policies executed abroad. Under the provisions of the Stamp Act, 1870, any policy Stamps on made or executed out of, but being in any manner enforceable within, the United Kingdom is chargeable with duty under the 30 Vict. c. 23, and may be stamped within the period of two months next after it shall have been received in the United Kingdom (y). No policy may be made for any time exceeding twelve Duration of months (). time policies. Prior to the execution of the stamped policy a memorandum Effect of the "slip." of the terms of the proposed policy is generally initialed by the underwriters (a). This memorandum is what is commonly called "the slip," and various questions have from time to time arisen as to its effect. Whilst the Acts relating to the stamping of marine insurances in force before the 30 Vict. c. 23, remained unrepealed, it was held that the Courts could not look at the slip" for any purpose (b). The 30 Vict. c. 23, provides that a contract of marine insurance, except when made under the Merchant Shipping Acts, shall be void unless expressed in a policy, and that no policy, unless stamped, shall be available either at law or in equity; and it seems that now a slip, although still, except in the case above mentioned, not enforceable, or admissible as evidence of a contract of marine insurance, may be given in evidence for collateral purposes. Thus, in order to ascertain whether there has been undue concealment on the part of the assured, the Court may, in an action on a duly stamped policy, look at the slip. It has been held that, as the slip is in practice, and according to the understanding of (y) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, s. 117. The 30 Vict. c. 23 contains, in sects. 13, 14, 15 and 16, provisions making liable to a penalty of 100%. persons who pay upon any loss unless the insurance is written and stamped, or who enter into any contract, memorandum, or agreeement for sea insurance unless such insurance is in writing and stamped, or issue copies of policies which are not stamped, and prohibiting brokers or agents making charges unless the policy is in writing and stamped. See, as to these sections, Stowe v. Querner, L. R., 5 Ex. 155. (z) 30 Vict. c. 23, s. 8. (a) See Xenos v. Wickham, 33 L. J., C. P. 13; Perry v. The Great Ship Co., M.P. 33 L. J., Q. B. 41. The initials f. p. a., f. g. a., and f. c. s. are sometimes written on the slip." These abbreviations signify that the proposed insurance is to be made "free of particular average,' "free of general average, or "free of capture and seizure. Fisher v. The Liverpool Marine Insurance Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. 471. (b) 35 Geo. 3, c. 63, ss. 17 and 18, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 21, s. 4, both of which are repealed by 30 Vict. c. 23. These provisions did not give any validity to slips. See Marsden v. Reid, 3 East, 572; Warwick v. Slade, 3 Camp. 127; Pattison v. Mills, 2 Bligh, N. S. 562; The Morocco Land and Trading Co. v. Fry, 11 Jurist, N. S. 76. G G X The name of the assured. those engaged in maritime assurance, the complete and final contract between the parties, the assured need not communicate to the underwriters facts which come to his knowledge after the slip has been initialed and before the policy has been executed (y). But a stamped policy is essential to a valid contract of insurance, and it has been held that the initialing of a slip and forwarding it to the broker of the assured are parts of one entire contract void under the statute, and so, although the broker pays the premium and the amount of the stamp duty to the agent of the underwriter, no further contract to execute a stamped policy can be implied, and therefore the assured, if there be no stamped policy, is without remedy (2). The effect of the alteration of a policy is mentioned below (a). The legislature has provided that it shall not be lawful to effect a policy on any ship, goods, or other property, unless the name or the usual style and firm of dealing of one or more of the persons interested, or of the consignor or consignee of the property insured, or of the person residing in Great Britain who receives the order for effecting the policy, or of the person who gives the order to the agent immediately employed to effect it, is inserted in it (b). This enactment has met with a liberal construction; and it has been held that a policy effected in the name of the general agents of the consignor, who receive a cargo upon the refusal of the consignee to accept it, is valid; and that if, acting