53. FEDERAL COURTS - Effect of State Decisions. The rule that the decision of the highest court of a State passing upon the validity of a State statute under the State constitution is binding upon the federal courts will not be applied in cases involving rights which arose under the statute prior to the decision of the State court; and the federal court will exercise an independent judgment. - JONES V. GREAT SOUTHERN FIREPROOF HOTEL CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 79 Fed. Rep. 477.

54. FEDERAL COURTS-Eminent Domain.-As to mere questions of procedure in the condemnation of property, or of conflict between the statute authorizing the condemnation, or the proceedings thereunder, and the constitution of the State, the decision of the highest court of the State is conclusive.-LONG ISLAND WATERSUPPLY CO. V. UITY OF BROOKLYN, U. s. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 718.

55. FEDERAL COURTS-Habeas Corpus - State Courts. -While the general rule is that persons prosecuted in State courts will not be released by the federal courts on writs of habeas corpus, but will be left to reach the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error, yet a federal court has the power to do so if special circumstances should require: possessing a discretion In the matter which must be governed by the facts in each case. IN RE GRICE, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Tex.), 79 Fed. Rep. 627.

56. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Promise to Pay Debt of Another. A promise to pay the debt of a third person, arising out of some new consideration, of benefit to the promisor, or harm to the promisee, moving to the promisor, either from the promisee or the original debtor, is not within the statute of frauds, although the original debt still subsists and remains unaffected by said agreement. CRAFT V. KENDRICK, Fla., 21 South.

Rep. 803.

An in.

57. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-Preferences. solvent debtor may lawfully secure a portion of his ereditors to the exclusion of the others, if in so doing he acted in good faith and without a fraudulent intent. -SMITH V. BOWEN, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 949.

58. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE TO WIFE. A deed from an insolvent married man to his wife, founded upon no other consideration than a contract previously made between them, by the terms of which she was to perform the ordinary household duties of a wife, for which he was to pay her a stipulated sum per annum, is, as to creditors of the husband whose claims were in existence at the time of the execution of the deed, voluntary, and therefore vold.-LEE V. SAVANNAH GUANO CO., Ga., 27 S. E. Rep. 159.

59. GARNISHMENT — Protection of Garnishee.-A garnishee who, in his answer, admits an indebtedness on open account to a debtor whose effects are sought to be reached by the garnishment, will not, as against a third person who is true owner of such account, be protected by a judgment rendered in the garnishment proceeding, if, at the time of answering, the garnishee knew the account actually belonged to such third per. son, or had knowledge of facts naturally suggesting an inquiry which would easily have led to a discovery of the truth. - CHURCHMAN V. ROBINSON, Ga., 27 S. E. Rep. 164.

60, HOLIDAYS.-Code, art. 13, § 9, establishing Febru ary 22d as a legal holiday, and providing that it shall be treated as Sunday only as regards the presenting of bills of exchange, checks, etc., does not make such day a "dies non,"and an act done on it is as effective as if done on any other day.-HANDY V. MADDOX, Md., 37 Atl. Rep. 222.

61. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Conveyances-Fraud.-It is the general rule that fraud will not ordinarily be presumed, but must be established by the party who has alleged it. The rule does not apply in a contest between a wife and creditors of her husband, in respect to transactions involving the transfer of property from the husband to the wife. In such a contest there is a presumption against her, which she must overcome

by affirmative proof. She must show by the preponderance of the evidence the bona fide character of the transaction. KIRCHMAN V. CORCORAN, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 916.

62. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Gifts-Trust.-Where a husband purchases real estate with his own funds, and causes the legal title thereof to be conveyed to his wife, the presumption is that the husband intended such real estate as a gift to his wife. KOBARG V. GREDER, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 921.

63. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Married Woman's Deed.No title is conveyed by a married woman's deed of her separate property where her husband's consent thereto, required by Const. art. 10, § 6, was not proved and recorded until after her death. GREEN V. BENNETT, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 142.

