law in force, provided that such laws do not impair the obligation of contracts. The plaintiff's evidence further tended to show that on the 6th day of January, 1886, a petition in insolvency against said West Rutland Marble Company was filed in the court of insolvency for the district of Rutland; that such proceedings were had that said company was duly adjudged an insolvent, January, 1886; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. that plaintiff was duly appointed assignee Feb-122 (4 L. ed. 529); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. ruary, 1886; and that on February, 1886, 12 Wheat. 213 (6 L. ed. 606); M'Millan v. all property of said insolvent debtor was duly M'Neill, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 209 (4 L. ed. 552); assigned to plaintiff as such assignee, all pur- Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 87 (3 L. suant to said Vermont insolvency statutes. ed. 162). The defendant conceded that on the 6th and 7th days of January, 1886, the West Rutland Marble Company was insolvent, and that defendant's officers had reasonable cause to believe said company to be insolvent; and made no question but the sales to defendant, so far as they took place in Vermont, were preferences in fraud of the insolvency laws of the State of Vermont, within the meaning of Vt. Rev. Laws, SS 1860, 1861, or that the said transaction at Salem was of the same character with the sales at West Rutland, except that, being out of the State, defendant claimed that the same could not be affected by the said laws of Vermont. Defendant claimed that plaintiff had not shown any such demand by him and refusal by defendant to return said property as would enable him to maintain this action. Messrs. Lawrence & Meldon, for plaintiff: No demand was necessary. Larkin v. Hapgood, 56 Vt. 597; 2 Allen, 24. The defendant was a wrongdoer. The assignee could recover the property or its value. The assignment would not be respected in the courts of New York. Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86. This court has often recognized the right of our citizens to go into other States and there to make contracts of sale which could not have been enforced if made here, yet which were adjudged to be valid as to our laws, because valid under the laws of the place where made. Thus, to make sales of intoxicating liquor (Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110; Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655); sales on Sunday (Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358); chattel mortgage (57 Vt. 360). Contracts of marriage between citizens of a State by whose laws they are absolutely forbidden are held valid by the courts of the same State when lawfully celebrated elsewhere, although the parties went there merely to evade the law. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521. Against this law can only be urged the principle that the State may compel its own citizens to refrain from doing beyond its limits some | operation of law relate back to the date of the things which the local law would avoid if done filing of the petition." Rev. Laws, § 1860, within its limits. pronounces a transfer like the one in question "void," and gives to the assignee the right to "recover the property or the value thereof from the person so receiving or so to be benefited thereby." Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 665; Hunter v. Potts, 4 T. R. 182; Dehon v. Foster, 7 Allen, 57. But this doctrine meets with these vital limitations: (1) It could not affect this case to concede that our courts may enjoin our citizens from prosecuting actions, valid by the laws of the States where pending; for putting in motion the legal process of another State does not create a contract protected by the National Constitution. (2) English precedents are not in point; for no constitution protects contracts against the action of Parliament. (3) The right of the bankrupt's chose in action is not concerned. Here personal chattels, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, were sold by an executed and lawful contract. 4 Johns. Ch. 460; 14 N. H. 38; 21 N. H. 106; 43 N. H. 44. The price at which the defendant agreed to take the property, under the circumstances, was not competent evidence of the money value of the articles. The position that a particular sale, to become evidence of value, should be fair, actual, and without unnatural advantages on either side, finds support in authority. Campbell v. Woodworth, 20 N. Y. 499; Gill v. McNamee, 42 N. Y. 44; Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 78 N. Y. 137. The contention in this case raises the old question whether an assignment in bankruptcy operates as a complete and valid transfer of all the bankrupt's movable property in other ju risdictions as well as at home, and thus gives the assignee the same rights against purchasers and attaching creditors in the one case as the other. This question, and the question as to the effect of a discharge upon nonresident or foreign creditors who have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, has received the most careful consideration of English and American courts, and of the ablest legal authorities of both countries. The opinions in some American cases contain a review and discussion of all the authorities; as in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 213 (6 L. ed. 606); Cook v. Moffat, 46 U. S. 5 How. 295 (12 L. ed. 159); Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551. The courts of England maintain the doctrine of the universal operation of an assignment upon all movable property, wherever situated at the time of assignment. The courts of this country are divided on the