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kinde, right as intelligence is alonelie the diuide nature, of whiche it followeth, that the ilke knowyng is more worthe than is either sens it knoweth by his proper nature, not onelie his subiecte,, as who saieth, it ne knoweth not alonelie, that appertaineth properlie to his knowyng, but it knoweth the subiectes of all other knowynges. But how shall it than bee, if that witte and imaginacion, striuen ayen reasonyng, and sain that of the ilke vniuersalf thynge, that reason weneth to seen, that it nis right naught, for witte and imaginacion saine, that that is sensible or imaginable, it ne maie not been vniuersall.

and crepen in the dust, and drawen after hem á trace, or a forough continued, that is to saie, as neders and snailes, and other beastes, by the wanderyng lightnesse of hir winges, beaten the windes, and ouer swimmen the spaces of the long aite, by moste fliyng.

And other beastes gladden hemself, to diggen hir traces, or hir steppes in the yearthe, with hit goyng, or with hir feete, and to gon either by the greene fieldes, or els to walken vnder the woodes. And all it be so that thou seest, that thei discorden by diuers formes, algates hir faces enclined, heauieth hir dulle wittes, onely the linage of manne heaueth highest his hie hedde, and standeth light with his vpright body, and beholdeth the yearthes vnder hym. And but if thou yearthlie manne waxeste euill out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth, thee that askest the Heauen, with thy right visage, and haste areised thy forehedde, to bearen vp on high thy courage, so that thy thought ne bee not heanied, ne put lowe vnder foote, sith that thy body is so high areised.

quod scitur, &c.

THEREFORE than, as I haue shewed a little here beforn that al thing that it wist, nis not knowen by his nature proper, but by the nature of hem that comprehenden it. Let vs loken now, in as moche as it is lefull to vs, as who saieth, let vs looken now as wee maie, whiche that is the estate of the diuine substaunce, so that wee maie well knowe, eke what his science is. To common iudgement of al creatures reasonables, than is, that God is eterne. Let vs consider than, what is eternitee; for certes, that shall shewen vs togider, the diuine nature, and the diuine science. Eternitee than is perfite possession, and all together of life interminable, and that sheweth the more cleralie, by the comparison or collasion of temporall thynges.

Than is there either the iudgement of reason sothe, ne that there nis nothyng sensible, or els for that reason wote well, that many thinges been subiect to wit, and to imaginacion: than is the concepcion of reason vain and false, whiche that loketh and comprehendeth that that is sensible and singuler, as vniuersall. And if that the reason would answere ayenste these twoo, that is to saie, to witte and imaginacion, and saie that sothly she her self that is to sain reason, loketh and comprehendeth by reason of vniuersalitie, both that that is sensible, and that that is imaginable, and Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omné thilke twoo, that is to sain, witte and imaginacion, ne mowen not stretchen hem self, to the knowynge of vniuersalitee, for that the knowing of hem ne maie not exceden, ne surmounten the bodily figures. Certes, of the knowyng of thynges, men oughten rather yeuen more credence, to the more stedfast, and to the more perfite iudgemente, in this maner striuyng, than we that haue strengthe of reasonyng, and of imaginacion, and of witte, that is to saie, by reason and by imaginacion, wee would rather praise the cause of reason, as who saieth, than the cause of witte, and of ymaginacion. Semblable thing is it, that the reason of mankinde ne weneth not, that the diuine intelligence, beholdeth or knoweth thynges to come, but right as the reason of mankinde knoweth hem: for thou arguiste thus, that if that it ne seme not to men, that some thynges haue certaine betidynges, thei ne maie not be wiste, before certainlie to betiden, and than is there no prescience of thilke thynges, and if we trowe, that prescience bee in these thynges, than is there nothyng, that betideth by necessitie. But if we might haue the judgemente, of the diuine thought, as we been parteners of reason, right so as we haue demed, that it behoueth by imaginacion and witte,, and beneth reason, right so would we demen, that it were rightfull thyng, that mannés reason ought to submitte it self, to be beneath the diuine thought, for whiche if wee maie, as who saieth, that if wee maie, I counsaile, that we enhaunce vs in the height of thilke souerain intelligence, for there shall reason well seen that, that it ne maie not beholde in it self, and certes, that is thus, in what maner the prescience of God, seeth all thyngs and diffinisheth, all though thei haue no certain betidynges: ne this is none opinion, but rather the simplicitie of the souerain science that is not shet, within no maner of boundes.

Quam variis terras animalia permeant figuris. Nam

que alia extento sunt corpore, &c.