64. INJUNCTION-Judgment - Certiorari.-Injunction will not lie to restrain the enforcement of a void judgment which can be reviewed by certiorari when the bill for injunction is filed.-SAN ANTONIO & A. P. RY. Co. v. GLASS, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 339.

65. INSANE PERSONS-Execution Sale.-Where a judg ment creditor, knowing that his debtor was then insane, purchased the latter's land at execution sale for an inadequate consideration, which he credited on the judgment, the sale is voidable, and may be set aside on direct attack.-HOUGHTON V. RICE, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 349.

66. INSOLVENCY-Preferences.-It cannot be held, as a matter of law, that because a technically insolvent merchant or trader suffers an action to be commenced against him upon a claim against which he has no defense, by creditors who know him to be technically insolvent, and allows a judgment to be entered and docketed against him for want of answer, which judg ment becomes a lien upon real property, the debtor intended to permit the judgment creditors to obtain an unlawful preference.-BEAN V. SCHEFFER, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 855.

67. INSURANCE.-In order that a plaintiff in a suit against an insurance company may recover an attor ney's fee as part of his costs, it must appear that the judgment is based upon a policy or contract of insurance, the policy must have been written upon real property, and be a contract of indemnity against loss by fire, tornado, or lightning, and the loss must have occurred without criminal fault on the part of the insured or his assigns.-EDDY V. GERMAN INS. Co., Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 947.

68. INSURANCE-Abatement - Waiver.-By denying, in an answer, any liability for loss under an insurance policy, the insurer does not waive its right to plead in abatement that under the terms and conditions of the policy as to payment the action has been prematurely brought.-LA PLANT V. FIREMAN'S INS. CO. OF BALTIMORE, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 856.

69. INSURANCE-Credit Guaranty.-A credit guaranty policy insured against loss by the insolvency of debt. ors owing for "merchandise sold between April 1, 1893, and March 31, 1894," and provided that the policy should "expire on March 31, 1894." It further provided that final proofs of loss must be presented within 90 days after the expiration of the policy, and that no loss should be payable unless included in such proofs, except that, should the policy be renewed on expiration, losses occurring after such expiration on sales made during its existence were payable: Held, that losses occurring after the expiration of the policy on sales made during its existence were payable, though the policy was not renewed, if final proof of loss was made as required.-SLOMAN V. MERCANTILE CREDIT GUARANTEE CO. OF NEW YORK, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep.

886.

70. INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-An indictment for sell. ing vinous liquors without license was not bad because it unnecessarily alleged that the liquor was sold to be drunk, and was drunk on the premises.-COMMONWEALTH V. HELBACK, Ky., 40 S. W. Rep. 245.

71. INTOXICATING Liquor-Civil Damage Laws.-An action by a widow for damage suffered in consequence of the furnishing to her deceased husband of intoxi. cating liquors cannot be defeated by proof that such liqdors were furnished by the defendant, a licensed saloon keeper, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff.-KLIMENT V. CORCORAN, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep.

910.

72. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Illegal Sale.-A conviction for illegal sale of liquor was erroneous where defendant purchased the liquor for another person with money furnished by the latter, and was not interested in the sale, as the seller's agent or otherwise.-PHILLIPS V. STATE, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 270.

73. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Illegal Sale.-Where an indictment charged a sale of liquor to A and S, and the evidence was conflicting as to whether each paid a part of the price, or whether A paid the whole, borrowing a part of the money from 8, an instruction that, if A bought the liquor, defendant could not be convicted, was properly refused; the same being sufficiently covered by a charge to acquit unless defendant sold to A and S, as charged.-CARTER V. STATE, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 267.

74. JUDGMENT LIEN.-The lien of a judgment of the district court attaches to all the lands of the debtor within the county where the judgment was rendered, whether then owned by him or subsequently acquired. -DUELL V. POTTER, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 932.