question; but the weight of American authority is considered to be in favor of confining the operation of such assignment to the State where the party is dejuryclared bankrupt or insolvent. The discussion of this vexed question has been so exhaustive, it would be but repetition to again review the cases, or to present the course of reasoning that has led the most eminent jurists to opposite results. Evidence of value too remote to be admissible is not a thing to be considered by the in their discretion, but is incompetent. Noyes v. Fitzgerald, 55 Vt. 49. A demand of the chattels was a condition precedent. The sale is valid to all the world except the assignee. It is not therefore void, but voidable. Snow v. Lang, 2 Allen, 18. On examination of the cases of the United States Supreme Court, where naturally questions growing out of bankruptcy and insolvency laws would receive the most searching investi A preference under Rev. Laws, SS 1860, 1861, is not malum in se. The purchaser does not become, by relation back, a trespasser, for hav-gation, it will be found that the case at bar, so ing taken the goods. far as the decisions of that court are concerned, Bayly v. Bunning, 1 Lev. 172; Letchmere v. is a new one. The parties in this case are both Thorogood, 1 Show. 12; Cooper v. Chitty, 1 residents of this State. The debtor company Burr. 20; Smith v. Milles, 1 T. R. 480; Schu-owned a marble quarry and mill in this State, man v. Fleckenstein, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 224; Nixon v. Jenkins, 2 H. Bl. 135; Tufts v. Syltester, 4 New Eng. Rep. 400. Veazey, J., delivered the opinion of the court: and another mill in Salem, New York, where some of its marble was sawed. On the day the petition in insolvency was filed, the treasurer of the creditor company, this defendant, took a transfer of certain marble and other property at the debtor's mill in this State, to One important question in this case is wheth- apply on its debt, then having reasonable cause er the assignee in insolvency became invested, to believe the debtor was insolvent; and the under the assignment, with the same right to next day he went to Salem, and for a like purrecover the value of the marble that was in pose took a like transfer of some of the marble Salem, New York, as though that marble had there, and brought it back to his company's been in Vermont when the defendant took it. premises in this State. The defendants stand It is insisted by the defendant's counsel that, solely on the fact that the contract for the Salem the contract as to that marble, between the two marble was made in New York. No court of marble companies, being valid in New York that State has intervened. No special law of where it was made, the insolvency law of this that State is invoked. No nonresident comState cannot "reach to the impairing or avoid-plains. The controversy is not between resiing of that contract." Rev. Laws, § 1820, dents of different States, nor as to a debt creprovides: "An assignment under order of aated prior to the enactment of the insolvency court of insolvency shall vest in the assignee law, nor as to the effect of the action of a court all the property of the debtor, real and person- in another jurisdiction touching the same matal, which he could have lawfully sold, assigned, ter. The difference between this case and or conveved; . . . and the assignment shall by those in the Federal and Massachusetts reports is well pointed out in Marsh v. Putnam, 3 | one in conflict with the two cases last cited Gray, 551. from Massachusetts and Maryland. We therefore consider that it is the right and duty of this court to enforce the statute according to its plain terms, and to hold that the defendant company shall not escape liability for an act in fraud of our laws, upon the plea that it occurred beyond the line of the State. In many of the cases the contention has been between residents of different States. It was so in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 213 (6 L. ed. 606), and the question was whether a discharge of a debtor was valid against a creditor who was a citizen of another State. It was decided in the negative. But For the purpose of showing the value of the in the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, he says: property taken by the defendant, the plaintiff "As between its own citizens, whatever be the offered to show the price for which the West origin of the contract, there is now no ques- Rutland company sold the property to the detion to be made on the effect of such a dis- fendant; and the same was admitted, -not as charge." It is to be noted that the court is conclusive, but to be considered with the other here invoked to administer a law of this State evidence in the case and in connection with the between its own resident citizens. A quotation fact that it was taken upon a demand against from the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, the vendor of the property. To the admission in Cook v. Moffat, 46 U. S. 5 How. 295 (12 L. of this evidence the defendant excepted. We ed. 159), is pertinent, as it seems to me sound: hold that the evidence was admissible, to be "According to established principles of juris- considered as indicated in the ruling. Price, prudence such (insolvent) laws have always generally, if not always, has more or less refbeen held valid and binding within the terri-erence to value. It must therefore tend in some torial limits of the State by which they are measure to show value. Its weight is dependpassed, although they may act upon contracts ent upon the circumstances of the sale. If the made in another country, or upon the citizens sale is usual in all respects, the price would tend of another nation; and they have never