THE beastes passen by the yearthes, by full diuers figures, for some of hem haue hir bodies straught,

For all thyng that liueth in tyme, it is present, and procedeth fro preteritees, into futures, that is to saine, from time passed, into time comming: ne there nis nothing established in tyme, that maic enbracen togithet, all the space of this life, for certes, yet ne hath it not taken, the tyme of to morowe, and it hath lost that of yester daie. And certes, in the life of this daie, ye ne liuen no more, but right as in this mouable, and transitorie moment. Than thilke thyng that suffereth tempo.all condicion, all though that it neuer began to be, ne thought it neuer cease to be (as Aristoteles demed of the world) and although the life of it be stretched with infinite of tyme, yet algates nis it no soche thynge, as men might trowen by right that it is eterne. For all though that it comprehende, and embrace the space of the life infinite, yet algates ne embrasethe it not the space of the life all togither, for it ne hathe not the futures that be not yet: ne it ne hath no lenger the preterities that ben done or passed. But thilke thing than, that hath and comprehendeth togider all the plente of the life interminable, to whom there ne faileth nought of the future, and to whom there nis nought of the preterite escaped or passed, thilke same is ywitnessed and proued by right to ben eterne. And it behouethe by necessite that thilke thing be alway presente te him selfe, and, competent,

as who saith, alway present to him selfe, and so mighty, that all be right at his plesaunce, and that he haue al present the infinite of the mouable tyme. Wherfore some men trowen wrongfullye, that whan they heren that it semed to Plato, that this world had neuer beginninge of time, that it neuer shall haue faylynge: they wene in thilke maner, that this worlde be maked eterne, wyth his maker, as who saythe, they wene that this worlde and God be maked togither eterne. And that is a wrongful wening for other thing it is to be ladde by the life interminable, as Plato graunted to the worlde, and other thinge it is to enbrace togither al the presence of the life that is interminable, which thinge is clere and manifest to the dyuine thought. Ne it ne shulde not. seme to vs that God is elder than thinges that ben maked by quantite of time, but rather by the prosperite of his simple nature. For this ilke infynyte mouynges of temperal thynges, foloweth thys presentary estate of thys lyfe immouable, and so as it ne maie not countrefeten ne faine it, ne be euenlike to it for the immobilite, that is to say, that is in the eternite of God, it faileth, and faileth in to mowing fro the simplicite of the presence of God, and disencreaseth in the infinite quantite of future and preterite. And so as it may not haue togyder all the plentie of the lyfe, algates yet for as moch as it ceaseth neuer, for to ben in some maner, yet it semeth somdele to vs, that it foloweth and ressembleth thilke thinge, that it ne may not attaine to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it selfe to some maner presence of thys❘ lytel moment: the whiche presence of this lytel and swifte moment for that it beareth a maner ymage of likenesse of the aye dwelling of God: it graunteth to soche maner thinges, as it betideth to, that it semeth hem as these thynges haue ben, and ben. And for that the presence of soche lytel moment ne may not dwell, therfore it rauished and toke thinfinite waie of time, that is to saye, by succession, and by this manere it is done, for that it shulde continue the life in goyng, of the whiche lyfe it ne might not enbrace the plentie of dwelling. And for thy, if we wollen put worthy names to thinges that folowen Plato, let us saye than sothelye, that God is eterne, and that the worlde is perpetuell. Than sithe euery iudgement knoweth and comprehendeth by his owne nature, thinges that ben subiect vnto hym, there is to God alwayes an eterne and a presentarie estate. And the scyence of hym that ouerpasseth al temporal m ment, dwelleth in simplicite of his presence, and enbraseth and consydereth all the infynite spaces of tymes preteritees, and of tymes futures. And loketh in his simple knowing, al thynges of preterite, right as they weren ydon presently right nowe. If thou wolte than thynken and aduise the prescience, by whiche it knoweth al thinges, thou ne shalt not demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou shalt demen more rightfully that is science of presence or of instance that neuer ne faileth, for whiche it nis not ycleped prouidence, but it shuld rather ben cleped purueiaunce, which is established full ferre fro right low thinges, and beholdeth from a ferre al thinges, right as it were fro the bye hyght of thynges. Why asketh thou than, or why disputest thou than the thilke thynges ben doen by necessite, whiche that ben ysene and yknowen by the diuine sight, sythe that forsothe men ne maken nat tbilke thynges necessary, whiche

