A sanitary district is similarly created, although this district is definitely established by legislative act and no opportunity for a popular vote is given. Thus the territory of Indianapolis, already a civil city and a school city, is to become a park city and a sanitary city-four separate, legally distinct municipal corporations over what is for all practical purposes the same area, each municipal corporation, as such, empowered to issue bonds up to the constitutional debt limitation. These new municipal corporations will, of course, relieve the city in its civil capacity from the burden of park and sewage disposal improvements; or rather will permit the making of such improvements, impossible for the civil city whose constitutional debt limit has been reached. Incidentally, the legal stratagem of separate corporate existence will not diminish the burden upon the taxpayer.

It would seem pertinent to inquire to what extent such creation of a special municipal corporation for each urgent improvement can be continued. As city indebtedness or need increases, a "fire district" such as found in New England, would relieve the civil city of the burden of providing a fire department, as the school district has removed the burden of schools from the civil city. A "lighting district," common in New England towns, and a "metropolitan water district," as found in Nebraska, might be added. From a legal and constitutional standpoint there has as yet been no limit to the number of such corporations that may be created over any given area nor to the public purposes for which they may be established. The question is largely one of legislative discretion and good sense. Unfortunately in the past special municipal corporations have developed through patchwork legislation in which there was no conscious attempt to understand the nature of the district nor to foresee the possibilities in its development.

As an example of the extraordinary development of a special municipal corporation and its possibilities as a new and flexible agency in the development of a community, the port of Portland stands preeminent under the powers conferred in 1917. Organized in 1891 under act of 1890, this "port" was created to improve the Columbia River, and its territory consisted of the area about that river, including the city of Portland. To its original purpose, similar to that of river and navigation districts in other states, there was added in 1901 authority to provide a dry-dock, which was completed in 1903. In 1908 by popular vote the district took over the towage and pilotage service at an expense of $500,000, in coöperation with the national government, and in its biennial report for 1907-1908 the governing body of the

port could well say: "No other community in this country began so early or has gone so far in expenditure for river improvements as has Portland, nor has any public body in any city ever received more hearty and uniform support from the voters and taxpayers than has the port of Portland Commission throughout its existence." The extraordinary extension of powers granted by the legislature of 1917 gives evidence of the utility of this special municipal corporation and the popular confidence in it.

The port of Portland is a municipal corporation, so recognized by the courts as similar districts in the state of Washington have been, and so designated by the latest legislative act, the title to which reads: "To extend the powers of municipal corporations known as ports. . . ." .." While civil cities over the country are struggling, often unsuccessfully, to secure the right to own and operate markets and terminal facilities, the port of Portland has now been empowered not only to lease warehouses and terminal facilities and issue bills of lading and warehouse receipts, but also to engage generally in the business of transporting passengers and goods between Portland and any point in the world, and for that purpose to have offices or agencies anywhere in the United States or in foreign countries.

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"The object, purpose and occupation of the said port of Portland," declares one of the three 1917 acts affecting the port, "shall be to promote the maritime shipping and commercial interests of the port of Portland Another act grants power "to transport, for hire, passengers and mails, express company matter, goods, wares, merchandise, animals, and other property and materials of all kinds and nature whatever, and from any city or place within the territorial limits of the port as the home port or principal terminus, to, from, and between the various cities, towns, seaports, and river ports or landing places of the world and to purchase, sell, own, charter, em

ploy, operate and maintain steam, sailing, auxiliary vessels and to lease or rent such buildings, warehouses, wharves, piers, quays, and basins as may be necessary or advantageous for carry

ing on business within the United States country."

or in any foreign

Two new purposes were added in 1917 to the list of those served by the special municipal corporation. Illinois, which has been unusually active in its use of special districts, has now provided for "public health

'Gen. Laws, Oregon, 1917, ch. 199.

Gen. Laws, Oregon, 1917, ch. 296, sec. 1.

more adjacent towns in counties under township organization, or any road district or two or more road districts in counties not under township organization, or any town or towns in a county under township organization and an adjacent road district or districts in counties not under township organization, may be organized into a public health district. The purpose of the district is thus to permit an existing agency to take on new functions or to permit several existing agencies to combine for the new purpose. Township and road district boundaries are respected but county lines may be ignored. The district is formed on petition and a vote at regular elections. Officials of existing agencies, however, are to govern the district. In counties not under township organization the board of county commissioners constitutes the board of health or governing body for each district in the county. In single towns the township supervisor, assessor and town clerk constitute the board of health. Where towns or road districts combine there are representatives from each on the board. This is a tendency, which has been manifest before in the case of drainage districts in some states, to avoid the multiplication of officers and to centralize the control of the special district in the hands of the existing officers.