upon the clear intention of the consignor, although without his express authority, they effect an insurance as his agents, or if their act is subsequently ratified by their principal, they may recover on the policy (c). Nor is it neces (y) Ionides v. The Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 6 Q. B. 674; affirmed, L. R., 7 Q. B. 517; Cory v. Patton, L. R., 7 Q. B. 304; L. R., 9 Q. B. 577; Lishman v. The Northern Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 8 C. P. 216; L. R., 10 C. P. 179. (z) Fisher v. Liverpool Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 8 Q. B. 469; affirmed on appeal, L. R., 9 Q. B. 418. See also Mackenzie v. Coulson, L. R., 8 Eq. 368, observed upon in Cory v. Patton, L. R., 7 Q. B. 304. (a) See post, p. 453. (b) 28 Geo. 3, c. 56. An earlier statute, the 25 Geo. 3, c. 44, which was repealed by this act, was passed to prevent the effecting of policies in blank, and required that the names of the persons interested, or of the agent who effected the policy, should be inserted. See Cox v. Parry, 1 T. R. 464, and Pray v. Edie, ib. 313. (e) Wolff v. Horncastle, 1 B. & P. 316; Lucena v. Craufurd, 3 B. & P. 75; 2 N. R. 269; Stirling v. Vaughan, 11 East, 619; Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274; Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M. & S. 485; Barlow v. Leckie, 4 J. B. Moore, 8; and see Bell v. Janson, 1 M. & S. 201, where it was held that a letter directing assurance could not be considered to be a ratification of an insurance which had been actually made at the time, but without the knowledge of the principal. See also Browning v. The Provincial Insurance Company of Canada, L. R., 5 P. C. 263. sary that an agent effecting the policy should be described in it as such (d). Where a broker had received directions from the owner of goods to insure them, and being unable to do so caused the risk to be indorsed upon a general policy which had been previously effected by the agents of the broker, in their own names, upon goods "to be valued and declared as interest might appear," and this indorsement was initialed by the underwriter, and the goods owner was informed of it, it was held that the policy not having been made by the owner of the goods, or by any one authorized on his behalf at the time, and not having been ratified by him, he could not sue upon it (e). A description of the subject matter of the insurance is re- Subject quired both from the nature of the contract and from the matter. universal practice of underwriters (ƒ). the ship. There is no express regulation in this country which requires The name of that the name of the vessel insured, or of her master, shall be inserted in the policy; it has been usual, however, either where the policy relates to a particular ship or to goods to be carried by a particular ship, to insert the name of the ship, since a knowledge of it is often material for the estimation of the risk to be insured. A policy on a ship "called the American ship President, or by whatever other name the same ship should be called," was held to be a valid policy on a vessel which was an American ship, and of which the real name was "The President" (g). The validity of insurances upon goods to be shipped by "ship or ships" without naming them has long been established (); and (d) De Vignier v. Swanson, 1 B. & P. 346, note. Where the persons interested were described as "the trustees of Messrs. K. & Co.," it was held that this might be considered to be their usual style and form of dealing. Hibbert v. Martin, 1 Camp. 538. The statute does not prevent an assured from recovering against persons who are engaged as partners in underwriting, though each has signed in his own name for a distinct sum. Brett v. Beckwith, 26 L. J., Chan. 130. from expressing any opinion as to (f) See Mackenzie v. Whitworth, (g) Le Mesurier v. Vaughan, 6 East, 382, and Hall v. Molineaux, cited ib. 385; see also Clapham v. Cologan, 3 Camp. 382. In Ionides v. The Pacific Insurance Company, L. R., 6 Q. B. 674; 7 Q. B. 517, it was held that a mistake in the name of the ship is immaterial if the underwriter cannot be prejudiced. (e) Watson v. Swann, 11 C. B., N.S. 756. The Court in this case abstained (h) See post, p. 457, n. (x). where a policy is effected in this form it attaches as soon as the goods are shipped, and it becomes the duty of the insured, as soon as he becomes aware of the shipment, to inform the underwriter by declaring the goods (g). It has been doubted whether such an insurance does not amount to a warranty that the party