that they sene ben ydon in hir sight, for addeth
thy beholding any necessite, to thilke thinges
whiche thou beholdest present? B. Naye (quod I),
P. Certes (quod she) than, yf men mighten.maken
any digne comparison or collacion of the presence
diuine, and of the presence of mankind, right so
as ye sene some thinges in this temporal presence,
right so seeth God all thing by his eterne presence.
Wherfore this diuine prescience ne chaungeth not
the nature of the propertie of thinges, but be-
holdeth soch thinges present to him warde, as they
shulden betyden to you warde in tyme to comen.
Ne it ne confoundeth not the iudgement of thinges,
but by one sight of his thought, he knoweth the
thinges to comen, as wel necessary as not neces-
sarie. Right so whan ye sene togither a man
walke on the erthe, and the sonne arisen in the
Heauen, al be it so that ye sene al togither that
one and that other: yet neuertheles ye demen
and discernen, that that one is voluntary, and that
other is necessary: right so than the diuine lokinge,
beholdinge all thinges vnder him, ne troubleth nat
the qualite of thinges that ben certainly present to
himwarde, but as to the condicion of tyme, for-
sothe they ben future, for whiche it foloweth that
this nys none opinion, but rather a stedfaste know-
ing ystrengthed by sothenesse, that whan that God
knoweth any thinge to be, he ne vnwote nat that
thilke thynge wantethe necessite to be, this is to
sain, that whan that God knoweth any thinge to
betide, he wote wel that it ne bath no necessite to
betide. And yf thou seist here that thilke thing
that God seeth to betide, it ne may nat vnbetide,
as who saythe it mote betyde, and thilke thinge
that ne may nat vnbetide, it mote betiden by ne
cessite, and that thou streyn me to this name of
the necessite. Certes I will well confessen and be-
knowen a thynge of full sad trouthe, but vnneth
shall there anie wight mow sene it or come thereto,
but if that he be beholder of the diuine thought,
for I will answere the thus, that thilke thinge that
is future whan it is referred to the diuine knowinge
than it is necessarie. But certes whan it is vnder-
standen in his owne kind, men sene it vtterly fre
and absolute fro all necessyte. For certes there
ben two maners of necessitees, that one necessite
is simple, as thus, that it behoueth by necessite
that all men be mortall or deedlye. Another
necessite is condycionell, as thus, yf thou wost
that a man walketh, it behoueth by necessite
that he walke, thilke thing than that any wight
hath yknowe to be, it ne may nat be none other
wyse than he knoweth it to be. But this condicion
ne draweth not with her thilke necessite simple, for
certes this necessite condicionell, the propre nature
of it ne maketh it nat, but the adiection of the
condicion maketh it. For no necessite ne con-
straineth a man to gon, that goeth by his proper
wil al be it so that whan he goth, that is necessary
that he goth. Right on this same maner than,
yf that the purueiaunce of God seeth any thinge
present, than mote thilke thinge ben by necessyte,
all thoughe that it ne haue no necessyte of his
owne nature. But certes the futures that betyden
by fredon of arbytrie, God seeth hem al togider
present. These thynges than if they ben referred
to the diuine sight, than ben they maked neces-
sarie by the condicion of the diuine knowinge. But
certes, if thilke thinges ben considered by hem
selfe, they been absolute of necessitie, and ne for-

letten not, ne cessen not of the libertie of hir owne nature. Than certes, without dout all the thinges shullen ben don whiche that God wote beforn that they ben to comen and betiden of fre arbitrie, or of free wyll, that al be it so that they betiden, yet algates ne lese they not hir proper nature in beynge, by the whiche firste or they weren doen, they hadden power not to haue betidde. Boecius. What is this to saine than (quod I) that thinges ne be not necessary by hir proper nature, so that they comen in al hir maners in the likenesse of necessie, by condicion of the diuine science? Philosophie. This is the difference (quod she) that tho thinges which that I purposed thee a lytel here beforne, that is to saine, sonne a risyng, and the man walking, that ther whiles that thilk thinges ben done, they ne might not ben vndoone. Nathelesse that one of hem or it was done, it behoueth by necessite that it was doone, but not that other. Right so it is here that the thynges whiche that God hath present, withouten doute they shullen ben, but some of hem discendeth of the nature of thynges, as the sonne arisinge, and some discendeth of the power of the doers, as the manne walkinge. Boecius. Than said I, no wronge, that if these thynges bee referred to the diuine knowing, than ben they necessarie, and if they been cosydred by hem selfe, than been they absolute fro the bonde of necessite. Righth so as al thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, if thou referre bem to reason it is vniuersall, and if thou loke it or refer it to it self, than is it singuler. But nowe if thou saiest thus, that if that it be in my power to chaungen my purpose, than shall I voiden the purueiaunce of God, whan perauenture, I shall haue chaunged the thinges whiche that he knoweth beforne.

that our futures yeuen cause of the prescience of God. For certes strength of the deuine science, whiche that embraseth al thinges by his presentary knowing, establisheth maner to all thynges, and it ne oweth not to latter thinges. And sithe that these thinges ben thus, that is to saine, that necessite is not in thinges by the diuine prescience, than is ther fredom of arbitrie that dwelleth hole and vnwemmed to mortal men, ne the lawes ne purposen not wycked medes, and paines to the willinges of men, that ben vnbounden and quite of all necessite: and God beholder and foreweter of al thinges dwelleth aboue, and the presente eternite of sight, renneth alwaye wyth the diuers qualite of our dedes, dispensyng or ordeining medes to good men, and tourmentes to wicked men. Ne in ydel ne in vaine ne ben ther not put in God hope and praiers, that ne mowen not ben vnspedeful ne without effecte, whan they ben rightful.

