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The County Courts in England having Admiralty jurisdiction Jurisdiction of County may try claims for necessaries, where the amount claimed does Courts and not exceed 1501., or where consent is given by agreement (n). other Courts. A limited jurisdiction has also been conferred on the Court of Admiralty in Ireland (0), and upon the Courts of the Recorders of Cork and Belfast (p).

The Vice-Admiralty Courts in British possessions abroad have jurisdiction to entertain claims for necessaries supplied, in the possession in which the Court is established, to any ship of which no owner or part-owner is domiciled within the possession at the time of the work being done (2).

The term "necessaries" is strictly applicable only to anchors, What are necables, rigging, and matters of this description; but it may also cessaries. include money expended upon necessaries. It includes all that is fit and proper for the service in which the ship is engaged, and that the owner, as a prudent man, would have ordered if present (). Insurance of freight, charges of brokers for entering and reporting, pilotage and light dues are within the term (s); and the onus of proving that the articles supplied were, under the circumstances, necessaries, lies, both in the Admiralty and in the Common Law Courts, upon the person who supplies them (t). Money expended in meat, &c. for the maintenance of the crew is within the term necessaries (u). In all cases, satisfactory proof

(n) The 31 & 31 Vict. c. 71 (the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868), s. 3. This jurisdiction is limited to cases over which the Admiralty Court had jurisdiction. Allen v. Garbutt, 6 Q. B. D. 165; The Dowse, L. R., 3 A. & E. 135. See also Gunnested v. Price, L. R., 10 Ex. 65, following Simpson v. Blues, L. R., 5 C. P. 134, and differing from the decision of the Privy Council in The Cargo ex Argos, L. R., 5 P. C. 134.

(a) The 30 & 31 Vict. c. 114, pt. iv. See also the County Offices (Ireland) Act (40 & 41 Vict. c. 56), s. 49, by which act power has been given to the Lord Lieutenant to confer jurisdiction in admiralty on other local courts in Ireland there mentioned.

(p) The 39 & 40 Vict. c. 28, s. 3. (9) The 26 Vict. c. 24, s. 10, amended by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 45. In the recent case of The Maude, the Vice-Admiralty Court at Gibraltar has held that this section confers a maritime lien.

(r) The Sophie, 1 W. Rob. 368; The Alexander, 1 W. Rob. 294; The Riga,

L. R., 3 A. & E. 516. Coals and
a screw propeller are necessaries for a
steamer. See The West Friesland, Swa.
454; The Hecla, 1 Spk. 441. In The
Comtesse de Frégeville, Lush. 329, it was
said that necessaries meant articles
immediately necessary for the ship, as
contradistinguished from those merely
necessary for the voyage. But see
now The Riga, ubi sup. ; The Albert
Crosby, L. R., 3 A. & E. 37. The ex-
penses of bringing witnesses to Lon-
don, to assist the master in causes in-
stituted against the ship in the Admi-
ralty, are not necessaries. The Bonne
Amélie, L. R., 1 A. & E. 19. See also
Gunn v. Roberts, L. R., 9 C. P. 331.

(s) The Riga, L. R., 3 A. & E. 516;
The St. Lawrence, 5 P. D. 250. Money
advanced to pay averages has been ex-
cluded. The Aaltje Wilelmina, L. R.,
1 A. & E. 107.

(t) The Alexander, 1 W. Rob. 288, 361; Carey v. White, 1 Brown, P. C. 214; Mackintosh v. Mitcheson, 4 Ex. 175.

(u) The Bonne Amélie, L. R., 1 A. & E. 19.

PART OWNERS.

Division of shares.

Rights and liabilities inter se.

Part owners not partners.

must be given that the necessaries were wanting, or that the money was bonâ fide advanced for the purpose of procuring them (a). It was formerly held that a suit could not be sustained for money paid to discharge a debt incurred for necessaries (y); but in a recent case, where a firm in England had accepted and paid a bill of exchange, drawn on them by the master of a foreign ship abroad, to procure necessaries, it was held that they might sue the ship in the Admiralty Court for necessaries (≈).

We have already seen that all ships are considered to be divided into sixty-four parts or shares, and it must now be observed that where the shares do not all belong to the same person, part ownership exists.

By sect. 37 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, as amended by sect. 2 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1880, the number of registered owners is limited to sixty-four, and no person is entitled to be registered as the owner of any fractional part of a share in a ship; but these rules are subject to the provisions of the former Act as to joint owners and owners by transmission, and do not affect the beneficial title of any number of persons, or of companies represented by or claiming under registered owners or joint owners; and bodies corporate may be registered by their corporate name (a). The 37th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, also provides that any number of persons not exceeding five may be registered as joint owners of a ship, or of a share or share therein, and that such joint owners shall be considered as only one person, so far as relates to the rule which has been mentioned as to the number of registered owners, and shall not be entitled to dispose in severalty of their interest in the ship.

