are permitted to regulate contracts, made in foreign countries. But to have this effect, the parties must not have had some other country in contemplation, at the time of making the contract. This being first ascertained, the government, within whose bounds such foreign laws claim admission, has next to consider, whether in case they are enforced, it will cause a prejudice to its rights, or to the rights of its citizens.

Did the parties intend to be governed by the laws of Mississippi; and had they not, at the time, in contemplation their return to this country? The acts of the parties speak louder than their words, and disclose the real intention of the parties. Be their intention as it may, a foreign law has no other force, than that which it derives from the consent of the government, within the bounds of which it claims to be admitted; and its admission may be refused whenever it shall interfere within its own regulations. One of the parties to this marriage was a minor; and under the protection of this government. This protection followed her wherever she went, having no other domicil than that of her mother in Louisiana. By our laws, a minor, who marries, cannot give away his property, without the authorization of those, whose consent is necessary for the validity of the marriage. But by the laws of the Mississippi Territory, all the personal estate of the wife, is the property of the husband. Again, according to our laws, we cannot give away more, than a certain portion of our property, when we have forced heirs. Not so in Mississippi. Shall the mother lose the inheritance of this child, secured to her by our laws; and shall our laws be reduced to silence within our own precints? But the municipal law of the Mississippi Territory, is not the law, which would govern this case, even there. The law of ǹations, is law at Natchez, as well as at New-Orleans. According to the principles of that law, personal incapacities, communicated by the laws of any particular place, accompany the person, wherever he goes. Thus, he, who is excused the consequences of contracts, for want of age, in his own country, cannot make binding contracts in another. Even in Mississippi, therefore, such marriage could not have the effect of giving to her husband, what the wife was forbidden to give.

11.

CAMBRIDGE T. LEXINGTON, Oct. T. 1823, 1 Pick. Mass. Rep.

P. 505.

A different The court in this case, recognize the doctrine, that a husband principle, however, divorced for the cause of adultery, in Massachusetts, where he

have been

courts in

adults.

was prohibited from again marrying, might nevertheless go into seems to New-Hampshire, where his marrying was not prohibited; and recognized might there contract that relation; and the issue by such second by other marriage would be legitimate. The court observed, that Mr. the case of Justice Buller, in his treatise on the law of N. P. p. 113, cites a case decided by the court of archies, and afterwards on appeal by the delegates, that a Scotch marriage between English parties, contrary to the English statutes, respecting marriage, was valid in England. This was carrying the doctrine further than it is laid down by Huber; for according to the exception to his third maxim, (same ch. s. 2.) such a marriage might be disallowed in the country where the parties lived, on the ground that it was entered into in evasion of the laws of their own country; the comity of nations not extending so far as to allow of the operation of the laws or contracts, which are prejudicial to their own subjects. But here, it is his descendants only, upon whom the present question can operate. The children of the second marriage are legitimate there, and they ought not, unless by virtue of some express legislative act, to be deemed illegitimate here. The disability was only local, limited by the confines of the state, which enacted it.

12.

SAUL V. HIS CREDITORS, 17 Mart. Lou. Rep. 598.

A different principle from that held, ante, No. 10, prevailed in And this principle al this case, in which it was held, that the law of the domicil of so has since the marriage, and not where it was dissolved, should determine been recog the rights of the husband and wife, upon a dissolution of the re- Louisiana. lation.

nized in

13.

ject.

MEDWAY V. NEEDHAM, Oct. T. 1819, 16 Mass. Rep. 157. S. P. PUTNAM V. PUTNAM, ET AL. 8 Pick. Mass. Rep. 433. Where it was held, that a marriage, which would be void if Same sub entered into within the state, was yet valid, being made in Rhode Island, where it was lawful, and this, notwithstanding the parties went there for the purpose of doing what by the laws of Massachusetts was unlawful, and immediately returned to dwell within the latter state. Parker, C. J. observes, (8 Pick. p. 435,) The court were aware of all the objections to the doc. trine maintained in that case, and knew it to be vexata quæstio among civilians; but they adopted the rule of law of England, on this subject, on the same ground as it was adopted there,

namely, the extreme danger and difficulty of vacating a marriage, which by the laws of the country, where it was entered into, was valid. The condition of parties thus situated, the ef· fect upon their innocent offspring, and the outrage to public morals, were considered as decisive reasons for giving place to the laws of the foreign country, not merely on account of comity, but from general policy. The widow of the husband of such a marriage was held to be entitled to dower in her husband's estate, after his death.

Same sub ject.

A deed by father to

14.

GREENWOOD V. CURTIS, March T. 1810, 6 Mass. Rep. 378. In the language of C. J. Parsons, If a foreign state allows of marriages, incestuous by the laws of nature, as between parent and child, such marriages could not be allowed to be of any validity here. But marriages not naturally unlawful, but prohibited by the law of one state, and not of another, if celebrated where they are not prohibited, would be holden valid in a state, where they were not allowed. As in this state, (Mass.) a marriage celebrated here, between a man and his deceased wife's sister, is lawful, but it is not so in some states. Such a marriage here, would be held valid, in any other state, and the parties entitled to the benefits of the matrimonial contract.*.

15.