Withstande than and eschewe thou vyces, worshippe and loue thou vertues, areyse thy corage to rightful hopes, yelde thou humble praiers and highe. Greate necessyte of prowesse and of vertue, is encharged and commaunded to you if ye nil not dissimulen, sith that ye worchen and doone, that is to saine, your dedes and youre werkes beforne the eyen of the iudge, that seeth and also that demeth al thinges. Deo gratias.

THUS ENDETH THE BOKE OF BOECIUS OF THE CONSOLACION
OF PHILOSOPHIE.

THE

CONCLUCIONS OF THE ASTROLABIE.

Philosophie. Than shall I answeren the thus: certes thou maiste wel chaunge thy purpose, but LYTEL Lowys my sonne, I perceiue well by certaine for as moche as the present sothnesse of the diuine euidences thyne abylyte to lerne scyences, touchpurueiaunce beholdeth that thou maiste chaunge ing nombres and proporcions and also well conthy purpose, and whether thou chaunge it or no, sydre I thy besye prayer in especyal to lerne and whitherward that thou tourne it, thou ne maist the tretyse of the astrolabye. Than for as moche not eschue the diuine prescience, right so thou ne as a philosopher saithe, he wrapeth hym in his maiste not slid the sight of the presenti ye, al- freude, that condiscendeth to the ryghtfull prayers though that thou tourne thy self by thy fre wil in of his frende: therefore I haue giuen thee a suffito diuers actions. But thou maiste saine ayen to cient astrolabye for oure orizont, compowned after this thus: how shall it than be, shall not the the latitude of Oxenforde: upon the whiche by diuine science ben chaunge by my disposicion, mediacion of this lytell treatise, I purpose to teache whan that I will one thing nowe, and now another thee a certaine nombre of conclusions, pertainyng thinge? And thilke prescience ne semeth it not to to this same instrument. I say a certaine of conentrechaunge stoundes of knowinge, as who saithe, clusions for thre causes, the first cause is this. ne shal it not semen to vs, that the diuine pre- Truste wel that al the conclusions that haue be science entrechaungeth his diuers stoundes of know-founden, or ells possiblye might be founde in so inge, so that it knowe sometime one thing, and sometime it knoweth the contrarie of that thing? Philo.

No forsothe (quod she) for the diuine sight renneth beforne and seeth al the futures, and clepeth hem ayen, and retourneth hem to the propre prescience of his propre knowinge, ne he entrechaungeth not so as thou wenest the stoundes of his foreknowing, as owe this, nowe that: but he dwelling aye cometh beforne, and embraseth at o stroke al the mutacions. And this prescienoe to comprehenden and to sene al thinges, God ne hath not taken it of the betidinges of thinges to comen but of his propre symplicite. And hereby is assoiled thilke thiuges that thou puttest a litel here beforne, that is to saine, that it is vnworthy thing to sain,

noble an instrument as in the astrolabye, ben vnknowen perfitely to anye mortal man in this region, as I suppose. Another cause is this, that sothely in any cartes of the astrolabye that I haue ysene, there ben some conclusions, that wol not in al thinges perfourme hir behestes: and some of hem ben to harde to thy tender age of ten yere to conceiue. This treatise deuided in fiue parts wil I shewe the wonder light rules and naked wordes in Englishe, for Latine ne canst thou nat yet but smale, my litel sonne. But neuerthelesse suffiseth to the these trewe conclusyons in Englishe, as wel as suffiseth to this noble clerkes Grekes these same. conclusions in Greke, and to the Arabines in Arabike, and to lewes. in Hebrewe, and to the Latin folke in Latyn: which Latyn folke had hem firste

THE firste partye of this treatise shall reherce the THE moder of thin astrolabye is the thickest plate figures, and the membres of thyne astrolaby, by-perced with a large hole, that receiueth in her cause that thou shalte haue the greater knowinge of wombe the thinne plates compowned of diuers clythine owne instrument. mats, and thy reete shapen in maner of a net or of a web of a lope.