4, c. 125.

It must not be forgotten that it has been established by decided Under 6 Geo. cases that in addition to the exemptions from compulsory pilotage which are specified in the 379th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, such of the exemptions as were created by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, and are not contrary to the express provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, are, by virtue of the 353rd section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, still in force within the pilotage districts of the Trinity House (p).

It has likewise been held that the exemptions which are contained in an Order in Council of the 18th of February, 1854, confirming a bye-law of the Trinity House, and extending the exemptions contained in the 59th section of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, to vessels trading to Norway, the Cattegat, the Baltic, round the North Cape, or into the White Sea, when coming up by the South Channels, and to vessels trading between Boulogne and the Baltic on their outward passages, and when coming up by the South Passages, are still in force within the London Pilotage District (g).

laws.

Since the passing of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the Under byeTrinity House have, by bye-laws made with the consent of her Majesty in Council, under the 332nd section of that act, exempted the following ships, when not carrying passengers, from compulsory pilotage within the London, and the Trinity Out Port, districts :-Ships navigating in ballast between places in the United Kingdom (r), and ships trading from any port or place in Great Britain, within the London district, or any of the

(p) See The Earl of Auckland, Lush. 166, 387; The Temora, Lush. 17; The Hankow, 4 P. D. 197, and supra, p. 260, and p. 261, note (s). It is not easy to follow the reasoning of the cases, and it is submitted that it was the intention of the framers of the M. S. Act, 1854, to comprise all the regulations with reference to compulsory pilotage in the Trinity House Districts in sects. 376379 of that act, and that the provisions in sect. 353 were intended to apply only to places outside of the pilotage districts of the Trinity House. The exemptions relating to ships in the Trinity House Districts contained in sect. 379 of the M. S. Act, 1854, are nearly the same as the exemptions contained in the 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, save that the former exemptions are expressly declared to apply only to ships when not

TRINITY HOUSES OF NEWCASTLE AND HULL.

LIABILITY OF PILOT FOR NEGLIGENCE, &c.

Trinity House Out Port districts to the port of Brest, or any port or place in Europe north and east of Brest, or to the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark or Man, or from Brest, or any port or place in Europe north and east of Brest, or from the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark or Man, to any port or place in Great Britain within either of the said districts (»).

By the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, sect. 387, the Trinity Houses of Newcastle and Hull are to continue to appoint subcommissioners of pilotage, not exceeding a certain number; but it is provided, that these sub-commissioners are not to be deemed pilotage authorities within the meaning of the act (s).

At common law a pilot would be liable for any injury done to another vessel by reason of his misconduct or negligence (t); as, however, pilots under the jurisdiction of the Trinity House of London are required to enter into a bond to observe the byelaws and regulations which may be made by that corporation, it has been thought reasonable to limit the liability of these pilots in cases of negligence to the amount of the penalty of this bond.

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, sect. 373, provides, therefore, that a qualified pilot who has executed this bond shall not be liable for neglect or want of skill beyond its penalty and the amount of pilotage payable to him for the voyage on which he is engaged (u). We have already seen that this statute contains clauses relating to qualified pilots generally which impose upon them a criminal liability in respect of wilful breaches of duty and neglects of duty causing injuries to or tending to the injury of the ship or of those on board; and that there are also

(2) See Order in Council of the 21st of December, 1871, Appendix, p. 78.

(s) For the pilotage jurisdiction of these corporations, see "The General Table of Pilotage Authorities in England and Wales," Appendix, p. 110.

(t) Stort v. Clements, Peake, 107. It has been held in Scotland that when harbour trustees, who are appointed "a pilotage authority" under the M. S. Act, 1854, do not license pilots under the powers conferred on them by Part V. of that act, but employ unlicensed pilots at stated wages to pilot vessels into their harbour, and

themselves receive the pilotage dues and apply them to harbour purposes, they are liable for the fault of the pilots so employed by them. Holman v. The Irvine Harbour Trustees, 4 Sess. Ca. (4th Series), 406.

(u) See the former act, the 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, s. 57, which contains a similar provision. Prior to the Judicature Acts it was held that the Admiralty Court had not jurisdiction to entertain a suit for negligence against a licensed Liverpool pilot. The Alexandria, L. R., 3 A. & E. 575; see also Flower v. Bradley, 44 L. J., Ex. 1.

numerous offences mentioned in the statute in detail to which penalties are attached (x).

OWNERS EX

Important questions have frequently arisen as to the extent MASTERS AND to which masters or owners are liable for injuries occasioned by EMPTED FROM the negligence or want of skill of the pilot whom they have employed (y).

LIABILITY FOR

ACTS OF PILOT.

law.

With regard to the liability of owners or masters for the acts of the pilot employed by them; the owners would, at common law, be liable for the consequences of all the tortious or negligent acts of the pilot done within the scope of his agency (z). The At common master, however, being an intermediate agent, would not be liable to his owner for the wrongful acts of the pilot (a). Whether he would be liable to a stranger, as for instance, to a person against whose vessel the ship might strike, through the negligence of the pilot, has been doubted (b). The better opinion, however, is that he would not be liable (c). The general question is not, however, of much importance, since very few cases of this description can now occur, in which the pilot is not acting under the provisions of some statute limiting or defining the liability of the master and owner.

