justified in refusing to issue a warrant of distress for a rate, when he entertains any reasonable doubt as to its validity (n). Affidavits.] The court will not grant a mandamus to compel justices to produce informations, when the affidavit to ground the application neither states the object or the purpose for which the prosecutor seeks the writ (o). Although the court will, by mandamus, direct justices to hear a complaint, they will not thereby compel them to adjudicate in any particular manner, as convicting a party of an offence (p). On every motion to the court for a mandamus, the affidavits must be entitled, "In the Queen's Bench," only without any cause. It is necessary to shew clearly by the affidavits in support of the rule, that the party against whom the motion is to be made, ought, either by the common law of the land or by force of some statute, to do the act required to be done, that he has been required to do such act, and has refused; for the obligation to do the act, the demand of him to do it, and the refusal to do it, are the gist and the foundation of the motion; the affidavits must make out a complete case, and shew a title to the writ (9). Time for application.] A party applying for a mandamus should come in within a reasonable time after the injury complained of (r). Service of writ.] The service need not be personal (s). The (n) R. v. Js. of Middlesex, 2 Ad. & E. 606; R. v. Stafford Js., 5 N. & M. 94; S. C. Nom. R. v. Hughes, 3 Ad. & E. 425; R. v. Mirehouse, 2 Ad. & E. 632; R. v. Greame, id. 615; R. v. Halls, 3 Ad. & E. 494; 4 Nev. & M. 549; see R. v. Barker, 6 Ad, & E. 388. It is no objection to a rule for a mandamus to justices, to issue their warrant of distress for the levy of poor rates, that it includes two separate and distinct rates, R. v. Ellis, 2 D. N. S. 361. It is the constant practice to call upon magistrates by mandamus to grant a distress warrant for levying a poor rate, R. v. Cheek, 11 Jur. (Eng.) 86, n. Q. B. (0) Lawless v. Commissioners of Police, 13 Ir. L. R. 367. (p) R. v. Middlesex Js. 5 B. & Ad. 298. (9) Corners C. P. 220; see also as to sufficiency of affidavits, R. v. Deverell, 3 EL & Bl. 372; Stokes v. Grisell, 14 C. B. 678; Lawless v. Com. of Police, 13 Ir. L. R. It is the established practice that if a rule nisi for a mandamus be discharged on account of a defect in the affidavits, the writ will not be afterwards granted on amended affidavits, unless the defect be merely in the title or jurat, R. v. Gt. Wst. R. C. 13 L. J. Q. B. 129. (r) See R. v. Fishbourne, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 6; see Corner's C. P. tit. Mandamus. (8) Corner's C. P. 224. court will not set aside service of a copy of a writ of mandamus on the ground that the original writ was not served, nor shewn to the party on whom the copy was served (†). On serving the writ the practice is to have copies served on the several parties named in the writ, the original being given to any one of the parties; and as the petty sessions clerk is the officer of the justices, it is usual to have him likewise served with a copy of the writ. Shewing cause.] Cause may sometimes be shewn by an interested party, though not named in the rule to shew cause; the practice in the crown office being to take affidavits relating to the matter, although the party who so files the affidavit be not named in the rule. Stamps.] No stamps are necessary at the crown side of the Court of Queen's Bench on any affidavit. When cause not shewn.] Unless cause be shewn within ten days, or within such further time as the party may have got liberty to shew cause, the conditional order is made absolute by the party having the carriage of the order filing an affidavit of the service thereof in the Crown Office; upon which the officer issues a certificate of no cause. The party having the carriage of the order applies to the court by counsel on the day the certificate bears date, to have the order made absolute; then a peremptory writ issues, which must be personally served upon one of the parties named in the writ. Nature of rule.] Upon application by motion for any writ of mandamus in the court of Queen's Bench, the rule may be absolute in the first instance, if the court should think fit; and the writ will bear teste on the day the order is pronounced, and is generally returnable in ten days, on a day certain in term; but time may be allowed to return it, by the court or a judge, either with or without terms. The court, on making the rule absolute, may mould the conditional order according to the exigency of the case, and frame the rule accordingly (u). Although there are more than two magistrates at petty sessions, all of (t) R. v. Birmingham, &c., R. C. 1, El. & Bl. 293. (u) R. v. Nottingham Old Waterworks Co. 6 Ad. & El. 355. Poor Law Commissioners v. Guardians of whom take part in a decision, it is not necessary that, upon an application for a mandamus, all who were present and took part in the decision should be included in the rule; but that, if the court saw that any two had been selected, or that any of the justices so acting had been omitted for any improper purpose, all would be required to be joined (v). It is at the peril of a person who desires a writ of mandamus to direct it to the proper party; the court will not specify in particular the proper party to whom it should be directed; nor is it the practice of the court to grant cross or concurrent writs without special reasons (w). Costs.] The court is empowered, since the passing of the 6 & 7 Vic. c. 67, to award costs in a mandamus case (x). If the rule is discharged, it is nearly always discharged with costs, unless a very strong case be made out by the party obtaining the rule (y). The return.] The court will not direct in what manner justices shall make their return to a mandamus; but, if the return made to it be insufficient to raise