75. JUDICIAL SALES-Enforcement.-A court of equity has power to make and enforce an order requiring a purchaser of property at a sale by its master to pay the amount of his bid into the court, but before mak ing such order the court must confirm the sale.-ALLRED V. MCGAHAGAN, Fla., 21 South. Rep. 802.

76. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Abandonment of Leased Premises.-A landlord is not, upon the abandonment of the demised premises by the tenant in violation of his contract, required to relet for the protection of the latter, but may, at his election, suffer the premises to remain vacant, and recover his rent for the remainder of the term, by means of an action on the lease.-MERRILL V. WILLIS, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 914.

77. LIFE INSURANCE-Conflict of Laws.-Language in a life insurance policy designating the beneficiary must, subject to limitations of the statute or charter as to who may be designated, be regarded as the language of the insured alone, and is to be treated as of a testamentary character, and should receive as nearly as possible the same construction as if used in a will under the same circumstances. Therefore, under a policy, issued in Ohio, payable to the heirs of the insured, who was domiciled in New York, and all the possible objects of whose bounty lived there, the court must determine by the law of New York who are his heirs.-KNIGHTS TEMPLARS & MASONIC MUT. AID. ASSN. V. GREENE, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 79 Fed. Rep. 461. 79. LIMITATIONS-Partial Payments.-In order to prevent the running of the statute of limitations, a partial payment must have been made by the debtor himself, or for him by his authority, or subsequently ratified, if made in his name, without his authority.PFENNINGER V. KOKESCH, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 867.

79. LIMITATIONS-Payment of Interest.-Note in suit is sufficiently identified as that on which payment of interest was made within six years, so as to prevent bar of the statute, though plaintiff held two notes of defendant, and the receipt for the payment recited merely that it was "on account of interest on note," plaintiff's evidence that payment of that date was for interest on note in suit being uncontradicted.-WRIGHT V. JORDAN, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 196.

80. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreign Receivers.-A receiver appointed and residing in another State cannot sue in Texas; and hence, where a suit was brought by such a receiver in Texas, solely by virtue of the foreign appointment, and the insolvent filed an amended complaint on the cessation of the receiver. ship, limitations ran against the cause of action until

82. MANDAMUS Executive Officers.-The governor can maintain mandamus against the State auditor to compel the performance of ministerial duties prescribed by statute, both under the general law and by virtue of Code, § 3320, subsecs. 1, 2, requiring the governor to supervise all executive officers, and see that their duties are performed, "or in default thereof apply such remedies as the law allows."-RUSSELL V. AYER, N. Car., 27 8. E. Rep. 133.

83. MANDAMUS Parties.-When mandamus proceed ings are instituted to redress a private wrong or en force a private right, the party beneficially interested should be named as relator.-VAN HORN V. STATE, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 941.

84. MECHANICS' LIENS-Scope of Employment.-Manual labor in the reconstruction of an hotel building is not within the scope of an employment of one to act as clerk and book-keeper, and to "make himself gener ally useful," during such reconstruction, and hence does not entitle the employee to a laborer's lien.-NASH V. SOUTHWICK, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 127.

85. MORTGAGES

Payment Subrogation.-A mort gagor's father paid off a balance on the mortgage, and took an assignment. The mortgagor procured a new loan from A, whose agent, B, had been assured by the mortgagor's father that the old mortgage had been paid. When the A mortgage matured, it was paid with money borrowed from another lender, also rep. resented by B, who found no incumbrances subsequent to the A mortgage, and the A mortgage was released: Held that, since the last mortgagee had advanced money to pay off the A mortgage, believing that she was to receive a valid first lien on the property, she was entitled to be subrogated to A's rights under the released mortgage, as against which the father, as assignee, was estopped from setting up the old mort gage.-PALMER V. SHARP, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep. 903. 86. MORTGAGE Signature of Wife.-A purchase. money mortgage executed by a husband is valid without the signature of the wife.-STANLEY V. JOHNSON, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 823.