been more strongly to show actual value than if the considered, on that account, as an infringe- sale is peculiar, as in this case; but it cannot ment upon the rights of other nations or their be said that, because it is peculiar, it has no recitizens. But beyond the limits of the State lation to the value. It is hardly conceivable they have no force, except such as may be given that buyers and sellers should not have value in to them by comity. But how far this com- mind in fixing a price. Price cannot in any ity should be extended would be exclusively a case be conclusive of value, yet it is concededly question for each State to decide for itself by competent to show price as having a value in its own proper tribunal." This is but stating some cases. Where is the line to be drawn? in substance that States may pass laws having It would seem to be better to admit the evidence effect within their respective limits, and binding of price in all cases, together with the circumtheir own courts, leaving the effect in other stances of the sale, and let the evidence be guardStates to be determined by their own tribunal. ed by proper instructions. If this assignee were seeking this remedy in New York, then the question of comity would arise. It would be for the court there to say whether, upon the ground of comity, it would enforce a plain statutory remedy of this State as against a contract executed in that State between citizens of this State. In Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551, it was held that a certificate of discharge under the insolvent law of Massachusetts is a bar to an action on a contract between two citizens of that State, though made and to be performed in another State. In Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill, 377, the action was trover under a statute like ours, and upon similar facts; and the court in a vigorous and learned opinion sustained the plaintiff's right of recovery, holding that their courts were bound to observe and enforce the statutory prcvisions of their own State, and that a nation will not suffer its own citizens to evade the operation of its own fundamental policy or laws, or to commit fraud in violation of them, by any acts or contracts made with that design in a foreign country; and it will judge for itself how far it will adopt or how it will reject any such act or contracts. We think this is a sound, as well as wholesome, view of the law. Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, supra, said: "It is a general rule, expressly recognized by the court in Sturges v. Crowninshield, that the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with the facts on which it is made." Subjecting all the reported insolvency cases to this rule, I think there is no It is further claimed that the plaintiff cannot recover because no sufficient demand for the return of the property was shown. We think no demand was necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover. The contract by which the defendant obtained the property was by the statute void. The defendant appropriated the property to its use by sale and otherwise. There was concededly an actual conversion, and no power to restore. The harsh rule was early established in this State, unlike the rule in some other States, that where one purchases personal property of a person in possession of it, but who is not the true owner and has no right to sell it, and the purchaser takes possession claiming title to it as owner, and puts it to use, this is an actual conversion, and makes him liable in trover to the owner, without any demand or notice, though he purchased in good faith of one whom he supposed to be the owner and entitled to sell it. Riford v. Montgomery, 7 Vt. 411. The case at bar is stronger, because here the vendor not only had no right to sell the property to the vendee, to be applied on the debt, thereby giving a preference, but the vendee was chargeable with knowledge of that fact. There is no necessity of proof of a demand and refusal for the purpose of establishing a conversion, when the conversion is otherwise established. It is only evidence of a conversion where the party might have delivered the property if he would. Rob. Dig. p. 709. Defendant's counsel cites Schuman v. Fleck Brooke v. McCracken, 10 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 466. The proof of demand and refusal constitutes evidence of conversion,-or constructive conversion, as sometimes called,-and is the equiva lent of proof of actual conversion, either of which is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, where the other elements are established. See Tapley v. Forbes, 84 Mass. 20; Larkin v. Hapgood, 56 Vt. 597. enstein, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 224. That action | he can recover. To the same effect, see also was brought by the assignee of a bankrupt under the United States Bankrupt Act (U. S. Rev. Laws, § 5128), to recover from the defendant the sum of $311, the alleged value of certain property transferred by the bankrupt to the defendant within two months prior to the filing of the petition against him in bankruptcy, contrary to the provision of said section, which is in substance and almost in terms the same as § 1860 of our Revised Laws. The defendant We think there was no error in the instrucdemurred, and for causes of demurrer as- tions to the jury as to the rule of damages. It signed that the complaint-a Code proceeding was the value of the property at the time the did not allege a demand and refusal of the prop-defendant took it. If the clause that the plainerty, or any fact showing a conversion by the defendant. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that an action to recover the value of property can only be maintained when the property itself has been actually or constructively converted to the use of the defendant, and the complaint must therefore allege a conversion in terms, or its legal equivalent,--a demand and refusal. Under that decision either is sufficient. Here we have a conversion in fact. Speaking of the action of trover, Chitty (Chitty, Pl. p. 170) puts it in the same way: "A demand and refusal are necessary in all cases when the defendant became in the first instance lawfully possessed of the goods, and the plaintiff is not prepared to prove some distinct actual conversion.' So in Trisuig v. Orr, 49 Cal. 617, it was held that, no distinct and actual conversion being shown, the plaintiff must allege and prove a demand and refusal before tiff was entitled to recover the value of the dynamo as it stood in the mill was fairly and clearly referable to the damage done to the insolvent's other property not taken by the defendant, it would doubtless be error; but we do not so construe it, or think it was so understood by the jury. But we do think that the jury, by inadvertence, included in the special verdict as to the dynamo, the three electric lamps and the cost of setting them up. The correspondence in the figures makes this very apparent. The amount of this, with interest, was $171.47. This the plaintiff offers to remit, and asks leave to file a remittitur. This we think should be allowed, but the defendant should have costs in this court. The judgment is reversed, and judgment is rendered for the plaintiff for the amount of the judgment below, less said sum remitted, with costs, less the defendant's costs in this court. VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS. James C. ALEXANDER et ux. V. J B. ALEXANDER et al. the other-are heard together, and a single decree is rendered, which passes upon the rights of the parties in both suits, and they are equally affected thereby; and the plaintiff in one suit appeals, the rights of the appellee, in the other suit, will also be considered on the appeal. 1. Where two suits between the same parties—the plaintiff in one being defendant in NOTE.-Joinder of causes of action; multifarious- Judgment by confession on warrant of attorney. ness. The complainant may join in the same bill Where a judgment at law by confession on a wartwo good causes of complaint arising out of the rant of attorney appears regular and formal acsame transaction, where all the defendants are inter-cording to the record, this court will not interfere ested in the same claim or right, and where the relief with or impeach it, on the ground of any alleged asked for as to each is of the same nature. Varick irregularity or informality in entering it up; but v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137 (3 N. Y. Ch. L.ed. 659). Upon the will consider the rights acquired under such judgreturn of an execution issued upon a judgment ment as valid in law; especially where several against joint debtors, upon some of whom process years have elapsed since the judgment, and the dehad not been served, a creditors' bill might be filed fendants have acquiesced in it and in the execuagainst them all, although the separate property of tion and sale under it. De Riemer v. De Cantillon, those not served could not be reached. Emery v. 4 Johns. Ch. 85 (1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 773). A Emery, 9 How. Pr. 134. See Lake Erie Com. Bank judgment entered up by confession on a warrant v. Meach, 7 Paige, 448 (4 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 225). Where of attorney, without the requisite specification separate judgments have been recovered against of the particulars of the debt, is good as between drawer and indorser, one creditors' bill may be the parties, and fraudulent only in respect to filed against both defendants, if the indorser has other bona fide judgment creditors and bona fide property or effects to the amount of $100 or more. purchasers for value. Beekman v. Kirk, 15 How. Austin v. Figueira, 7 Paige, 59 (4 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 59). Pr. 231; Daly v. Mathews, 20 How. Pr. 274; Marks v. To make a bill multifarious, it must contain two Reynolds, 12 Abb. Pr. 407, note; Kendall v. Hodggood causes of action that cannot be united. White ins, 1 Bosw. 664; Whitney v. Kenyon, 7 How. Pr. v. Kuntz, 13 Daly, 200. There must be a combina- 460; Dunham v. Waterman, 3 Duer, 180. tion of several distinct matters on which relief could be granted in equity, if separate. Brownlee v. Lockwood, 20 N. J. Eq. 257. A bill is not multifarious where it sets up one sufficient ground for equitable relief, and another claim which, upon its face, contains no equity which can entitle the complainant to the interposition of the court, either for discovery or relief. Durling v. Hammer, 20 N. J. Eq. 228; Red Jacket Tribe v. Hoff, 33 N. J. Eq. 442; Warren v. Warren, 56 Me. 367. Such bill is not multifarious, although it contains an offer for relief as to each claim. Wilkinson v. Bradley, 54 Ala. 684. See also 13 L. R. A. 346. Husband's initiate right of curtesy. Curtesy before the wife's death is not a right vested in the husband; it does not become vested until her death. Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599; 2 Bish. Mar. Wom. $ 43. The husband's right to his wife's personalty in possession, and his estate for their joint lives, is a vested right (Quigley v. Graham, 18 Ohio St. 42; Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479; 2 Bish. Mar. Wom. § 40); but it is otherwise as to his right to her chose in action which he has not reduced to possession before his death. Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164. See Goodyear v. Rumbaugh, 13 Pa. 480; Henry v. Dilley, 25 N. J. L. 302. 