jurisdiction in any particular case, attaches in the first set of magistrates duly authorized, who have possession and cognizance of the facts, to the exclusion of the separate jurisdiction of all others. So that the acts of any other, except in conjunction with the first, are not only void, but such a breach of the law as subjects them to indictment (t). It would appear, however, that magistrates have jurisdiction to entertain a case in another petty sessions court in the same county, if the first set of justices have been equally divided in opinion upon the case (u). Former decision.] It is the rule of law that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties upon the same matter, directly in question in another court (v); when, therefore, a servant who had been discharged by her master before the proper time, sued him in the county court for wrongfully discharging her without reasonable cause, whereupon judgment was given for the defendant, and she afterwards at the expiration of her quarter took out a summons before justices to recover her quarter's wages, the same question arising, the Court of Q.B. held that the decision of the county court was a bar to such a proceeding; and the justices at petty sessions had no jurisdiction to reopen the question and try it a second time (w). Limitation of authority as to time.] The magistrate's jurisdiction is also limited in point of time. The extent of that limit is to be ascertained by referring to the statutes themselves which direct the proceedings in each case, and when in cases of summary jurisdiction no time is specially limited, the information is to be laid within six calendar months from the time when the cause of complaint shall have arisen, but not otherwise (x). Where the offence complained of is a continuing (t) R. v. Sainsbury, 4 T. R. 456; R. v. Gt. Marlow, 2 East, 244; Paley on Conv. 40. (u) R. v. Ellis, 2 D. N. S. 361. It has been held, in construing acts which mention Justices in or near the place where the offence was committed, that notwithstanding that description, any J. P. of the county may take cognizance of the matter, and the same construction has been put upon the words, Justices of the Division -Paley, Conv. 32. (v) Duchess of Kingston's case, 2 Smith's L. C. 424. (w) Routledge v. Hislop, 29 L. J. M. C. 90. (x) 14 & 15 Vic., c. 93, s. 10. offence under a particular statute which does not limit the time for proceeding against the offender, the period for making the complaint is not limited to the date of the original cause of complaint, or the day that the right first accrued to institute proceedings, but the information may be laid at any time within six calendar months, as long as the cause of complaint continued to exist by reason of the continued offence; for every distinct offence creates a new penalty. If the offence be an assault committed on a particular day, there the offence being single, the period to institute proceedings dates from that day; if, on the other hand, the offence be the departing of an apprentice from his master's service without his consent, then, every day that the apprentice so absents himself, he commits a distinct offence, and the proceedings may be instituted against him for so departing on any day that is within six calendar months before the making of the complaint. The period is fixed by different statutes, either with reference to the time of commencing the prosecution, or to the time of conviction; and the following rules apply according as these different terms are made use of. Where the proviso, as to the time, runs, "that the offence be prosecuted," or that "the party be prosecuted for the offence within a stated time," it is sufficient that the information be laid, though the conviction do not take place within that time (y): the information being for that purpose the commencement of the prosecution. But if a statute authorizes a conviction, "provided such conviction be made within months after the offence committed," it is not enough that the information was within that period, but the conviction itself is void if not made within the limited time. And it makes no difference that it was prevented from being so by an adjournment at the request of the defendant himself; for, after the time has expired for making the conviction, there is no authority existing for that purpose (2). Computation of time.] As a general rule, where the proceedings in respect to any act done are to be instituted within a limited period from the commission of such act, the time is computed exclusive of the day of the institution of the proceed(y) R. v. Barrett, 1 Salk. 383. (2) R. v. Tolley, 3 East, 467. ings (a). If a year be mentioned or an aliquot part or it, the computation is by calendar months; and by the 13th and 14th Vic. c. 21, s. 4, it is enacted, as regards months, that the word "month" shall mean calendar month, unless words be added showing a lunar month is intended. When an act is to be done within a certain number of days from "the date" or the "day of the date" of an instrument, &c. the day on which the instrument is executed, order made, or the like, is excluded from the computation (b). If the act is to be done so many "days at least," or so many "clear days," such days are to be exclusive of both the first and last days (c). The words "immediate” and "forthwith" occurring in a statute are not construed in their strictest sense "on the instant," but mean with reasonable promptness, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case (d). Under an act which allowed the party "aggrieved by the judgment" of the justice to appeal to the next quarter sessions, it was contended that the party was not aggrieved by the judgment until