87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-False Imprisonment. -A city is not liable for the trespass committed by its officers in enforcing a void judgment for a fine where the charge was an offense against the general law of the State.-Fox v. CITY OF RICHMOND, Ky., 40 S. W. Rep. 251.

88. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Ordinances.-An ordinance of a city authorizing the council thereof, by resolution, to require the construction of sidewalks in front of and adjacent to any premises situated upon any street, and which provides for notice to property owners by the publication of such resolution, is not directory merely, but mandatory; and a strict compli ance therewith is essential in order to confer upon the city authority to charge private property with the cost of such improvements.-IVES V. CITY OF OMAHA, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 961.

89. MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS - Change of GradeDamages In the absence of any express statutory or constitutional authority, an action will not lie in this State against a municipal corporation for conse quential injuries to property caused by a change of the legally established grade, where such grading is done in a proper manner: Held, however, that Sp. Laws 1985, ch. 5. is applicable to property situate in the city of Minneapolis, and authorizes the assessment of damages in such case in the manner therein pro vided.-ABEL v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 851.

90. PARTNERSHIP - Fraudulent Conveyance.-A defendant was a member of three successive firms, the first two of which had sold out to the third; and his codefendant was a member of the third firm only, and had no interest in the other firms. Loans had been made to the first two firms and to the first mentioned defendant individually, for which notes of the third firm had been given by him without the knowledge or consent of his codefendant, and without any new consideration for the assumption by such firm of the debts of the other firms: Held, that a transfer by the third firm, while insolvent, of its assets, to satisfy such loans was fraudulent as to its creditors.-MUSKEGON VALLEY FURNITURE Co. v. PHILLIPS, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 822.

91. PARTNERSHIP Receivers Appointment.-Receivers for a partnership should not be appointed on application by members thereof, except on a showing that the parties cannot or will not arrange matters in controversy themselves, that there is some abuse of partnership rights and property, and some fraud or mismanagement or violation of partnership duties by the partner against whom relief is asked.-WEBB V. ALLEN, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 342.

92. PARTNERSHIP-Retiring Partner.-Where no pub lle notice was given of the dissolution of a partnership, the retiring partner was liable for a debt arising from a transaction immediately after the dissolution, between the other partner and one who knew they had been doing business as partners, and believed they were partners at the time, and that he was extending credit to the partnership.-ALEXANDER V. HARKINS, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 120.

93. PARTNERSHIP-What Constitutes.-Defendant authorized plaintiff to solicit loans for him, the commissions being divided between them, and a second mortgage to defendant being taken to secure such commis. sions. Each application for a loan, when accepted by defendant, was returned with a separate letter of instructions, and the sum necessary to make the loan; and when it was made all papers were sent to defendant. The parties lived in different States, had no part. nership name, and each carried on other business: Held that, as between themselves, there was no partnership.-GRIGSBY V. DAY, S. Dak., 70 N. W. Rep. 881. 94. PAYMENT Release of Sureties.-Where an agent authorized to collect a judgment accepts a check in payment, knowing that there is money in the bank to pay it, and notifies his principal, who is the real party in interest, though another is the nominal creditor, and, before presenting the check, by collusion permits the deposit to be exhausted by a check previously given to the principal for another debt, but dishon ored for lack of funds, the judgment will be considered paid, so that it may not be enforced against sureties for the debt for which it was obtained.-KALLANDER V. NEIDHOLD, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep. 892.

95. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - - Authority.-Ostensible authority to act as agent may be conferred if the party to be charged as principal, affirmatively or inten. tionally, or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows third persons to trust an act upon such apparent agency.-PHOENIX INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, Conn. v. WALTER, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 938.

Powers

96. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Special Agent Liability of Principal.-Commission merchants who specially authorized one not their agent to buy cotton at a certain place, of a designated person, were not liable for cotton of equal value and quality purchased by him from other persons in a different locality.ROBINSON MERCANTILE Co. v. THOMPSON, Miss., 21 South. Rep. 794.

