the government to require the warrant or material taken from the said lands of the

Although the three years limitations for

ingly.

I think the applicants were subject to criminal prosecution at that date; and were then authorized to enter the tracts applied for; and therefore reverse your decision, and allow the entry.

scrip to be lifted, and money or other United States in the ordinary clearing of commencement of criminal proceedings scrip, or warrant representing the exact the land, in working a mining claim, or have now elapsed, the question must be amount, to be laid in its place. for agricultural or domestic purposes, or considered as of the date of their appliThis, especially after issue of patent, for maintaining improvements upon the cation, and their right determined accordwould involve confusion of records and land of any bona fide settler, or for or on titles without good or apparent reason. account of any timber or material taken or It is much simpler in practice to take the used by any person without fault or words of the statute in their natural sense, knowledge of the trespass, or for or on acand without disturbing the entry and title count of any timber taken or used withpapers, make the repayment as provided, out fraud or collusion by any person who by account with the treasury, with an en- in good faith paid the officers or agents of dorsement of the transaction upon your the United States for the same, or for or records as in other cases under the same on account of any alleged conspiracy in law, without reference to the question relation thereto. Provided, That the prowhether the payment was made in money visions of this section shall apply only to or in paper receivable as cash under the trespasses and acts done or committed, law providing for its use. And such I and conspiracies entered into, prior to understand to be the true intendment of March 1, 1879; And provided “further, That defendants in such suits or proceedings shall exhibit to the proper courts or officers the evidence of such entry and payment, and shall pay all costs accrued up to the time of such entry."

the act.

1. Wherever, therefore, the entry is made by specific location, and wholly fails, the scrip or warrant, being within the control of your office, and not in fact satisfied, may be returned for proper location upon cancellation of the former invalid entry. And this I understand is already the practice, the case not being one falling under the repayment laws.

2. But where the consideration is carried into the treasury as cash, and can only be withdrawn by application under the repayment statutes, it seems clear that it must be repaid in the manner provided by the statutes, out of money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.

3. And in cases of excess, where they fall within the provisions of the repayment acts, the excess must also be repaid, as provided by the law, out of such moneys. This construction will harmonize the whole law, and conduce to uniformity in the practice of your office.

SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner Me Farland, February 23, 1883.

I have considered the appeal of Coe and Carter from your decision of April 15, 1882, rejecting their application to purchase under the first section of the act of June 15, 1880, the S. of S. W. of Sec. 18, N. of N. E. 4, the N. of N. W. 4, and the S. E. of N. W. 4 of Sec. 19, in Tp. 11 N., R. 75 W., and the S. E. of S. E. of Sec. 13, Tp. 11 N., R. 76 W., Denver, Colorado.

This section provides, "That when any lands of the United States shall have been entered, and the Government price paid therefor in full, no criminal suit or proceeding by or in the name of the United States shall thereafter be had or further maintained for any trespasses upon, or for, or on account of any material taken from said lands; and no civil suit or proceeding shall be had or further maintained for or on account of any trespasses upon or

Section four provides that the act shall not apply to any of the mineral lands of the United States, and that no person who shall be prosecuted for or proceeded against on account of any trespass committed or material taken from any of the public lands after March 1, 1879, shall be entitled to the benefit thereof.

This statute contemplates that persons who committed trespasses on the public lands (not mineral) prior to March 1, 1879, may secure themselves against criminal or civil proceedings therefor by purchase of such lands at the government price.

To

CIRCULAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., March 3, 1883. Registers and Receivers U. S. District Land Offices, and to Special Timber Agents of the General Land Office.

The first section of the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., p. 482), granting to railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United States, provides that any railroad company organized as therein described shall have "the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, material, earth, stone, and timber necessary for the construction of said railroad."

In determining the rights of railroad companies under the foregoing provision, you will be governed by the following instructions:

1. Said provision refers exclusively to contemplated or unconstructed roads. Companies have no right to take timber or other material under this act for re|pairs, fuel, or for the further improvement of roads already constructed.