effecting it is ignorant of the name of the vessel; but however this may be, it is clear that if the effect of withholding the name is to deprive the underwriter of any material information, the Where policy concealment avoids the policy (h). Where an insurance is on cargo, it will extend, although the ship is named in the policy, to any other ship into which it may be properly shifted (i). on cargo. The name of the master. The premium. The subscription. After naming the ship and appurtenances, the policy, as we have seen, mentions the master. This portion of the policy is so simple, and the liberty given by it to the assured is so extensive, that no questions have arisen out of it, nor does it call for further notice. The premium is the amount paid by the assured to the underwriter, as a consideration for his undertaking the risk. The 35 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 11, required that the premium "paid, given or contracted for upon the insurance," should be expressed in the policy. But that Act has been repealed, and the present Acts relating to the stamping of marine policies contain no similar provision. The broker is, as we have seen, the person to whom the underwriter looks for its payment (j). As between the assured and the underwriter, the receipt which is always inserted in the policy has been held to be conclusive evidence of the receipt of the premium by the latter (k); except, indeed, in the case of fraud (). The 30 Vict. c. 23, s. 7, requires, as we have seen (m), that the names of the subscribers and underwriters and sums insured should be specified on the policy; otherwise the policy is void. It is not necessary, however, that a policy under (g) Kewley v. Ryan, 2 H. Bl. 343; (h) Lynch v. Hamilton, 3 Taunt. 37, written by a company or co-partnership should be signed by every member; it is sufficient if it be subscribed in the name of the firm (n). But where a policy is signed per procuration of the several members of an unregistered society it is void, if it does not specify the names of the several members (0). Any material alteration in a policy, as in any other contract, Alteration of mercantile instrument, or deed, even although made by a policy. stranger, has the effect of making it void, as against all parties who did not authorize the alteration (p). A person, therefore, who desires a change in the terms of the policy should obtain the concurrence of the other parties to it before the insertion of the alteration. A material alteration, however, made by the assured cannot be set up by him, and will not entitle him to claim a return of premium (7). An alteration which is immaterial does not vacate the policy, and those parties who did not consent to it remain liable on the original contract (r). The most usual mode of making a material alteration in a policy is by a memorandum on the back of it; and the signatures or initials of the parties are commonly appended. If the alteration be required for the purpose of remedying an error, the Chancery Division has jurisdiction to effect it (s). The 30 Vict. c. 23, s. 10, enacts, that the provisions of that Under 30 act shall not prevent "the making of any alteration which Vict. c. 23. may lawfully be made in the terms and conditions of any policy, after the same shall have been underwritten, provided that such alteration be made before notice of the determination of the risk originally insured, and that it shall not prolong the time covered by the insurance thereby made beyond the period of six months in the case of a policy made for a less period than six months, or beyond the period (n) Reid v. Allan, 4 Ex. 326; Dowdall v. Allan, 19 L. J., Q. B. 41; decisions upon similar words in the 35 Geo. 3, c. 63. (0) In re Arthur Average Association, Ex parte Hargrave & Co., L. R., 10 Ch. 542. (p) Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320; S. C., 1 Smith, L. C. (7th edit.) 871; Fairlie v. Christie, 7 Taunt. 416; Campbell v. Christie, 2 Stark. 64; Forshaw v. Chabert, 3 B. & B. 158; Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. 778; S. C., 13 M. & W. 343; Croockewit v. Fletcher, 1 H. & N. 893. (9) Langhorn v. Cologan, 4 Taunt. 330. (r) Sanderson v. M'Cullom, 4 J. B. Moore, 5; Sanderson v. Symonds, 1 B. & B. 426. See also the remarks upon the principle of these cases in the judgment in Aldous v. Cornwell, L. R., 3 Q. B. 573. (s) Motteux v. London Assurance Company, 1 Atk. 545; Judicature Act, 1873, s. 37; Clark v. Girdwood, 7 Ch. D. 9; Henkle v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 1 Ves. 317. |