Independently of legislative provision, the Courts of law have always considered, as indeed justice required, that wherever the employment of a pilot was compulsory, that is to say, where if one was not employed a statutory penalty was incurred, the owners and master were not liable for injuries arising from his acts; for in these cases it was deemed that their authority was superseded by legislative enactment and that it was unjust to hold them responsible for the skill, sobriety, and

(x) See ante, p. 269, and the M. S. Act, 1854, ss. 365-367.

(y) The Pilot Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, s. 53, exempted owners and masters from liability for any loss or damage which might happen in consequence of there being no licensed or qualified pilot on board, unless it was proved that the want of a pilot arose from a refusal to take him on board, or from the wilful neglect of the master in not heaving to, or using all practicable means consistent with the safety of the vessel, to take on board any pilot who might have offered his services. This act also expressly provided that nothing contained in it should affect the remedy

which any person might have in such
cases upon any insurance or other con-
tract, unless it was proved that the
omission to take a pilot arose from the
refusal or wilful neglect of the master;
see s. 56. These provisions are omitted
in the M. S. Act, 1854.

(2) See ante, pp. 158, 159.

(a) Aldrich v. Simmons, 1 Stark. 214. (b) Boucher v. Noidstrom, 1 Taunt. 568, where the master was held not to be liable. In that case, however, the pilot was acting beyond the scope of his employment.

(c) See 3 Kent Com. 176, and the American authorities there referred to, and The Eden, 2 W. Rob. 442.

Under M. S.
Act, 1854.

caution of one whom they had not selected, and who could not be regarded as their servant or agent (d).

This principle is applied when the collision takes place in foreign waters where the employment of the pilot is compulsory, and even though the law of the foreign country may expressly provide that the circumstance of the employment of the pilot being compulsory shall not exempt the owner of the ship from liability for his acts, because the Courts of this country will not render a defendant liable for acts which are done by a person who is not his servant or agent (e).

Where the law does not subject the master to any penalty, but only to payment of the pilot's allowance on refusal to take him, it seems that the employment of a pilot is still to be regarded as compulsory, and the shipowner to be exonerated from liability (ƒ).

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, expressly provides, by sect. 388, that no owner or master of any ship shall be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of the ship (g) within any district where the employment of the pilot is compulsory by law (h).

(d) Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. &
S. 77; Bennet v. Moita, 7 Taunt. 258;
The Maria, 1 W. Rob. 95; The Anna-
polis, Lush. 295; The Agricola, 2 W.
Rob. 10; The Montreal, 17 Jur. 538.
In America, it has been held in some
cases that the owners were liable,
although the employment of the pilot
was compulsory. See Story on Agency,
s. 456 a, note; The China, 7 Wallace,
58, and Sherlock v. Allen, 3 Otto (Ame-
rican) Sup. Court Rep. 99; see also the
observations of Lord Stowell as to this
rule of law in The Neptune the Second,
1 Dods. 467; and of Sir Robert Philli-
more in The Halley, L. R., 2 A. & E.
3; S. C., reversed on appeal, L. R., 2
P. C. 193; and The Hibernian, L. R., 4
P. C. 511. On the same principle,
where the master of a ship is compelled
by law to obey the orders of a dock
master, neither the owners nor the
master are liable for any damage that
may be occasioned by carrying out
such orders. See The Bilbao, Lush.
149; The Belgic, 2 P. D. 57; The Cyn-
thia, 2 P. D. 52.

(e) The Halley, L. R., 2 P. C. 193.
(f) The City of Cambridge, L. R., 4

A. & E. 161; 5 P. C.51; The Hibernian, L. R., 4 P. C. 511; The Princeton, 3 P. D. 90. The Attorney-General v. Case, 3 Price, 302, is sometimes cited as an authority against the proposition laid down in the text, but the case was decided on other grounds. See the judgment of Dr. Lushington in The Maria, 1 W. Rob. 95, 101. The owner's exemption from liability is not affected by the fact that the master can select from a number of pilots. The Hibernian, L. R., 4 P. C. 511; and see Martin v. Temperley, 4 Q. B. 298, where, however, it was held that the same principle was not applicable with respect to the compulsory employment of licensed Thames watermen, as the selection of the owner in that case was practically unlimited.

(g) A qualified pilot employed by compulsion of law on board a ship in tow of a steam-tug is not, although the navigation of the tug is under his sole control, acting in charge of her within this enactment. The Mary, 5P. D. 14.

(h) See the former act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, s. 55, and The Lion, L. R., 2 A. & E. 102; 2 P. C. 525. In Ritchie v. Bousfield, 7 Taunt. 309, which was de

This exemption from liability is applicable to those cases only in which the employment of the pilot by whose fault or incapacity the damage is occasioned was compulsory, and does not extend to cases where a pilot has in fact been employed within his district, although it was not compulsory to employ him (¿).