2. A bill to enforce two judgments will not be held multifarious as to one of the defendants who is a party to but one of the judgments in suit, where the other parties are entitled to have the two causes of action united, and where such right overweighs any inconvenience which such defendant could suffer. 1876-77, chap. 329, p. 333), it is deemed advisable to set out in detail the sources from which the property claimed as the separate estate of the female appellant was derived. On the 6th day of May, 1874, as fully appears by the record, Sue J. Boyd, a feme sole, received as a 8. A confession of judgment made under a $1,000, which, very soon after, to wit, in May, legatee of one Ann Davidson the sum of power of attorney executed under seal in the firm name by a member of the firm will be held 1875, she loaned to H. Alexander, taking his valid as against all the members of the firm on bonds therefor, with J. B. Alexander as his collateral attack, and in the absence of proof security. And for this debt, with accrued inthat all the members were not consenting there-terest, she subsequently, to wit, in April, 1881. to, although a partner cannot usually bind his copartners under seal, a seal not being requisite to such a power of attorney. 4. A married woman may sue a firm of which her husband is a member, upon a confession of judgment executed to her for a loan from her separate estate, subsequent to the Married Woman's Act (Acts 1876-77, p. 333); and it is immaterial that her husband is joined with her in such confession of judgment, as a nominal party took a new bond from these same parties; and this latter bond it is which is the foundation of the larger of the two judgments hereinafter mentioned. In the month of March, 1874, Andrew Boyd, the father of the said Sue J., died, having bequeathed to her a legacy of $800, subject, however, to a deduction of $177, the value of a horse, bridle, and saddle, which she had received as an advancement; which horse, with his equipments, seems to have been 6. When a married woman sues a firm of soon disposed of, exactly in what way does not which her husband is a member, on a contract appear. At the death of the testator, her faconcerning her separate estate, there is no objec-ther, his family consisted of his wife, this tion to her husband's being joined with her as a nominal plaintiff, although he is also one of the defendants. required by the statute. 6. The Married Woman's Act is to be construed fairly, so as to carry out the intent of the Legislature to secure to the feme covert, as separate estate, free from the debts, liabilities, and disposal of the husband, all of the property acquired at the times and in the ways pointed out in the Act. 7. A husband's initiate right of curtesy, and right to reduce into possession his wife's choses in action, are not vested rights which may not be lawfully taken away or impaired by the Legislature. 8. Tenancy by the curtesy initiate is done 9. A legacy to a daughter from her father, not (August 23, 1988.) daughter, Sue J., and two unmarried sons, John and Andrew; his six other children hav ing homes away. After the death of the testator the widow and her said three unmarried children continued to reside on the farm, the said children leasing the farm and personal property from the widow for a merely nominal sum, and farming in partnership. On the 30th of December, 1875, this Sue J. Boyd intermarried with James C. Alexander, a brother of the Alexanders herein mentioned. In November, 1878, she received the sum of $256, a part of the legacy derived from her father, and the same was loaned by her to the firm of J. B. Alexander & Co., composed of J. B. Alexander, M. J. Alexander, and her husband, J. C. Alexander, with H. Alexander as security; and this debt is represented by the second and smaller judgment mentioned in this suit. In April, 1881, she received the residue of said legacy, amounting to $367; but what disposi tion was made of it the record does not disclose. Upon the death of her mother, in February, 1880, Mrs. Alexander became seised and possessed in fee of a one undivided ninth-part of a tract of land situated in Pulaski County. containing 450 acres, and worth about $9,000 or $10,000; and shortly thereafter the said Sue J. and her brothers John and Andrew bought out the shares of the other children, and received conveyances therefor,-the interest of separate use, free from the control and debts of her husband. By these conveyances and the devise of her father Mrs. Alexander and her two brothers became the owners of all the real estate of which her father died seised,-each owning one undivided third. And in making her purchase of two ninths of this property it is admitted that she never received from her husband, directly or indirectly, one dollar in money, labor, or assistance of any kind or character. Indeed, so far from receiving assistance from her husband, the record shows that she gave him several hundred dollars to aid him in his business schemes, and herself provided for her family. About this time, in 1881 or 1882, and probably before she had entirely APPEAL by plaintiff Sue J. Alexander, Mrs. Alexander being conveyed to her sole and wife of James C. Alexander, from a decree of the Pulaski County Circuit Court in favor of defendants in an action to subject real estate to the payment of a judgment. Reversed. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Hinton, J., delivered the opinion of the court: As this case involves to some extent the coustruction of the Act of Assembly passed April 4. 1877, entitled "An Act Securing to Married Women, on Couditions, all Property Acquired by Them Before or After Marriage" (see Acts |