97. RAILROAD COMPANY Express Messenger-Con. tract Exempting from Liability.-A contract whereby a passenger on a railroad train agrees not to hold the railroad company liable for injury to him caused by the negligence of the company or its servants is void, as against public policy, and this rule applies to an ex. press messenger carried by a railroad company in a

special car, under a contract with the express com. pany. VOIGHT V. BALTIMORE, ETC. RY. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 79 Fed. Rep. 561.

98. RAILROAD COMPANY-Injury to Stock. -A railroad company is negligent in running its trains in the night time at such rapid speed that it is impossible, by ordinary means and appliances, to stop the train, and prevent injury to stock on the track, within the distance in which the stock could be seen by the aid of the headlight.-LOUISVILLE, ETC. Co. v. KELTON, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 819.

99. RAILROAD COMPANY - Negligence at Street Crossing. The rights and duties of railroad companies and of travelers on highways crossing their tracks are mutual and reciprocal, and no greater degree of care is required of the one than of the other; the care to be exercised by each being such as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise under similar circumstances.TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. CODY, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 703.

100. RAILROAD COMPANY -Street Railroads Negli. gence.-Plaintiff, in crossing a street traversed by street cars on double tracks, did not look for cars after starting to cross, and went on the second track six or seven feet in front of a slowly moving car, which it was impossible for the motorman to stop in time to avoid an accident, and which plaintiff would have seen had he looked: Held, that he could not recover for injuries caused by being struck by such car.-NUGENT V. PHILADELPHIA TRACTION Co., Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 206.

Preferential

101. RAILROAD MORTGAGES-Receivers Claims. A claim for damages for death by the negligence of a railroad company occurring before the ap. pointment of a receiver, is not a preferential claim, which is entitled to be paid out of the income or the corpus of the mortgaged property, to the exclusion of the mortgage debt.-VEATCH V. AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 79 Fed. Rep. 471.

102. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.-A federal corporation sued in a State court may have the cause removed to a federal court upon the ground that it was created by act of congress, though that fact does not appear from the complaint.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. BARRETT, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 707.

103. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Admission of Territory as State. The right to remove into the federal courts causes which were pending in the territorial courts of Utah at the time of its admission into the Union did not depend on the judiciary act of March 3, 1887, but rested entirely on the provisions of the enabling act, and of the State constitution adopted pursuant thereto, for the special purpose of removing into the federal courts causes pending in the territorial courts, when such courts should cease to exist. And while the constitution of Utah provides that causes of which the United States courts would not have had exclusive jurisdiction shall be removed only upon petition or motion made under and in accordance with the act or acts of congress of the United States, this does not mean that the application for removal must be made before pleading by the defendant, or at any specified time before trial.-McCORNICK V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 79 Fed. Rep. 449.

104. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Appearance.-The filing, by defendant, of a petition to remove the cause into a federal court, disclaiming any intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the State court, is not an appear. ance in the action waiving defects in the service or return of summons.-HAWKINS V. PEIRCE, U. S. C. C., D. (Ind.), 79 Fed. Rep. 452.

106. SALES Rescission.-Assuming that a contract for the sale of machinery authorized the buyers to rescind if they were in fact dissatisfied with the machinery after a fair trial, although there was no reasonable ground for such dissatisfaction, the fact that they used the machinery for 3 1-2 years after they claimed to have notified the seller of their election to rescind, and then sold it, and appropriated the proceeds to their own use, constituted an abandonment of their right of rescission, and remitted them to their right to damages for alleged breach of the warranties. It is immaterial that the sale took place after the seller instituted his suit for the contract price, as he had the right to show, as an answer to the plea of rescission, that by a course of conduct which began before the suit was filled, and continued thereafter, the defendants had manifested an intention to abandon their alleged right of rescission.-BUCKSTAFF v. RUSSELL & Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 79 Fed. Rep. 611.

Consideration.