It appears that prior to March 1, 1879, the applicants unlawfully cut timber on 2. The right granted to any railroad the tracts applied for; that civil suits company under this act, to take timber or were commenced against them for such other material from the public lands " adtrespass; that they offered a certain sum jacent to the line of said road" for conof money in satisfaction thereof, which struction purposes, is construed to mean was accepted by this Department; that that, in procuring timber or other material the agreed price was paid in April, 1880, for the purposes indicated in the act, the and the suits were withdrawn. There- same must be obtained from the public after the government had no further claim lands in the neighborhood of the line of upon them under civil proceedings; and road being constructed, and within the were this the only question, the applicants terminal points of such road, if possible. would have no right under that act. Not If, however, it should be found that the so, however, as respects a criminal prose- material required in the construction of cution for their acts. Section 1046, Re- such road cannot be procured from the vised Statutes, and the act of April 3, public lands in the neighborhood of, and 1876 (19 Stat. 32), provide that no per- within the terminal limits of such road, son shall be prosecuted, tried or punished then it is permitted that such company for any offence-not capital-except for may obtain the material required outside crime arising under the revenue or slave- the terminal limits of the road under contrade laws, unless the indictment is found struction; such material, however, to be or the information is instituted within taken from such points as are most three years next after such offense shall accessible and nearest to the terminal limhave been committed. These trespasses its thereof. were committed in 1876 and 1877; but, although their precise date does not appear, it is reasonable to suppose, in view of the allegations of the applicants, that some of them were committed within three years prior to November 9, 1880, the date of the application, and hence that, on that date, they were not exempt from criminal proceedings, and were then authorized to enter the tracts, in order to secure immunity therefrom.

3. All duly organized railroad companies under this act, upon the filing and acceptance of properly authenticated copy of their articles of incorporation and organization, and map of definite line of location, are entitled (as provided in paragraph numbered 2 of this circular) to take timber from any of the public lands not otherwise reserved or previously occupied according to law, whether the same be mineral or non-mineral in character.

The courts held these proceedings as without authority and void of legal effect, and that the patent was not vitiated thereby. Upon the general question of the authority of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to issue second patents to correct defects in the originals, the court, in Le Roy vs. Clayton, held that the Commissioner had such power in a proper case, with the consent of parties, and that he had power to determine whether the application and evidence in a given instance presented a proper case for the exercise of that authority.

tures to, the original instrument can be reproduced after a lapse of time such as has occurred in the present instance.

In view therefore of all the circumstances of this case, I must hold that I am not authorized to comply with your request to issue a new patent for the Guadaloupe Rancho.

It is your further request, in event of such decision, that a new certificate be now written across the patent, withdrawing all prior endorsements. As the first endorsement has already been withdrawn by the second so far as one endorsement can withdraw another, and as the courts have already declared in this case that such endorsements are nugatory, I must decline to further complicate the matter by making a new endorsement which could have no utility, and for the making of which I possess no authority.

4. In the procurement of timber or United States. (Le Roy vs. Clayton, 2 Saw-so, since neither the date of, nor the signaother material for construction purposes, yer, 493; Le Roy vs. Jamison, 3 Sawyer, such company must, before causing the 369; Adam vs. Norris, 103 U. S., 591.) cutting or removal thereof, appoint in This patent bears upon its face a note writing one or more persons as their duly purporting to be a note of cancellation, authorized agent or agents, for that pur- and a subsequent note purporting to pose. Copies of all such appointments must revoke the attempted cancellation. be filed in this office for its information, in order that such company may be held responsible for any violation of the rules and regulations as herein prescribed, in relation to the cutting or removal of timber or other material from the public lands by such agent, or those employed by or under him. 5. All such duly appointed agents have authority to employ others to procure from such public lands and deliver to them, for the use of such company, all material required for the purposes specified in the act. It is immaterial whether such persons are employed by the day or by the piece; but no authority can be given by such railroad company to the general public to cut timber from the public lands. 6. No railroad company organized according to the provisions of this act is entitled to procure, or cause to be procured, either by itself or through any of its agents, any timber or other material from the public lands for sale or other disposal, either to other companies or to the general public.

7. The right to take timber from the public lands by such railroad company, or its agents, is confined to such timber or other material as is actually necessary in original construction of same, and ceases when such road is open to the public for general use.

8. In the procurement of such timber from the public lands, none less than eight inches in diameter is permitted to be cut or removed; no waste or destruc

tion of timber is allowable, and the tops and laps of all trees must be cut and piled, in order that the spread of forest fires may be checked thereby.

All rules and regulations or instructions heretofore prescribed under said act of March 3, 1875, by this Department, inconsistent with the provisions contained in this circular, are hereby rescinded.

N. C. MCFARLAND, Commissioner. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, March 5, 1883. Approved: H. M. TELLER, Secretary.

PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.
RANCHO GUADALOUPE.