Part owners are not necessarily partners; they are tenants in common when, as is almost always the case, they take their interests at different times and by separate purchases (b).

(x) The Sophie, 1 W. Rob. 368; The
Alexander, ubi sup.

(y) The N. R. Gosfabrick, Swa. 341.
(2) The Onni, Lush. 154. See also
The Albert Crosby, L. R., 3 A. & E.
37; The Anna, 1 P. D. 253; The St.
Lawrence, 5 P. D. 250.

(a) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 18, s. 2 (Appen-
dix, p. ccclxx). It is important to bear
in mind that, by s. 100 of this act, all
persons who are beneficially interested
in a ship (otherwise than by way of

mortgage), but whose names are not on the register, are made liable to all pecuniary penalties imposed by this or any other act on the owners of ships.

(b) Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Owston v. Ogle, 13 East, 538; Helme v. Smith, 7 Bing. 709; Brodie v. Howard, 17 C. B. 109; Collyer on Partnership, b. 5, c. 4; Smith's Merc. Law, p. 191, (8th edit.); Lindley on Partnership, vol. 1, 4th ed. p. 61.

The meaning of this rule is, that the relation of partnership does not arise between them from the mere fact of their holding shares in the same ship; they may, however, be actually in partnership (c), or there may be a partnership in the adventure, and not in the ship (d). In partnership, properly so called, no one can become the partner of another without his consent: but a person may become part owner of a ship without the consent of the other owners, as by purchase, succession and the like (e). There appears to be nothing to render impossible the creation of an ordinary joint tenancy in the shares of a ship (ƒ), but even should this relation exist between the part owners, it is a rule both of the law merchant and of equity, that there is no survivorship between them, for jus accrescendi Jus accrescendi. inter mercatores, pro beneficio commercii locum non habet (g). When it is said that this is a rule of law, it is meant that if a joint tenancy existed in a ship, there would be no survivorship of the legal title to the shares, but it must not be supposed that rights of action are affected by this rule. The right of action on any joint contract with merchants, or for any injury to the joint property, survives, and the executor of the deceased could not be joined in the suit (). The earnings of a ship follow the general law of partnership (i).

against each other.

Subject to these observations, the ordinary rules respecting Remedies as tenants in common apply to part owners. Thus one part owner could not, according to the principles administered in the Com

(c) See the judgment in Helme v. Smith, ubi sup. Where part owners work the ship together for profit they are in the same position as partners. Jebsen v. East and West India Dock Company, L. R., 10 C. P. 300.

(d) Holderness v. Shackells, 8 B. & C. 612. It was once held that part owners, although tenants in common and not joint tenants, had a right to consider the ship as partnership effects, and as liable to pay all debts which any of them might have incurred on her account, so as to give to those partners who were compelled to pay, a lien in equity on the share of others who had not contributed. Doddington v. Hallett, 1 Ves. sen. 497. But this decision has since been overruled. Ex parte Young, 2 Rose, 78, note; 2 Ves. & B. 242; and see Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395.

(e) Holt on Ship., Introduction, 32. (f) See Abbott on Ship. 78; Smith's Merc. Law, p. 189 (8th edit.).

(g) See the authorities cited in the last note, and Co. Litt. 182 a; Buckley v. Barber, 6 Ex. 164.

(h) This is an anomaly; see the judgment of Dampier, J., in Rex v. Collector of Customs, 2 M. & S. 225; Martin v. Crompe, 1 Ld. Raym. 340; Buckley v. Barber, 6 Ex. 164. In the earlier cases this rule was not distinctly recognized; actions were brought jointly by the survivor and the executor, and the non-joinder of the executor was in some instances pleaded in abatement. See Hall v. Huffam, 2 Lev. 188, 228; 3 Keb. 737, 798; Kemp v. Andrews, 3 Lev. 290; Smyth v. Milward, 2 Lutw. 1493.

(i) Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Gardner v. McCutcheon, 4 Beav. 534.

Admiralty jurisdiction as to employ

mon Law Courts, bring trover for the value of his share against another, unless there has been an actual destruction of the ship, or some act equivalent to it (). The mere sale of the ship by one of them, it appears, was not equivalent to a destruction, for, generally, such a sale would only pass the interest of the seller; although it would be otherwise if the whole property passed (7). Where it appeared that the plaintiff was tenant in common of one moiety, and the defendants of the other, and that they forcibly took the ship out of his possession, changed her name, and secreted her from him, and that she, after getting into the hands of a third person who sent her on a foreign voyage, was totally lost, it was left to the jury to consider whether the destruction was not by means of the defendants' acts; and the jury having found that it was, the Court held that the direction was proper, and refused to disturb the verdict (m). But where one part owner sued the other for fraudulently and deceitfully carrying the ship beyond the seas without his assent, whereby he lost his share, the Court arrested the judgment, and held, that owing to the trust and confidence which the law supposes to exist between tenants in common, there cannot be any fraud between them, and that, under such circumstances, they had no remedy at law (n).