107. SALE BY HUSBAND TO WIFE The signing by a wife of a mortgage upon the home. stead of herself and husband, the legal title to which is in him, to raise money with which to pay his debt, is such a valuable consideration, if otherwise suffi. cient, as will support a sale of personal property of the husband to the wife.-SLOAN V. VAN BUSKIRK, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 948.

108. SLANDER OF TITLE.-Plaintiff in an action for slander of title must show the falsity of the words published, the malicious intent with which they were uttered, and pecuniary loss.-CARDON V. MCCONNELL, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 109.

109. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Parol Contract. - Specific performance of a parol agreement by an heir relinquishing his share in realty in consideration of the release of his indebtedness to the estate and other indebtedness to his co-heirs will be enforced as against his descendants, where, in reliance on the agreement, and with his acquiescence until his death, 25 years later, the other heirs entered and improved the realty, and one of them bought and improved the shares of the others.-MOONEY V. ROWLAND, Ark., 40 S. W. Rep. 259.

110. STATUTE-Amendment-Constitutional Law.-An act of the legislature which is clearly amendatory of an existing statute is unconstitutional when such amendatory act in no way mentions or describes that of which it is amendatory. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF AURORA V. MOSES, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 946.

111. STATUTES-Retroactive Operation - Attachment. -The Colorado act of 1887 amending the statute relative to attachments by dropping out one of the grounds of attachment, does not have a retroactive operation, so as to affect pending attachments.-NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE V. RIETHMANN, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 79 Fed. Rep. 582.

112. SUBROGATION.-The right of subrogation must in every case rest upon some recognized subject of equi table cognizance.-CHICAGO LUMBER CO. V. ANDERSON, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 919.

113. TRUST Resulting Trusts. Where a husband buys land in his own name with his separate means, or with community property, his mere intention, at the time of payment, to hold the land for his wife's benefit, does not create a resulting trust in her favor.JOHNSON V. FIRST NAT. BANK OF SULPHER SPRINGS, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 334.

114. TRUST-Resulting Trusts-Principal and Agent.Where one agrees to loan money to the devisee of a mortgagor, and with it to bid in the land for the dev. isee at foreclosure sale, and take title in his own name as security for the loan, and pursuant thereto bids in the land in his own name, a trust results in favor of the devisee. - HEBRON V. KELLY, Miss., 21 South. Rep. 799.

115. USURY-Commission to Third Person.-A loan of money made in consideration of the maximum legal

rate of interest and one-half of the commissions charged by a third person for negotiating the loan, is usurious; and, under such circumstances, it is imma terial whether the third person is the agent of the lender, or of the borrower, or of both. - POTTLE V. LOWE, Ga., 27 S. E. Rep. 145.

--

116. USURY Recovery of Penalty. In an action against a national bank to recover the penalty for tak ing usury, it appeared that the transactions between the plaintiff and the bank consisted of a large number of loans evidenced by notes, many of which had been from time to time renewed: Held, that evidence of the whole course of transactions was material in order to trace the different debts and the interest reserved on each, although some transactions were not pleaded as usurious.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF TOBIAS V. BARNETT, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 937.

117. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-- Contract. When the terms of a written contract are in any respect doubt. ful or uncertain, or if the contract contains no provisions on a given point, or if it fails to define with certainty the duties of the parties with respect to a particular matter or in a given emergency, and the parties to it have by their conduct placed a construction upon it which is reasonable, such construction will be adopted by the court, upon the principle that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract. - SHOUSE V. DOANE, Fla., 21 South. Rep. 807. 118. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Contract.-Complainant wrote its agent that it would sell defendants "surface rights" of a certain 40 acres of land on certain terms of payment. The agent wrote defendants that we will sell you surface rights" on different terms of payment, and that on receipt of the cash payment complainant would make a contract accordingly. Defendants accepted the offer, and remitted $1,000. Complainant then sent defendants a contract, which provided that the former should have the right to enter on the land to explore for ores and carry on the business of min. ing; and, for such purpose, to take so much of the land, and for such time, as it should deem expedient, paying defendants damages therefor: Held that, giv ing to the term "surface rights" the meaning in which it was used in the offer to sell, the contract tendered was not in accordance therewith. KEWEENAW ASSN. V. FRIEDRICHS, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep. 896.