Second Patent. So long as a patent is outstand-
ing, a second patent cannot issue to the same
party for the same land. The jurisdiction of

the department over the patent ceases with

its issue, and must be re-acquired before it can be again exercised. COMMISSIONER MCFARLAND to J. K. Redington, Washington, D. C., Jan. 29, 1883. J. W. L. I have considered your application for the issue of a new patent for the Rancho Guadaloupe. The existing patent bears date March 18, 1870, and its validity as against the United States, in the absence of proper proceedings to set it aside, has been affirmed by the Circuit Court for California and the Supreme Court of the

SECRETARY'S DECISION. SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFar land, March 16, 1883.

Rancho.

The question before me, then, is whether the circumstances of this case authorize the recall of the patent of 1870, and the issue of a new patent in its place? I do not understand that this is what you desire, but rather that the parties whom you rep- California, I have considered the appeal In the matter of the Rancho Guadalupe, resent wish to retain the original patent, and to receive also a new one free from from your decision of January 29, 1883, the endorsements which appear upon the refusing to issue a new patent for that former. The latter proposition could not be entertained. So long as a patent is outstanding, a second patent cannot issue to the same party for the same land. The jurisdiction of this office over the patent ceased with its issue, and must be reacquired before it can be again exercised. But if the parties were willing to surrender the patent of 1870, several obstacles to the acceptance of such surrender and the issue of a new patent would be presented under the circumstances of this case.

The affirmative ground upon which the application is based, does not appear to me to present a proper case for recall. It is not alleged by the parties that the patent of 1870 does not include all the land claimed by them. The United States has not asked that the patent be surrendered in order that one for a less quantity may be issued in its stead. There is no error in the name of the grantee. There is no defect in the present patent as a legal instrument. Nothing appears in the case that goes to the substance of the title, or to the possession of it by the proper parties.

If a new patent would convey or relinquish nothing not conveyed or relinquished by the present patent, then the issue of a new patent would be a vain thing. If a new patent would convey or relinquish something else, then I should not be authorized to issue it in the absence of jurisdiction to reopen the whole case, and to decide it anew upon its merits.

Nearly thirteen years have now elapsed since the patent in this case was issued.

If officers who execute a patent may, within a proper time, and under circumstances of sufficient moment, replace that patent with another on account of some defacement of the first, it is manifest that their successors are not equally able to do

In 1866 a patent was issued for this grant. The owner refused to accept it, upon the ground that it did not include all the land to which he was entitled.

Upon a new survey and further proceedings, a second patent was issued March 1, 1870, which included all the lands claimed-being some ten thousand acres more than were in the first.

The owners of Rancho Laguna, an adjoining rancho, obtained in 1873 a patent covering some five thousand acres included in the Guadalupe patent of 1870. This led to further controversy in this Department and in your office, and to extended litigation in the federal courts, the particulars of which it is not necessary to

recite.

It is sufficient to say that the validity of the patent of 1870, and the right of the Guadalupe owners to all the lands embraced in it, were fully established (Le Roy vs. Clayton, 2 Sawyer 493; Le Roy vs. Jamison, 3 ib. 369; Adam vs. Norris, 103 U. S. 591)

In the course of the controversy the following writing was made upon the face of the patent of 1870, viz. :

"Canceled. See decision dated June 12, 1872, of General Land Office, affirmed by the honorable Secretary of the Interior, March 26, 1873."

"WILLIS DRUMOND, Commissioner. GENERAL LAND OFFICE, April 10, 1873.” "DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., April 24, 1873." "This cancellation, dated April 10, 1873, is hereby revoked by order of the Secretary of the Interior. sent to and received at this office on the 23d day of April, A. D., 1873.

"WILLIS DRUMMOND, Commissioner."

There can be no doubt about the power
of your office to issue a patent while an-
other is outstanding, but it must issue to
serve some legal purpose. This right was
recognized in the case in the Supreme
Court (supra). The question raised was
as to the validity of the patent of 1870,
when one patent had already been issued,
viz., that of 1866. The court said: "It is but
the common case of a grantor who, having
failed to convey what he was bound to
convey, makes another deed to correct the
wrong. The deeds are not in conflict.
the power of the land office was exhausted
by the first deed, it was only so as to the
land which it included."