the execution; but the court held that he must appeal to the sessions next after the conviction, and not to those after the execution upon it (e). Compromise of offences.] There is very little authority to be found on this branch of the law, but it may be stated, that it is the policy of the common law not to allow the compromise of offences which are of a public nature (f). In a recent case upon this subject, it was held by the (a) Williams v. Burgess, 12 A. & E. 635. (b) Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49-52. (c) Zouch v. Empsey, 4 B. & Ald. 522; R. v. Js. of Middlesex, 14 L. J. 139, M. C.; Mitchell v. Foster, 12 A. & E. 472; see R. v. Js. of Shropshire, 8 id. 173. (d) R. v. Aston, 1 L. M. & P. 491, 19 L. J. M. C. 236 ; Arnold v. Dimsdale, 2 El. & Bl. 601; and see cases collected, Paley on Conv. 45. See the interpretation put upon the words "as soon as possible" in Altwood v. Emery, 26 L. J. 73, C. P. When a Court of Q.B. and affirmed by thing is to be done "directly," it means "as soon as possible," Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225. See Coster v. Hetherington, 28 L. J. M. C. 196, for the legal definition of the word "forthwith." Lord Campbell says it may have a different meaning according as the act to be done is ministerial or judicial. (e) Prosser v. Hyde, 1 T. R. 414. See where a thing is to be done so many days after the "cause of complaint," or "fact committed," Collins v. Rose, 5 M. & W. 194. (f) See Edgecombe v. Rodd, 5 East, 294. the Court of Exchequer Chamber (g), that an agreement not to prosecute further a pending indictment for riot and assault upon a constable in the execution of his duty, was illegal. C. J. Tindal, in giving judgment in Kier v. Leeman (h), says, "Indeed it is very remarkable what very little authority there is to be found, rather consisting of dicta than decisions, for the principle that any compromise of a misdemeanour, or indeed of any public offence, cannot be otherwise than illegal, and any promise founded on such a consideration, otherwise than void. If the matter were res integra, we should have no doubt on this point. We have no doubt that, in all offences which involve damages to an injured party, for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit. It is said, indeed, that in the case of an assault he may also undertake not to prosecute on behalf of the public. It may be so, but we are not disposed to extend this any further. In the case before us, the offence is an assault coupled with riot and the obstruction of a public officer. No case has said that it is lawful to compromise such an offence, nor do we think that the assent of the judge was material." Commissioners of excise are expressly authorized by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 53, s. 98, to compromise offences against the excise. CHAPTER V. OF ARREST. Ir is proposed in the first branch of this work to consider the jurisdiction of magistrates in indictable offences, the means by which accused persons are made amenable to justice, and how criminal charges of a serious character should be investigated, reserving as far as possible for another place the consideration of (g) Kier v. Leeman, 6 Q. B. 308; S. C. in error, 9 Q. B. 371; see also Goodall . Lowndes, 6 Q. B. 464; Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W. 361; aud notes to Collins v. Blantern, 1 those proceedings that are peculiarly applicable to cases of summary jurisdiction. Offenders against the law are made amenable to justice either by arrest or by process, which is issued to compel their attendance before the proper tribunal. Appearance by summons.] Upon a criminal charge being made, if the magistrate considers the ends of justice will be sufficiently attained, he may issue a summons (a), in the first instance requiring the attendance of the person charged; and the information or complaint upon which this summons is issued may be made either with or without oath, as the justice shall see fit (b), the rule of the law being that unless a statute require it, an information need not be on oath or in writing (c); and a magistrate may proceed without an information on oath if he has jurisdiction over the matter, and has good reason for setting the law in motion (d). But whenever it is intended that a warrant shall issue for the arrest or committal of any person, the information or complaint must be in writing, and upon the oath of the complainant or of some one upon his behalf (e). Form of summons.] The summons is to be directed to the accused, and requires him to appear and answer the complaint; it must be signed by the justice and not issued in blank (ƒ). It is the common practice in this country for the constable to bring the justice a summons nearly filled, and request his signature to the process. There is no objection in point of law to this proceeding. However, should the summons disclose an indictable charge of a serious complexion, it would be advisable for obvious reasons that the justice should send for the complainant, and investigate the charge before issuing the summons. For then he may examine the informant and any other person upon oath, and judge for himself upon the facts deposed to, whether there are grounds for charging any one with the commission of an offence. If such a proceeding should occupy a little more of the justice's time, and make his duties more arduous, yet it will in many cases prevent any further proceed (a) For form, see schedule B, 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93. (b) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, ss. 10, 11. (c) R. v. Millard, 1 D. C. C. 166; 6 Cox, C. C. 150. (e) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 10. |