It has been held, that where one part owner objects to the employment of the ship on a particular voyage, but does not expressly dissent, he is liable in equity, if the ship is afterwards lost, for his proportion of the loss (0), but that it is otherwise if he expressly dissents (p).

In consequence of the difficulty of obtaining complete relief in the Courts of Common Law in cases of disputes between part ment of ship, owners as to the employment of the ship, the Court of Admiralty putes between from early times has exercised a peculiar jurisdiction in such cases (7). In the words of Lord Tenterden "it has been the

and as to dis

owners.

(k) See Litt. s. 323; Heath v. Hubbard, 4 East, 110; Mayhew v. Herrick, 7 C. B. 229.

(1) Heath v. Hubbard, ubi sup., 2 Wms. Saund. 47 p, note (c); Barton v. Williams, 5 B. & A. 395; and see the observation of Parke, B., in Farrar v. Beswick, 1 M. & W. 688; and Ex parte Howden, 2 Mont. D. & D. 574.

(m) Bernadiston v. Chapman, C. B.,

.

1 Geo. 1, before King, C. J., cited 4 East, 121.

(n) Graves v. Sawcer, 1 Lev. 29; S. C., Sir T. Raym. 15. It does not appear distinctly whether the ship was lost; see also Molloy, B. 2, c. 1, s. 2.

(0) Shelley v. Winson, 1 Vern. 297.
(p) Horn v. Gilpin, Ambler, 255.
(9) Molloy, B. 2, c. 1, s. 2; Beawes,

107.

constant practice, in disputes between part owners as to the employment of the vessel, where the majority in value of the shareholders are desirous to send the vessel on a voyage to which the minority will not consent, for the Court of Admiralty to arrest the ship at the instance of the latter, and to take from the majority a stipulation in a sum equal to the value of the shares. of those who disapprove of the adventure, either to bring back and restore to them the ship, or to pay them the value of their shares. Although the jurisdiction of the Admiralty in such cases was once doubted, there are several authorities recognizing it; and it may now be taken as settled, that in disputes between part owners as to the employment of a ship, the Court of Admiralty may, by warrant, arrest and detain the ship until security be given to the amount of the value of the shares of those part owners who dissent from the particular employment” (»). If the minority have possession of the ship, and refuse to employ her, the majority may, on a similar warrant, obtain possession and send her to sea, on giving the like security (s). A dissenting owner is not entitled to any share of the freight earned on the voyage (t). Where, however, he arrests the ship after the other owners have expended money in repairing it and fitting it out, he is bound to pay his proportion of these expenses (). But the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty was so limited that until recently it was unable to decide questions of title (). Further, it had no power to enter- Adjustment

(r) In re Blanchard, 2 B. & C. 248, and see The Apollo, 1 Hagg. 306. The Court has jurisdiction to take a vessel from a mere wrongdoer, and deliver it to the lawful owner. Ib.

(s) According to the present practice the condition of the bail bond is to answer judgment in the action. Where a bond was given for the safe return of a ship to a particular port of this kingdom, and the ship having been carried by distress into another port was there arrested in suits for salvage and wages, the Court of Admiralty declined to pronounce the bond forfeited, and held, that while the ship was within the jurisdiction of the Court, safe and unsold, the application' was premature. It appears that, according to the American law, the minority may employ the ship in like manner, if the majority decline to employ her at all. Steamboat Orleans

v. Phœbus, 11 Peter's (American) Rep.
175; The Margaret, 2 Hagg. 276.

(t) Anon., 2 Chane. Cas. 36; Boson
v. Sandford, Carth. 63.

(u) Davis v. Johnston, 4 Sim. 539.

(x) Where the shares were not ascertained, the Court had no jurisdiction of this description, and in such a case the Court of Chancery would restrain the sailing of the ship by injunction until the share of the party complaining was ascertained, and security given to the amount of it. Haly v. Goodson, 2 Mer. 77; Christie v. Craig, Ib. 137. See, however, Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare, 89. As to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery where there is an express agreement as to the employment of the ship, see Darby v. Baines, 9 Hare, 369. See, also, Brenan v. Preston, 2 De G., M. & G. 813; Hart v. Herwig, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 861.

of accounts.

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