If

In the cases referred to, not only was the validity of the patent expressly declared, but the particular effect of the writing as affecting its validity was considered. Mr. Justice Field said: "The indorsements on the copy produced show a revocation by the Secretary of the cancellation directed by the Commissioner; and if titles can be affected in this irregular way, can be divested and re-invested by indorsements of the officers of the land office upon its records, the revocation is of equal validity with the cancellation." I do not deem it necessary to discuss at The issuing of new or further patents length the question of the power of your in certain cases is a matter largely in your office to issue a second patent. Justice discretion; and I do not think this DeField, in LeRoy vs. Jamison (supra), un-partment should interfere with such disdoubtedly states correctly what the prac- cretion, unless it is apparent that some tice should be; he says, "Cases may often wrong has been done or some substantial occur where a second patent would be right denied. As no such reason appears necessary to prevent gross wrong to the in this case, I affirm your decision, and patentee." And he instances a supposed decline to direct you to issue a new patent. case of a confirmation of three distinct tracts, but by mistake two only are patented; then, he says, upon a proper presentation of the fact, a second patent might issue for the omitted tract, or one patent embracing the three tracts together.

In the present application it is conceded that there is no error in the patent. It covers exactly the land claimed, and ex

STATE SELECTIONS.

STATE OF FLORIDA.

Indemnity School Selections.-Such selections
cannot be made of double minimum lands
within railroad grants, though the lands lost
were double minimum in price.
SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFar-
land, March 12, 1883.

Sub

Judice.-Statement of facts showing that the tract in question was within a Mexican grant sub judice when the railroad grant became effective. It does not pass to the railroad company.

SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFarland, February 5, 1883.

I have considered the case of Christian W. A. Eberle vs. the Southern Pacific Railroad Company Branch Line, involving the S. W. of Sec. 7, Tp. 1. S., R. 10 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles District, California, on appeal by the company from your decision of November 17, 1881, in favor of Eberle.

The tract is within the twenty miles (granted) limits of the company's grant by act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat. 579), which became effective April 3d. ensuing, 10th ensuing. the withdrawal for which was made May

The tract was also embraced within the

cept as to the endorsements upon it, it is Governor of Florida, from your decision I have considered the appeal of the in the usual and proper form. Counsel of March 18, 1882, denying the right of for the application, in his brief referring the state to select certain specified tracts claimed limits of the Rancho Azusa (jurto the decision cited, says: "These ques- of double minimum lands aggregating idical possession whereof was delivered to tions have been thus finally, definitely and 2,240 acres, in lieu of a deficit of like one Luis Arenas, April 26, 1842), but was forever settled, * * * and we are in quiet, undisputed possession of every acre in certain fractional townships. quantity of double minimum lands situate excluded therefrom by the survey made U. S. Deputy Surveyor Hancock, in the of the land included in our patent" (being It appears that the State, per List No. year 1858, and approved by the Surveyor the patent of 1870). "But, notwithstand-2, dated June 20, 1881, selected the tracts General of California in January, 1860. ing all this, we are still without the clean in question as indemnity school selections One Henry Dalton (who had, under date patent which the United States should under the provisions of the act of May of December 27, 1844, purchased said the said Mexican The applicant does not propose to sur- the same because said lands are double 20, 1826 (4 Stat. 179), but you rejected grant claim from render the patent of 1870 to be canceled, minimum in price by reason of their being and take a new one in place of it, and in within the granted limits of the Gulf and that respect I think he is quite right. Not West India Transit Railroad Company, only has the land described in the patent whereas the lands lost are only double been adjudged to belong rightfully to the minimum in price. patentee, but the instrument of conveyance, the patent itself, has been declared

have delivered to us in 1870."

to be valid by the highest tribunal in the

land.

Inasmuch as your decision is in accord-
ance with the Departmental rule
ing all cases of such selections, I affirm

the same.

ICO.

PUBLIC NOTICES.
[No. 885.]
NOTICE

grantee), having filed exceptions to the correctness of such survey, the U. S. District Court overruled and dismissed the same, December 9, 1864.

Subsequently, November 21, 1867, at a re-hearing had before said court upon the question of survey, the court dismissed for want of jurisdicsuch proceedings governtion," and remitted the same to the Surveyor General. That officer having approved another survey of said rancho (made by U. S. Deputy-Surveyor Thompson), forwarded the same to your office "for definite action," such survey taining in the aggregate 18,211.21 acres" in excess of the Hancock survey, and embracing a number of settlement claims excluded from the latter.

The issuing of a new patent would serve no purpose, except that of having a cleanly instrument. No principle is involved. Indeed, the issuing of a new patent would quite likely raise a suggestion or suspicion of infirmity in the old one, which, as we OF THE REMOVAL OF THE LAND OFFICE FROM have seen, does not exist. The courts in LA MESILLA TO LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXsuch a case would not, under the practice relating to specific performance either as to private or public lands, compel another conveyance. It would be a sufficient answer that the party already had had a valid conveyance of all the land he claimed. The writings upon the patent of 1870 are a nullity; the one neutralized the other, and canceled the cancellation.