Among the powers conferred upon the board of health are: to levy an annual tax of not to exceed four mills; to appoint a public health officer from a list of eligibles supplied by the state department of health; to appoint nurses, chemists, experts and such clerks as the public health districts" in which there are several new features. Any town or two or officer recommends; to acquire and hold real estate and personal property; and to publish pamphlets. The public health officer is the executive of the board of health; enforces the rules of the state department of health; enforces all city, village and incorporated town ordinances relating to nuisances, public health and sanitation; investigates existence of contagious and infectious diseases, and arrests the progress of the same; and establishes dental clinics for school children."

North Carolina passed an act to incorporate "rural communities,” creating a special municipal corporation which, in the number of its purposes, approaches much more closely the municipal corporation proper the city or village. The people of any community in North Carolina upon petition signed by a majority of the registered voters of such community, embracing in area one or more contiguous school districts, may be incorporated under the name of "The ... Community of County." A new departure in the procedure for

Session Laws, Ill., 1917, p. 763.

organization is the provision that the petition shall be filed with the secretary of state who issues a certificate of incorporation. Most special municipal corporations in the past have been formed on a hearing before some local authority, usually the county court, and in most states there is little record in the secretary of state's office of the existence of these corporations. The registered voters of the community hold a public meeting, and a tax levy can be made only at the annual meeting. A board of three directors is elected by the meeting, and the meeting may adopt ordinances on the following subjects: the public roads of the community; public schools; public health; police protection; abatement of nuisances; care of paupers, aged or infirm persons; to encourage the coming of new settlers; regulation of vagrancy; aids to enforcement of state and national laws; collection of community taxes; establishment and support of public libraries, parks, halls, playgrounds, fairs and other agencies of recreation, education, health, music, arts and morals. A tax may be levied at an annual meeting if a majority of the qualified voters are present and vote in favor of it, or the question may be submitted to an election thirty days later. The board of directors may adopt standards for protection and marketing of produce, canned vegetables, etc., and may adopt labels, trademarks and brands and regulate their use. A state bureau of community service is given supervision over these "communities."

State House, Providence, R. I.

Session Laws, N. C., 1917, ch. 128.

FREDERIC H. GUILD.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON PUBLIC LAW

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

University of Illinois

Parole-Repeal Violates No Vested Right of Prisoner. Neal v. Hines (Kentucky, May 28, 1918, 203 S.W. 518). The plaintiff was convicted of murder in 1911 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Under the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law of 1910 he had the right, after he had served 5 years of his term, to make application for a parole. In 1914 this law was amended so as to extend the time which must elapse before a prisoner sentenced for life became eligible to parole from 5 to 8 years. The plaintiff has served 5 years of his term and brings mandamus to compel the board of prison commissioners to parole him. He alleges that the new law cannot be applicable to him. The court denied the petition for mandamus on two grounds: First, a prisoner under the law has no vested right to a parole and a parole law may be amended or repealed entirely without violating any of his constitutional rights. A parole is given as an act of grace and not of right. Consequently the law of 1914 applies to the plaintiff and he is not eligible to parole until he has served 8 years of his term. Second, by the terms of the law the act of granting a parole is made discretionary and not mandatory and this discretion cannot be controlled by the issuance of a mandamus.

Police Power-Validity of Ordinance Against Falsely Labeling Meat "Kosher." People v. Atlas (New York, Appellate Division, May 31, 1918, 170 N. Y. Supp. 834). A New York statute of 1915 penalized the offense of selling or offering for sale any meat falsely marked with the word "kosher." "Kosher" meat is that which is prepared either by a rabbi or under his direction in such a manner as to comply with all the requirements of the orthodox Hebrew faith. The statute did not limit the sale of such meat to orthodox Jews but left the sale of it open to the general public. The purpose of the legislature was merely to prevent fraud. The court rejected the argument of unconstitutionality urged against the statute by the defendant in this case. In the first place the