the question intended to be agitated, the court will, at the instance of the party interested, make a rule giving the justices liberty to amend in the manner required, if they wish so to do (z), or set aside the return (a). If the justice make no return, or fail in his respect and obedience, he is punishable for his contempt by attachment (b). In R. v. Justices of Lancashire (c) it was made a question, but not decided, whether a criminal information will lie against justices for making a false return to a mandamus, unless the return is corruptly and wilfully false. This leads to the consideration of those acts which (v) R. v. Ellis, 2 D. N. S. 361; see R. v. Wiltshire Js., 8 D. P. C. 717. (w) R. v. Corporation of Wigan, 2 Burr. 782. (x) R. v. Guardians of Tuam Union, 9 Ir. L. R. 321; see 1 Wm. IV., c. 21, s. 6. (3) See R. v. Mayor of Newbery, 1 Ad, & El. N. S. 751; R. v. Eastern Counties Railway, 2 id. 578 Arch's Crown Prac. 286; R. v. Js. of Surrey, 9 Q. B. 37; id. 14, id. 684; R. v. South Eastern R. C., 3 H. L. Cas. 471, and cases collected in note to Chitty's Statutes, tit. Mandamus 195. (z) R. v. Marriott, 1 D. & R. 166, (a) In the case of Kildare Co. v. Southern R. C. Q. B. Trin. T. 1849, on motion that certain portions of the return filed by the defendants to the writ of mandamus by quashed, the court ordered that the time be enlarged to first day of Mich. Term, to file a return. (b) Burns J., tit. Mandamus, 50. (c) 1 D. & R. 485 n; see case of the Surgeons' Co., 1 Salk. 374; 2 Hawk. c. 26. s. 1. may render a justice liable to be punished criminally, either by information or indictment. Criminal information.] The Court of Queen's Bench will grant an information against a J. P. as well for refusing or criminally neglecting to act on any given occasion, as for misconducting himself in his office (d); and the party grieved may also apply to put him out of his commission. When a magistrate acts in his office with a partial, malicious, or corrupt motive, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be proceeded against by indictment or criminal information in the Queen's Bench, which exercises a general supervision over all magistrates. It is most usual to proceed by criminal information in preference to an indictment; but sometimes where there has been delay in the application, or a jury may be more fit to apply to than the court, then an indictment should be the form of remedy (e). Justices will never be punished criminally for a mere error in judgment, nor in any case, unless it appears they have acted from an oppressive, dishonest, or corrupt motive, under which fear or favour is included (ƒ). Misconduct in his office may render a magistrate amenable to a criminal information, though he be not actuated by motions of pecuniary interest or personal malice, as if he gives way to passion so as clearly to interfere with the due administration of justice; but a mere display of ill-humour, or an error of judgment, will not induce the court to interfere (g). In a recent case in England, tried before Coleridge, J. on an ex officio information, a magistrate of the county of Durham was tried for corruptly extorting, by virtue of his office, the sum of one pound from each of two persons brought before him. It appears that two persons having been taken into custody by the police, for trespassing in pursuit of game upon the magistrate's (d) 3 Burn. 1017. (e) 3 Burn. 1017. (f) In re Fentiman, 4 Nev. & Man. 126; R. v. Young, 1 Burr. 556; R. v. Borron, 3 B. & Ad. 432; R. v. Cox, 2 Burr. 785; R. v. Palmer, ib. 1162; R. v. Jackson, 1 T. R. 653; on the other hand see when it will be granted, R. v. Bad ger, 4 Q. B. 468; R. v. Holland, 1 T. R. 692; R. v. Athay, 2 Burr. 653; R. v. Williams, 3 Burr. 1317; R. v. Newton, 1 Stra. 413; R. v. Brooke, 2 T. R. 190; as to Practice in applying for a criminal information against a J. P., see 3 Burn. 1021. (g) R. v. Barton, 4 Cox; C.C. 353. land, were taken before him, when he threatened that, unless they each gave him one pound, he would send them to gaol that evening, and they would be fined on the next day two pounds each. Being thus threatened, they paid the amount demanded, ten shillings of which he gave to the policeman, and kept the remainder, and thereupon discharged the men. He was found guilty, and sentenced to be imprisoned one year, to pay a fine to the Queen of £200, and to be kept in prison until the fine was paid. Not liable civilly and criminally.] Justices are not liable to be punished both ways, that is, both criminally and civilly; and before the court will grant an information, they will require the party to relinquish his civil action, if any such is commenced. And even in the case of an indictment, and though the indictment be actually found, yet the Attorney-General (on application made to him) will grant a nolle prosequi upon such indictment, if it appear to him that the prosecutor is determined on a civil action at the same time (h). CHAPTER III. LOCAL LIMITS OF JURISDICTION. WHEN magistrates are appointed by commission, their jurisdiction is limited to the counties for which they are in commission; and when appointed for particular purposes, as stipendiary magistrates, the local extent of their jurisdiction is restricted to some defined district. These restrictions most usually require that the circumstances which occasion the exercise of the magistrate's authority should have arisen within the district of his jurisdiction (a). The authority of a magistrate is in no case attached to the person, so as to be capable of being exerted else (h) R. v. Fielding, 2 Burr. 719. (a) It has been held that a wrongful act done by a person, the beginning of which was within the local jurisdiction of the justices, is enough to give them jurisdiction, although the act may not have been completed within their jurisdiction. Ashersmith v. Drury, 28 L. J. M. C. 5. |