Notice is hereby given that the President of the United States, by executive order dated March 10, 1883, has, pursuant to law, directed that the office for the sale of public lands, now located at La Mesilla, New Mexico, be removed to the town of Las Cruces, in said Territory, on or before May 1, 1883.

con

It having thus become necessary to publish such survey, pursuant to the provisions of the act of July 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 332), your office accordingly, May 6, 1868, remanded the surveys with instructions to publish the Hancock survey of 1858.

This survey was sustained by the Department, September 20, 1872, and ap

proved and patented by your office, May 29, 1876, to Dalton.

Subsequently, August 16, 1878, however, he filed an application to purchase under the 7th section of the act of July 23, 1866 (14 Stat., 218), certain lands alleged to have constituted a portion of the original grant of Azusa, which lands embraced the tract in question; but such claim was rejected by this Department, May 24, 1881.

It further appears that under date of June 28, 1881, Eberle applied at the local office to make homestead entry of the tract, but his application was rejected on the ground that the tract was within the aforesaid railroad limits. He appealed from this action, alleging that at the date the company's grant became effective the tract was sub judice, or in a state of reservation by reason of an unadjusted Mexican grant.

claim to be surveyed and a plat to be made by said Attorney (Quinby vs. Conlin, 104
thereof." Section 2 prescribes: "That the U. S. 420), was duly considered and found
provisions of the preceding section shall to be inapplicable, for it will be observed
apply to all surveys and plats by the Sur- that the question at issue in the case cited
veyor General of California heretofore was a segregation survey made pursuant to
made, which have not already been ap- the provisions of the 8th section of the
proved by one of the District Courts of the act of July 23, 1866 (14 Stat., 218), which
United States for California, or by the Com- was held not to be subject to the provis-
missioner of the General Land Office: Pro- ions of the act of July 1, 1864 (13 Stat.,
vided, That where proceedings for the cor- 332), whereas the survey involved in the
rection or confirmation of a survey are case in question was subject to the latter
pending on the passage of this act in act, as shown by my decision therein.
one of the said district courts, it shall be
lawful for such district court to proceed
and complete its examination and deter-
mination of the matter, and its decree
thereon shall be subject to appeal to the
Circuit Court of the United States for the
district in like manner, and with like effect,
as hereafter provided for appeals in other
cases to the circuit court, and such appeals
may be in like manner disposed of by said
circuit court."

By your decision you sustained such appeal, and under authority of Newhall As the aforesaid surveys and plats vs. Sanger (92 U. S., 761), permitted theretofore made by the Surveyor-General Eberle "to make homestead entry of the had neither been approved by any of the land in accordance with his application." U. S. District Courts of California, nor by It was shown by the aforesaid decision the Commissioner of the General Land of September 20, 1872, that "in 1865 the Office, at the date of the approval of the land excluded by Hancock's survey was act in question, and as the proceedings subdivided, the plats were filed in the local for the correction of said surveys were office, rights were acquired under State "pending on the passage of this act in possessory laws, pre-emption filings were one of the said district courts," it is quite allowed." This was pursuant to the pro- manifest in the light of such express provisions of the act of March 3, 1853 (10 visions that at the date the railroad grant Stat., 244), as now embodied in section became effective, the tract in question was 2280 R. S. claimed in the proper tribunal, to be part of a Mexican grant, and that that claim was sub judice pending the adjustment of the same.

It thus appears that the said rancho was surveyed in the year 1858, and that the lands excluded therefrom were surveyed as public lands in the year 1865. Such Undoubtedly a tract of land embraced decision was in accord with the invariable practice that obtained at the date thereof; but it should be observed that the rulings and practice have since changed by reason of the Supreme Court decision in the case cited by you.

within a Mexican or Spanish grant claim
at the date a railroad grant becomes effec-
tive is excepted from the operation of the
same, because such tract cannot be re-
garded as forming a part of the "public
lands" of the United States, as such term
is defined by the U. S. Supreme Court in
the case cited. (See Departmental decis-
ion of June 8, 1882, in the case of the At-
lantic and Pacific R. R. Co. vs. William
Fisher, 9 Land Owner, 80.)

