"(1) That the proofs before the board on the 25th day of February, 1916, the date upon which the said order was entered, conclusively established the allegations of the petition of respondents as set forth in Exhibit B, hereto attached, praying for discontinuance of payments to claimant, and therefore there was nothing before the board upon which could be based its order in relation to future payments to claimant for partial disability.

"(2) That the board exceeded its authority in entering an order without any evidence before it upon which such order might be based.

"(3) That the order of the board as to future payments to claimant for partial disability is opposed to the only evidence that was before the board at the time such order was entered.

"(4) That if the record before the board was incomplete on the date of such order, the only possible proceeding for the board was to dismiss such petition and the board was in error in not ordering such dismissal."

The return of the industrial accident board contains the following:

"13. Said industrial accident board further returns that paragraph seven (7) of respondents' affidavit for writ of certiorari is very incorrect, and avers that said industrial accident board, on February 25, 1916, when it made its order complained of in this case, had before it the following papers which it considered in the making of said order:

"(1) A copy of the agreement in regard to compensation heretofore referred to.

"(2) The petition of the respondents to stop payments..

"(3) The petition of the applicant asking that the board find that the applicant was permanently disabled and which consisted of the affidavit of the applicant himself, and of the affidavit of Dr. Joseph Rottenberg, and of the affidavit of Beatrice Jacobs, and of the affidavit of Benjamin Wolach, and of the affidavit of Charles W. Connor, * * *

"(4) The deposition of Helen Gray.

"(5) Said board also had the benefit of the argu

ments of attorneys for the respective parties, which arguments were made before the board on January 13, 1916, and said board had before it at that time sufficient papers, proofs and testimony upon which to base an intelligent order, and it believes that the order it made on that date is the order that should have been made in said cause, and avers that it has carefully considered the testimony filed since that time, and that its order would have been the same had all of said testimony been before it.

"14. Said board further returns that, as a matter of fact, its order of February 25, 1916, was merely an order of the board affirming that the agreement between the parties should stand, and indicating that possibly the applicant might be able to work some after October 19, 1915. Under the terms of said order, if said applicant were unable to work after that date, the compensation of said applicant would still continue at $9.61 per week, but if said applicant were able to work some, then his compensation would be reduced proportionately under the terms of the workmen's compensation law."

It seems to be the claim of the respondents and appellants that the industrial accident board, at the time of the entering of the order made on February 25, 1916, had before it simply the uncontradicted evidence of the facts established by the deposition of Helen Gray, and that, with simply these facts before it, the board should have entered an order for the discontinuance of payments to the claimant in accordance with the petition filed for such relief. We think it a sufficient answer to this contention to call attention to the return of the board, which sets forth that at the time of the making of the return they had before them the counter-showing of the claimant, and they aver that they have carefully considered the testimony filed, and that the order would have been the same had all the testimony been before them at the time of the making thereof. In our opinion, and in accordance with our previous decisions, we do not believe that the

administration of this act should be too technical, and we can see no reason, if the board, with all the testimony before them, return to us that they were of the opinion that the petition should be denied, why it should not be said that there was a question of fact squarely presented to them, and they having determined it, we are in no position to review it, because of the fact that the legislature by the terms of the act has made the decision of the board binding as to such questions. Section 12, pt. 3, Act No. 10, Extra Session. 1912 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5465). See Papinaw v. Railway Co., 189 Mich. 441; Ramlow v. Ice Co., 192 Mich. 505; Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463.

Up to the time that the order denying this petition was made, no formal order of the board had been made approving the agreement for compensation. It is now also urged that there was no evidence of any kind before the board which would warrant the finding of partial disability and that therefore no such order should have been made. We see no harm to the defendants, however, from the part of the order thus complained of, which reads:

"It is further ordered and adjudged that said applicant is entitled to recover from said respondents compensation for partial disability from and after said October 19, 1915, at the rate of one-half the difference between his average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage which he is able to thereafter."

earn

So far as this part of the order is concerned, it was merely a statement of the law that the injured employee was entitled to weekly compensation equal to one-half the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages he is able to earn thereafter (section 10, pt. 2, Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912, 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5440). The order does not state any definite

amount for the future payments, but leaves this question to future proof.

We see no legal infirmity in the order as made, and therefore affirm the action of the board.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and STONE, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

ELWELL v. PIERCE.

1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ACCOUNTING-EQUITY-JURIS

DICTION.

On a bill by the administrator and the heirs of a deceased insane person against the wife and children of a former guardian, to enable the administrator to marshal the assets of the estate, which involves an intricate and complex accounting covering a long period of years, and there is no proceeding in which the administrator can obtain the relief sought other than by an equity proceeding, the court of equity has jurisdiction.

On cross-appeals from an order sustaining demurrers to the bill and cross-bills, in view of the complexity of the questions raised, and of the fact that from the pleadings it is impossible for the appellate court to decide them, the demurrers will be overruled and the case remanded to the court below for hearing upon the merits upon proper pleadings.

Cross-appeals from Kalamazoo; Weimer, J. Submitted January 24, 1918. (Docket No. 127.) Decided March 27, 1918.

Bill by Hubert Elwell, administrator of the estate of Jeanette Parish, deceased, and others against Julia Pierce and others. Defendants demurred to the bill and filed a cross-bill to which plaintiffs demurred. From a decree dismissing the bill and cross-bill, all parties appeal. Reversed and remanded.

William E. Ware (Burritt Hamilton, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Boudeman & Adams, for defendants.

In this case both parties, except defendant City Bank, appeal from a decree rendered by the circuit court of Kalamazoo county, in chancery. The issues are raised by two demurrers: First, the demurrer of defendants (embraced as a part of the answer of defendants to the original bill of complaint), and, second, a demurrer by plaintiffs to the cross-bill of complaint of defendants, which cross-bill is contained in, and is a part of, the answer of defendants to the original bill. The demurrers were argued before the court at the same time and the court dismissed both the original and cross-bills.

The controversy arose from the following facts: On March 18, 1869, Horace H. Pierce was duly appointed guardian of his insane sister, Jeanette Parish, by the probate court of Kalamazoo county, and immediately took possession of all of her property, consisting of 40 acres of land, deeded to her by their father, and some personal property, and continued in possession of the same and in the management and control of all her affairs until he died, September 12, 1910, during which time he received her pension from the United States government, allowed for herself and her three children, plaintiffs herein. Acting upon his petition as guardian, the probate court, on March 27, 1869, adjudged Jeanette Parish insane and ordered