WALLIS, EX'R v. WALLIS, March T. 1808, 4 Mass. Rep. 135. If a father, by bargain and sale, convey lands to a son, the son is good law will presume a consideration of natural affection, from the although relation of the parties, in addition to the valuable consideration nothing but a valuable expressed in the deed; and where the conveyance is to the son, considera to have and to hold, after the death of the grantor, with the pressed, for usual covenants, it will be construed to be a covenant of the guinity of grantor, to stand seized to his own use during life, and after the parties his death to the use of the grantee.

tion be ex

the consan

though not

mentioned

Parsons, C. J. said: For, although a freehold cannot be conin the deed veyed in futuro by a common law conveyance, yet, by a cove

is consis

tent with it.

* In Doe v. Vardill, 5 B. & C. 433; S. C. Ham. Abr. p. 650, where the question was, whether a child born in Scotland of unmarried parents, who had their domicil in that country; and, who afterwards intermarried there, (which by the Sotch law rendered the child legitimate,) was capable of inheriting land in England. The court held, that, in order to inherit socage lands in England, the heir must be born after marriage. The Lex domicili governs in the distribution of personal property; but the rule as to land must depend upon the law of the place where it is situated; and it being necessary, in England, in order for the heir to take by descent, that he be born in lawful matrimony, the comity of nations cannot prevail against it.

nant to stand seized to uses, such conveyance can be effected. And every deed ought to be construed, if it be legally possible, so as to effect the intent of the parties. Upon the execution of the deed, the grantor was tenant for life, and a remainder in fee was vested in the grantee.

16.

a child is ei

vancement

to the inten

JACKSON D. BENSON V. MATSDORF, ET AL. 11 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 91; THOMPSON'S HEIRS V. THOMPSON'S DEVISEES, 1 Yerg. Tenn. Rep. 97. Where a father purchases land in the name of his child, it of land in A purchase shall be deemed a trust, for the father, or an advancement for the name of the child. And whether it is the former or the latter, will de- ther a trust pend mainly on the intention of the parent. Thus, the father or an ad received a deed of lands to his infant daughter, but kept the according deed in his own hands until it was privately taken away by the tion of the daughter and her husband. The father afterwards obtained an- father in making it. other deed from the grantor to himself; and the defendants claimed under the father, and were in possession. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, on the grounds: 1st, that the deed on the face of it, appeared to be a resulting trust, and such a trust not being within the statute, may be proved by parol evidence; 1 J. Cas. 153; 3 Johns. 216. 2d, And there was no trust completed by delivery of the deed to the trustee. 3d, But admitting a delivery of the deed, the interest created was a resulting trust to the father, who paid the consideration; and if the legal estate vested in the daughter, it could not alter the case.

In the case cited from Yerger, the father paid the purchase money, and took a bond for a conveyance to himself and son, jointly; and afterwards the father received the deed to himself alone. Held, that he was a trustee of the legal estate for the moiety belonging to the son, which the heirs of the son might de vest by a suit in equity.

(E) AS TO THE EARNINGS OF THE CHILD."

There is no question but that a father, who is entitled to the services of his minor son, and for whom he is obliged to provide, may, at the common law, assign those services to others, for a consideration to enure to himself. The statute of 1794. (Mass.) does not, like the English statute of 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 41, relating to apprentices and servants, make void all contracts by which a minor is bound in service, unless such contracts are made pursuant to the statute. Per Parsons, C. J. 7 Mass. Rep. 142. Vide tit. Assumpsit, ante, vol. 1, p. 546, E.; vide also,Guardian & Ward post.

1.

NIGHTINGALE V. WITHINGTON, Oct. T. 1818, 15 Mass. Rep. 273; MORSE V. WELTON, 6 Conn. Rep. 547; Keene v. SPRAGUE, 3 Greenl. Me. Rep. 77.

Generally, the father, and in case of his death, the mother, is entitled to the earnings of their minor children. But where the parent has discharged himself of the obligation to support his child, or has obliged the child to support himself, there is no principle but that of slavery, which will give him a right to the child's labor. Thus, where the parent denies his child a home, and a support, so that he is obliged to labour abroad for a living; or, where the parent gives, or in the more questionable way, sells the child his time; the law in these cases, implies an emancipation of the son.

But he may waive this

right.

And when

the child is

2.

WHITING V. EARLE, Oct. T. 1825, 2 Pick. Mass. Rep. 201.

So, where a minor makes a contract for his services on his own account, his father not objecting, this will be considered an implied assent on the part of the father, for the child to have his earnings, and the father consequently has no claim thereto.

3.

BURLINGAME V. BURLINGAME, 7 Conn. Rep. 92; BENSON v.
REMINGTON, 3 Mass. Rep. 113; NIGHTINGALE V. WITH-
INGTON, 15 ib. 272.

Whenever the child is entitled to his own earnings by the conentitled to sent or emancipation of the father, the action may be brought in his earnings he may sue his own name.

in his own

name.

4.

In such case

a creditor of

MANCHESTER V. SMITH, AND TRUSTEES, Oct. T. 1831, 12 Pick. Mass. Rep. 113; MORSE v. WALTON, 6 Conn. Rep. 547; SHUTE V. DAVIS, 5 Wend. N. Y. Rep. 206.

Where the father had, by indenture of apprenticeship, relinthe father quished all claim to the earnings of the son, till his age of 21, cannot reco the minor alone was held entitled to the earnings; and it was also held, that the creditors of the father could not attach them by a process of foreign attachment.

ver the earn

ings.

But in general the law considers the child as the servant of his parent, and as labouring for him, though not in his actual employment; and the parent may sue for his earnings.