As before stated, the company's grant
became effective April 3, 1871, the Han-
cock survey of said rancho was not ap-
proved and patented by your office until
May 29, 1876, and Eberle applied to make
homestead entry of the tract June 28,
1881. I am therefore of the opinion that
the tract in question was reserved from
the operation of the company's grant, and
that the same formed a part of the public
land subject to homestead claim when
Eberle applied to enter the same as such.

It will be seen from the foregoing statement of facts, that while the rancho in question was surveyed in the year 1858, approved by the Surveyor General in 1860, and Dalton's exceptions to such survey were overruled and dismissed by the court, it is nevertheless a fact that the same tribunal subsequently dismissed the whole proceedings upon the question of survey, and this for want of jurisdiction, and remitted the same to the Surveyor General. It having thus been virtually determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the case fell neither within the purview of the acts of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 631), nor of June 14, 1860 (12 id., 33), it was therefore competent for the Land Department to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by virtue of the provisions of the act of July 1, 1864 (3 ibidem, 332). The first section of this act imposed upon the Surveyor General of California the duty of giving notice by publication, as specifically prescribed, that he had, in compliance with the 13th section of the said act of Before I rendered decision in the case March 3, 1851, "caused any private land in question, the decision in the case cited!

Your decision is accordingly affirmed.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. vs. EBERLE. Survey.-The Supreme Court decision in Quinby vs. Conlin does not apply to this case. SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFarland, February 13, 1883.

MINERAL PATENTS ISSUED. Since our last report patents have been issued for the following mining claims :

J. B. W.
Central Lode.

ARIZONA.

Cachise County.

Gardiner et al., S. Ext. Grand

CALIFORNIA.

Amador County.

J. L. Goodman, Gold Mountain Overplus Qtz.
Calaveras County.

Mine.
W. A. Wallace et al., Lost Boy Qtz. Mine.
Napa County.

O. S. Roney et al., Mountain View Quick-
silver Mine.
Nevada County.
Nevada Cy. G. Qtz. Mg. Co., Nevada Cy.
Extn. G. Qtz. Mine.
Sierra County.
Wm. F. Hanley, Hanley Qtz. Mine.

COLORADO.

Boulder County.

Conrad Bardill, True Blue Lode.
Sidney P. Haines, Logan Lode.
Chaffee County.
Geo. Partridge, Brighton Lode.
Robert N. Scott, Iron Lode.
Clear Creek County.
Andrew Altro et al., Chicago Lode.
Chas. P. Baldwin, Central Indiana and High-
land Laddie Lodes.

J. S. Barker, Hercules Lode.

Harvey Bradley et al., Edinborough and White Pine Lodes.

John Brennan et al., Columbian Chief Extn.
Lode.

R. P. Dewey et al., Great Republic Lode.
Jacob J. Elliott et al., Donna Juanita Lode.
Jas. A. Fisher, Wolverine Lode.

Julia F. Gorsline et al., Troy Lode.
H. M. Griffin, Dividend Lode and Mill Site.
Geo. W. Hall, Crocus and Hartwell Lodes.
Jos. B. Johnson, Jack Frost Lode.
Wm. H. Lane, Hillsdale Lode.
Robert O. Old, Argyle Lode.
J. G. Pohié, Mammoth Lode.
Chas. W. Pollard, Amy Lode.
John Quinane et al., Rapparee Lode.
Springfield S. Mg. Co., Snowy Range Lode.
Harvey M. Thompson et al., Maple Leaf

Lode.

G. B. Weeks, Bonanza Lode and Mill Site. Chas. F. Wells et al., Alert and Tippecanoe Lode.

Custer County.

Chas. F. Blossom et al., Shetland Lode. Lucille Cons. Mg. Co., Lucille and Protection Lodes.

Dolores County.

Chas N. Cox, Harriette Lode.

New York and Palmetto Mg. Co., Diamond, 198, 199, 231, 251, 264, 278, 281, 285, 286.
Pearl, President, and Treasurer Lodes.

Nos. 52, 91, 94, 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 109, 118, 124, 130, 131,

San Juan Cons. Mg. and M'g Co., Little inclusive, 2366, 2375, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2381, 2388, 2389, 2392, 2685, 2688 to 2595 inclusive, 2699.
Giant Lode.

Nos. 226, 228, 231, 232, 234, 238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246,
Little Giant Gold Mg. Co. of Dak., Little 251, 255, 264, 268, 274, 275, 293, 307, 308, 346, 375, 407, 427, 494,
Giant Lode.
537, 584 to 598 inclusive, 600, 601, 602, 603.