Loss of freight.

Loss of charter.

Damages for detention.

Measure of damage not altered

Where damage has arisen, subsequent to the collision, from the want of ordinary nautical skill and prudence on the part of those in charge of the damaged vessel, such damage will not be regarded as consequent upon the collision (); but persons sud-. denly placed in a position of danger and difficulty, although they are bound to show ordinary resolution and control, cannot be expected always to adopt, in the emergency, the measures which subsequent events may prove would have been the best (a).

Where a vessel is earning freight at the time of the collision, and a claim is sustained for a total loss, compensation for the freight she would have earned had her voyage been completed is allowed, subject to necessary deductions representing the cost which would have been incurred in earning the freight. But if a vessel is totally lost by collision at a time when she is not earning freight, interest on her value will be allowed from the time of her loss (b).

So, the loss of the benefit of a charter, the performance of which has been interfered with by the collision, may be taken into account (c).

Where the damaged vessel can be repaired damages for the detention of the vessel during the time necessarily occupied by the repairs are commonly allowed in addition to the cost of the repairs (d).

A defendant, in an action of collision, is not entitled to deduct from the amount of the damages a sum which the plaintiff has though plain- received from an underwriter on account of the same injury;

amount of salvage remuneration to
which the salvors are entitled. The
Legatus, Swa. 168. Where the action
of collision is tried in the Queen's
Bench Division, the proper question
for the jury is whether, in respect to
the suit for salvage, the master of the
salved ship pursued the course which
a prudent and reasonable man would
have followed. Tindall v. Bell, 11 M.

& W. 228.

(2) The Eolides, 3 Hagg. 367.
(a) See Williams and Bruce, Admi-
ralty Practice, p. 83.

(b) The Northumbria, L. R., 3 A. &
E. 12; The Clyde, Swa. 23; The Iron-
master, Swa. 441; see also The Columbus,
2 W. Rob. 158; The Clarence, 3 W.
Rob. 283. Where ship and freight are
totally lost, the measure of freight
lost is the gross freight contracted for,

less the expense which would have been incurred in carrying it. The Canada, Lush. 585.

(c) See the judgment of Dr. Lushington in The Matchless, 10 Jur. 1017; and the judgments of Sir Robert Phillimore in The Star of India, 1 P. D. 466; The Consett, 5 P. D. 229; see also The Betsy Caines, 2 Hagg. 28; The Yorkshireman, ib. 30, note. As to what damages are direct see The Sisters, 1 P. D. 117, and The Bailiffs of Bonney Marsh v. The Trinity House, L. R., 5 Ex. 204; affirmed L. R., 7 Ex. 247.

(d) The Inflexible, Swa. 200; The Black Prince, Lush. 508. See also The Star of India, 1 P. D. 466. As to the rate of compensation for detention usually allowed in the case of steamers, see The City of Buenos Ayres, 1 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 169.

for a wrong-doer cannot claim the benefit of a contract of insur- tiff has reance effected by the person whose property he has injured (e).

covered from underwriters.

actions before

having con

current juris

diction.

Where proceedings in the nature of proceedings in rem have Pendency of been instituted in a competent Court abroad to recover damages foreign courts arising out of a collision, and whilst such proceedings are or courts pending, an action in rem in respect of the same collision is instituted in the Admiralty Division, the plaintiff will be put to his election to abandon one or other of the two suits (ƒ). And in a case where it appears that at the time when proceedings were being taken in an action of damage in the Admiralty Division, cross causes of damages between the same parties were pending in the Court of Admiralty in Ireland, the Admiralty Division ordered the suit before it to be dismissed (g).

In

(f) The Mali Ivo, L. R., 2 A. & E. 356; The Delta, 1 P. D. 404; see also The Lanarkshire, 2 Spks. 189. The Delta, 1 P. D. 404, the defendant in an action of damage in rem pleaded that the plaintiff had been condemned in the damages arising out of the same collision by the judgment of a foreign court pronounced in an action in rem. The judgment of the foreign court was a judgment by default, and, in the particular circumstances, the Admiralty Division refused to recognize the foreign judgment as having any binding effect. Where a point was raised as to whether the pendency of proceedings in the Court of Session in Scotland to recover damages in respect of the same collision could be set up as lis alibi pendens in answer to the

claim in the English Court of Ad-
miralty, it was held by the Privy
Council, that since the two suits were
in their nature different, the one being
in personam, and the other in rem, the
pendency of the former could not be
pleaded in suspension of the latter.
The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moo. P. C. C.
207; 3 W. Rob. 220. See also
The Bengal, 5 Jur., N. S. 1085;
Swa. 468; and Castrique v. Imrie, 8
C. B., N. S. 1; S. C., in Cam. Scacc.,
ib. 405; in Dom. Proc., L. R., 4 H. L.
414. See, as to pleas that the de-
fendant's ship was French, and that a
French Court of law had decided the
question, The General Steam Navigation
Company v. Gillou, 11 M. & W. 877.
In Harris v. Willis, 15 C. B. 710, it was
held, in an action of collision, that a
plea alleging that the merits of the case
had already been determined by the
Admiralty Court in favour of the
defendant in proceedings taken in that
Court, afforded no answer to the action,
the plea not showing on the face of it
that the Admiralty Court had jurisdic-
tion over the matter.