121. WILLS

Effect of Renunciation.-Renunciation by widow, and election to take against the will, is equivalent to her death for purpose of distribution to testator's children, under will giving estate in trust for support of wife and children, and during her life, and after her death to their support, in the discretion of the trustees, till they are of age or marry, and, when all the children arrive at age or marry, to divide the estate among the children, and, in the event of no child or issue thereof, then to divide the estate among testator's brothers and sisters.-RANDALL V. RANDALL, Md., 37 Atl. Rep. 209.

122. WITNESSES- Husband and Wife. - Under Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 775, forbidding husband and wife to testify against each other "except in a criminal prosecution for an offense committed by one against the other," a wife is not a competent witness against her husband on his trial for an abortion committed on her prior to their marriage. MILLER V. STATE, Tex.,

40 S. W. Rep. 313.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE 18, 1897.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has put itself upon record as in harmony with the general drift of authorities on the subject of the right to maintain an action against a party for inducing a third person to break a contract, the court holding that such action is not maintainable. Glencoe Sand Co. v. Hudson Bros., 40 S. W. Rep. 93. The court in its opinion called attention to the cases on this subject, and showed that the limit of the rule was as to actions by the master against a third party for enticing away a servant or inducing him to leave his master's employment. Beyond this, as all the recent cases show, the rule does not go, and has no application to ordinary contracts.

The right of free speech in public parks of a city has been passed upon recently by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Davis v. Commonwealth, 17 S. C. Rep. 731, wherein it was held that a city ordinance providing that no person shall nake any public address in any of the public grounds of the city "except in accordance with a permit from the mayor," does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. It was argued by those asserting the invalidity of the act that there was a right in the people to use what is known as the Boston Commons for purposes of addresses free from legislative or municipal control or regulation. This, the court, shows, is not well taken.

It was

held that there was nothing to show that the power of the legislature over the Boston Commons is less than its power over any other park dedicated to the use of the public, or over public streets, the legal title to which is in the city or town. Therefore, as representative of the public, the legislature may, and does exercise control over the use which the public may make of such places, and it may, and does delegate more or less of such control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park, says the court, is no more an infringement of the rights of a mem

ber of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication for public uses. It was therefore conclusively determined that there was no right in an individual to use the commons except in such mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature in its wisdom may have deemed proper to prescribe. The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which was here invoked does not destroy the power of the States to enact police regulations as to the subjects within their control and does not have the effect of creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to use public property in defiance of the constitution and laws of the State.

The South Carolina liquor dispensary law has received another blow in the recent decision by Judge Simonton of the United States Circuit Court at Charleston, in the case of the Vandercock Co. v. The State. The court in that case rendered a decree restraining the State from preventing the sale of liquors brought therein. The opinion of the court in substance was that while any State may, in the exercise of its police power, declare that the manufacture, sale, barter and exchange or use as a beverage of intoxicating liquors are public evils, and having thus declared can forbid such manufacture, sale, barter and exchange or use within its territory, yet, however, where the State recognizes and approves the manufacture, sale, barter and exchange as a beverage of intoxicating liquors, and the State itself encourages its manufacture and engages in the sale of and provides for the consumption of liquors as a beverage, and so precludes the idea that such manufacture, sale, barter, exchange or use is injurious to the public welfare, it is not a lawful exercise of the polive power to forbid the importation of such liquors or their sale in the original packages for personal use. and consumption. Such prohibition, under such circumstances, the court said, is in conflict with the law regulating interstate and foreign commerce, and inasmuch as the disspensary act of 1896, as amended by the act of 1897, approves the purchase and manu