(g) The Catterina Chiazzare, 1 P. D.
368.

nature of

SALVAGE is the compensation allowed to persons by whose SALVAGE. exertions a ship or boat, or the cargo of ship, or the lives of General persons belonging to her, are saved from danger or loss, in service. cases of shipwreck, derelict, capture, or the like (a). The right to remuneration in these cases rests obviously upon equitable grounds; it was recognized by the Roman law, and has been upheld by the different maritime Courts of Europe (b). The subject of salvage has been frequently dealt with by the Legislature of this country. The chief statutory provisions now in force in this country with reference to wreck and salvage are contained in Part VIII. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (c). Independently of these statutory provisions, a salvor may be defined to be one who assists a vessel in distress, acting at the time as a volunteer, and not under any contract or duty which binds him to that particular service (d).

mere work

Salvage is not claimable in every case in which work and Must not be labour is done about the preservation of a ship and cargo; there and labour. must, usually, in order to support a claim for salvage, be skill and

(a) See 1 Beawes' Lex Merc. 241. An express demand, or an express acceptance, of salvage service actually performed is not a condition precedent to salvage reward; The Annapolis, Lush. 375. No claim for remuneration from the owner is given by the common law to those who preserve goods on shore, unless they interfere at the request of the owner. Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Bl. 254.

(b) See the judgment of Sir C. Robinson in The Calypso, 2 Hagg. 218; and the judgment of Chief Justice Eyre in Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. & Bl. at p. 257. See also Lohre v.

Aitcheson, 4 App. Cas. 761; and Hart-
ford v. Jones, 1 Ld. Raym. 393.

(c) The General Salvage Acts in
force before the M. S. Act, 1854, were
the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 99, and the 16 & 17
Vict. c. 131 (ss. 39 to 51). The former
of these statutes repealed the earlier
Salvage Acts (which are very nume-
rous), with the exception of the 1 & 2
Geo. 4, c. 76 (Supplementary Ap-
pendix, p. 127) and the 9 Geo. 4, c. 37,
which relate to salvage within the
jurisdiction of the Cinque Ports. See
post, p. 669.

(d) See the judgment of Lord Stowell in The Neptune, 1 Hagg. 236.

enterprise on the part of the salvors, and peril with respect to the property saved (e). Thus, if the services rendered to a vessel not disabled or in distress do not exceed the ordinary assistance which is rendered by a towing ship, no salvage can be claimed (ƒ). If, however, a steamer renders assistance to a disabled vessel by towing, she may be entitled to salvage (g); and a service which commences as a mere towage service may, if new circumstances Conversion of arise, become a salvage service (h). The conversion of towage towage into into salvage service depends on the circumstances of each particular case (i); and the Courts watch with jealousy the conduct of steamtugs, in cases of this description, in order to see that the increased danger from which the ship may have been rescued, was not attributable to the fault of the tug. If it was caused by wilful misconduct or negligence, or want of reasonable skill on the part of the tug, she is never permitted to profit by her own wrong and can have no claim to salvage (k). Salvage may

salvage.

(e) See the judgment in The Clifton, 3 Hagg. 120; The London Merchant, ib. 395; The Charlotte, 3 W. Rob. 71; Colby v. Watson, 6 Moo. P. C. C. 334; and The Prince of Wales, 6 Notes of Cases, 39; The Bomarsund, Lush. 77. See also the cases cited in Castellain v. Thompson, 13 C. B., N. S. 105.

(f) The Princess Alice, 3 W. Rob.
138; The Harbinger, 16 Jur. 729; The
Upnor, 2 Hagg.3; The Annapolis, Lush.
355; The Lady Egidia, ib. 513.

(g) The Charles Adolphe, Swa. 153;
The Strathnaver, 1 App. Cases, 58, 65.
(h) See the judgment of Sir J.
Nicholl in The Isabella, 3 Hagg. 428;
The Princess Alice, ubi sup.; The Lon-
don Merchant, 3 Hagg. 394; The
Reward, 1 W. Rob. 174; The Galatea,
4 Jur., N. S. 1064; The Albion, 1
Lush. 282; The Saratoga, ib. 318; The
I. C. Potter, L. R., 3 A. & E. 292;
The Pericles, Br. & L. 80; The White
Star, L. R., 1 A. & E. 68; The
Canova, L. R., 1 A. & E. 54. Where
in a collision the innocent vessel was
being towed by a tug, it was held that
the latter was entitled to salvage for
assisting the vessel which had caused
the collision, the right not being
affected by the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63,
s. 33, which required colliding vessels
to render mutual assistance.
Queen, L. R., 2 A. & E. 53.

The

(i) The question in all these cases is whether supervening circumstances, such as stress of weather or otherwise,

have occurred such as to justify the steam tug in abandoning her contract of towage. The I. C. Potter, L. R., 3 A. & E. 298.

(k) The Minnehaha (Ward v. M'Corkill) Lush. 335; S. C., 15 Moo. P. C. C. 133; The Robert Dixon, 5 P. D. 54— C. A. The following broad and luminous statement of the rules by which the Courts are governed in cases of this kind will be found in the judgment of the Privy Council in the former of these cases. "" 'When," said the Court, "a steam boat engages to tow a vessel for a certain remuneration from one point to another, she does not warrant that she will be able to do so, and will do so under all circumstances, and at all hazards; but she does engage that she will use her best endeavours for that purpose, and will bring to the task competent skill, and such a crew, tackle, and equipments, as are reasonably to be expected in a vessel of her class. She may be prevented from fulfilling her contract by a vis major, by accidents which were not contemplated and which may render the fulfilment of her contract impossible, and in such case, by the general rule of law, she is relieved from her obligations. But she does not become relieved from her obligations because unforeseen difficulties occur in the completion of her task; because the performance of her task is interrupted, or cannot be completed in the mode which was origi